FILE THIS OPINION WAS FILED
FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON
NOVEMBER 9, 2023
IN CLERK’S OFFICE
SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON
NOVEMBER 9, 2023
ERIN L. LENNON
SUPREME COURT CLERK
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Personal )
Restraint of: ) No. 101068-1
)
AMANDA CHRISTINE KNIGHT, ) En Banc
)
Petitioner. ) Filed: November 9, 2023
_____________________________________)
PENNELL, J. * — This case marks the second time our court has considered
a petition for relief from personal restraint by Amanda Knight. In the prior case, the
court rejected Ms. Knight’s claim that her separate convictions for felony murder
(based on the felony of first degree robbery) and first degree robbery violated the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy.1 Although the prohibition of double
jeopardy generally precludes the State from imposing separate convictions for felony
murder and its predicate offense, the court’s prior case held this prohibition did not
apply because Ms. Knight’s felony murder and robbery convictions were premised
on different conduct. Specifically, the felony murder was based on robbery of a safe,
*
Judge Rebecca L. Pennell is serving as a justice pro tempore of the Supreme Court
pursuant to article IV, section 2(a), of the Washington Constitution.
1
See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9.
In re Pers. Restraint of Knight
No. 101068-1
whereas the first degree robbery was based on robbery of a ring. Ms. Knight moved
for reconsideration of our prior decision, arguing that this court had misconstrued
the basis for the felony murder conviction. Reconsideration was denied.
Ms. Knight’s current petition argues that given the court’s previous holding,
her conviction for felony murder must be reversed because the jury was presented
with insufficient evidence that there had been a robbery of the safe, as that charge
was defined by the trial court’s jury instructions. This issue was not anticipated by
the prior decision. Nevertheless, it has merit. We agree with Ms. Knight that there
was insufficient evidence at trial to justify a conviction for robbery of the safe. Thus,
the basis for the felony murder conviction cannot be sustained. We therefore grant
Ms. Knight’s petition for relief, vacate the felony murder conviction, and remand for
resentencing.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Amanda Knight is serving 860 months in prison based on convictions for first
degree felony murder, first degree robbery, and other offenses. The facts underlying
Ms. Knight’s case have been addressed in detail in prior appellate decisions. See
In re Pers. Restraint of Knight, 196 Wn.2d 330, 333-35, 473 P.3d 663 (2020); State v.
Knight, 176 Wn. App. 936, 941-47, 309 P.3d 776 (2013). We therefore provide only
a brief summary.
2
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In April 2010, Ms. Knight and three male accomplices engaged in a home
invasion robbery. Ms. Knight and one of her accomplices gained entrance to the home
of James and Charlene Sanders under the pretext of buying a ring listed for sale on
Craigslist. While discussing the ring, Ms. Knight’s accomplice pulled out a handgun
and brandished it at the Sanderses. Ms. Knight and her accomplice then restrained
the Sanderses with zip ties, removed both their rings, and ordered them to lie face
down on the floor. The remaining two accomplices then entered the residence after
Ms. Knight issued a signal via a Bluetooth device. See Knight, 176 Wn. App. at
941-42.
Once all accomplices were inside, the Sanderses’ two minor children were
brought at gunpoint into the same room as their parents. The children were restrained
with zip ties and one was pistol-whipped in the head. Not long after, Ms. Knight went
upstairs to look for other items of value. See Knight, 196 Wn.2d at 334.
While Ms. Knight was upstairs, one of the male invaders held a gun to
Charlene Sanders’s head. He pulled back the hammer, began counting down, and
asked about a safe. Ms. Sanders initially denied having a safe. The man kicked
Ms. Sanders in the head, called her a profanity, and threatened to kill her and her
children. Eventually, Ms. Sanders admitted there was a safe in the garage. See Knight,
176 Wn. App. at 943.
3
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No. 101068-1
James Sanders agreed to provide a combination to the safe and his zip ties
were loosened. Mr. Sanders then broke free of the restraints and attacked one of the
men. See Knight, 196 Wn.2d at 334. Mr. Sanders was shot in the ear, rendering him
unconscious. The men then dragged Mr. Sanders into another room, where he was
fatally shot. See Knight, 176 Wn. App. at 943.
Ms. Knight and her accomplices fled the residence, taking the rings and other
items. See id. at 943-44. The safe was neither breached nor removed from the
residence.
Ms. Knight subsequently turned herself in to authorities and was charged
with felony murder, based on first degree robbery; two counts of first degree robbery,
one for robbing James Sanders and one for robbing Charlene Sanders; two counts of
second degree assault, one for assaulting Charlene Sanders and one for assaulting her
child; and first degree burglary. Each charge alleged accomplice liability, firearm
enhancements, and aggravating factors. Ms. Knight exercised her right to trial. See id.
at 944-45.
After the close of trial in April 2011, the jury was instructed that Ms. Knight’s
felony murder charge was based on the allegation that she or an accomplice had
committed first degree robbery. The jury instructions did not clarify which conduct
formed the basis of the underlying robbery. The instructions specified the State was
required to prove a completed robbery in order to secure a conviction for felony
4
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murder. See Pers. Restraint Pet., No. 99755-1 (Wash. May 10, 2021) (PRP), App. F
(jury instruction 9).2 The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts.
Ms. Knight appealed her convictions, arguing that her robbery and assault
convictions against Charlene Sanders merged and that her separate convictions and
punishments violated double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed.
See Knight, 176 Wn. App. at 940-41.
In 2016, Ms. Knight filed her first personal restraint petition, raising a new
claim that her convictions for the robbery and felony murder of James Sanders
merged. The Court of Appeals initially denied her petition, but then granted partial
relief on reconsideration. See In re Pers. Restraint of Knight, No. 49337-3-II,
slip op. at 2 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2019) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.
gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2049337-3-II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf. Both the State
and Ms. Knight moved for discretionary review, which we granted. 3
2
The to-convict instruction on felony murder specified the State was required to
prove that Ms. Knight “or an accomplice committed Robbery in the First Degree.” PRP,
App. F (jury instruction 9) (emphasis added). Had attempted robbery been contemplated
as the basis for the felony murder charge, the instructions would have needed to require the
State to prove that Ms. Knight or an accomplice “[committed] [or] [attempted to commit]
[Robbery in the First Degree].” 11 WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 26.04, at 366 (3d ed. 2008) (emphasis added) (most alterations
in original). The parties do not dispute that the instructions, as written, required proof of a
completed robbery.
