In the Matter of the Expungement Application of K.M.G.

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0363-22
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE MATTER OF
THE EXPUNGEMENT November 8, 2023
APPLICATION OF K.M.G.
APPELLATE DIVISION
________________________

Argued October 3, 2023 – Decided November 8, 2023

Before Judges Sumners, Rose and Perez Friscia.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Monmouth County, Docket No.
XP-21-002190.

Monica do Outeiro, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
cause for appellant State of New Jersey (Raymond S.
Santiago, Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney;
Monica do Outeiro, of counsel and on the brief).

Tara K. Walsh argued the cause for respondent K.M.G.
(Ansell Grimm & Aaron, PC, attorneys; Robert A.
Honecker, Jr., and Tara K. Walsh, of counsel and on the
brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

SUMNERS, JR., C.J.A.D.

In this appeal of first impression, we must determine whether the "clean

slate" statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3, which permits an expungement of a New

Jersey criminal record if ten years have passed "from the date of the person's
most recent conviction," applies to a conviction from another state. (Emphasis

added). The trial court entered an order expunging petitioner's New Jersey

criminal record after determining her 2017 Virginia misdemeanor conviction did

not preclude eligibility for expungement under the "clean slate" statute because

an out-of-state conviction does not constitute a "most recent conviction." The

State contends the trial court erred in its interpretation of the "clean slate"

statute, contending petitioner's Virginia conviction must be considered, and

because it was entered within ten years of her petition for expungement, her

petition should have been denied.

We reverse because the text of the "clean slate" statute and related

expungement statutes do not support the trial court's interpretation to preclude

consideration of an out-of-state conviction from the phrase "most recent

conviction." Moreover, such interpretation defies common sense given the

"clean slate" statute's purpose to expunge a criminal record of an applicant who

has not violated the law within ten years of their last New Jersey conviction.

Consequently, petitioner's Virginia offense presently disqualifies her from

expungement of her New Jersey criminal record under the "clean slate" statute.

I.

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 On June 15, 2021, petitioner, a Virginia resident, filed an application with

the Law Division seeking an ordinary expungement under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6, for

a 1988 arrest for forgery,1 and under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2, for a 1991 conviction for

third-degree conspiracy to commit burglary and fourth-degree theft resulting in

a three-year probation sentence. The State objected, claiming petitioner failed

to include an "out-of-state arrest and/or charge" of unknown disposition.

On July 15, 2022, petitioner filed an amended petition, explaining that in

2016, she was arrested and charged in Virginia with "Attempt to Purchase a

Firearm Without a Permit" and "False History on Criminal History Consent

Form." Petitioner eventually pled guilty in 2017 to a Class 1 misdemeanor

"Concealed Weapon" charge, Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-308(a), resulting in a

twelve-month suspended jail sentence. 2 She professed she innocently affirmed

1
No conviction resulted.
2
In New Jersey, "[a]n offense defined by the laws of any other jurisdiction"
that is punishable by "a sentence of imprisonment of one year or less, but more
than 30 days, . . . shall be considered in this State to be a disorderly persons
offense when a reference is made by this code, or by any other statute of this
State, to such offense." N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(b)(2)(a). Disorderly persons offenses
and "crimes" are distinct. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(b)(1). An out-of-state offense
punishable by more than one year imprisonment "shall be considered in [New
Jersey] to be a crime." N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(a)(2).

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3
on her handgun purchase application that she had never been convicted of a

felony. Petitioner claimed she believed her 1991 New Jersey conviction had

been automatically expunged.

Petitioner argued before the trial court that "her Virginia conviction

should not be considered a criminal conviction." She does not repeat that

argument here. Indeed, her Virginia offense does not qualify as a "crime," see

N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(a)(2), but as a "disorderly persons offense" under New Jersey

law, see N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(b)(2)(a).3 There is no basis to read "most recent

conviction" to refer only to convictions for "crimes."

