State v. Rami A. Amer

SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office
of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor
approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.

State v. Rami A. Amer (A-9-22) (086950)

Argued March 14, 2023 -- Decided July 3, 2023

PATTERSON, J., writing for a unanimous Court.

Defendant Rami A. Amer moved to dismiss his New Jersey indictment for
offenses related to a series of burglaries, alleging a violation of his speedy trial
rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-1 to -
15, which is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact addressing the transfer
of a prisoner from the jurisdiction in which he is incarcerated to another jurisdiction
in which he faces criminal charges.

Defendant was arrested in New Jersey in November 2016 in connection with
seventeen burglaries. He was arrested the next month in Pennsylvania in connection
with a series of burglaries committed in that state. In October 2017, defendant pled
guilty to the charges pending against him in Pennsylvania and was incarcerated
there. On February 23, 2018, the State received defendant’s notice under the IAD,
in which he requested the prompt disposition of his New Jersey charges. Defendant
was transported from Pennsylvania to New Jersey the same day.

On May 21, 2018, defendant filed two motions to suppress, which were
denied 53 days later, on July 13. During jury selection on July 24, 2018, the trial
judge informed counsel that after July 31, the trial would resume on September 13,
2018. Neither party objected to that proposed schedule, but when jury selection
resumed the next day, defense counsel stated that the IAD required the trial to begin
on August 22, 2018, and argued that defendant’s rights under the IAD would be
violated if, for example, the court began a trial but “put it off [for] six months.” The
trial court ultimately entered an order stating that trial had commenced for IAD
purposes on July 24, 2018, when jury selection began, and that the IAD’s 180-day
time period had been tolled between the filing and the denial of defendant’s motions.

In an August 28, 2018 letter, defendant contended that the trial court had
violated his rights under the IAD to a trial by August 22, 2018. Treating defendant’s
letter as a motion to dismiss his indictment, the trial court denied the motion. In
October 2018, the jury convicted defendant on four counts. Defendant appealed,
challenging in relevant part the ruling that his IAD rights were not violated.
1
 The Appellate Division affirmed on that issue, holding that defense counsel
waived defendant’s right to be brought to trial within 180 days of his notice pursuant
to the IAD. 471 N.J. Super. 331, 353, 359 (App. Div. 2022). It further concluded
that defendant was “unable to stand trial” for purposes of N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-6(a)
while his pretrial motions were pending; that N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3(a)’s 180-day
period for the commencement of trial was tolled during that period; and that the trial
court had properly granted a continuance extending the deadline. --Id. at 354.

The Court granted defendant’s petition for certification, in which he
challenged the Appellate Division’s decision on the IAD issue. 252 N.J. 89 (2022).

HELD: The trial court did not violate defendant’s speedy trial rights under the IAD,
and it properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment. The Court does
not agree with the Appellate Division that defense counsel waived defendant’s rights
under the IAD. But the Court affirms the Appellate Division’s other determinations
-- that the IAD’s 180-day time period was tolled during the pendency of defendant’s
pretrial motions and that defendant was “brought to trial” when jury selection began
prior to the deadline.

1. Two provisions of the IAD are central here. The first requires that a prisoner be
brought to trial within 180 days after having delivered to the prosecution and court a
written notice and request for a final disposition pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3(a).
The 180-day period begins to run on the date that the notice is delivered to the
prosecutor in the receiving state. The IAD does not specify what it means to be
“brought to trial” for purposes of that provision. The second IAD provision
governing this appeal is N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-6(a), which states that certain time
periods in the IAD -- including the 180-day period -- “shall be tolled whenever and
for as long as the prisoner is unable to stand trial.” (pp. 14-18)

2. With regard to waiver, the Court notes that it was the trial judge, not defense
counsel, who expressed a preference for delaying the State’s presentation until
September. Defense counsel conceded only that the trial could not be completed on
July 31, 2018 -- nothing more -- and he consistently asserted defendant’s rights
during trial. Counsel did not waive defendant’s rights under the IAD. (pp. 19-20)

3. Turning to the Appellate Division’s holding that the 180-day period prescribed
by the IAD was tolled while defendant’s motions to suppress were pending because
defendant was “unable to stand trial” during that period, the Court notes that
Congress could have expressly stated that the phrase “unable to stand trial” as used
in the IAD applies only to circumstances involving a physical or mental incapacity
to stand trial, but it did not. Defendant’s argument that nothing short of physical or
mental incapacity satisfies the “unable to stand trial” language of N.J.S.A. 2A:159A -
6(a) is further undermined by subsection (b) of that statute, which provides that no
2
IAD provision or remedy made available by the interstate compact applies “to any
person who is adjudged to be mentally ill.” N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-6(b). A clear
majority of federal courts of appeals that have considered whether pretrial defense
motions render a defendant “unable to stand trial” have answered that question in the
affirmative, as have the courts of several sister states. Those federal and state
decisions recognize that as a practical matter, a criminal trial ordinarily will not
proceed while a pretrial motion is pending. While the defendant awaits disposition
of his suppression motions, he is “unable to stand trial” for purposes of N.J.S.A.
2A:159A-6(a). (pp. 20-26)

4. The Court does not construe N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-6(a) to indefinitely toll the IAD’s
speedy trial provisions if a defendant subject to the interstate compact files a pretrial
motion, however. Rather, the Court holds that a defendant who has filed a pretrial
motion in an IAD case should be considered “unable to stand trial” under N.J.S.A.
2A:159A-6(a) during the pendency of a pretrial motion, with an important caveat:
N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3(a)’s 180-day trial deadline should not be tolled during any
portion of the period in which the defendant’s motion was pending that would not be
considered excludable time for speedy trial purposes under --- Rule 3:25-4(i)(3). The
Court imposes that limitation to ensure that defendants in cases governed by the IAD
will not be subjected to inordinate trial delays when they file motions with the trial
court. (pp. 26-28)

