Commitment of M T

FILED
Sep 14 2023, 9:55 am

CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jan B. Berg Jenny R. Buchheit
Indianapolis, Indiana Sean T. Dewey
Alexandria H. Pittman
Ice Miller LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Civil September 14, 2023
Commitment of: Court of Appeals Case No.
23A-MH-341
M.T.,
Appeal from the Marion Superior
Appellant-Respondent, Court
v. The Honorable David J. Certo,
Judge
Community Health Network, Trial Court Cause No.
49D08-2301-MH-2458
Appellee-Petitioner

Opinion by Judge Mathias
Judges Vaidik and Pyle concur.

Mathias, Judge.

[1] In In re Commitment of C.P., ___ N.E.3d ___, No. 22A-MH-2960 (Ind. Ct. App.

Sept. 14, 2023), we held that an appeal from an expired involuntary civil

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-341 | September 14, 2023 Page 1 of 13
 commitment order was not moot and was properly before us based on the

negative collateral consequences that that respondent may face under federal

and state firearm restrictions that accompany involuntary civil commitment

orders. Here, we hold, based on the facts established in the record and the

attendant briefing, that this appeal from an expired involuntary civil

commitment order is not moot. Rather, it is properly before us based on the

negative collateral consequences that the respondent, M.T., may face with

respect to future involuntary civil commitment proceedings if the instant

commitment order were invalid and left undisturbed. However, on the merits of

this appeal, we hold that Community Health Network presented sufficient

evidence to support M.T.’s temporary commitment.

Facts and Procedural History
[2] M.T. has a history of mental illness and has previously been diagnosed with

Schizophrenia, for which he has been prescribed medication. Since July 2022,

M.T. has lived with his parents in their home. During that time, M.T. did not

take his prescription medication, and his behavior “progressively got[] worse.”

Tr. Vol. 2, p. 12. M.T. would go two-to-three weeks without changing his

clothes. He would not sleep for up to three days on end, and, instead of

sleeping, M.T. would “stand in the middle of the hallway and stare at the wall.”

Id. at 13. M.T. also did not eat regularly, sometimes going days without eating,

and, aside from occasionally making himself a bowl of cereal, his food was

prepared by his mother.

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[3] Sometime in January 2023, M.T.’s mother attempted to make a phone call, and

M.T. “tried to grab the phone away from her forcefully.” Id. at 14. M.T. then

“took off” out of the front door even though he was not “dressed for January

weather.” Id. at 15. M.T., who was unemployed, did not have identification or

money with him. M.T.’s parents and brother “drove around” and “look[ed] for

him” for six to eight hours, but they were unable to locate him. Id. M.T.’s father

was concerned for M.T. because M.T. was not able to “live independently”

from his parents and their home. Id. at 17.

[4] On January 15, M.T. appeared at a pizzeria and told staff that he had hit his

head and was confused. M.T. was then transported to a nearby emergency

department. After doctors there were unable to identify a physical injury, they

had him moved to Fairbanks Behavioral Health within the Community Health

Network (“Community Health”).

[5] There, Dr. Ishrat Bhat examined M.T. and diagnosed him with Schizophrenia,

post-traumatic stress disorder, and catatonia. In reaching those conclusions, Dr.

Bhat relied on M.T.’s record of “previous hospitalizations” for mental-health

issues, which had started in 2017. Id. at 21. Those prior hospitalizations

included an August 2022 hospitalization. 1 M.T.’s medical records indicated

Schizophrenia, and Dr. Bhat opined that the “five . . . year[]” timeline of

1
It is not clear from the record on appeal whether any of M.T.’s prior hospitalizations were involuntary.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-341 | September 14, 2023 Page 3 of 13
 M.T.’s mental-health records and hospitalizations was “enough to establish a

diagnosis of Schizophrenia.” Id.

[6] Dr. Bhat also based his diagnosis of Schizophrenia on his own observations.

Those observations included M.T.’s “disorganized” behavior and speech,

“catatonic” behavior, and “negative symptoms of Schizophrenia,” namely,

“apathy, social withdraw[al], . . . being quiet, poor self-care,” and lack of

pleasure. Id. at 22. Dr. Bhat concluded that M.T. lacks insight into his own

mental illness and that M.T.’s lack of insight results in M.T. not taking his

prescribed medication or being able to take care of himself. Dr. Bhat further

concluded that, due to M.T.’s mental illness, M.T. is unable to provide himself

with food, clothing, shelter, and other essential human needs and also that

M.T.’s mental illness causes M.T. to suffer a substantial impairment of his

judgment, reasoning, or behavior that results in his inability to function

independently.