If not for her Virginia conviction, it appears petitioner would have been
eligible for ordinary expungement under paragraph three of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a),
which provides that a person may present an expungement application if she has
been "convicted of multiple crimes . . . all of which are listed in a single
judgment of conviction," but not if she has "any subsequent conviction for
another crime or offense in addition to those convictions included in the
expungement application, whether any such conviction was within this State or
any other jurisdiction." (Emphasis added). Had she been convicted of only one
crime in New Jersey, she might have been eligible under paragraph one, which
requires that the petitioner does not have "any subsequent conviction for another
crime, whether within this State or any other jurisdiction." N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a).
Petitioner's Virginia conviction was not for a "crime," but a "disorderly persons
offense." See N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(b)(1).
3
This offense has no bearing on the timeliness of petitioner's "clean slate"
application. As will be discussed later, the "clean slate" statute provides for the
expungement of disorderly persons offenses, too, not just crimes. N.J.S.A.
2C:52-5.3.
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 Petitioner requested that the trial court consider the "facts and

circumstances surrounding" her Virginia conviction and "grant [her]

expungement at the present time, rather than denying [her] application only to

resubmit" when the 2017 Virginia conviction satisfies the ten-year conviction-

free waiting period sometime in 2027. The State objected, arguing petitioner

was ineligible for ordinary expungement because the Virginia conviction was

not outside the ten-year window to permit a "clean slate" expungement under

N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(b).

On September 7, 2022, the trial court issued an order and written opinion

granting petitioner's expungement application. The court determined the

Virginia conviction did not make petitioner's expungement application

premature, and that she otherwise satisfied the "clean slate" eligibility

requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3.

The trial court reasoned the Virginia conviction did not constitute a "most

recent conviction" under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3 because it was an out-of-state

conviction. The court interpreted the "most recent conviction" language of the

"clean slate" statute's ten-year time requirement to exclude an out-of-state

conviction. The court explained the phrase "most recent conviction" is used

twice in N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(b), and the second usage necessarily refers to a New

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Jersey conviction where it states: "The person shall submit the expungement

application to the Superior Court in the county in which the most recent

conviction for a crime or offense was adjudged . . . ." The court determined that

a petitioner could not file for a "clean slate" expungement in another

jurisdiction, so the phrase "'most recent conviction' . . . in that sentence must be

referring to a New Jersey conviction." Citing De Flesco v. Mercer County Board

of Elections, 43 N.J. Super. 492, 499 (App. Div. 1957) (citation omitted), it

relied on "the presumption that a word or phrase is used in the same sense

throughout [a] statute," finding that "since the phrase 'most recent conviction' in

the third sentence of subsection (b) is clearly limited to a New Jersey conviction,

the same phrase in the first sentence regarding the ten-year waiting period must

also be limited to a New Jersey conviction." The court held "[t]o conclude

otherwise would require [it] to conclude, which it cannot, that the [L]egislature

included contradictory language within the subsection of a statute."

The trial court found further support for disregarding petitioner's Virginia

conviction by ruling: (1) another "potential starting point[] of the waiting

period," "the date on which the petitioner made payment of any 'court-ordered

financial assessment,'" is limited to penalties related to New Jersey convictions,

as the statute defines "court-ordered financial assessment" to mean any

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"financial assessment imposed by the court as part of the sentence for the

conviction or convictions that are the subject of the application," N.J.S.A.

2C:52-5.3(b) (emphasis added); (2) "convictions" in the phrase "a duly verified

petition as provided in N.J.S.A. 2C:52-7 praying that all the person's convictions

. . . be expunged," N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(b), "must be limited to New Jersey

convictions"; and (3) the Legislature expressly considered out-of-state

convictions in defining eligibility in the other expungement statutes, but failed

to include similar language in defining the waiting period in the "clean slate"

statute.

II.

Before us, the State argues the trial court misinterpreted the "clean slate"

statute. Before addressing the specifics of the State's challenge, we first lay out

the principles governing statutory interpretation and the "clean slate" statute's

requirements for expungement.

A.

Our review of statutory interpretation is "de novo, unconstrained by

deference to the decisions of the trial court." State v. Grate, 220 N.J. 317, 329

(2015) (citing State v. Drury, 190 N.J. 197, 209 (2007)). In doing so, "[w]e

'must follow the well-settled rules of statutory construction "to determine and

A-0363-22
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give effect to the Legislature's intent."'" In re R.K., 475 N.J. Super. 535, 540-

541 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting In re H.D., 241 N.J. 412, 418 (2020)). If "a

statute's plain language is clear, we apply that plain meaning and end our

inquiry." Id. at 541 (quoting Garden State Check Cashing Serv., Inc. v. Dep't of

Banking & Ins., 237 N.J. 482, 489 (2019)). The Legislature's words and phrases

are to be construed within the context of "related provisions so as to give sense

to the legislation as a whole" and given their "generally accepted meaning . . .

unless that meaning is 'inconsistent with the manifest intent of the

[L]egislature.'" State v. Courtney, 243 N.J. 77, 85 (2020) (first quoting Spade

v. Select Comfort Corp., 232 N.J. 504, 515 (2018); and then quoting N.J.S.A.