5. Courts in two states have previously determined that a defendant is “brought to
trial” for purposes of the IAD when jury selection begins. The Court agrees, noting
similar rules based on other speedy trial provisions and that double jeopardy
principles are distinct from the interests addressed by the IAD. But the Court
cautions trial judges to avoid prolonged recesses between voir dire and the
presentation of evidence when the IAD’s speedy trial provisions apply. (pp. 28-31)

6. Here, when defendant provided notice of his request for the disposition of his
New Jersey offenses on February 23, 2018, N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3(a) required that he
be “brought to trial” by August 22, 2018. During the 53 days while his motions
were pending, defendant was “unable to stand trial” under N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-6(a).
Accordingly, the 180-day period was tolled, and the final deadline for defendant to
be “brought to trial” shifted to October 13, 2018. Defendant was “brought to trial”
when jury selection began on July 24, 2018 -- well in advance of the deadline set by
N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3(a), as tolled pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-6(a). (pp. 31-33)

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES SOLOMON, PIERRE-LOUIS,
WAINER APTER, and FASCIALE; and JUDGE SABATINO (temporarily
assigned) join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion.
3
 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-9 September Term 2022
086950

State of New Jersey,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

Rami A. Amer,

Defendant-Appellant.

On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at
471 N.J. Super. 331 (App. Div. 2022).

Argued Decided
March 14, 2023 July 3, 2023

Shane D. Avidan, Designated Counsel, argued the cause
for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender,
attorney; Alison Perrone, Deputy Public Defender, Scott
Welfel, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, and Shane D.
Avidan, Harris Fischman, and Alexander E. Jones,
Designated Counsel, admitted pursuant to Rule 1:21-3(c),
on the briefs).

Michael C. Mellon, Special Deputy Attorney General/
Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for
respondent (Christine A. Hoffman, Acting Gloucester
County Prosecutor, attorney; Michael C. Mellon, of
counsel and on the briefs, and Dana R. Anton, Special
Deputy Attorney General/Acting Senior Assistant
Prosecutor, on the briefs).

1
 James A. Plaisted argued the cause for amicus curiae
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey
(Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; James A.
Plaisted and Joshua P. Law, on the brief).

Jennifer E. Kmieciak , Deputy Attorney General, argued
the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New
Jersey (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney;
Jennifer E. Kmieciak, of counsel and on the brief).

JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), codified in New Jersey as

N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-1 to -15, is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact

addressing the transfer of a prisoner from the jurisdiction in which he is

incarcerated to another jurisdiction in which he faces criminal charges. When

a jurisdiction in which the prisoner is subject to an “untried indictment,

information or complaint” imposes a detainer against him, and the prisoner

gives notice that he requests a transfer to that jurisdiction for a final

disposition of his charges there, he must be “brought to trial within 180 days”

of the receiving jurisdiction’s receipt of that notice. N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3(a).

That 180-day deadline for trial, however, may be extended in accordance

with the compact’s provisions. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-6(a), that time

period “shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to

stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter.” In

2
addition, the court with jurisdiction over the prisoner “may grant any necessary

or reasonable continuance” for good cause, subject to conditions prescribed by

the IAD. N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3(a).

In this appeal, defendant Rami A. Amer requested to be transferred from

a Pennsylvania correctional facility to New Jersey pursuant to the IAD to face

criminal charges, thus commencing the 180-day period prescribed by N.J.S.A.

2A:159A-3(a). After his transfer, defendant filed two pretrial suppression

motions, which remained pending for fifty-three days before they were denied.

The trial court conducted jury selection 150 days after defendant’s notice

under the IAD, but the jury was not sworn and the evidence was not presented

until several weeks later.

Following jury selection but before the jury was sworn, defendant

moved to dismiss his indictment on the ground that the trial court violated his

speedy trial rights under the IAD. He argued that he was not brought to trial

within the IAD-mandated 180 days of his request for transfer and that there

was no basis to toll the IAD’s speedy trial requirements.

The trial court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court held that

during the fifty-three days when defendant’s suppression motions were

pending, he was “unable to stand trial” within the meaning of N.J.S.A.

2A:159A-6(a), and the IAD’s 180-day time period for defendant to be

3
“brought to trial” was therefore tolled. The trial court also ruled that

defendant was “brought to trial” when jury selection began within the 180-day

period set by N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3(a), and that his rights under the IAD were

not violated. Defendant was tried before a jury and was convicted of four

offenses, and he appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s conviction but remanded

the matter to the trial court for resentencing. State v. Amer, 471 N.J. Super.

331, 359 (App. Div. 2022). The appellate court held that in a colloquy with

the trial judge during jury selection, defense counsel waived defendant’s right

to be brought to trial within 180 days of his notice pursuant to the IAD . It

further concluded that defendant was “unable to stand trial” for purposes of

N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-6(a) while his pretrial motions were pending; that N.J.S.A.

2A:159A-3(a)’s 180-day period for the commencement of trial was tolled

during that period; and that the trial court had properly granted a continuance

extending the deadline imposed by N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3. Id. at 354.

