Yes In My Back Yard v. City of Culver City

Filed 10/27/23
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

YES IN MY BACK YARD et al., B321477 consolidated with B325606
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiffs and Super. Ct. No. 20STCV43253)
Respondents,

v.

CITY OF CULVER CITY et al.,

Defendants and
Appellants.

APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Mary H. Strobel, Judge. Affirmed.
Aleshire & Wynder, June S. Ailin and Pam K. Lee for
Defendants and Appellants.
Patterson & O’Neill, Ryan J. Patterson and Brian O’Neill
for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

__________________________
 The Housing Crisis Act of 2019 (the Act), codified at
Government Code section 66300 et seq., 1 is among the measures
that the California Legislature has adopted to address the state’s
housing shortage. Subdivision (b)(1)(A) of section 66300 prohibits
affected cities from (1) enacting any policy that changes the
zoning of parcels to “a less intensive use” or (2) “reducing the
intensity of land use” within a zoning district to below what was
allowed under zoning ordinances in effect on January 1, 2018. In
July 2020, defendants City of Culver City and the City Council of
the City of Culver City (City Council) (collectively, the City)
adopted Ordinance No. 2020-010 (the Ordinance), which
amended the City’s zoning code, changing development standards
in its single-family residential, or R-1, zone. Among other
changes, the Ordinance reduced the allowable floor area ratio
(FAR) for primary residences from .60 to .45, decreasing the
square footage of a house that could be built on a lot. Plaintiffs
Yes In My Back Yard and Sonja Trauss (Trauss) (collectively,
YIMBY) filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking an order
declaring the Ordinance void. Following a hearing on the
petition, the trial court determined the Ordinance violated
section 66300 because the FAR reduction impermissibly reduced
the intensity of land use. We affirm the judgment.
Additionally, the City appeals from a post-judgment order
awarding YIMBY attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 1021.5. The City contends that even if the
judgment is affirmed, the fee award was not warranted because it
is questionable whether the judgment benefits a significant
segment of the public. Further, the City asserts the court

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Government
Code.

2
considered improper factors in applying a multiplier to the
lodestar amount. We disagree and affirm the fee award.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The City’s Study on Residential Development
Standards
In July 2017, the City retained John Kaliski Architects
(JKA) to study how to address community concerns regarding
“mansionization” in its R-1 neighborhoods. Based on input from
residents, JKA recommended amendments to the City’s R-1
development standards that would reduce the square footage of a
house that could be built on a lot. This included changing the
FAR from .60 to .45 for lots of less than 10,000 square feet and
to .35 for lots of 10,000 square feet or more. In developing its
draft recommendations, JKA defined FAR as ratio of floor area to
total lot area.
A joint study session with the City Council and Planning
Commission took place in May 2019, where JKA’s survey findings
were presented, which included the opinion that “[h]ouses that
maximize the existing zoning envelope and allowable [FAR] are
consistently disliked across all neighborhoods.” It was noted that
the draft recommendations’ goal was to “[p]romote neighborhood
compatibility by maintaining the existing character and scale of
Culver City’s single-family residential neighborhoods.” The staff
report for the joint study session also noted that the City Council
and Planning Commission needed to consider how accessory
structures, such as additional dwelling units (ADUs), contributed
to lot coverage and FAR.

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B. The City Council Votes to Reduce FAR to .45
In January 2020, City staff presented revised
recommendations from JKA to the City’s Planning Commission
for amendments to R-1 development standards. The
recommendations included reducing the FAR in R-1 zoned
neighborhoods from .60 to .45 for all lot sizes. The City staff
report for the meeting stated, “The intent of the proposed FAR
reduction [was] to reduce bulk and mass of new structures as a
part of overall allowable square footage.” After noting that state
laws removed local governments’ ability to count ADUs’ square
footage towards allowable FAR, the staff report indicated the
“original intent of the recommended FAR [was undermined],” so
although a FAR reduction of .50 had previously been discussed,
City staff was recommending a FAR reduction to .45. In other
words, the recommendation was to reduce FAR from .50 to .45 to
account for the fact that ADUs could not be included in
calculating FAR. The City’s Planning Commission, however,
recommended FAR be reduced to .50, instead of the staff’s
proposed .45.
The City Council held a public hearing on the Planning
Commission’s recommendation in May 2020 and introduced the
Ordinance. The Draft of the Ordinance read, “The proposed
Zoning Code Amendment is intended to reduce incompatible
mass and bulk of new single-family housing [in] Culver City. . . .
The existing Zoning Code language allows for single-family home
[ ] construction that does not fit existing neighborhood character.
The proposed Zoning Code Amendment will modify
single[-]family residential zone standards to regulate buildings
that are more compatible with existing surroundings.” The City’s
Planning Manager explained that “[t]he driving force behind [the

4
proposed changes was] residents’ concerns of the size and scale of
new construction.”
While addressing whether the FAR should be reduced
to .50 or .45, one Councilmember explained that the difference
between a .50 and .45 FAR is about 250 to 270 square feet, which
the Councilmember described as “one extra bedroom.” Another
Councilmember said that the change from .50 to .45 had to do
with “the fact that ADUs will not count towards FAR,” so some
ground was lost “in terms of the original goals of the
mansionization ordinance.” The City Council decided to set the
FAR at .45 and to adopt the other changes recommended by the
Planning Commission.