3
In her motion for discretionary review, Ms. Knight asserted that her convictions for
assault and robbery of Charlene Sanders merged. The Court of Appeals had declined review
of this issue as it had already been addressed on direct review, and we affirmed that portion
of the Court of Appeals decision. See Knight, 196 Wn.2d at 333, 335, 341.
5
In re Pers. Restraint of Knight
No. 101068-1
In a 5-4 decision, this court reversed the Court of Appeals in part and affirmed
Ms. Knight’s original conviction and sentence, effectively dismissing her petition. See
Knight, 196 Wn.2d at 342. This court began its double jeopardy analysis by reviewing
the applicable legal framework. The court recognized that the fundamental question
regarding whether multiple convictions and punishments violate double jeopardy
turns on legislative intent. 4 See id. at 336. But because the legislature rarely declares
its intent on this issue, courts have developed a series of interpretive tests.
The first is the Blockburger5 same elements test. This asks whether each of the
offenses required proof of a fact that the other did not. See Knight, 196 Wn.2d at 337
(quoting State v. Freeman, 153 Wn.2d 765, 772, 108 P.3d 753 (2005)). We also
consider the merger doctrine, which analyzes whether two offenses should be treated
as one because the degree of a greater offense is elevated by a separately criminalized
lesser offense. See id. (quoting Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 772-73). Finally, there is the
independent purpose or effect test. This test operates as an exception to the merger
doctrine and involves an analysis of whether each of a defendant’s underlying crimes
4
When multiple convictions fall under the same criminal statute, double jeopardy
turns on the unit of prosecution test. See, e.g., State v. Villanueva-Gonzalez, 180 Wn.2d 975,
980-81, 329 P.3d 78 (2014).
5
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932).
6
In re Pers. Restraint of Knight
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involve a separate and distinct injury. 6 See id. at 337-38 (quoting Freeman,
153 Wn.2d at 773; State v. Arndt, 194 Wn.2d 784, 819, 453 P.3d 696 (2019)).
The court’s prior decision stated, “[N]either the statute for felony murder
nor the statute for first degree robbery explicitly authorizes these crimes to be
punished separately from any related crime.” Id. at 336 (citing RCW 9A.32.030;
RCW 9A.56.190, .200). “Furthermore, these statutes’ legislative history do not reflect
that the legislature intended to punish these offenses separately . . . .” Id. Thus, the
prior decision deemed “legislative intent unclear.” Id. However, the court observed
that “[i]f our analysis stopped” at either the Blockburger test or the merger doctrine,
Ms. Knight’s separate convictions for felony murder and robbery “would violate
double jeopardy.” Id. at 337. The court then focused its attention on the independent
purpose or effect exception to merger.
The court applied the independent purpose or effect test to the robbery and
murder of James Sanders and concluded the two offenses did not involve the “same
conduct.” Id. at 338. According to the court, Ms. Knight “had already completed the
first robbery before the second robbery began that led to her felony murder charge.”
6
Though not addressed in the prior decision, we note under the supremacy clauses
of the state and federal constitutions, our double jeopardy jurisprudence cannot be less
protective than the standard set by the United States Supreme Court. See WASH. CONST.
art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also State v. Gocken, 127 Wn.2d 95, 107, 896 P.2d
1267 (1995) (holding that Washington’s double jeopardy clause must be “given the same
interpretation the [United States] Supreme Court gives to the Fifth Amendment [to the
United States Constitution]”).
7
In re Pers. Restraint of Knight
No. 101068-1
Id. The court explained the first robbery occurred when Ms. Knight “and her
accomplice took [James Sanders’s] ring off his finger; once [Mr. Sanders] was held
at gunpoint and had his ring removed, the robbery was complete.” Id. The robbery of
the safe was described as “a separate robbery” from the robbery of the ring. Id. at 339.
It was this “new robbery,” characterized as “a second, distinct robbery,” that formed
the basis of the felony murder conviction. Id. Given the distinction between the first
robbery of the rings and the second purported robbery of the safe, a majority of this
court held Ms. Knight’s “convictions against James Sanders had ‘independent effects’
from each other” and therefore did not violate double jeopardy. Id.
The prior decision rejected Ms. Knight’s concern that the jury was never
advised about which robbery formed the basis of the felony murder charge. Although
the jury instructions did not clarify which robbery was connected to the felony
murder charge, the majority noted the prosecution “made this election during closing
argument.” Id. at 340. The way in which the State argued the case “clearly show[ed]
that the robbery of the ring was complete” before Ms. Knight’s accomplices “engaged
in another robbery of the Sanderses’ safe and the subsequent murder of James
Sanders.” Id.
Four justices dissented from the majority opinion. Among other things, the
dissent argued the majority had misinterpreted the State’s closing argument. Contrary
to the majority’s analysis, the dissent opined the State had not made a clear election
8
In re Pers. Restraint of Knight
No. 101068-1
about which conduct formed the bases of the felony murder and robbery counts. Id.
at 346 (Yu, J., dissenting). Absent a clear election, the dissent asserted, the jury’s
verdicts must be interpreted in Ms. Knight’s favor under the rule of lenity. See id.
(citing State v. Kier, 164 Wn.2d 798, 811-14, 194 P.3d 212 (2008); State v. Whittaker,
192 Wn. App. 395, 416-17, 367 P.3d 1092 (2016)). The majority rejected this analysis
and affirmed. See id. at 340-41.
Ms. Knight moved for reconsideration. The crux of the reconsideration motion
echoed the dissent’s concern that the court had misconstrued the State’s closing
argument. According to Ms. Knight, the State never made a clear election as to a
distinct robbery forming the basis of the felony murder charge. Instead, the
prosecutor’s position was simply that the charges of felony murder and first degree
robbery of James Sanders were based on the same acts. See Pet’r’s Mot. for Recons.,
In re Pers. Restraint of Knight, No. 97066-1, at 2-6 (Wash. Oct. 28, 2020).