1:1-1).

We recognize that courts must neither "rewrite a plainly-written

enactment of the Legislature nor presume that the Legislature intended

something other than that expressed by way of the plain language." R.K., 475

N.J. Super. at 543 (quoting State v. Frye, 217 N.J. 566, 575 (2014)).

Nonetheless, even though a statute may be clear and unambiguous, we have the

responsibility to avoid "a literal interpretation [that] would create a manifestly

absurd result, contrary to public policy, [such that] the spirit of the law should

control." Frye, 217 N.J. at 575 (quoting Turner v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 162

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N.J. 75, 84 (1999)). This court recently recognized our "rules of construction

are subordinate to [the] . . . proposition" that legislation should not be construed

to create an absurd result. State v. W.C., 468 N.J. Super. 324, 331 (App. Div.

2021) (quoting State v. Provenzano, 34 N.J. 318, 322 (1961)). Thus "when . . .

a plain reading of the statute leads to an absurd result, we may turn to extrinsic

evidence, 'including legislative history, committee reports, and

contemporaneous construction.'" Courtney, 243 N.J. at 86 (quoting State v.

Rodriguez, 238 N.J. 105, 114 (2019)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B.

Expungement in New Jersey is governed by N.J.S.A. 2C:52-1 to -32.1,

which was "'intended to establish "a comprehensive statutory scheme for the

expungement of criminal records"' and to create 'an equitable system of

expungement of indictable and nonindictable offenses as well as of arrest

records.'" State v. Gomes, 253 N.J. 6, 21 (2023) (quoting State v. T.P.M., 189

N.J. Super. 360, 364 (App. Div. 1983)). Eligibility for expungement depends

on the record to be expunged: indictable offenses, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2; disorderly

and petty disorderly persons offenses, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3; local ordinances,

N.J.S.A. 2C:52-4; and juvenile matters, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-4.1. In 2019, our

Legislature reformed the expungement system, in pertinent part, "including

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'clean slate' expungement for those who had not committed an offense in ten

years, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3." Gomes, 253 N.J. at 22.

This appeal centers around the interpretation of the "clean slate" statute,

which was enacted to make expungement available to those who are "not

otherwise eligible to present an expungement application pursuant to any other

section of chapter 52." N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(a). Primary focus is on N.J.S.A.

2C:52-5.3(b), which provides:

The person, if eligible, may present the expungement
application after the expiration of a period of ten years
from the date of the person's most recent conviction,
payment of any court-ordered financial assessment,
satisfactory completion of probation or parole, or
release from incarceration, whichever is later. The term
"court-ordered financial assessment" as used herein and
throughout this section means and includes any fine,
fee, penalty, restitution, and other form of financial
assessment imposed by the court as part of the sentence
for the conviction or convictions that are the subject of
the application, for which payment of restitution takes
precedence in accordance with chapter 46 of Title 2C
of the New Jersey Statutes. The person shall submit the
expungement application to the Superior Court in the
county in which the most recent conviction for a crime
or offense was adjudged, which includes a duly verified
petition as provided in [N.J.S.A.] 2C:52-7 praying that
all the person’s convictions, and all records and
information pertaining thereto, be expunged. The
petition appended to an application shall comply with
the requirements set forth in [N.J.S.A.] 2C:52-1 et seq.

[(Emphasis added).]

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 The "clean slate" statute further provides a person may apply to expunge

any number of New Jersey convictions for crimes, disorderly persons offenses,

and/or petty disorderly persons offenses, so long as the person has never been

convicted of a more serious crime listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(b), which are not

subject to expungement, e.g., sexual assault, or of certain drug offenses

described in N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(c). N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(a). Additionally, the

eligibility bar against those who have previously had a conviction expunged

does not apply to "clean slate" expungements. N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(a); N.J.S.A.

2C:52-14(e).