[7] Community Health then petitioned for M.T.’s involuntary temporary

commitment in order to re-establish M.T.’s routine with his prescription

medication. Dr. Bhat testified in support of M.T.’s temporary commitment. In

addition to the reasons for his diagnoses and M.T.’s mental-health history, Dr.

Bhat noted that a ninety-day commitment would be necessary for M.T.

because, “usually if someone has been in a state of psychosis or catatonia for a

long time, it takes a while for them to get better and to get stabilized.” Id. at 26.

M.T.’s father also testified in support of M.T.’s commitment. M.T. testified

against his own commitment and denied suffering from mental illness.

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[8] Following the fact-finding hearing, the court found that M.T. was gravely

disabled. The court then granted Community Health’s petition for M.T.’s

involuntary temporary commitment. M.T. now appeals that order, and he

timely filed his notice of appeal. On April 24, 2023, hardly more than one week

before M.T.’s initial brief in our Court was due, his ninety-day term of

commitment expired.

1. Where, as here, commitment orders carry consequences
beyond the terms of the commitments and appellate review
can provide meaningful relief from those collateral
consequences, appeals from expired involuntary civil
commitment orders are not moot, and they are properly before
us on their merits.
[9] In C.P., we explained that, while our Court has traditionally considered appeals

from expired involuntary civil commitment orders to be moot, at least until

2019 we had nonetheless “routinely considered the merits” of those appeals.

E.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 188 N.E.3d 464, 466 (Ind. 2022)

(per curiam). However, in more recent years, various panels of our Court have

dismissed these appeals on the theory that there is no meaningful relief that can

be had by our review of them. See, e.g., In re Commitment of J.G., 209 N.E.3d

1206, 1210-11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

[10] Yet, we also explained in C.P. that our Supreme Court’s opinions in this area

have made it a point to leave open the possibility of an alternative analytical

framework in which to reach the merits of expired involuntary civil

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 commitment orders on appeal. In particular, our Supreme Court has “left open

the possibility that respondents in [temporary-commitment appeals] could seek

relief” from allegedly invalid orders due to any “harmful collateral

consequences” that accompany such orders. E.F., 188 N.E.3d at 466; In re

Commitment of T.W., 121 N.E.3d 1039, 1044 n.5 (Ind. 2019). In C.P., we held

that the respondent had successfully demonstrated one such negative collateral

consequence, namely, that his involuntary civil commitment would make it a

violation of federal and state criminal law for him to carry a handgun. C.P., ___

N.E.3d at ___.

[11] M.T. raises a different negative collateral consequence for our consideration,

one we passed over in C.P. See id. at ___ n.2. In particular, M.T. asserts that the

order for his involuntary temporary commitment, if invalid but left in place,

would add to the history of hospitalizations on his medical record and make

future involuntary commitment proceedings against him more likely to be

successful. We agree, and we therefore conclude that this negative collateral

consequence M.T. potentially faces makes our review of his involuntary

temporary commitment order meaningful and not moot.

[12] As we explained in C.P.:

Indiana’s appellate courts have applied the “collateral
consequences” doctrine to hold that appeals are not moot where
meaningful relief may still be had by our review of those appeals
on their merits. For example, in In re S.D., our Supreme Court
considered the validity of a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”)
adjudication. 2 N.E.3d 1283 (Ind. 2014). However, while the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-341 | September 14, 2023 Page 6 of 13
 appeal was pending, the child was returned to her mother’s care,
and the CHINS case was closed. Accordingly, the Indiana
Department of Child Services (“DCS”) moved to dismiss the
appeal as moot.

Our Supreme Court held that the appeal was not moot based on
the following “long-lasting collateral consequences” that
accompany CHINS adjudications:

a CHINS finding can relax the State’s burden for
terminating parental rights. Under Indiana Code section
31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2013), the State may
terminate parental rights if a child has been adjudicated [a]
CHINS on two prior occasions, without proving either
that the conditions resulting in a child’s removal will not
be remedied or that continuing the parent-child
relationship threatens the child’s well-being. And a prior
CHINS finding may have adverse job consequences as
well, such as precluding Mother from employment with
any DCS contractor. See generally Ind. Dept. of Child
Servs., Ind. Child Welfare Policy Manual § 13.4 (2013),
available at http://www.in.gov/dcs/files/
13.4_Evaluation_of_Background_Checks_
for_DCS_Contractors.pdf. Similarly, a CHINS finding
may preclude her from become a licensed foster parent. Id.
at § 13.10, available at http://www.in. gov/dcs/files/
13_10_Evaluating_Background_Checks_for_Foster_Famil
y_Licensing. pdf. Reversal cannot change the efforts Mother
expended in complying with the CHINS case, but it still affords
her meaningful relief by lifting those collateral burdens. We
therefore decline to find the case moot.