Reconsideration was denied over a four-justice dissent. The dissent agreed
with Ms. Knight that the majority had misapprehended the State’s closing argument.
According to the dissent, the State never argued there had been “two different crimes
based on two different robberies.” Ord. Den. Mot. for Recons., In re Pers. Restraint
of Knight, No. 97066-1, at 1 (Wash. Feb. 2, 2021) (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting).
Instead, the State’s theory of the case was that the robbery underlying Ms. Knight’s
felony murder conviction was the robbery of the ring.
9
In re Pers. Restraint of Knight
No. 101068-1
Again, a majority of the court was unpersuaded and denied reconsideration.
The opinion became final on February 2, 2021, the date reconsideration was denied.
Several months later, Ms. Knight filed a personal restraint petition directly
in this court, arguing the evidence was not sufficient to support felony murder based
on robbery of the safe. See PRP. This court transferred the petition to the Court of
Appeals for consideration under RAP 16.5(c). In an unpublished decision that did
not terminate review, the Court of Appeals held Ms. Knight’s petition was successive,
but not untimely based on RCW 10.73.100(4) (insufficient evidence exception).
Accordingly, the petition was transferred to this court, citing RCW 10.73.140.
See In re Pers. Restraint of Knight, No. 56100-0-II, slip op. at 5 (Wash. Ct. App.
July 6, 2022) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%
2056100-0-II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf. This court subsequently granted
review and ordered the petition be set for consideration on the merits.
ANALYSIS
Ms. Knight filed this personal restraint petition just over seven years after her
judgment became final in 2014. Typically, petitions are subject to a one-year statutory
time bar. See RCW 10.73.090(1). But the law allows some limited exceptions. Ms.
Knight asserts her petition falls under an exception because her conviction was not
supported by sufficient evidence. This type of claim is exempt from the one-year bar.
10
In re Pers. Restraint of Knight
No. 101068-1
RCW 10.73.100(4). Accordingly, the question of whether Ms. Knight’s petition is
timely turns on the substance of her insufficiency claim. 7
When presented with a sufficiency challenge, we construe the evidence in the
light most favorable to the State and ask whether a rational trier of fact could have
found each and every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. State
v. Kintz, 169 Wn.2d 537, 551, 238 P.3d 470 (2010). All reasonable inferences are
drawn in the State’s favor and the evidence is interpreted against the defense. State v.
Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). This is a deferential standard,
but it is not a rubber stamp. If there is a failure of proof as to an essential element of a
charged offense, the defendant’s conviction must be reversed with prejudice. State v.
Smith, 155 Wn.2d 496, 505, 120 P.3d 559 (2005).
As the jury was instructed, the charge of felony murder required the State to
prove the following elements:
(1) That on or about April 28, 2010, [Amanda Knight] or an accomplice
committed Robbery in the First Degree;
(2) That [Amanda Knight] or an accomplice caused the death of James
Sanders, Sr[.], in the course of or in furtherance of such crime;
(3) That James Sanders, Sr. was not a participant in the crime of Robbery in
the First Degree; and
(4) That any of these acts occurred in the State of Washington.
7
The Court of Appeals declined review of Ms. Knight’s personal restraint petition,
reasoning it was successive. Under RCW 10.73.140, the Court of Appeals generally cannot
consider successive petitions. But this restriction does not apply to the Supreme Court. Thus,
the Court of Appeals may transfer a successive petition to the Supreme Court if the petition
is not otherwise time barred. See In re Pers. Restraint of Bell, 187 Wn.2d 558, 562, 387 P.3d
719 (2017) (per curiam).
11
In re Pers. Restraint of Knight
No. 101068-1
PRP, App. F (jury instruction 9) (emphasis added).
Felony murder need not be based on a completed crime. RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c).
But if it is predicated on an attempted crime, the jury instructions must so state. See
State v. Stewart, 35 Wn. App. 552, 555, 667 P.2d 1139 (1983). Here, the instructions
referenced only a completed crime. The State did not object to the instructions at the
time of trial; in fact, the State proposed the felony murder instruction that was
ultimately adopted by the trial court. PRP, App. G (State’s proposed jury instruction
10). It therefore became the law of the case that the State was required to prove
Mr. Sanders’s murder was caused in the course of or in furtherance of the completed
crime of first degree robbery. See State v. Johnson, 188 Wn.2d 742, 755, 399 P.3d 507
(2017); State v. Hickman, 135 Wn.2d 97, 101-02, 954 P.2d 900 (1998).
The decision governing Ms. Knight’s prior petition held the robbery that
provided the basis for the felony murder charge was the robbery of the safe. See
Knight, 196 Wn.2d at 339 (concluding that Mr. Sanders was fatally shot “in
furtherance of [Ms.] Knight’s accomplices robbing the Sanderses of their safe”
(emphasis added)). Yet the evidence at trial showed nothing more than an attempted
robbery of the safe. The safe was never breached. Nor was it removed from the
Sanders residence. Insufficient evidence supports a jury verdict for felony murder
predicated on robbery of the safe.
12
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To save Ms. Knight’s conviction from a sufficiency challenge, the State
attempts to recharacterize the felony murder conviction in ways that diverge from its
prior characterizations of the basis for the felony murder conviction and that diverge
from our prior decision. In its most recent briefing to this court, the State argued that
the “second” robbery that formed the basis of the felony murder conviction was the
robbery of items taken from the upstairs of the residence.8 At oral argument, the State
changed course and claimed there were never actually two distinct robberies. While
not suggesting the felony murder conviction was predicated simply on the robbery
of the rings, the State argued “the homicide of Mr. Sanders occurred during the course
of and in furtherance of an armed home invasion robbery.” Wash. Sup. Ct. oral
argument, In re Pers. Restraint of Knight, No. 101068-1 (Feb. 28, 2023), at 15 min.,
56 sec. through 16 min., 6 sec., video recording by TVW, Washington State’s Public
Affairs Network, http://www.tvw.org. According to the State, this home invasion
“robbery began when the gun was pointed at Mr. and Mrs. Sanders” and did not end
until Ms. Knight and her accomplices “le[ft] the house and . . . fle[d].” Id. at 27 min.,
44 sec. through 27 min., 53 sec.; 26 min., 20 sec. through 26 min., 28 sec.
