Filed 10/31/23 In re R.S. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re R.S., A Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
IMPERIAL COUNTY HEALTH & D082419
HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. JJP000451)
v.
A.S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Imperial County,
Marco D. Nunez, Judge. Affirmed.
William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Melissa A. Mandel and Joseph C. Anagnos,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
A.S. appeals from a protective order issued as part of an order
authorizing disclosure of confidential juvenile court records to the prosecutor
in a related criminal prosecution against A.S. for felony child abuse. (Pen.
Code, § 273a, subd. (a).) We conclude that A.S. has forfeited and waived her
challenges to the specific terms of the protective order by failing to raise them
in the juvenile court and acquiescing in the protective order.
After A.S. lost custody of her son and the juvenile court terminated her
parental rights in a dependency proceeding, the deputy attorney general who
was prosecuting her in a related criminal case for felony child abuse filed a
petition for access to the juvenile case records under Welfare & Institutions
Code section 827 and rules 5.552 and 5.553 of the California Rules of Court.
The prosecutor explained in an attachment to the petition that she was
seeking these records for the following purposes: (1) “to ensure the People
have accurate and complete information regarding . . . the injuries that the
child suffered . . . [and] the . . . investigation into the mistreatment and abuse
of the child . . . .”; (2) “to ensure consistency in the criminal proceeding and to
determine whether either [A.S.] or [her husband] made any incriminating
statements”; and (3) to obtain “any testimony presented in dependency court
that could aid in the prosecution of this case.”
A.S. did not file any written objection to the prosecutor’s petition. Over
the next four months, the juvenile court held multiple hearings on the matter
and granted continuances to permit the Imperial County Department of
Social Services (Department) to compile the records and make appropriate
redactions.
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion because it is determined
by controlling authority which does not require any reexamination or
restatement. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1(2).)
2
At a hearing on April 26, 2023, the juvenile court directed the
Department to submit a proposed order. County counsel agreed to submit a
proposed order and serve it on the parties.
On April 28, 2023, the Department submitted a proposed protective
order for the confidential documents. At a hearing four weeks later, counsel
for A.S. stated: “I’ve seen the protective order. I’m happy with the protective
order.” At the final hearing on June 28, 2023, county counsel made minor
changes to the proposed protective order by interlineation. Counsel for A.S.
again did not object to the protective order or any of its specific terms.
After balancing the interests of the prosecutor, the child, and the
parties to the dependency proceeding, the juvenile court ordered the release
of the requested records and transcripts to the prosecutor under the terms set
forth in the protective order. At the final hearing of June 28, 2023, the court
informed the parties that it intended to sign the protective order. Counsel for
A.S. again did not raise any issues with the specific provisions of the
protective order and did not request any revisions to it. The court signed and
filed the protective order the same day.
Throughout the proceedings on the prosecutor’s petition, counsel for
A.S. objected orally that disclosure of the confidential juvenile court records
would violate her constitutional rights and have a chilling effect. Counsel for
A.S. “object[ed] to the whole proceeding,” but acknowledged, “there’s nothing
I can do about it.” He asserted that allowing the prosecutor to use A.S.’s
statements in the dependency case against her in a criminal proceeding
“irritates me” and “seems unfair, seems unconstitutional.” He proclaimed
that he did “not like” the statute authorizing disclosure and that it “just goes
against my fairness bones because everything is supposed to be confidential
until it’s not . . . .” Although counsel for A.S. voiced disapproval of the
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disclosure of these records to the prosecutor, he never objected to any of the
specific terms and conditions of the proposed protective order.
On appeal, A.S. no longer challenges the disclosure of the juvenile court
records and transcripts to the prosecutor. For the first time on appeal,
however, A.S. challenges the specific terms of the protective order on the
following grounds: (1) the protective order is overbroad because it authorizes
the prosecutor to use the information for preparation and presentation of the
criminal case, rather than just for impeachment; (2) the protective order
authorizes any expert retained by the prosecutor to review the confidential
information, even though the prosecutor did not request such authorization;
and (3) the protective order has no directions for disposing of, returning, or
restricting access to the confidential information after it is no longer needed
for the criminal prosecution.
A.S. has forfeited these contentions by failing to raise them in the
juvenile court. “In dependency proceedings, as elsewhere, a litigant forfeits
an appellate argument by failing to raise it before the trial court.” (In re D.P.
(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1282, 1292; see also In re Kevin S. (1996) 41
Cal.App.4th 882, 885–886.) The forfeiture rule applies to non-jurisdictional
objections to a protective order. (See, e.g., People v. Race (2017) 18
Cal.App.5th 211, 219, fn. 4.) A.S.’s general objections to the disclosure of the
records were insufficient to preserve the specific, non-jurisdictional objections
she now makes to the terms of the protective order. (See In re E.A. (2012)
209 Cal.App.4th 787, 790 [“General objections are insufficient to preserve
issues for review. . . . The objection must state the ground or grounds upon
which the objection is based.”].)
A.S. had ample opportunity to object to the specific terms of the
protective order in the two months after it was first proposed by the
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Department and before it was signed by the court. Instead of objecting, her
counsel affirmatively told the juvenile court: “I’m happy with the protective
order.” “Such agreement constitutes a waiver of the issue, since appellant
and counsel acquiesced in and contributed to any such error.” (Sperber v.
Robinson (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 736, 742–743; see also Electronic Equipment
Express, Inc. v. Donald H. Seiler & Co. (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 834, 856–857
[alleged error “waived by appellants’ acquiescence” in trial court].) Thus, A.S.
has both forfeited and waived the only issues she raises on appeal.
DISPOSITION
The order of June 28, 2023 is affirmed.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
RUBIN, J.
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