We granted defendant’s petition for certification, and we affirm as

modified the Appellate Division’s judgment. We do not concur with the

Appellate Division that defense counsel waived defendant’s rights under the

IAD. We agree with the appellate court, however, that the IAD’s 180-day time

period was tolled during the pendency of defendant’s pretrial motions, and that

4
defendant was “brought to trial” when jury selection began prior to the

deadline set by N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3(a). We therefore conclude that the trial

court did not violate defendant’s speedy trial rights under the IAD, and that the

court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment.

I.

A.

On November 21, 2016, defendant was arrested in Mantua Township in

connection with seventeen burglaries committed over nine days in four

Gloucester County municipalities. He was released from custody on

December 12, 2016.

On December 24, 2016, defendant was arrested in Philadelphia in

connection with a series of burglaries committed in Philadelphia County,

Pennsylvania. On January 11, 2017 and January 23, 2017, defendant was

charged in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County with seventeen

counts of burglary, criminal trespass, criminal mischief, and other offenses.

In indictments returned on March 29, 2017 and April 26, 2017, a

Gloucester County grand jury charged defendant with thirty offenses arising

from the November 2016 burglaries. In a superseding indictment, defendant

was charged with seventeen counts of third-degree burglary, five counts of

third-degree theft, two counts of fourth-degree theft, two counts of fourth-

5
degree attempted theft, and eleven counts of fourth-degree criminal mischief.

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3(a), the Gloucester County Prosecutor’s Office

filed a detainer with Pennsylvania authorities on March 29, 2017.

On October 6, 2017, defendant pled guilty to the charges pending against

him in Pennsylvania. He was sentenced to serve between fifty-four months

and ten years in prison and was incarcerated in a Pennsylvania state

corrections facility.

On February 23, 2018, the State received defendant’s notice under

N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3(a), in which he requested the prompt disposition of his

New Jersey charges pursuant to the IAD. Defendant was transported from

Pennsylvania to New Jersey the same day.

B.

By virtue of the State’s receipt of defendant’s notice under the IAD on

February 23, 2018, the 180-day period set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3(a)

began to run. As the trial court acknowledged, at that point in time the IAD

would have required that defendant be “brought to trial” no later than August

22, 2018.

On May 21, 2018, defendant filed two motions to suppress, one seeking

suppression of evidence found in defendant’s vehicle after his arrest on

November 21, 2016, and the other seeking suppression of defendant’s

6
statement to police on the same date, based on an alleged violation of his rights

under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). By order and opinion dated

July 13, 2018, -- fifty-three days after defendant filed the motions to suppress

-- the trial court denied both motions.

To “make preliminary determinations in this case so that jury selection

and trial may proceed in the most expeditious manner,” the trial court

conducted a pretrial conference on July 23, 2018. The court ordered that jury

selection would commence the following day.

During jury selection on July 24, 2018, the trial judge informed counsel

that proceedings would continue the next day and that counsel should plan to

be in court on July 31, 2018. Anticipating a break in the trial because of the

trial judge’s obligations in pretrial detention matters and his planned vacation

in August, as well as defense counsel’s vacation scheduled for early

September, the court notified counsel that after July 31, the trial would resume

on September 13, 2018. Neither party objected to that proposed schedule.

However, when jury selection resumed the next day, defense counsel

stated that the IAD required the trial to begin on August 22, 2018, and argued

that defendant’s rights under the IAD would be violated if, for example, the

court began a trial but “put it off [for] six months.” The State took the position

7
that the trial had already commenced and that the IAD’s deadline had been

tolled during the pendency of defendant’s suppression motions.

The court ruled that the trial had commenced for IAD purposes on the

first day of jury selection, July 24, 2018, but acknowledged that defense

counsel had preserved defendant’s right to assert his speedy trial rights under

the IAD.

Later in the day on July 25, 2018, the prosecutor asked the trial judge

whether the State should be prepared to present witnesses “next Tuesday,”

referring to Tuesday, July 31, 2018. The trial judge commented that if he were

the attorney trying the case, he “would say let’s get the jury picked and then

we’ll start openings when we return.” The court asked counsel to state their

views on the schedule, and the following exchange between the trial judge and

defense counsel took place:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I’m concerned about time, but
what happens is there’s no way that this trial finishes
on Tuesday --

THE COURT: No.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: -- at this point, I do concede.

THE COURT: Right. I think it’s best that we do that.
I just think -- I think what that will also help is prevent,
hopefully, a lot of questions about the testimony that
came in that, you know, on Tuesday, you know?

8
 THE STATE: And then --

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And that would extend
proceedings.

The trial court then entered an order stating that trial had commenced for

IAD purposes on July 24, 2018, when jury selection began, and that the IAD’s

180-day time period had been tolled between May 31, 2018, when defendant

filed his suppression motions, and July 13, 2018, when those motions were

resolved.

On July 31, 2018, the parties completed jury selection. The trial did not

resume in August 2018.

In an August 28, 2018 letter, characterized as a motion to dismiss all

charges and submitted pro se, defendant contended that the trial court had

violated his right under the IAD to a trial -- which, he claimed, included a final

disposition of the case -- by August 22, 2018. The trial court treated

defendant’s letter as a motion to dismiss his indictment.

In a written opinion and order, the trial court denied defendant’s motion

to dismiss. The court reasoned that defendant was “unable to stand trial”

under N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-6(a) during the period between the filing and the

disposition of his motions to suppress, and that those motions postponed the

IAD’s 180-day deadline from August 22 to October 14, 2018. The court also

9
held that it had the authority to grant a continuance, on a showing of good

cause, thus expanding the 180-day period set forth in the IAD. The trial court

further held that trial had commenced for IAD purposes at the start of jury

selection on July 24, 2018, and that the court had accordingly met its

obligations under the IAD.