8
Adhering at least to the framework of the court’s prior decision, the State’s
supplemental brief repeatedly argues Mr. Sanders was shot in the course of a “second”
robbery. Suppl. Br. of Resp’t at 24, 25. The State’s briefing recognized that under the
terms of the prior decision, it needed to show “that Mr. Sanders was murdered in the course
of or in furtherance of a completed robbery—one that [Ms.] Knight was a party to and that
was distinct from the robbery of the rings.” Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
13
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The dissent also recasts the prior decision, albeit under a different
methodology. Unlike the State, the dissent does not claim that the felony murder was
based on the robbery of items taken from the upstairs of the residence or that it was
based on an ongoing home invasion robbery. Instead, the dissent claims the “felony
murder conviction was based on the robbery of James Sanders’s wedding ring.”
Dissent at 1.
Neither attempt to salvage Ms. Knight’s felony murder conviction is faithful to
the text of the prior decision. The prior decision could not have been clearer that there
were two distinct robberies and that the second robbery—the one that formed the
basis of the felony murder conviction—was the robbery of the safe.
The prior decision did not simply make clumsy use of the word “complete.”
Cf. id. at 6 n.1. The prior decision repeatedly, emphatically, and through the use of
different synonyms insisted that the murder of Mr. Sanders occurred “in furtherance
of” 9 a different robbery than the robbery of the rings that formed the basis of Ms.
Knight’s robbery conviction. Knight, 196 Wn.2d at 339, 342; see id. at 338 (“[Ms.]
Knight had already completed the first robbery before the second robbery began that
led to her felony murder charge.” (emphasis added)), 338-39 (“Subsequently, [Mr.
Sanders] was pulled up from the floor and had his zip tie loosened in order to guide
9
It bears emphasis that in the felony murder context, the phrase “in furtherance of”
is a term of art with specific statutory meaning. As set forth in RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c), the
phrase designates the felony that forms the basis of the felony murder conviction.
14
In re Pers. Restraint of Knight
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[Ms.] Knight’s accomplices to the safe—a separate robbery.” (emphasis added)),
339 (“In the middle of this new robbery, [Mr. Sanders] attacked [Ms.] Knight’s
accomplices, who then killed [Mr. Sanders]—completing [Ms.] Knight’s felony
murder charge, as [Mr. Sanders’s] murder was in furtherance of a second, distinct
robbery.” (emphasis added)).
Furthermore, the prior decision specifically held that the separate robbery
was of the safe, not robbery of some other pieces of property. See id. at 338-39
(“Subsequently, [Mr. Sanders] was pulled up from the floor and had his zip tie
loosened in order to guide [Ms.] Knight’s accomplices to the safe—a separate
robbery.” (emphasis added)), 339-40 (“We conclude that even though both the ring
and the safe were owned by [Mr. Sanders], the circumstances in which these items
were stolen were completely distinct from each other as to constitute two ‘separate
forcible taking[s] of property,’ thus the first robbery of [Mr. Sanders] was completed
once his ring was taken off his finger at gunpoint.” (emphasis added) (second
alteration in original)), 340 (“[T]he robbery of the ring was complete before
[Ms.] Knight’s accomplices engaged in another robbery of the Sanderses’ safe
and the subsequent murder of James Sanders.” (emphasis added)).
Apart from this express language in its characterization of the facts, the legal
reasoning employed in the prior decision emphasized that the court was addressing
separate robbery offenses, not merely separate effects. As previously noted, the prior
15
In re Pers. Restraint of Knight
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decision explained that the existence of two separate robberies was consistent with
the jury instructions because the State elected to prove two robberies during closing
argument to the jury: one robbery as the basis for the felony murder charge and one
as a standalone crime. Id. at 340.10 The decision also utilized the concept of “unit[s]
of prosecution” in reasoning that there were two separate chargeable robberies. Id.
at 339.11 Neither of these discussions would have been apt—indeed they would have
been contradictory—had the prior decision intended to convey the idea that the jury
was asked to find only one overarching robbery.
As previously noted, the prior decision’s insistence that there were two distinct
robberies prompted strong dissents. The dissents argued the record did not support
finding more than one robbery of James Sanders so as to justify separate punishments
10
The prior decision’s discussion of the prosecutor’s election was based on State v.
Coleman, 159 Wn.2d 509, 150 P.3d 1126 (2007), and State v. Carson, 184 Wn.2d 207,
357 P.3d 1064 (2015). See Knight, 196 Wn.2d at 340. Coleman and Carson are not double
jeopardy cases. They do not address concepts of merger or independent effects. Instead, the
cases dealt with the unanimity problem that can arise when jurors are presented with multiple
acts, any number of which might form the basis of a criminal charge. In such circumstances,
unanimity must be ensured by either an instruction or the prosecutor’s election of “which . . .
act[ ] is relied upon for a conviction.” Coleman, 159 Wn.2d at 511 (emphasis added). A
prosecutor does not elect independent purposes or effects when presenting a case to a jury.
11
The unit of prosecution analysis is used to determine whether a defendant may be
properly charged with and convicted of multiple violations of the same statute. State v. Tvedt,
153 Wn.2d 705, 710, 107 P.3d 728 (2005). When it comes to robbery, the unit of prosecution
“is each separate forcible taking of property from or from the presence of a person having an
ownership, representative, or possessory interest in the property, against that person’s will.”
Id. at 714-15. The prior opinion held that the robbery of the ring and the robbery of the safe
were “two ‘separate forcible taking[s] of property.’ ” Knight, 196 Wn.2d at 339-40
(alteration in original). In other words, the decision held the conduct encompassed two
separate units, meaning two separate criminal acts.