Compared to the ordinary expungement pathway, "clean slate"

expungement has softer eligibility requirements but a harsher waiting period of

ten years. See N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) (imposing a five-year waiting period for

ordinary expungement); In re LoBasso, 423 N.J. Super. 475, 491 (App. Div.

2012) (holding the waiting period under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2 "was to increase the

likelihood that a beneficiary of expungement had permanently turned away from

criminal activity and will not re-offend"). "Clean slate" petitions are otherwise

subject to much of the same requirements as ordinary expungement petitions.

While the "clean slate" statute makes expungement available to those who are

"not otherwise eligible to present an expungement application pursuant to any

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other section of chapter 52 . . . or other section of law," N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(a),

it also states that a "clean slate" petition "shall comply with the requirements set

forth in" chapter 52, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(b). Additionally, while N.J.S.A. 2C:52-

14(e) expressly exempts "clean slate" expungement petitions from the previous

expungement bar, the other grounds for denial of expungement listed in N.J.S.A.

2C:52-14 do not contain such exemptions. N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14(a) to (d).

III.

The State essentially accepts the trial court's reading as to the plain

meaning of the statute––out-of-state convictions are excluded from the phrase

"most recent conviction"––but argues that it is not the best indicator of the

Legislature's intent in this appeal. In particular, the State argues the trial court's

interpretation should be rejected because it contradicts the purpose of New

Jersey's expungement statutes—to give "relief to the reformed offender." See

N.J.S.A. 2C:52-32 (emphasis added). Expungement in view of petitioner's 2017

conviction, according to the State, "leads to inconsistent and absurd results."

A.

Initially, we point out our disagreement with the trial court, and for that

matter, the State's concession that based on a plain meaning interpretation of the

"clean slate" statute, "conviction" in the phrase "most recent conviction" is

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limited to New Jersey convictions. Because the "clean slate" statute allows for

the expungement of disorderly and petty disorderly persons offenses, not just

crimes, "conviction" in the phrase "most recent conviction" means a conviction

of a crime or disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense . When the

words "crime," "disorderly persons offense," or "petty disorderly persons

offense" are used in New Jersey statutes, they ordinarily include out-of-state

offenses. For example, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(b)(2)(a) states that "[a]n offense

defined by the laws of any other jurisdiction" that is punishable by "a sentence

of imprisonment of one year or less, but more than 30 days, . . . shall be

considered in this State to be a disorderly persons offense when a reference is

made by this code, or by any other statute of this State, to such offense."

While we appreciate the trial court's worthy analysis, we do not interpret

"most recent conviction" in the ten-year waiting period provision as creating a

contradiction to exclude out-of-state convictions as the court maintained. At

most, the statutory language creates an inconsistency—in one provision, it

includes out-of-state convictions, in another, it does not. But arguably, there is

no inconsistency because "conviction" simply means "conviction," in New

Jersey or elsewhere, and "conviction" in the statute's venue provision is

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impliedly qualified to mean "New Jersey conviction," while it is not so qualified

in the waiting period provision.

More importantly, while it is the "general rule that a word or phrase should

have the same meaning throughout the statute in the absence of a clear indication

to the contrary," Perez v. Pantasote, Inc., 95 N.J. 105, 116 (1984), courts should

not "accord controlling significance to a mechanical rule of statutory

construction when to do so would violate the clear policies that form the

foundation of" a statute, State v. O'Connor, 105 N.J. 399, 408 (1987). The trial

court's reading of the statute failed to consider the Legislature's mandate that

chapter 52 "be construed with the primary objective of providing relief to the

reformed offender," but not "persistent violators of the law or those who

associate themselves with continuing criminal activity." N.J.S.A. 2C:52-32. To

be clear, the trial court's interpretation of the statute is not limited to applicants

like petitioner, who some might say had only a minor additional brush with the

law. The court's reading would apply equally and give relief to a petitioner with

a lengthy record of out-of-state convictions in the ten years preceding an

expungement petition. Reading N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(b) to permit the

expungement of an unlimited number of convictions of a person who has

continued to violate the law is plainly contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-32. Had the

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Legislature intended to exclude a person's out-of-state offenses in defining their

ability to obtain "clean slate" expungement, it would have made that intention

more explicit, as it did in making the prior-expungement bar inapplicable to

"clean slate" expungement. N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(a); see Perez v. Zagami, LLC,

218 N.J. 202, 216 (2014) (recognizing the Legislature does not "hide elephants

in mouseholes" (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468

(2001))).