When the trial resumed on September 13, 2018, defendant reserved the

right to reopen the issue whether his rights under the IAD had been violated.

On October 4, 2018, the jury convicted defendant of third-degree

burglary, third-degree theft by unlawful taking, fourth-degree criminal

mischief, and fourth-degree attempted theft by unlawful taking. The jury

acquitted defendant of the remaining charges. Defendant was sentenced to an

aggregate sixteen-year term of incarceration, to run consecutively to the term

of incarceration that he was serving for his Pennsylvania offenses.

C.

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence. In his appeal,

defendant challenged the trial court’s ruling that his rights under the IAD were

not violated by virtue of the timing of his trial.1

1
The other issues that defendant raised before the Appellate Division -- the
adequacy of the evidence presented to the jury, the trial court’s denial of his
motion to suppress evidence found in his vehicle, the admissibility of lay
opinion testimony by a police officer, and the propriety of his sentence -- are
not before the Court in this appeal.
10
 The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s convictions, vacated his

sentence, and remanded for resentencing. Amer, 471 N.J. Super. at 359. The

appellate court determined that the trial judge “properly denied defendant’s

motion to dismiss based on an IAD violation.” Id. at 353. The court observed

that N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3(a)’s requirement that a prisoner transferred at his

own request be brought to trial within 180 days is not absolute. It noted that

the 180-day time period may be extended by a grant of a continuance on a

showing of good cause, tolled because the prisoner subject to detainer is

“unable to stand trial” for a portion of that period under N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-

6(a), or nullified by the defendant’s waiver of his rights under the IAD. Id. at

351-53.

The Appellate Division premised its determination on three separate

grounds. First, the appellate court found that defendant waived his rights

under the IAD “when his attorney conceded during jury selection on July 25,

2018 that the State should not be required to present witnesses to testify on the

next scheduled court day of July 31.” Id. at 353.

Second, the Appellate Division concurred with the trial court that “the

period between the filing of defendant’s suppression motions and their

resolution several weeks later tolled the time under the IAD for defendant to

be brought to trial.” Id. at 354. Interpreting the IAD in conjunction with the

11
time-exclusion provisions of the federal Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161,

the Appellate Division viewed N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-6(a)’s extension of the

IAD’s 180-day deadline if the defendant is “unable to stand trial” to “‘include

those periods of delays caused by the defendant’s own actions.’” Id. at 352

(quoting United States v. Peterson, 945 F.3d 144, 154 (4th Cir. 2019)).

Third, the Appellate Division acknowledged a trial court’s authority to

grant a continuance under the IAD for good cause and suggested that

defendant’s suppression motions constituted good cause for a continuance. Id.

at 354. It declined to find an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s extension

of the 180-day period based on the filing of those motions. Ibid.2

The Appellate Division therefore concluded that defendant was brought

to trial in accordance with the IAD. See id. at 350-53.

D.

We granted defendant’s petition for certification, in which he challenged

the Appellate Division’s decision with respect to the IAD issue. 252 N.J. 89

(2022). We also granted the applications of the Association of Criminal

Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL) and the Attorney General to

participate in this appeal as amici curiae.

2
The Appellate Division did not reach defendant’s contention that he was not
“brought to trial” for purposes of N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3(a) until September 13,
2018, when the jury was sworn and jeopardy attached.
12
 II.

A.

Defendant contends that the Appellate Division erred when it concluded

that defense counsel waived defendant’s right to be brought to trial within the

IAD’s time constraints. He argues that only a physical or mental disability

renders a defendant “unable to stand trial” under N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-6(a), and

that his motions to suppress did not toll the IAD’s 180-day period during

which the court was required to bring him to trial. Defendant contends that the

trial court did not grant a continuance in accordance with the procedural

requirements of N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3(a).

B.

The State counters that, by filing his suppression motions and by virtue

of his counsel’s comments about the schedule for the presentation of trial

evidence, defendant implicitly agreed to the trial schedule set by the court. It

contends that a defendant is “unable to stand trial” under N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-

6(a) while his dispositive motions are pending before the trial court and that

defendant’s suppression motions therefore tolled the 180-day time period. The

State argues that the trial court’s finding of good cause for a continuance

comported with the spirit of the IAD.

13
 C.

Amicus curiae ACDL contends that defendant did not voluntarily waive

his right to a trial within the time limitations set forth in the IAD. It asserts

that defendant’s suppression motions did not toll the 180-day period set forth

in the statute, that the trial court did not grant a continuance on a showing of

good cause, and that defendant’s trial did not commence under the IAD until

the jury was sworn on September 13, 2018.

D.

Amicus curiae the Attorney General argues that the trial court properly

found that defendant was “unable to stand trial” under N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-6(a)

while the court considered his motions to suppress and that defendant was

“brought to trial” under 2A:159A-3(a) when jury selection commenced on July

24, 2018.

III.

A.

The IAD “is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact within the

Compact Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10, cl. 3.” Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S.

716, 719 (1985). It is a compact among the federal government, forty-eight

states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the United States Virgin

14
Islands. Ibid. The IAD was adopted in New Jersey in 1958 and is codified as

N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-1 to -15. See L. 1958, c. 12.

The IAD was “drafted in response to a variety of problems arising out of

the then unregulated system of detainers commonly used where one or more

jurisdictions had charges outstanding against a prisoner held by another

jurisdiction.” United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 737 (2d Cir. 1977). As the

Legislature found when it codified the IAD in New Jersey, “charges

outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments,

informations or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons

already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which

obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation.” N.J.S.A.