C. YIMBY Comments on the Ordinance
After the Ordinance was introduced, YIMBY submitted a
letter commenting on it. YIMBY expressed “that the recently
approved reduction in [FAR] and setback modifications, . . .
before the City Council on the consent calendar, violate[d] the
Housing Crisis Act of 2019 (Gov Code § 66300).” Among other
things, the letter asserted, “[T]he reduction in permitted [FAR]
from .60 to .45 would clearly reduce the intensity of residential
use in the affected zones.” YIMBY further communicated, “Lower
FAR and excessive setbacks result in smaller homes with fewer
bedrooms, limit options for ADU placement, and disincentivize
development.”
At a City Council meeting in June 2020, adoption of the
Ordinance was postponed to allow City staff time to consult with
the California Department of Housing and Community
Development (the Department of Housing) and to contact Trauss.
The City’s Planning Manager emailed the Department of

5
Housing, seeking guidance about how the Act affected the
Ordinance. In response, the Department of Housing wrote that
the Act “ta[lk]s about intensity of uses,” and that the Ordinance
could impact the number of bedrooms that could be built, which
“might trigger the less intensive use provision.” The Department
of Housing did not take a formal position on whether the
Ordinance violated the Act.

D. The Ordinance is Adopted
The City Council voted unanimously to approve the
Ordinance in July 2020. The staff report for the City Council
meeting claimed that the Ordinance was consistent with the Act
since it facilitated construction of ADUs and Junior ADUs
(JADUs), did not reduce the number of units that could be built
on a lot, and did not decrease the total square footage allowed on
a lot.

E. Petition for Writ of Mandate
After the Ordinance was adopted, YIMBY filed a petition
for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other extraordinary relief;
complaint for declaratory relief; and request for immediate stay
against the City. YIMBY alleged that the City violated
section 66300’s “explicit prohibition against ‘reducing the
intensity of land use’ by enacting an ordinance that reduces
‘[FAR],’” and that the Ordinance resulted in a reduction of up to
three million square feet of residential capacity within the City.
The petition sought an order directing the City to refrain from
enforcing the Ordinance and declaring it void.
The trial court held a hearing on the petition for writ of
mandate and ruled that the Ordinance violated section 66300.

6
The court found that the Act was clear and unambiguous and
generally prohibited reductions in FAR. The court rejected the
City’s argument that the Act applied only to changes that lower
density, finding that the statutory language demonstrated the
Legislature intended for section 66300 to cast a wide net to
prohibit any standard that could lessen the intensity of housing.
In addition, the court found the Ordinance did, in fact, reduce
FAR within the City, and that YIMBY proved that the pre-
Ordinance .60 FAR did not preclude development of ADUs or
JADUs in the R-1 zone, which the City did not rebut. Judgment
was entered in YIMBY’s favor, and the court issued a peremptory
writ of mandate ordering the City to repeal the Ordinance in its
entirety. 2

F. Attorney Fees
Following post-judgment briefing, YIMBY was awarded
$131,813.58 in attorney fees pursuant to the private attorney
general fee statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. This
was based on a lodestar amount of $90,405 for work performed on
the merits of the case, $9,310 for work on the motion for attorney
fees, and $9,497.33 for work performed after the filing of the
motion. The court applied a 1.25 multiplier to the lodestar only
for the work performed on the merits (($90,405 x 1.25) + $9,310 +
$9,497.33). The City timely appealed from the judgment and the
order awarding fees. We consolidated the appeals.

2 YIMBY’s petition also included a declaratory relief cause of
action. After the hearing on the petition, YIMBY informed the court it
would not pursue the declaratory relief claim because the parties
agreed the writ of mandate adequately addressed YIMBY’s claims.