16
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for robbery and felony murder. See id. at 346 (Yu, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that
the instructions at trial did not specify that the robbery forming the basis of felony
murder was “of the safe, as opposed to the robbery of the ring”); Ord. Den. Mot.
For Recons., In re Pers. Restraint of Knight, No. 97066-1, at 1 (Wash. Feb. 2, 2021)
(Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting) (pointing out the “majority opinion
misapprehended” the facts in concluding there were “two different crimes based on
two different robberies”). Yet the prior decision stood firm, without qualification:
Mr. Sanders was killed “in furtherance of” a robbery of the safe, not his ring. Knight,
196 Wn.2d at 339. At this point the decision is final and cannot be revised, regardless
of any misgivings.
Had the prior decision decided that there was only one robbery—either a single
ongoing robbery of the home or a robbery of the rings—the court’s analysis and
outcome would have been different. Our case law holds that double jeopardy prohibits
punishing felony murder separately from the underlying felony on which the murder
charge is based. See State v. Muhammad, 194 Wn.2d 577, 619, 451 P.3d 1060 (2019)
(plurality opinion) (opinion of Gordon McCloud, J.) (noting that “felony murder and
the felony on which it is based . . . must merge”); see also id. at 637 (Madsen, J.,
concurring/dissenting) (concluding that felony murder premised on rape, and the rape
17
In re Pers. Restraint of Knight
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itself, “constitute[d] one crime”);12 Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 693-94,
100 S. Ct. 1432, 63 L. Ed. 2d 715 (1980). Separate convictions and punishments are
available only if the felony murder is based on a felony that is different from other
felonies found by the jury. See Muhammad, 194 Wn.2d at 626 (opinion of Gordon
McCloud, J.). Thus, the only way the court could justify separate convictions and
punishments for Ms. Knight’s felony murder and robbery convictions was by
concluding the two crimes were based on separate conduct.
Moreover, contrary to the State’s invitation to find that the felony murder
robbery was, in hindsight, based on items taken from the upstairs of the Sanderses’
home, we are not simply free to sift through the record to find a separate basis for the
felony murder conviction other than the robbery of the safe. It is the jury’s job to find
facts, not this court’s. Stiley v. Block, 130 Wn.2d 486, 502, 925 P.2d 194 (1996).
12
Justice Gordon McCloud’s opinion in Muhammad bore three justices’ signatures.
However, the partial concurrence authored by Justice Madsen and signed by Justice Johnson
stated that it “concur[red] with . . . Justice Gordon McCloud’s opinion on the issue of double
jeopardy.” 194 Wn.2d at 633; see also id. at 637 (stating simply, “Turning to double
jeopardy, I agree with Justice Gordon McCloud”). Nor did Justice Madsen’s partial
concurrence elaborate in a way that indicated any disagreement with Justice Gordon
McCloud’s analysis. Although the predicate crime in Muhammad was first degree rape,
not first degree robbery, that superficial distinction is of no consequence to the point of
law for which we cite Muhammad. Felony murder necessarily incorporates all elements of
its predicate felony, regardless of the specific predicate felony. Just as “felony murder
[premised on first degree rape] encompasses all of the elements of first degree rape,” see id.
(Madsen, J., concurring/dissenting), felony murder premised on first degree robbery
encompasses all of the elements of first degree robbery. See id. (“Murder is not felony
murder without the underlying felony.”); accord id. at 624 (opinion of Gordon McCloud, J.)
(noting felony murder’s “unique dependence on its predicate offense”). In sum, we cite
Muhammad for legal analysis that five justices in that case agreed to.
18
In re Pers. Restraint of Knight
No. 101068-1
Where, as here, the defendant’s conviction and punishment required a finding of
distinct criminal conduct, we cannot go beyond what was established by the jury’s
verdict. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d
435 (2000); see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 153 L. Ed.
2d 556 (2002) (“If a State makes an increase in a defendant’s authorized punishment
contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no matter how the State labels it—must
be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”). This court’s prior decision
comported with this constitutional demand by deciding the jury must have found,
pursuant to the prosecutor’s election, that the felony murder was based on robbery of
the safe and therefore based on conduct separate from the first degree robbery, which
was based on robbery of the rings.
We note it is nothing new to say that application of the independent purpose
and effects test must comport with the constitutional right to have a jury decide all
facts necessary for punishment. A foundational case in this context is State v.
Freeman, where the issue was whether and when a defendant may be punished for
both a robbery elevated to first degree by an assault and the assault itself. 153 Wn.2d
at 771. In discussing the independent purposes and effects test, the Freeman court
reasoned this exception to the merger doctrine “would not apply” based on facts
“not found by the jury.” Id. at 779. Judicial speculation that a crime may have had
an independent purpose or effect is not sufficient. See id. Freeman stands for the rule
19
In re Pers. Restraint of Knight
No. 101068-1
that “the double jeopardy inquiry is into the offenses as charged and proved.” In re
Pers. Restraint of Francis, 170 Wn.2d 517, 535, 242 P.3d 866 (2010) (Madsen, C.J.,
concurring).13
Other cases are in accord. Apart from our resolution of Ms. Knight’s first
petition, the only two cases from this court where the independent purposes or effects
test was employed to justify separate punishments after a jury trial are Arndt and State
v. Vladovic, 99 Wn.2d 413, 662 P.2d 853 (1983). 14 In both cases, the court approved
separate punishment because the defendant’s different crimes of conviction involved
proof to the jury of separate victims. See Arndt, 194 Wn.2d at 819 (separate victims
for first degree murder and arson); Vladovic, 99 Wn.2d at 421-22 (separate victims for
attempted robbery and kidnapping). Neither case authorized judges to search the
record for an independent purpose or effect beyond what was established by the jury
verdicts.
13
Contrary to the dissent’s characterization, Freeman does not conflict with
Muhammad. See dissent at 16 n.6. Freeman did not involve felony murder or the unique
statutory language contained in the felony murder statute. As contemplated in Freeman,
an assault and a robbery elevated to first degree by the assault might be separately punished
if the assault was for some purpose besides “to facilitate the robbery.” 153 Wn.2d at 779.