2A:159A-1. The IAD reflects each party jurisdiction’s policy “to encourage

the expeditious and orderly disposition of [outstanding] charges and

determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried

indictments, informations or complaints.” Ibid.

Two provisions of the IAD are central to our analysis. The first is

Article III of the IAD, codified as N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3. That provision “gives

a prisoner incarcerated in one State the right to demand the speedy disposition

of ‘any untried indictment, information or complaint’ that is the basis of a

detainer lodged against him by another State.” Carchman, 473 U.S. at 718-

15
19.3 To that end, the IAD requires “[t]he warden, commissioner of corrections

or other official having custody of” a prisoner to inform him about “any

detainer lodged against him” and notify him of “his right to make a request for

final disposition of the indictment, information or complaint on which the

detainer is based.” N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3(c). The compact also prescribes the

method by which a prisoner provides to that official “written notice and

request for final disposition,” and requires the official to promptly forward the

notice “to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or

certified mail, return receipt requested.” Id. at (b).

Article III of the IAD requires that a prisoner

be brought to trial within 180 days after he shall have
caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the
appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s
jurisdiction written notice of the place of his
imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to
be made of the indictment, information or complaint.

3
Article IV of the IAD prescribes a separate procedure by which “the
appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment,
information or complaint is pending” may request that “a prisoner against
whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of imprisonment in
any party State” be transferred to that jurisdiction’s temporary custody for
trial. See N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-4(a). Under that provision for prosecutor-
initiated transfer, the time period in which the prisoner must be brought to trial
is 120 days, not 180 days as in Article III. Id. at (c).

16
 [Id. at (a).]4

The IAD does not specify what it means to be “brought to trial” for purposes

of that provision.

“[I]n the event that an action on the indictment, information or complaint

on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial within

the period provided in Article III or Article IV” of the IAD, “the appropriate

court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information or complaint has

been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any

detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect.” N.J.S.A.

2A:159A-5(c).

The court exercising jurisdiction over the matter, however, “may grant

any necessary or reasonable continuance” based on “good cause shown in open

court, the prisoner or his counsel being present.” N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3(a).

Moreover, in certain circumstances, a defendant may be held to have waived

his right to a speedy trial under the IAD by virtue of his counsel’s consen t to a

trial date later than the date on which the 180-day time period expires. New

4
The 180-day period begins to run on the date that the written notice is
delivered to the prosecutor in the receiving state, not the date on which the
prisoner begins the process by requesting that an official of the jurisdiction in
which he is in custody transmit the notice to the prosecutor. See Fex v.
Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 49 (1993) (noting that “delivery is the key concept”);
accord State v. Pero, 370 N.J. Super. 203, 215 (App. Div. 2004).
17
York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 112-18 (2000); see also State v. Buhl, 269 N.J.

Super. 344, 357 (App. Div. 1994) (holding that a defendant who requested an

adjournment of his trial until after the expiration of N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3(a)’s

180-day period “waived his right to have the trial commence within 180 days

of his request for final disposition of the pending charges”).

The second IAD provision governing this appeal is Article VI, codified

as N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-6. It states that “[i]n determining the duration and

expiration dates” for purposes of Articles III and IV, “the running of said time

periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to

stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter.”

N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-6(a). Article VI further provides that no IAD provision or

remedy made available by the compact “shall apply to any person who is

adjudged to be mentally ill.” Id. at (b).

The IAD “is a federal law subject to federal construction,” Carchman,

473 U.S. at 719, and the interpretation of its terms “presents a question of

federal law,” State v. Pero, 370 N.J. Super. 203, 214 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting

Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 442 (1981)). Accordingly, we look to

decisions of the United States Supreme Court and federal courts for guidance

in interpreting the IAD. Ibid.

18
 B.

We first consider the Appellate Division’s holding that defense counsel

waived defendant’s rights under the IAD by virtue of his comments to the

court about trial scheduling on July 25, 2018. See Amer, 471 N.J. Super. at

353.

In Hill, the United States Supreme Court observed that “no provision of

the IAD prescribes the effect of a defendant’s assent to delay on the applicable

time limits.” 528 U.S. at 114. The Court stated, however, that in accordance

with general principles of waiver in criminal cases, “courts have agreed that a

defendant may, at least under some circumstances, waive his right to object to

a given delay under the IAD, although they have disagreed on what is

necessary to effect a waiver.” Ibid. The Supreme Court held in Hill that the

defendant waived his speedy trial rights under the IAD when he agreed to a

trial date after the conclusion of the 180-day period for a defendant to be

brought to trial under Article III. Id. at 113-18; see also State v. Miller, 277

N.J. Super. 122, 128-30 (App. Div. 1994) (holding that a defendant who pled

guilty and then requested, pending sentencing, a transfer back to the

jurisdiction from which he had been transferred had waived his rights under

the IAD by making the request to return to the original jurisdiction).

19
 Here, the Appellate Division found a “waiver in open court” based on

what the appellate court viewed to be defense counsel’s concession on July 25,

2018, that the State should not be required to present witnesses on the next

trial date, July 31, 2018, in order to avoid questions from the jury about any

testimony presented on that date when the trial resumed in September 2018.