Id. at 1285, 1290 (emphasis added).

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 Our appellate courts have likewise repeatedly invoked the
collateral-consequences doctrine to review the merits of appeals
where the order at issue, if invalid and left undisturbed, could
contribute to a future adverse finding against the appellant. See,
e.g., Smith v. State, 971 N.E.2d 86, 89 (Ind. 2012) (reviewing the
merits of the trial court’s finding that the defendant had violated
the conditions of his placement in community corrections due to
possible “negative collateral consequences” from such a finding,
even though the defendant had “served his sentence”); Hamed v.
State, 852 N.E.2d 619, 622-23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (reviewing the
merits of an expired no contact order because, if a violation of
the order were later alleged, it could contribute to a contempt
proceeding or a criminal charge); Kirby v. State, 822 N.E.2d 1097,
1101 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (reviewing the merits of a post-
conviction petition, even though the sentence for the underlying
conviction had been served, because “convictions have collateral
consequences inasmuch as they . . . may form the basis of a
habitual offender enhancement”), trans. denied; McBain v.
Hamilton Cnty., 744 N.E.2d 984, 987-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)
(reviewing the merits of a tax sale, even though the original
owners had redeemed their property, based in part on “negative
collateral consequences that would be unjustified if the sale
w[ere] invalid . . . .”); Roark, 551 N.E.2d at 867-68 (reviewing the
merits of a CHINS adjudication, despite the matter being closed,
“because of the potentially devastating consequences” of the
adjudication); In re Marriage of Stariha, 509 N.E.2d 1117, 1123
(Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a father’s appeal of his
contempt conviction for failure to pay child support was not
moot, even though his sentence had been served, because of
“possible collateral consequences”); see also S.D., 2 N.E.3d at
1290 (holding that a closed CHINS case is not moot in part
because a CHINS adjudication can result in “relax[ing] the
State’s burden for terminating parental rights”).

Id. at ___.

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[13] M.T.’s involuntary civil commitment order carries at least one similar and

significant negative collateral consequence. We have long recognized that a

“history of mental illness requiring hospitalizations” may be probative of

whether a person is “gravely disabled and should be involuntarily committed.”

Golub v. Giles, 814 N.E.2d 1034, 1039 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Thus,

as M.T. notes in his brief on appeal, a respondent’s history of being committed

may contribute to a future serious adverse finding that he again should be

committed. That consequence, which is adequately developed in the record and

in the briefing here, is sufficient to place M.T.’s appeal from his expired

involuntary civil commitment order within Indiana’s case law that such appeals

are not moot under the collateral-consequences doctrine. See, e.g., S.D., 2

N.E.3d at 1290; Kirby, 822 N.E.2d at 1101 n.4.

[14] Indeed, Dr. Bhat’s testimony in support of Community Health’s petition for

M.T.’s involuntary commitment proves the point. In his testimony, Dr. Bhat

emphasized M.T.’s record of “previous hospitalizations” for mental-health

issues, which dated back to 2017 and included an August 2022 hospitalization.

Tr. Vol. 2, p. 21. Dr. Bhat opined that the five-year timeline of M.T.’s prior

hospitalizations “establish[d]” M.T.’s “diagnosis of Schizophrenia.” Id. And

Dr. Bhat further opined that the term of the requested commitment order here

would be necessary because, “usually if someone has been in a state of

psychosis or catatonia for a long time, it takes a while for them to get better and

to get stabilized.” Id. at 26.

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[15] Thus, M.T.’s medical history, including his prior hospitalizations, was relevant

to Dr. Bhat’s diagnosis of M.T. and to Dr. Bhat’s recommended treatment plan

for M.T. If the instant order were invalid but not reviewed in this appeal, it

would potentially contribute to that evidence against M.T. in a future

commitment proceeding just as his existing history contributed to the evidence

against him here. Our review of the instant order is therefore an opportunity for

meaningful relief to M.T.

[16] Still, Community Health asserts that our holding that M.T.’s appeal is

meaningful and not moot is contrary to our Supreme Court’s opinion in E.F.