7
 DISCUSSION
A. The Writ of Mandate
1. Standard of Review
A zoning ordinance is a legislative act that is reviewable by
writ of mandate. (Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa (1980) 28
Cal.3d 511, 521; see also Jolicoeur v. Mihaly (1971) 5 Cal.3d 565,
570, fn. 2 [noting that mandamus is appropriate for challenging
the validity of statutes or official acts].) In a traditional
mandamus proceeding (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085), “‘our review is
limited to a determination of whether the agency’s decision was
arbitrary, capricious, entirely lacking in evidentiary support,
unlawful, or procedurally unfair. [Citation.] Independent review
is required, however, where the issue involves statutory or
regulatory construction, such as whether the agency’s action was
consistent with applicable law. [Citation.]’” (Protect Our
Neighborhoods v. City of Palm Springs (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th
667, 676; see also California Charter Schools Assn. v. City of
Huntington Park (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 362, 369 [“Under Code of
Civil Procedure section 1085, when the relevant facts are
undisputed, and the issue is one of statutory interpretation, the
question is one of law for which we employ our independent
review”].)

2. The Ordinance Violates Section 66300’s Plain
Language
The City asserts that section 66300 is ambiguous, such that
we must look at legislative materials to ascertain the
Legislature’s objective. YIMBY, however, argues that the Act’s
plain language prohibits reductions in FAR, unless a stated
exception is satisfied. We agree with YIMBY.

8
 “The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the
court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to
effectuate the purpose of the statute.” (Law Office of Carlos R.
Perez v. Whittier Union High School District (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 463, 472.) We begin with the statutory language
because it is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative
intent. (City of Alhambra v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 55
Cal.4th 707, 718–719 (City of Alhambra); DeNike v. Mathew
Enterprise, Inc. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 371, 378 (DeNike).) “The
law of statutory interpretation instructs us to apply the usual
and ordinary meaning of words unless a definition is provided
within the statute itself. Internal definitions are controlling.”
(Witt Home Ranch, Inc. v. County of Sonoma (2008) 165
Cal.App.4th 543, 559 (Witt Home Ranch). “If the words
themselves are not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature
meant what it said, and the statute’s plain meaning governs.”
(DeNike, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 378; see also City of
Alhambra, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 719 [“‘We consider extrinsic
aids, such as legislative history, only if the statutory language is
reasonably subject to multiple interpretations’”].)
In response to California’s housing crisis, the Legislature
adopted the Act, effective January 1, 2020. (Stats. 2019, ch. 654,
§ 13 (Sen. Bill No. 330).) The Legislature declared that the
housing crisis was harming families in numerous ways, including
increasing poverty and homelessness, driving families out of the
state, and forcing lower-income residents into crowded and
unsafe housing. (Ibid.)
As originally enacted in 2020, section 66300,
subdivision (b)(1)(A), of the Act precluded an affected city from
enacting a development policy, standard, or condition that had

9
the effect of “[c]hanging the general plan land use designation,
specific plan land use designation, or zoning of a parcel or parcels
of property to a less intensive use or reducing the intensity of
land use within an existing general plan land use designation,
specific plan land use designation, or zoning district in effect at
the time of the proposed change, below what was allowed under
the land use designation and zoning ordinances of the affected
county or affected city, as applicable, as in effect on January 1,
2018.” The Act also defined what a “less intensive use” was: “For
purposes of this subparagraph, ‘less intensive use’ includes, but is
not limited to, reductions to height, density, or floor area ratio,
new or increased open space or lot size requirements, or new or
increased setback requirements, minimum frontage
requirements, or maximum lot coverage limitations, or anything
that would lessen the intensity of housing.” (Stats. 2019, ch. 654,
§ 13 (Sen. Bill No. 330).)
As amended in 2022, subdivision (b)(1)(A) prohibits an
affected city 3 from enacting a development policy, standard, or
condition that has the effect of “[c]hanging the general plan land
use designation, specific plan land use designation, or zoning of a
parcel or parcels of property to a less intensive use or reducing
the intensity of land use within an existing general plan land use
designation, specific plan land use designation, or zoning district
in effect at the time of the proposed change, below what was
allowed under the land use designation or zoning ordinances of
the affected county or affected city, as applicable, as in effect on

3 The City does not dispute that it is an “affected city” as defined
by section 66300, subdivision (a)(1)(A). Further, there is no dispute
that the Ordinance amends the City’s zoning code , and thus, is a
“[d]evelopment policy, standard, or condition” as defined by
section 66300. (§ 66300, subd. (a)(5)(C).)