Amer, 471 N.J. Super. at 353-54. As the trial transcript reflects, however, it

was the trial judge, not defense counsel, who expressed a preference for

delaying the State’s presentation of testimony until trial resumed in September,

given the potential for juror questions about such testimony when the trial

resumed after a long delay. Defense counsel conceded only that the trial could

not be completed on July 31, 2018 -- nothing more. As he had in the course of

pretrial proceedings, defense counsel consistently asserted defendant’s rights

under the IAD during trial.

Accordingly, we respectfully disagree with the Appellate Division’s

view that defense counsel waived defendant’s rights under the IAD.

Defendant’s argument that the trial court violated his speedy trial rights under

the IAD was therefore preserved for appeal.

C.

We next review the Appellate Division’s holding that the 180-day period

prescribed by the IAD’s Article III(a) was tolled while defendant’s motions to

20
suppress were pending before the trial court, because defendant was “unable to

stand trial” under IAD Article VI(a) during that period. See id. at 354. We

consider whether Congress intended the term “unable to stand trial” in Article

VI(a) to denote only prisoners whose physical or mental condition renders

them unable to stand trial, or whether it envisioned that the term would apply

to a broader range of settings.

In that inquiry, we apply familiar principles of statutory construction.

Our “overriding goal” is to determine Congress’s intent, and our analysis “thus

begins with the language of the statute,” affording the statute’s words “their

ordinary and accustomed meaning.” State v. Hudson, 209 N.J. 513, 529

(2012); see also N.J.S.A. 1:1-1. “If a plain-language reading of the statute

‘leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then our interpretive process is over.

Only if there is ambiguity in the statutory language will we turn to extrinsic

evidence.’” State v. Hupka, 203 N.J. 222, 232 (2010) (quoting Richardson v.

Bd. of Trs., PFRS, 192 N.J. 189, 195-96 (2007)). We refrain from adding “a

qualification that has been omitted from the statute” by its drafters.

DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 493 (2005).

Here, Congress could have expressly stated that the phrase “unable to

stand trial” as used in Article VI applies only to circumstances involving a

physical or mental incapacity to stand trial. It did not do so. Instead,

21
Congress chose general language in Article VI(a), without limiting the term

“unable to stand trial” to settings involving prisoners with debilitating ph ysical

or mental conditions. See N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-6(a). We decline to impose

limiting language that appears nowhere in the IAD.

Defendant’s argument that nothing short of physical or mental incapacity

satisfies the “unable to stand trial” language of N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-6(a) is

further undermined by subsection (b) of that statute, which provides that no

IAD provision or remedy made available by the interstate compact applies “to

any person who is adjudged to be mentally ill.” N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-6(b). It

simply does not make sense that Congress would limit the “unable to stand

trial” language of Article VI(a) to prisoners whose physical or mental

conditions render them unable to stand trial, but entirely exclude any prisoner

“adjudged to be mentally ill” from the IAD. -------
See ibid. We conclude that the

phrase “unable to stand trial” was not intended to be given the narrow

construction urged by defendant.

Our plain-language reading of N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-6(a) is underscored by

federal appellate case law. The United States Supreme Court has yet to

directly address the precise question whether the 180-day time period of

22
Article III of the IAD is tolled during the pendency of pretrial motions.5 As

the Appellate Division noted in this appeal, however, a clear majority of

federal courts of appeals that have considered whether pretrial defense motions

render a defendant “unable to stand trial” have answered that question in the

affirmative. See Amer, 471 N.J. Super. at 352 n.6.

In Peterson, the Fourth Circuit held that the 120-day time limit

prescribed for IAD Article IV’s prosecutor-initiated transfer procedure is

tolled while the defendant’s pretrial motions remain pending. 945 F.3d at 155.

The court reasoned that the IAD’s “unable to stand trial” language

incorporates “‘those periods of delays caused by the defendant’s own

actions,’” and that “a defendant’s own actions include ‘periods of delay

occasioned by . . . motions filed on behalf of [a] defendant.’” Id. at 154-55

(alteration and omission in original) (first quoting United States v. Ellerbe, 372

F.3d 462, 468 (D.C. Cir. 2004); and then quoting United States v. Nesbitt, 852

F.2d 1502, 1516 (7th Cir. 1988)). As the Fourth Circuit observed, such an

approach not only harmonizes the IAD with the federal Speedy Trial Act, but

“also avoids creating an incentive for defendants to saddle district courts with

5
In Hill, the Supreme Court observed that it was “uncontested” that the IAD’s
180-day time limit had been tolled during the pendency of several motions
filed by the defendant. 528 U.S. at 112.
23
innumerable pretrial motions in hopes of manufacturing delays and waiting out

the [IAD]’s 120-day clock.” Id. at 155.

Other circuit courts of appeals agree. In Ellerbe, the D.C. Circuit noted

that Article VI of the IAD “expressly directs that the period be tolled

‘whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to stand trial,’ 18 U.S.C.

app. 2, § 2, art. VI(a), which courts have construed to include those periods of

delays caused by the defendant’s own actions.” 372 F.3d at 468. The Second

Circuit reached the same conclusion in United States v. Cephas, noting its

previous holding that the IAD excludes “all those periods of delay occasioned

by the defendant.” 937 F.2d 816, 819 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v.

Roy, 771 F.2d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 1985)). In Nesbitt, the Seventh Circuit held

“that both the district court’s grant of a continuance . . . as well as the periods

of delay occasioned by the multiple motions filed on behalf of the defendant”

tolled the running of the time periods set forth in Articles III and IV of the

IAD. 852 F.2d at 1516. The Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Johnson

that fifteen days of pretrial delay due to the defendant’s motions tolled the

IAD’s time periods, just as it tolled the time periods set forth in the federal

Speedy Trial Act. 953 F.2d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 1992); see also United States

v. Collins, 90 F.3d 1420, 1427 (9th Cir. 1996). The Eighth Circuit similarly

held in United States v. Sawyers that pretrial motions tolled the time periods

24
for the IAD. 963 F.2d 157, 162 (8th Cir. 1992). And in United States v.