But Community Health is mistaken. In E.F., our Supreme Court expressly said

that any possible collateral-consequences analysis in temporary-commitment

appeals was “left open.” 188 N.E.3d at 466. Community Health interprets that

language to mean that in fact any such analysis was closed shut. We think that,

if our Supreme Court had intended that outcome, it would have explicitly said

so.

[17] Community Health further asserts that our holding for M.T. will effectively

make every appeal from an expired involuntary civil commitment order not

moot. We also addressed this assertion in C.P. As we noted there, while “[o]ur

Supreme Court’s analysis” in its most recent opinion on collateral consequences

was based on the consequences “that attach to any” orders of the type on appeal

and “was not based on a showing of specific facts,” we need not go so far to

decide this appeal. See C.P., ___ N.E.3d at ___ n.1 (discussing S.D., 2 N.E.3d at

1285-86, 1290); see also id. at ___ (collecting cases). Instead, and as in C.P., “we

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 limit our holding to these specific facts and need not reach the question of

whether the same showing” M.T. makes here “would suffice to enable appellate

review of the merits of every involuntary civil commitment order.” Id. at ___

n.1.

[18] We therefore proceed to the merits of this appeal.

2. Community Health presented sufficient evidence to support
M.T.’s temporary commitment.
[19] On the merits of his appeal, M.T. contends that Community Health failed to

present sufficient evidence to support his temporary commitment. In our review

of such issues, we consider “only that evidence most favorable to the judgment,

along with” the reasonable inferences therefrom. In re Commitment of T.K., 27

N.E.3d 271, 274 (Ind. 2015) (cleaned up). We will not reweigh the evidence or

reassess witness credibility on appeal. Id. at 273. It is the petitioner’s burden in

the trial court to support the petition for an involuntary civil commitment by

clear and convincing evidence. Id.

[20] To support its petition for M.T.’s involuntary temporary commitment,

Community Health was required to show that M.T. was (1) mentally ill; (2)

either dangerous or gravely disabled; and (3) that his commitment was

appropriate. I.C. § 12-26-2-5(e) (2022) (emphasis added). M.T. challenges only

whether Community Health’s evidence was sufficient to show that he was

gravely disabled. According to Indiana Code section 12-7-2-96 (2022), “gravely

disabled,” as relevant to our analysis here, “means a condition in which an

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 individual, as a result of mental illness, is in danger of coming to harm because

the individual . . . has a substantial impairment . . . of that individual’s

judgment, reasoning, or behavior that results in the individual’s inability to

function independently.”

[21] Community Health presented sufficient evidence to show that M.T. was

gravely disabled. M.T. has an established history of Schizophrenia, with

multiple hospitalizations going back more than five years. He has been

prescribed medication for that diagnosis. However, in July 2022, he ceased

taking his prescription. Around that same time, his behaviors “progressively

got[] worse.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 12. M.T. went weeks without changing clothes, days

without sleeping, did not eat regularly, and had to have most meals prepared

for him.

[22] In January 2023, after “forcefully” trying to grab his mother’s phone from her,

M.T. “took off” out of his parents’ house even though he was not “dressed for

January weather.” Id. at 14-15. Sometime thereafter, he appeared at a pizzeria

confused, which resulted in him being transported to Fairbanks Behavioral

Health. And, there, Dr. Bhat observed M.T.’s “disorganized” behavior and

speech, “catatonic” behavior, and “negative symptoms of Schizophrenia,”

namely, “apathy, social withdraw[al], . . . being quiet, poor self-care,” and lack

of pleasure. Id. at 22.

[23] Dr. Bhat concluded that M.T. lacks insight into his own mental illness and that

M.T.’s lack of insight results in M.T. not taking his prescribed medication or

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-341 | September 14, 2023 Page 12 of 13
 being able to take care of himself. Dr. Bhat also opined that M.T.’s mental

illness causes M.T. to suffer a substantial impairment of his judgment,

reasoning, or behavior that results in his inability to function independently.

M.T.’s father likewise testified that M.T. was not able to “live independently”

from his parents and their home. Id. at 17.

[24] A reasonable fact-finder could conclude from those facts that M.T. was gravely

disabled. And M.T.’s arguments to the contrary on appeal simply seek to have

this Court reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. We affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

Conclusion
[25] For all of these reasons, we hold that M.T.’s appeal of his temporary-

commitment order is not moot, even though the term of his commitment has

expired, based on the collateral consequences that accompany his order of

involuntary civil commitment. On the merits of this appeal, we hold that

Community Health presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s

order that M.T. be committed for not more than ninety days. Accordingly, we

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

[26] Affirmed.

Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

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