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January 1, 2018.” (Italics added to highlight changes.) The
amendment clarified that “‘reducing the intensity of land use’
includes, but is not limited to, reductions to height, density, or
floor area ratio, new or increased open space or lot size
requirements, new or increased setback requirements, minimum
frontage requirements, or maximum lot coverage limitations, or
any other action that would individually or cumulatively reduce
the site’s residential development capacity.” (Italics added to
highlight changes.) 4
Accordingly, in enacting the Act, the Legislature declared
that a “‘less intensive use’ includes . . . reductions to height,
density, or floor area ratio . . . or anything that would lessen the
intensity of housing.” (Stats. 2019, ch. 654, § 13 (Sen. Bill No.
330), italics added.) As amended, section 66300,
subdivision (b)(1)(A), almost identically defines “‘reducing the
intensity of land use’” as including “reductions to height, density,
or floor area ratio . . . or any other action that would individually
or cumulatively reduce the site’s residential development
capacity.” (Italics added.) The use of the disjunctive “or” reflects

4 The parties refer to both versions of the statute. As amended in
2022, the Legislature added subdivision (k) to the statute, which
states, “The amendments to subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of
subdivision (b), . . . do not constitute a change in, but are declaratory
of, existing law.” Where statutory amendments merely clarify, rather
than change, existing law, “it is not improperly retroactive to apply it
to transactions predating its enactment because the true meaning of
the statute remains unchanged.” (Tran v. County of Los Angeles (2022)
74 Cal.App.5th 154, 164; see also Carter v. California Dept. of Veterans
Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914, 922 [“A statute that merely clarifies,
rather than changes, existing law is properly applied to transactions
predating its enactment”].) Our interpretation of the statute is
consistent under both versions. Unless otherwise stated, we cite to the
current version for ease of reference.

11
a legislative intent that a single event, including a reduction in
FAR, standing alone, constitutes an act “reducing the intensity of
land use.” (Kray Cabling Co. v. County of Contra Costa (1995) 39
Cal.App.4th 1588, 1593 [“The ordinary, familiar meaning of ‘or’ is
a delineation of alternatives”].) The City does not dispute that
the Ordinance reduced the allowed FAR for single-family
residences in the R-1 zone to below what was permitted under
the City’s zoning ordinance in effect on January 1, 2018.
The City cites extensively to a general-purpose dictionary
and a specialized dictionary focused on land use planning to
argue the terms “density” and “intensity,” as used in the Act, are
ambiguous. The City claims that the Legislature intended that
only a zoning change that reduces density, meaning the number
of housing units, violates section 66300; it therefore remains free
to enact zoning changes that reduce the capacity of dwellings to
house people. However, there is no need to look at how other
sources define “density” and “intensity,” as the statutory
definition for “reducing the intensity of land use” found in the Act
itself is controlling. (Witt Home Ranch, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th
at p. 559; Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9
Cal.5th 73, 84.) “Courts accord great weight to statutory
definitions because they presume such definitions accurately
reflect legislative intent. A statute itself furnishes the best
evidence of its own meaning, and if an act’s intent can be
ascertained clearly from its own provisions, that intent prevails
and courts do not resort to other aids for construction. A
legislature, best knowing its own intent, which defines the
meaning of a word, not only exercises its legislative power, but
does so with the explicit goal to provide a correct understanding
of its intention, and thus to facilitate the primary judicial inquiry

12
of statutory interpretation.” (Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutes and
Statutory Construction (7th ed. 2022) § 47:7, fn. omitted.)
Further, the Legislature employed both terms, “intensity”
and “density,” in subdivision (b)(1)(A) (“‘reducing the intensity of
land use’ includes, but is not limited to, reductions to height,
density, or floor area ratio . . . ” (italics added)). Had the
Legislature intended for subdivision (b)(1)(A) to apply only to
zoning changes that lower density, it could have used the term
“density” alone. To interpret subdivision (b)(1)(A) in the manner
suggested by the City—so that only a reduction in density
constitutes a less intensive use—would require us to effectively
write language out of the statute. We would need to conclude
that the Act places no restrictions on a city’s ability to enact
standards that reduce height or FAR, or increase open space and
setback requirements, even though it plainly says otherwise.
(See B.B. v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 10 Cal.5th 1, 13
[“Because defendants’ construction renders the phrase ‘wholly
without . . . effect,’ adopting it would be inconsistent with the
well-established principle that courts should, if possible, give
meaning to every word of a statute and avoid constructions that
make any word surplusage”].)
The City’s argument that subdivision (b)(1)(A)’s catchall
provision (“or any other action that would individually or
cumulatively reduce the site’s residential development capacity”)
creates an ambiguity is unpersuasive. First, the catchall
provision does not abrogate the express provision stating
reductions in FAR are included in the Act’s definition of
“reducing the intensity of land use.” Second, the use of the
phrase, “or any other action” after listing prohibited changes
indicates that each of the listed actions, including reductions to