In her merits brief, petitioner acknowledges "that the legislative intent of

the '[c]lean [s]late' statute is to provide rehabilitated individuals the opportunity

to succeed by removing barriers" presented by past convictions. But the

question here is not whether petitioner is "a rehabilitated individual who . . .

deserves an expungement," as she argues, but whether this court should accept

a construction of the "clean slate" statute that would give relief to not only her,

but also to individuals who have not reformed and have repeatedly violated the

law out-of-state since their last New Jersey conviction. Our answer is

unequivocally no.

B.

Assuming arguendo the trial court's and petitioner's interpretations of the

"clean slate" statute were a fair reading of its plain language, which excludes

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consideration of her Virginia conviction in expunging her New Jersey

convictions, we agree with the State that it would "lead[] to inconsistent and

absurd results."

Applying the trial court's plain-meaning interpretation is contrary not only

to the general purpose of the expungement statutes, but also to the apparent

design of the "clean slate" statute as an alternative to ordinary expungement, one

that balances comparatively looser eligibility requirements with a stricter

waiting period. As this court has noted with respect to an ordinary

expungement, the intended "function of the original ten-year waiting period"—

which was later amended down to five years, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a)—for ordinary

expungement "was to increase the likelihood that a beneficiary of expungement

had permanently turned away from criminal activity and will not re-offend."

LoBasso, 423 N.J. Super. at 491.

The Legislature's apparent intention in creating the "clean slate" option

was to expand eligibility while ensuring, with a harsher waiting period, that only

the least likely to re-offend could benefit from it. Allowing a continuous

offender to expunge all their New Jersey convictions simply because their most

recent crimes occurred out of state would completely undermine this design. It

would also, as the State argues, disadvantage New Jersey residents over non -

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New Jersey residents for no conceivable reason. As a matter of common sense,

petitioner should not be rewarded through an expungement of her New Jersey

criminal record for what amounts to a disorderly persons offense because the

offense took place in another state. Had the disorderly persons offense been

committed in New Jersey, petitioner could not have had it expunged under the

"clean slate" statute. This belies logic considering the "clean slate" statute's

purpose.

Our courts have faced a similar dilemma when interpreting prior iterations

of the expungement statutes to avoid an absurd result. In State v. Josselyn, 148

N.J. Super. 538, 539-40 (Law Div. 1977), the trial court interpreted the phrase

"no subsequent conviction" in the expungement statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:164-28.4

At that time, the statute stated:

In all cases wherein a criminal conviction has been
entered against any person, and no subsequent
conviction has been entered against such person, it shall
be lawful after the lapse of 10 years from the date of
such conviction or 10 years after the date such person
completed his term of imprisonment or was released
from parole, whichever is later, for the person so
convicted to present a duly verified petition to the court
wherein such conviction was entered, setting forth all

4
"N.J.S.A. 2A:164-28 . . . was the applicable expungement statute prior to the
enactment of Title 2C of the penal code in 1979." In re Ross, 400 N.J. Super.
117, 122 (App. Div. 2008).
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 the facts in the matter and praying for the relief
provided for in this section.

[Josselyn, 148 N.J. Super. at 539-40 (quoting N.J.S.A.
2A:164-28 (1977)).]

The court determined that "no subsequent conviction" included out-of-

state convictions. Id. at 540. The court reasoned that the alternative "would

enable an individual with a single criminal conviction in this State, but . . .

subsequent judgments of conviction rendered against him within the ten -year

period in every other jurisdiction of this nation, to petition the New Jersey

courts" for expungement, an "absurd" result that ran counter to the statute's

purpose to give relief to the reformed. Id. at 540-41.5

Likewise, we addressed out-of-state convictions in State v. Ochoa, 314

N.J. Super. 168, 170-73 (App. Div. 1998). We considered whether out-of-state

disorderly persons offenses impacted expungement eligibility under an earlier

version of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3, which then provided:

Any person convicted of a disorderly persons offense
or petty disorderly persons offense under the laws of
this State who has not been convicted of any prior or
subsequent crime, whether within this State or any

5
The Legislature effectively validated the court's conclusion in Josselyn two
years later when it enacted a new expungement statute making explicit that a
disqualifying "prior or subsequent crime" encompassed crimes "within this State
or any other jurisdiction." N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) (1979).