Walker, the First Circuit held that IAD Article IV’s 120-day period was tolled

during the pendency of the defendant’s motion to suppress and other motions.

924 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1991). 6

Moreover, the courts of several of our sister states concur that a

defendant is “unable to stand trial” pursuant to the IAD’s Article VI(a) while

his pretrial motions are pending. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 953 A.2d 1174,

1181 (N.H. 2008) (holding that reasonable delay during the pendency of a

defendant’s pretrial motion tolls the IAD’s time periods); Diaz v. State, 50

P.3d 166, 167-68 (Nev. 2002) (recognizing that a defendant’s motion to

dismiss tolls the IAD’s time periods); Commonwealth v. Montione, 720 A.2d

738, 741 (Pa. 1998) (finding persuasive “the analysis and interpretation of the

courts that held that delay occasioned by the defendant is excludable” from the

6
The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have construed the IAD’s “unable to stand trial”
language more narrowly. In Birdwell v. Skeen, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that the phrase “unable to stand trial” in Article VI of the IAD “was
consistently and only used by federal courts to refer to a party’s physical or
mental ability to stand trial throughout the fifteen years prior to Congress’
enacting the [IAD] in 1970. We decline to expand that phrase to encompass
legal inability due to the filing of motions or requests.” 983 F.2d 1332, 1340-
41 (5th Cir. 1993) (footnotes omitted). And in Stroble v. Anderson, the Sixth
Circuit held that absent a showing that the defendant “was physically or
mentally disabled,” the district court had erred when it found the defendant
“unable to stand trial” under Article VI(a) while his motions were pending.
587 F.2d 830, 838 (6th Cir. 1978).
25
IAD’s time limitations); State v. Batungbacal, 913 P.2d 49, 56 (Haw. 1996)

(concurring with the majority of “federal courts that have construed the phrase

‘unable to stand trial’ as including within the [A]rticle VI tolling provision all

those periods of delay occasioned by the defendant, including delays

attributable to motions filed on behalf of the defendant”).

We find the reasoning adopted by those courts to be compelling. Those

federal and state decisions recognize that as a practical matter, a criminal trial

ordinarily will not proceed while a pretrial motion is pending. Indeed, our

criminal court rule addressing pretrial proceedings provides that “[a] motion

made before trial shall be determined before the trial memorandum is prepared

and the trial date fixed, unless the court, for good cause, orders it deferred for

determination at or after trial.” R. 3:10-2(b). A trial court’s grant or denial of

a pretrial motion to suppress such as the motions at issue here may have a

profound -- if not dispositive -- impact on a defendant’s prosecution and any

plea negotiations. While the defendant awaits disposition of his suppression

motions, he is “unable to stand trial” for purposes of N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-6(a).

We do not construe N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-6(a) to indefinitely toll the IAD’s

speedy trial provisions if a defendant subject to the interstate compact files a

pretrial motion, however. Rule 3:25-4(i)(3), a provision of our court rules

governing excludable time for speedy trial purposes following the Criminal

26
Justice Reform Act (CJRA), N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26, provides that “[t]he

time resulting from the filing of a motion by either the prosecution or

defendant” is “excluded in computing the time in which a case shall be

indicted or tried,” subject to the following limitations:

(A) If briefing, argument, and any evidentiary hearings
required to complete the record are not complete within
60 days of the filing of the notice of motion, or within
any longer period of time authorized pursuant to R.
3:10-2(f), any additional time shall not be excluded.

(B) Unless the court reserves its decision until the time
of trial, if the court does not decide the motion within
30 days after the record is complete, any additional time
during which the motion is under advisement by the
court shall not be excluded unless the court finds there
are extraordinary circumstances affecting the court’s
ability to decide the motion, in which case no more than
an additional 30 days shall be excluded.

(C) If the court reserves its decision on a motion until
the time of trial, the time from the reservation to
disposition of that motion shall not be excluded. When
the court reserves a motion for the time of trial, the
court will be obligated to proceed directly to voir dire
or to opening statements after the disposition of the
motion.

[R. 3:25-4(i)(3)(A) to (C)].

Rule 3:25-4(i)(3) strikes an appropriate balance, in the CJRA context,

between a confined defendant’s interest in a speedy trial and the need to afford

the court sufficient time to develop a thorough record and carefully decide

27
pretrial motions. We consider the same limitations on tolling of time periods

due to the pendency of pretrial motions to be appropriate in an IAD case.

Accordingly, a defendant who has filed a pretrial motion in an IAD case

should be considered “unable to stand trial” under N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-6(a)

during the pendency of a pretrial motion, with an important caveat: N.J.S.A.

2A:159A-3(a)’s 180-day trial deadline should not be tolled during any portion

of the period in which the defendant’s motion was pending that would not be

considered excludable time for speedy trial purposes under Rule 3:25-4(i)(3).7

We impose that limitation to ensure that defendants in cases governed by the

IAD will not be subjected to inordinate trial delays when they file motions

with the trial court.

D.

We briefly address the question whether a defendant is “brought to trial”

for purposes of N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3(a) when jury selection commences, as the

State argues and the Appellate Division determined, or when the jury is sworn

and jeopardy attaches, as defendant contends.