13
FAR, is an act that reduces a lot’s residential development
capacity. (See International Federation of Professional &
Technical Engineers, Local 21, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court (2007)
42 Cal.4th 319, 342 [explaining that where a statute lists a series
of specific categories followed by a catchall category, the catchall
is “‘“restricted to those things that are similar to those which are
enumerated specifically”’”].)
Subdivision (b)(1)(A)’s express prohibition of reducing the
intensity of land by reducing FAR is to be “broadly construed so
as to maximize the development of housing within this state.”
(§ 66300, subd. (f)(2), italics added.) There is no language
suggesting that a reduction in the intensity of land use requires a
reduction in the number of housing units, and we will not insert
such a requirement into the Act. (Bay Area Citizens v.
Association of Bay Area Governments (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 966,
1003 [“‘[W]e may not simply rewrite the statutory scheme,
purporting to sit as a super-Legislature’”]; DeNike, supra, 76
Cal.App.5th at p. 384 [“‘we will not read a requirement into a
statute that does not appear therein’”].) The Ordinance,
therefore, violates the Act’s plain language by reducing the
intensity of land use in the R-1 zone to below what was allowed
under the City’s zoning ordinance that was in effect on
January 1, 2018.

3. The Act’s Plain Language is Consistent with the
Legislature’s Purpose
Given the Act’s plain meaning, it is not necessary to
consider the City’s contention that the legislative history
demonstrates that a different construction was intended.

14
Nevertheless, the legislative history is consistent with our
reading.
“The plain meaning of the words of a statute may be
disregarded only when the application of their literal meaning
would (1) produce absurd consequences that the Legislature
clearly did not intend or (2) frustrate the manifest purposes that
appear from [the statute’s] provisions . . . when considered as a
whole in light of its legislative history.” (Martinez v. City of
Clovis (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 193, 239 (Martinez); see also
California State University, Fresno Assn., Inc. v. County of Fresno
(2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 250, 266 [“‘The plain meaning of words in a
statute may be disregarded only when that meaning is
“‘repugnant to the general purview of the act,’ or for some other
compelling reason . . .”’”].)
Legislative declarations and findings indicate the Act
should be interpreted in a manner that offers expansive housing
protection and limits the ability of local governments to interfere
with housing construction. While the Legislature certainly
recognized a need for more housing units (see e.g., Stats. 2019,
ch. 654, § 2(a)(4) (Sen. Bill No. 330)), the Legislature also found
the causes of the housing crisis “are multiple and complex.” (See
§ 65589.5(a)(2)(B) [amended as part of the Act in Sen. Bill
No. 330].) They include lengthy permitting processes, high fees
for producers of housing, and local government decisions that
thwart the development of housing. (Stats. 2019, ch. 654,
§§ 2(a)(10), 3(a)(1)(D) (Sen. Bill No. 330).) Indeed, the
Legislature described one of the purposes of the Act as follows:
“At a time when housing is so desperately needed, there are some
local policies that should just be off limits. [Senate Bill No.] 330
is a targeted approach that prohibits the most egregious practices

15
in the areas where housing is most needed. It prevents local
governments from downzoning unless they upzone elsewhere,
and it stops them from changing the rules on builders who are in
the midst of going through the approval process.” (Sen. Rules
Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Unfinished Business Analysis
of Sen. Bill No. 330 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 12,
2019, pp. 7–8.)
The Legislature confirmed the Act’s intent to broadly
prohibit any local policies that lessen housing intensity when it
enacted the 2022 amendments. In discussing the prohibition on
reducing the intensity of land use and zoning ordinance
amendments, the Legislature recognized that an affected city had
to “ensure that there is no net loss in residential capacity.”
(Stats. 2021, ch. 161 (Sen. Bill No. 8), italics added .)
The City repeatedly argues that the Act’s plain language
will lead to bigger homes, but the Act does not increase the
allowable FAR of dwellings. Furthermore, there are
circumstances where the allowable FAR of a home and the
number of bedrooms relate directly to a lot’s residential capacity,
such as with multi-generational households. 5 For example,
before the Ordinance was adopted, one resident emailed a City
staff member explaining that the reduced FAR would not allow

5 “The ‘extended family’ that provided generations of early
Americans with social services and economic and emotional support in
times of hardship, and was the beachhead for successive waves of
immigrants who populated our cities, remains not merely still a
pervasive living pattern, but under the goad of brutal economic
necessity, a prominent pattern-virtually a means of survival for large
numbers of the poor and deprived minorities of our society. For them
compelled pooling of scant resources requires compelled sharing of a
household.” (Moore v. City of East Cleveland (1977) 431 U.S. 494, 508,
Brennan, J., concurring, footnotes omitted.)

16
her to add space to her family’s home to house her elderly,
disabled father. When the City staff member responded that the
resident could build an ADU for her father, the resident
explained she could not afford the cost to “install a kitchen, bath,
run plumbing, increase the electrical, and install a separate
HVAC . . . .”
Subdivision (b)(1)(A)’s express definition of “reducing the
intensity of land use” does not produce absurd results or frustrate
the purpose of the Act. (Martinez, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at
p. 239.) The legislative history shows an intent to ensure that
local governments do not enact policies that delay housing
development or reduce a lot’s residential capacity.