But when it comes to felony murder, the sole purpose of the offense is to facilitate the
underlying predicate felony. “The exception to the merger rule and felony murder are
irreconcilable and cannot coexist.” Muhammad, 194 Wn.2d at 626 (opinion of Gordon
McCloud, J.).
14
The only other case from this court to justify separate punishments by virtue of
independent purposes and effects is In re Personal Restraint of Fletcher, 113 Wn.2d 42,
776 P.2d 114 (1989). Fletcher involved a guilty plea. It is an early case that did not clearly
distinguish the independent purposes and effects test from the Blockburger test.
20
In re Pers. Restraint of Knight
No. 101068-1
Because Ms. Knight’s murder and robbery convictions were based on distinct
conduct, the separate convictions and punishments did not run afoul of the protection
against double jeopardy. See Knight, 196 Wn.2d at 342.15 But as Ms. Knight points
out in her current petition, the specific conduct that the State elected as the basis for
the felony murder conviction was not actually sufficient to prove the elements of
felony murder as that charge was presented to the jury. This leaves us in the unusual
circumstance where the State’s victory in the prior decision (allowing separate
punishments for robbery and felony murder) mandates its defeat here. In theory,
Ms. Knight could have been subject to separate punishments for robbery based on
the theft of the ring and felony murder based on an attempted robbery of the safe.
But as submitted to the jury, the conviction for felony murder cannot be sustained.
Ms. Knight has demonstrated she is under restraint for a conviction that is
not supported by sufficient evidence. Thus, her petition for relief is subject to an
15
As the dissent points out, the justices who dissented from the prior decision took
the view that based on the jury instructions, the verdict could not be interpreted as finding
Ms. Knight guilty of felony murder based on a robbery of the safe, “as opposed to the
robbery of the ring,” Knight, 196 Wn.2d at 346 (Yu, J., dissenting), and therefore double
jeopardy precluded multiple punishments. Dissent at 3. But this position did not prevail. As
already explained, the Knight majority repeatedly insisted that multiple punishments were
permissible because Mr. Sanders was murdered “in furtherance of Knight’s accomplices
robbing the Sanderses of their safe.” 196 Wn.2d at 339 (emphasis added); see id. at 338-40.
It is not a re-write to make this point. Nor is it improper for the justices previously in dissent
to now adhere to the majority’s prior characterization of the record. Far from overruling the
prior decision or threatening the integrity of the court, adhering to the text of a prior opinion,
despite previous disagreements, fosters respect for the rule of law and public confidence in
the judiciary. See State v. Barber, 170 Wn.2d 854, 863, 248 P.3d 494 (2011) (observing that
standing by past opinions promotes the courts’ actual and perceived integrity).
21
In re Pers. Restraint of Knight
No. 101068-1
exception to the one-year time bar. We grant Ms. Knight’s petition and remand this
case with instructions to vacate the conviction for felony murder and for resentencing.
Pennell, J.P.T.
WE CONCUR:
22
In re Pers. Restraint of Knight, No. 101068-1 (González, C.J., concurring in part;
dissenting in part)
No. 101068-1
GONZÁLEZ, C.J. (concurring in part; dissenting in part) — Amanda Christine
Knight and her accomplices entered James and Charlene Sanders’ home under
false pretenses; terrorized the Sanderses and their children; and assaulted, robbed,
and brutally murdered James Sanders. State v. Knight, 176 Wn. App. 936, 941-44,
309 P.3d 776 (2013). They also assaulted and robbed Charlene Sanders, and stole
rings off of James’ and Charlene’s fingers. Id. at 940, 942. A jury heard the
evidence and found Knight guilty. Id. at 940. This is not under debate today.
To convict Knight of felony murder, the jury had to find that she or her
accomplices killed James Sanders in the course or furtherance of robbing him.
Clerk’s Papers (Wash. No. 97066-1 (2020)) (CP) at 336 (jury instruction 9). To
convict Knight of robbing James Sanders, the jury had to find that she or her
accomplices unlawfully took personal property from him. CP at 340 (jury
instruction 13). Nothing in either to-convict jury instruction required the jury to
determine what property had been taken.
1
In re Pers. Restraint of Knight, No. 101068-1 (González, C.J., concurring in part;
dissenting in part)
Both our state and federal constitutions explicitly forbid double jeopardy.
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9; U.S. CONST. amend. V. That means, among other things,
that a person cannot be punished twice for the same offense. State v. Contreras,
124 Wn.2d 741, 745, 880 P.2d 1000 (1994). Where, as here, a person is being
punished multiple times for crimes arising out of the same event, double jeopardy
rears its head. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180,
76 L. Ed. 306 (1932). Under Blockburger, “where,” as here, “the same act or
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each
provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Id.
As this court properly recognized three years ago, under the double jeopardy
test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Blockburger, absent an
exception, both convictions could not stand. In re Pers. Restraint of Knight, 196
Wn.2d 330, 337, 473 P.3d 663 (2020) (citing Blockburger, 284 U.S. 299). Every
element of robbing James Sanders was also an element of murdering him.
Compare CP at 366, with CP at 340. Absent clear legislative intent to punish both
crimes separately or some other exception, it violates double jeopardy to punish
Knight for both crimes. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304; State v. Freeman, 153
Wn.2d 765, 771, 108 P.3d 753 (2005).
2
In re Pers. Restraint of Knight, No. 101068-1 (González, C.J., concurring in part;
dissenting in part)
A majority of the court concluded that such an exception applied to the
crimes against James Sanders. The majority concluded that the robbery and
murder had a separate purpose or effect from the other. Knight, 196 Wn.2d at 337-
38 (quoting Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 773).