7
As in the speedy trial setting under Rule 3:25-4(i)(3)(B), a finding of
“extraordinary circumstances affecting the court’s ability to decide the
motion” in an IAD case warrants the addition of only 30 days to the time
period for a defendant to be brought to trial.
28
 Although the United States Supreme Court and the federal courts of

appeals have not yet addressed that question, appellate courts in two of our

sister states that are parties to the IAD have concluded that a defendant is

“brought to trial” under the IAD when jury selection begins.

In State v. Bjorkman, the New Hampshire Supreme Court rejected the

defendant’s argument that, because jeopardy does not attach until the jury is

empaneled and sworn, a defendant is not “brought to trial” under the IAD until

the jury is sworn and the State presents evidence. 199 A.3d 263, 267-69 (N.H.

2018). Citing the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of the federal Speedy Trial

Act in United States v. Odom, 674 F.2d 228, 231 (4th Cir. 1982), the New

Hampshire Supreme Court reasoned that jury selection is part of the trial

process, and that the concerns underlying double jeopardy principles are

distinct from the interests addressed by the IAD. Bjorkman, 199 A.3d at 267-

69. Addressing the defendant’s concern about the prospect of a long delay

between jury selection and the presentation of evidence, the New Hampshire

Supreme Court stated that “incident to [its] holding is [the] understanding that

prosecutors and courts will act in good faith to ensure the speedy progression

of all phases of trial,” and it noted the State’s burden to demonstrate

compliance with the IAD. Id. at 269.

29
 In Bowie v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma similarly

held that “for purposes of the IAD, a trial commences when the jury selection

begins,” given that “[j]ury selection is an intrinsic part of the trial process.”

816 P.2d 1143, 1147 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).

We find those courts’ reasoning to be persuasive. Jury selection is not a

pretrial proceeding, but a critical stage of the trial itself. See State v.

Singletary, 80 N.J. 55, 62 (1979) (“Jury selection is an integral part of the

process to which every criminal defendant is entitled.”); accord State v. W.A.,

184 N.J. 45, 54 (2005). Federal decisions consistently hold that under the

Speedy Trial Act, trial begins with voir dire. See, e.g., United States v.

Brown, 819 F.3d 800, 810 (6th Cir. 2016) (“For the purposes of the Speedy

Trial Act, trial generally commences when voir dire begins.”); Gov’t of Virgin

Islands v. Duberry, 923 F.2d 317, 320 (3d Cir. 1991) (“While the statute does

not define ‘commence,’ other courts of appeals have held that for Speedy Trial

Act calculations, a trial commences when voir dire begins and we will follow

that rule.”); United States v. Fox, 788 F.2d 905, 908 (2d Cir. 1986) (“Trial

normally ‘commences’ for purposes of the [Speedy Trial] Act with the voir

dire of the jury.”).

The speedy trial provision of the CJRA explicitly specifies that “a trial is

considered to have commenced when the court determines that the parties are

30
present and directs them to proceed to voir dire or to opening argument, or to

the hearing of any motions that had been reserved for the time of trial.”

N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(2)(b)(i); accord State v. D.F.W., 468 N.J. Super. 422, 435

(App. Div. 2021).

We do not view the law of double jeopardy to control here; rather, we

concur with the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s reasoning in Bjorkman that

“the protections afforded defendants and the goals achieved by the IAD are

distinct from those covered by double jeopardy principles.” 199 A.3d at 268.

As a general rule, we view a defendant to be “brought to trial” under N.J.S.A.

2A:159A-3(a) when jury selection begins.

That general rule, however, does not authorize trial courts to schedule

jury selection far in advance of the trial’s remaining stages in an effort to

circumvent the IAD. We appreciate that scheduling conflicts or witness

availability issues, among other considerations, may prevent a trial court from

continuing a trial immediately after a jury is selected, but we caution trial

judges to avoid prolonged recesses between voir dire and the presentation of

evidence when the IAD’s speedy trial provisions apply.

E.

We apply the principles stated above to this appeal.

31
 When defendant provided notice to the State of his request for the

disposition of his New Jersey offenses on February 23, 2018, N.J.S.A.

2A:159A-3(a) required that he be “brought to trial” by August 22, 2018.

Defendant filed his suppression motions on May 21, 2018. The trial court

denied the motions fifty-three days later, on July 13, 2018. During those fifty-

three days, defendant was “unable to stand trial” under N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-6(a).

Accordingly, the 180-day period prescribed in N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3(a) was

tolled during those fifty-three days, and the final deadline for defendant to be

“brought to trial” shifted to October 13, 2018. Defendant was “brought to

trial” under N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3(a) when jury selection began on July 24,

2018. He was convicted on October 4, 2018.

Defendant was thus “brought to trial” well in advance of the deadline set

by N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3(a), as tolled pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-6(a).8 We

concur with the Appellate Division that the trial court did not violate

defendant’s rights under the IAD, and we affirm the Appellate Division’s

8
In light of our ruling, we need not reach the question whether the trial court
granted a “necessary or reasonable continuance” based on “good cause shown
in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present.” N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-
3(a). We remind trial courts, counsel, and parties that any such continuance
must be premised on a showing of good cause and must be granted in open
court, with the defendant or his counsel present. See ibid.
32
determination that the court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss his

indictment.

IV.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed as modified.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES SOLOMON, PIERRE-LOUIS,
WAINER APTER, and FASCIALE; and JUDGE SABATINO (temporarily
assigned) join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion.

33