4. The Ordinance is Not Exempt from Section 66300
The City contends that the Ordinance does not violate
section 66300 because the Ordinance facilitates the development
of housing for lower-income households and an increase in
density. We conclude that the City fails to show that the
Ordinance falls within an exception of section 66300.
Subdivision (j) of section 66300 states, “Notwithstanding
subdivisions (b) and (f), this section does not prohibit an affected
city or an affected county from enacting a development policy,
standard, or condition that is intended to preserve or facilitate
the production of housing for lower[-]income households, as
defined in Section 50079.5 of the Health and Safety Code, or
housing types that traditionally serve lower[-]income households,
including mobilehome parks, single-room occupancy units, or
units subject to any form of rent or price control through a public
entity’s valid exercise of its police power.” (Italics added.)
Subdivision (f)(3) instructs that section 66300 is not to be

17
construed as prohibiting the adoption or amendment of a zoning
ordinance that: “(A) Allows greater density. (B) Facilitates the
development of housing. (C) Reduces the costs to a housing
development project.”
The City does not establish that the Ordinance satisfies the
exemption set forth in section 66300, subdivision (j). First, the
City does not contend that the Ordinance is “intended to preserve
or facilitate the production of housing for lower[-]income
households, as defined in Section 50079.5 of the Health and
Safety Code . . . .” Second, while ADUs may offer relatively
affordable housing in some circumstances, 6 the City does not
point to anything in the record showing that ADUs within the
City tend to house lower-income households. Notably, the City
does not respond to YIMBY’s assertion that ADUs are market-
rate units that can be rented to any household regardless of
income. The Legislature’s intent was for any exception to be
construed narrowly (§ 66300, subd. (f)(2)), and the City does not
show that the Ordinance facilitates the production of housing
types similar to mobile home parks, single-room occupancy units,
units subject to any form of rent or price control, or units that
traditionally serve lower income households.

6 In asserting that ADUs offer lower cost housing, the City relies
on legislative findings from 1982 relating to section 65852.150, part of
the statutory provisions governing planning and zoning (section 65000
et seq.). (Stats. 1982, ch. 1440, § 1, operative July 1, 1983.) The City,
however, does not show that section 65852.150’s legislative intent was
to address the same issues as the Act. (See § 65800 [“the Legislature
declares that in enacting this chapter it is its intention to provide only
a minimum of limitation in order that counties and cities may exercise
the maximum degree of control over local zoning matters”].)

18
 The City does not establish that subdivision (f)(3) requires
a different outcome either. The City does not show that the
Ordinance allows greater density. While the City claims that it
believed reducing the permitted FAR for housing in the R-1 zone
would “open up property owners’ minds to including an ADU or
JADU on their property,” it admits the Ordinance does not
actually change the number of housing units that can be built on
an R-1 zoned lot. As ADUs could be built before or after the
passage of the Ordinance, the City acknowledges “[i]t does not
change the density of housing permitted on an R-1 lot.”
Moreover, the City does not show the Ordinance would facilitate
the development of housing, when its goal is to lower the living
space within a house. Finally, while the City asserts that the
Ordinance reduces housing development costs generally, the City
neither cites to anything in the record to support this claim, nor
shows that the Ordinance reduces the cost of a particular housing
development project.

B. Attorney Fees
1. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in
Awarding YIMBY Attorney Fees Under Code of Civil
Procedure Section 1021.5
The City argues that YIMBY’s attorney fee award must be
reversed because the judgment does not confer a benefit on a
large class of persons or a significant segment of the public as
there is no consensus on what the housing policy should be
regarding single-family residential development. We are
unpersuaded by this argument.
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, “‘“[e]ligibility
for . . . attorney fees is established when ‘(1) [the moving party’s]

19
action “has resulted in the enforcement of an important right
affecting the public interest,” (2) “a significant benefit, whether
pecuniary or nonpecuniary[,] has been conferred on the general
public or a large class of persons” and (3) “the necessity and
financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the
award appropriate.”’” [Citation.]’” (Early v. Becerra (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 726, 736 (Early).) Here, the City is challenging the
second element.
“‘The determination whether a party has met the
requirement for an award of fees and the reasonable amount of
such an award are matters best decided by the trial court in the
first instance. [Citation.] That court “‘“must realistically assess
the litigation and determine from a practical perspective whether
the statutory criteria have been met.”’” [Citation.] We will
uphold the trial court’s decision to award attorney fees under
section 1021.5 unless the trial court abused its discretion.
[Citation.] In making this determination we review the entire
record, noting the trial court’s stated reasons for awarding fees
and whether it applied the proper standards of law in reaching
its decision. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] We will reverse the trial
court’s determination only if the resulting injury ‘“‘“is sufficiently
grave to amount to a manifest miscarriage of justice,”’”’ and “‘no
reasonable basis for the action is shown.’” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”
(Early, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 736.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that
YIMBY’s lawsuit conferred a significant benefit on the general
public and a large class of persons, including the City’s current
and future residents, by enforcing important housing rights. The
Legislature has declared that lack of housing is a “critical
problem that threatens the economic, environmental, and social