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 other jurisdiction, or of another three disorderly
persons or petty disorderly persons offenses, may, after
the expiration of a period of 5 years from the date of his
conviction, payment of fine, satisfactory completion of
probation or release from incarceration, whichever is
later, present a duly verified petition as provided in
section [N.J.S.A.] 2C:52-7 hereof to the Superior Court
in the county in which the conviction was entered
praying that such conviction and all records and
information pertaining thereto be expunged.

[Id. at 170 (emphasis added) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:52-
3 (1981)).]

The issue centered on the qualifier phrase, "whether within this State or any

other jurisdiction," which followed "subsequent crime" but seemed not to apply

to "or of another three disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offenses."

Id. at 170-71 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3 (1981)). We concluded "[i]t would be

manifestly inconsistent with this legislative intent to expunge the New Jersey

convictions of a habitual petty offender who has committed numerous petty

offenses in other jurisdictions but no more than three such offenses in New

Jersey." Id. at 172 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3 (1981)).

We also rejected the notion that "a literal reading" of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3

supported such a result, reasoning that the statute barred "expungement of

convictions for disorderly persons and petty disorderly offenses if the petitioner

has 'another three disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offenses,'

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without specifying that such offenses must have been committed within this

State." Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3 (1981)). Notwithstanding that the

statute expressly referred to convictions for crimes "'whether within this State

or any other jurisdiction,' without repeating this phrase in regard to other

convictions for disorderly persons and petty disorderly persons offenses," the

court declined "to construe this omission as an affirmative expression of a

legislative intent that convictions of disorderly persons and petty disorderly

persons in other jurisdictions should be disregarded." Id. at 172-73. The current

version of the statute now makes clear that disorderly persons convictions

"whether within this State or any other jurisdiction" are counted in determining

eligibility. N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3.

As in Ochoa, the "clean slate" language does not specify that the

conviction in question includes out-of-state convictions, but it also does not

specify "that such offenses must have been committed within this State." 314

N.J. Super. at 172; cf. N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3. Like in Ochoa, there also is a strong,

if not conclusive, textual argument that the disputed language nevertheless

excludes out-of-state convictions. See Goldhagen v. Pasmowitz, 247 N.J. 580,

600 (2021) ("When 'the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place

and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.'" (quoting

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In re Plan for Abolition of Council on Affordable Hous., 214 N.J. 444, 470

(2013))). Furthermore, similar to Ochoa, that argument must fail given the

Legislature's clear directive that the expungement statutes be construed to give

relief to the reformed "but not to create a system whereby persistent violators of

the law . . . have a regular means of expunging their police and criminal records."

N.J.S.A. 2C:52-32.

Our Supreme Court has concluded that "[t]he Legislature is presumed to

be 'thoroughly conversant with its own legislation and the judicial construction

placed thereon.'" Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephson, 135 N.J. 209, 239-40

(1994) (quoting Quaremba v. Allan, 67 N.J. 1, 14 (1975)). When our Legislature

has not specified whether out-of-state convictions are considered regarding the

availability of expungement, the courts have construed the expungement statutes

to declare that they do. E.g., Ochoa, 314 N.J. Super. at 172-73; Josselyn, 148

N.J. Super. at 539-40. We should not assume the Legislature intended we would

rule any differently here.

Finally, nothing in the history of the "clean slate" statute's enactment

supports the trial court's interpretation. Statements from the Governor's Office

and legislators in support of the enactment are consistent with the purpose of the

expungement statutes as expressed in N.J.S.A. 2C:52-32. The Governor's

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Office's press release refers to the "clean slate" expungement process as for

those "who have not committed an offense in ten years." Senate President

Stephen M. Sweeney, who sponsored the "clean slate" bill, S. 4154 (2018), said

that "clean slate" was for "former offenders." Assemblywoman Verlina

Reynolds-Jackson stated the process would "bring us a step closer to social

equity and social justice for offenders who have not committed a law violation

in years." We are thus convinced that, given the clear intent of the "clean slate"

statute, expunging petitioner's New Jersey criminal record would result in an

absurd result because her Virginia conviction occurred within ten years of her

petition for expungement.

Reversed and remanded to the trial court to enter an order vacating its

expungement order.

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