In Knight, the court concluded that the murder and the robbery had separate
effects based on a strained review of the record. While the State presented
evidence that Knight and her accomplices stole considerable property from the
Sanders family and attempted to steal more, the court concluded that the robbery
conviction was predicated on taking James Sanders’ ring from his finger. Knight,
196 Wn.2d at 338 (“Knight committed the robbery she was charged with when she
and her accomplice took James’ ring off his finger; once James was held at
gunpoint and had his ring removed, the robbery was complete.”) The murder, the
court concluded, was in furtherance of a different, uncharged attempted robbery—
an attempted robbery of a safe the Sanderses kept in the garage. Id. at 339
(“James’ ‘person or property’ was injured ‘in a separate and distinct manner’ when
he was robbed of his ring, and then injured ‘in a separate and distinct manner’
when he was shot in furtherance of Knight’s accomplices robbing the Sanderses of
3
In re Pers. Restraint of Knight, No. 101068-1 (González, C.J., concurring in part;
dissenting in part)
their safe.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Arndt, 194 Wn.2d
784, 819, 453 P.3d 696 (2019))).1
But nothing in the jury instructions suggest that the felony murder count was
based on a separate, uncharged, attempted robbery of the safe. Nor could a jury
that was faithfully following the jury instructions have returned a felony murder
guilty verdict based on the attempted robbery of the safe. As instructed, the jury
had to find that James Sanders’ murder occurred in the course or furtherance of a
completed robbery, not an attempted one. CP at 336.
Furthermore, even if Knight and her accomplices had completed a robbery
of the safe before fleeing the Sanderses’ home, a separate robbery charge would
not have been supported. “[M]ultiple counts [of robbery] may not be based on
multiple items of property taken from the same person at the same time.” State v.
1
I respectfully disagree with the dissent that “all of the justices in Knight agreed, the predicate
for Sanders’s murder is the robbery of the rings.” Dissent at 2. In fact, the majority in Knight
found that the murder was not predicated on the robbery of the rings, but on a separate
(attempted) robbery of the safe, explaining:
Knight committed the robbery she was charged with when she and her accomplice
took James’ ring off his finger; once James was held at gunpoint and had his ring
removed, the robbery was complete.
Subsequently, James was pulled up from the floor and had his zip tie
loosened in order to guide Knight’s accomplices to the safe—a separate robbery.
In the middle of this new robbery, James attacked Knight’s accomplices, who
then killed James—completing Knight’s felony murder charge, as James’ murder
was in furtherance of a second, distinct robbery.
Knight, 196 Wn.2d at 338-39.
4
In re Pers. Restraint of Knight, No. 101068-1 (González, C.J., concurring in part;
dissenting in part)
Tvedt, 153 Wn.2d 705, 720, 107 P.3d 728 (2005). Nothing in the record or in
Knight establishes that a robbery of the safe would have been a separate robbery or
that an attempted robbery charge based on things the defendants tried and failed to
steal would have been appropriate.
Accordingly, I concur with the lead opinion to this extent—if Knight was
correctly decided, insufficient evidence supports the felony murder conviction.
The to-convict instruction required a completed robbery, not an attempted one. If
Knight is good law, Knight’s murder conviction must be dismissed with prejudice.
But I write separately because this result is not just. I recognize that no
party has asked us to consider overruling Knight, but we have “inherent authority
to consider issues not raised by the parties if necessary to reach a proper decision”
and we may overrule a case that is both incorrect and harmful. State v. Cantu, 156
Wn.2d 819, 822 n.1, 132 P.3d 725 (2006) (citing Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wn.2d
448, 502 P.2d 1181 (1972)); Deggs v. Asbestos Corp., 186 Wn.2d 716, 727-28, 381
P.3d 32 (2016) (quoting In re Rights to Waters of Stranger Creek, 77 Wn.2d 649,
653, 466 P.2d 508 (1970)). Knight was incorrect then and is harmful now. Knight
was incorrect at the time because it was based on an incorrect understanding of the
record and it is harmful now because it requires this court to strike a murder
5
In re Pers. Restraint of Knight, No. 101068-1 (González, C.J., concurring in part;
dissenting in part)
conviction for insufficient evidence when the evidence presented was sufficient to
support the charge actually made and the verdict reached. 2
I would overrule Knight and vacate Knight’s conviction for robbing James
Sanders. This would avoid the injustice that follows from our mistakes in our
earlier opinion. We would do better to admit we were wrong than to double down
on our mistake. But I am constrained to concur with the lead opinion that under an
opinion that a majority of the court believes should stand, insufficient evidence
supports Knight’s felony murder conviction.
With these observations, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
2
I also respectfully disagree with the dissent that the rule of this court is that when there is no
majority opinion, the holding is the narrowest ground on which a majority agreed. Dissent at 14.
I acknowledge there are cases that have so asserted. But many other cases have held, and I agree,
that “[a] principle of law reached by a majority of the court, even in a fractured opinion, is not
considered a plurality but rather binding precedent,” regardless of whether those principles are
found in the majority, concurrence, or dissent. In re Det. of Reyes, 184 Wn.2d 340, 346, 358
P.3d 394 (2015) (citing Wright v. Terrell, 162 Wn.2d 192, 195-96, 170 P.3d 570 (2007)); see
Saleemi v. Doctor’s Assocs, 176 Wn.2d 368, 385-86, 292 P.3d 108 (2013). The relevant, but
unhelpful, holding of State v. Muhammad is that Muhammad’s felony murder and rape
convictions merged for double jeopardy purposes. 194 Wn.2d 577, 628, 451 P.3d 1060 (2019)
(opinion of Gordon McCloud, J.); id. at 637 (Madsen, J., concurring/dissenting).
6
In re Pers. Restraint of Knight (Amanda Christine)
No. 101068-1
MADSEN, J. (dissenting)—The lead opinion’s rewrite of In re Personal Restraint
of Knight, 196 Wn.2d 330, 473 P.3d 663 (2020), threatens the integrity of this court’s
decision-making process. One need only read the positions taken by dissenting members
of the Knight court to realize that the facts recited by the lead opinion today are not the
facts on which any members of the court in Knight relied.
In Knight, we upheld Amanda Knight’s separate convictions for felony murder
and first degree robbery against a double jeopardy challenge. Inherent in our analysis,
indeed its central premise, is that Knight’s felony murder conviction was based on the
robbery of James Sanders’s wedding ring. Based on the robbery of the wedding ring, we
were asked to consider whether Knight’s separate convictions for felony murder based on
that robbery and the robbery itself must merge because the conviction for both crimes
would result in unconstitutional multiple punishments in violation of double jeopardy
protections.