20
quality of life in California.” (§ 65589.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) Many
Californians are inadequately housed or lack housing altogether,
costing the state $140 billion a year in lost economic output.
(Stat. 2021, ch. 161, § 2, pp. 37–39 (Sen. Bill No. 8).) The trial
court could have reasonably found that YIMBY advanced the
public’s interest in the development of housing by challenging an
ordinance that reduced the intensity of land use and residential
capacity. (See Indio Police Command Unit Assn. v. City of Indio
(2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 521, 543 [“The courts are not required to
narrowly construe the significant benefit factor”].)
As to the City’s contention that “the judge adopted the
Legislature’s view of what the state’s policies regarding
single[-]family residential housing should be,” legislative
enactments are expressions of public policy. (English v. Marin
Municipal Water District (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 725, 730,
disapproved on other grounds in Delta Farms Reclamation
District v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 699, 707.) The City
fails to show that the trial court’s reliance on the Legislature’s
view of what benefits the public amounted to a manifest
miscarriage of justice.
Moreover, the City does not cite any authority to support
the proposition that a consensus about a policy is required to find
that a significant benefit has been conferred on the general public
or a large class of persons. 7 Indeed, people often disagree about

7 We previously granted the City’s request to take judicial notice
of two actions pending in Los Angeles County Superior Court: City of
Redondo Beach, et al., v. Bonta, Case Number 22STCP01143, and City
of Rancho Palos Verdes, et al., v. Bonta, Case Number 22STCP02369.
The City provides that these other actions concern Senate Bill No. 9,
which allows splitting lots and constructing two housing units on each
Fn. continued on the next page.

21
whether a particular policy serves the greater good. As to the
City’s claim that a greater number of public comments from
people in the community were in favor of lowering the intensity of
housing, the record shows that the residents’ comments were
primarily concerned with maintaining the existing character of
their neighborhoods and did not contemplate the impact that the
Ordinance would have on the housing crisis.

2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Awarding a Multiplier
As noted, the lodestar amount was calculated as follows:
$90,405 for YIMBY’s counsel’s work on the merits of the case,
$9,310 for work on the motion for attorney fees, and $9,497.33 for
time spent on the reply brief filed in support of the motion. The
court then applied a multiplier of 1.25 to the $90,405 worth of
work on the merits (($90,405 x 1.25) + $9,310 + 9,497.33 =
$131,813.58). The City challenges only the multiplier, arguing it
was based on improper factors. We find no error.
“Where attorney fees are awarded under section 1021.5,
‘the fee setting inquiry ordinarily begins with the “lodestar,” i.e.,
the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the
reasonable hourly rate.’ [Citation.] ‘Next, the court engages in
the multiplier analysis, and determines whether the lodestar
figure should be augmented or diminished by one or more
relevant factors’ . . . .” (Keep Our Mountains Quiet v. County of
Santa Clara (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 714, 736–737.) Factors that

lot in single-family residential zones. The fact that other cities have
filed lawsuits concerning different legislative actions has little
relevance to determining whether YIMBY’s writ action conferred a
substantial benefit on the general public or a large class of persons.

22
the court may consider in adjusting the lodestar include “(1) the
novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill
displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature
of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys,
[and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v.
Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) However, “‘[t]here is no
hard-and-fast rule limiting the factors that may justify an
exercise of judicial discretion to increase or decrease a lodestar
calculation,’” any one factor “may be responsible for enhancing or
reducing the lodestar.” (Krumme v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 123
Cal.App.4th 924, 947.)
“‘The award of a multiplier is in the end a discretionary
matter largely left to the trial court.’ [Citation.] ‘We will not
disturb the trial court’s exercise of discretion in deciding whether
to increase or reduce the lodestar figure unless the fee award is
clearly wrong [citation], and we may “presume the trial court
considered all the appropriate factors in choosing the multiplier
and applying it to the whole lodestar”’ [Citation.]” (Kennedy
Com. v. City of Huntington Beach (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 436, 467
(Kennedy Com.); see also Ramos v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.
(2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 615 [we apply an abuse of discretion
standard in reviewing a trial court’s decision to apply a
multiplier] (Ramos).) “‘The only proper basis of reversal of the
amount of an attorney fees award is if the amount awarded is so
large or small that it shocks the conscience and suggests that
passion and prejudice influenced the determination.’ [Citation.]”
(Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1509 (Loeffler).)
Here, the trial court applied the multiplier after
considering multiple factors, including (1) the writ petition
presented questions of first impression involving the Act, (2)

23
YIMBY’s lawyers presented the case effectively in achieving
YIMBY’s litigation objective, (3) YIMBY’s attorneys’ hourly rates
were on the low side for comparable cases in Los Angeles, such
that the difficulty and novelty of the questions presented were
not fully reflected in the lodestar amount, (4) the fee award would
substantially inure to the benefit of YIMBY, a non-profit
organization, and (5) the fee award would ultimately be paid by
taxpayers.
First, the City contends that because there is case law on
the interpretation of statutes generally, the issues presented
were not “particularly novel.” However, there is no published
authority addressing the proper interpretation of section 66300,
and thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
considering the novelty of the questions presented. (See Sonoma
Land Trust v. Thompson (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 978, 986 (Sonoma
Land).)
Second, the City contends the trial court improperly
considered YIMBY’s lawyers’ low hourly rates and skill when
awarding the multiplier, when these factors “should have been
addressed by the trial court in determining the lodestar amount.”
This argument fails. In calculating the lodestar amount, the
court accepted the hourly rates of YIMBY’s counsel, noting that
“[the City] ma[d]e no argument to the contrary.” It was within
the court’s discretion to then enhance the lodestar amount
because the rates were on the low side and did not fully reflect
the skill of the attorneys or difficulties of the case. (Sonoma
Land, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 988; see Donovan v. Poway
Unified School Dist. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 567, 628 [1.25
multiplier was not an abuse of discretion, particularly in light of
finding that hourly rate of plaintiffs’ attorneys was in the “‘low

24
range’ of reasonable”].) This is precisely what the court did. To
the extent the City asserts that YIMBY’s attorneys did not show
special skill in this case, we will not second-guess the trial court’s
assessment. (See Loeffler, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1509.)
Next, the City asserts that the court improperly considered
YIMBY’s success in achieving its litigation objective because
success is relevant only in determining whether a party is
entitled to fees. The City does not cite any authority holding that
the result the attorneys achieved cannot be considered in
applying a multiplier. Indeed, case law indicates the trial court
has discretion to take the results obtained by YIMBY into
account. (See e.g., PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th
1084, 1096 [court can consider “success or failure” in determining
value of legal services]; Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc.
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 489 [court has discretion to take into
account a variety of factors in applying a multiplier, including
“the results obtained”].)
Furthermore, the City argues that it was improper for the
trial court to justify the payment of the fee award by taxpayers
based upon the City’s prelitigation refusal to amend the
Ordinance to comply with the Act, as this was relevant only to
YIMBY’s entitlement to fees. The case that the City cites for this
proposition, Ramos, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 615, is inapposite.
Ramos involved an attorney fees award in a class action against a
mortgage lender that settled prior to trial. (Id. at pp. 618–619.)
The award was reversed with directions to the trial court to
“exercise its discretion anew,” as it did not articulate reasons for
applying a multiplier to the fee award in the first instance. (Id.
at p. 619.) Consideration of taxpayers’ interests in the payment
of fees was expressly recognized as “not pertinent” in Ramos. (Id.

25
at p. 623, fn.2.) To the extent that it considered the effect of
settlement discussions generally, the Ramos court indicated that
because the lender agreed to settle before trial, enhancing the fee
award might subvert the policy in favor of settlement. (Id. at
p. 627 [“Here, for example, it might be said that the parties’
willingness to compromise should be a factor in setting a
reasonable fee, including the choice of any multiplier used”].) In
this case, however, the City did not settle, so the policy in favor of
settlement would not be subverted by use of a multiplier. Thus,
the City fails to show that it was improper for the court to apply a
multiplier, even though the fee award would be paid by
taxpayers, where the court found the City’s elected
representatives had a meaningful opportunity to avoid litigation.
Finally, contrary to the City’s claims, there is no showing
that the trial court applied the multiplier to punish the City. The
court applied a more modest 1.25 multiplier to the lodestar solely
for the work done on the merits of the case, after rejecting
YIMBY’s request for a 3.0 multiplier. 8 The court articulated
numerous non-punitive, rational reasons for applying the
multiplier. Based on the foregoing, the City fails to establish that
the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the multiplier.
(Loeffler, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1509; Kennedy Com.,
supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 467.)

8 The City does not dispute that it was proper for the court to
consider that the attorney fee award would substantially inure to
YIMBY’s benefit, a non-profit organization. While the City seemingly
questions the truthfulness of Trauss’s statements about YIMBY’s
limited litigation budget, the City fails to point to anything that shows
such statements were untrue.

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 DISPOSITION
The judgment and order are affirmed. YIMBY is awarded
costs on appeal.

MORI, J.
We concur:

CURREY, P. J.

ZUKIN, J.

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