Ultimately, we rejected Knight’s double jeopardy claim based on the independent
purpose and effects exception to multiple punishments. That exception answers whether
No. 101068-1
Madsen, J., dissenting
two felonies, one operating as the predicate for the other, should nevertheless be punished
separately because of the independent effects caused by those crimes. State v. Freeman,
153 Wn.2d 765, 778-79, 108 P.3d 753 (2005). Where a defendant’s acts support charges
under two criminal statutes—in Knight’s case, felony murder and robbery—double
jeopardy is not violated if the legislature intended to punish those offenses separately. Id.
at 771. Knight and her accomplices engaged in a home invasion robbery of the
Sanderses’ home. During that home invasion, the robbery of the wedding rings created a
situation in which the family was zip-tied and held at gunpoint, allowing the invaders to
commit additional offenses, culminating in the death of James Sanders. The murder itself
occurred during the attempted robbery of the safe—the end in the series of robberies and
attempted robberies that stemmed from the first robbery, that of the wedding rings, which
the Sanderses had advertised online and which were the intended objects of the home
invasion.
Contrary to the lead opinion’s assertion, the discussion of these events in Knight
does not make the attempted robbery of the safe the predicate of the felony murder. As
all of the justices in Knight agreed, the predicate for Sanders’s murder is the robbery of
the rings. While there was disagreement regarding the independent effect doctrine, the
majority of this court held that the attempted robbery of the safe constituted the
independent effect of the robbery and the murder, justifying an exception to the double
jeopardy merger doctrine, not the predicate crime for felony murder.
2
No. 101068-1
Madsen, J., dissenting
Our 2020 decision in Knight, properly read, discusses these statements about the
attempted robbery of the safe within the accepted framework of our double jeopardy case
law, specifically the “well established exception” to merger—the independent purpose
test. Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 778. The lead opinion ignores this framework, choosing
instead to decontextualize the references to the robbery of the safe, resulting in a
misinterpretation of our 2020 decision and unjustifiably overturning Knight’s conviction
for felony murder.
In the view of the entire court in 2020, including the dissent, Knight’s felony
murder conviction was premised on the robbery of James Sanders’s wedding ring. Our
2020 decision is now the law of the case. RAP 2.5(c); Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish
County, 119 Wn.2d 91, 113, 829 P.2d 746 (1992) (a subsequent appellate court will not
revisit the holdings of the first appellate court in the same case). And the law of the case
for Knight’s second personal restraint petition (PRP) says nothing about the robbery of
the safe as the predicate offense for felony murder. To claim otherwise, as the lead
opinion does, ignores the law of the case and undermines public confidence in the court
as an institution that follows its own precedent and rules, and is mindful of its
responsibility to decide the law honestly and consistently.
Our 2020 decision holds unambiguously that the robbery of the rings is the
predicate for felony murder. Thus, the jury’s convictions were supported by sufficient
evidence and Knight’s insufficiency claim should be rejected.
3
No. 101068-1
Madsen, J., dissenting
Discussion
Because both Knight’s current petition and the lead opinion here turn on the
meaning of our 2020 decision, we must start there.
1. The 2020 Majority Decision Did Not Hold the Robbery of the Safe Was the
Underlying Offense for Felony Murder
In a 5-4 vote, this court held that Knight’s convictions for felony murder and
robbery against James Sanders did not violate double jeopardy. Knight, 196 Wn.2d at
336. The 2020 majority opinion began with the basics.
The federal and state constitutions protect defendants from being convicted for the
same offense twice. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9).
Double jeopardy concerns arise generally when the State attempts to prosecute twice for
the same crime in a subsequent prosecution. However, double jeopardy may be
implicated when the State brings multiple charges within the same prosecution, as in this
case. See State v. Calle, 125 Wn.2d 769, 772, 888 P.2d 155 (1995).
To constitute the “‘same offense’” under double jeopardy, two offenses must be
the same in both law and fact. Knight, 196 Wn.2d at 336 (quoting State v. Arndt, 194
Wn.2d 784, 815, 453 P.3d 696 (2019)). When a defendant’s actions support charges
under two criminal statutes within the same prosecution, reviewing courts look to
legislative intent to determine whether the offenses are the same. Id. (quoting Freeman,
153 Wn.2d at 771).
In this legislative intent inquiry, courts first scrutinize the statutes themselves. Id.
The 2020 opinion noted that neither the statutes for felony murder and first degree
4
No. 101068-1
Madsen, J., dissenting
robbery nor their legislative history specifically authorized separate punishments. Id.
(citing RCW 9A.32.030; RCW 9A.56.190, .200). Thus, the majority concluded that the
legislative intent was unclear.
Next, the 2020 majority reviewed Knight’s convictions under Blockburger v.
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932). The Blockburger test
provides that when the same act or transaction violates two distinct statutory provisions,
to determine whether there are two offenses or one, the test is whether each provision
requires proof of a fact that the other does not. Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 772. The 2020
majority found the felony murder and robbery of James Sanders satisfied Blockburger,
but pointed out that other exceptions may apply. Knight, 196 Wn.2d at 337. Pursuant to
the merger doctrine, when an offense’s degree is raised by conduct separately
criminalized by the legislature, courts presume the legislature intended to punish both
offenses through the greater sentence for the greater crime. Id. (quoting Freeman, 153
Wn.2d at 772-73). The majority opinion determined that felony murder is an offense
raised by the separately criminalized conduct of first degree robbery. Id.
Nevertheless, the majority stated, its double jeopardy analysis was not finished.
Even if two offenses appear to be the same or for charges that would merge “‘on an
abstract level,’” if an independent purpose or effect exists for each, they may be punished
separately. Id. (quoting Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 773). This exception to merger requires
a crime to “‘injure the person or property of the victim or others in a separate and distinct
5
No. 101068-1
Madsen, J., dissenting
manner from the crime for which it also serves as an element.’” Id. at 338 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arndt, 194 Wn.2d at 819).
The 2020 majority decision then concluded that a “clear independent effect”
distinguished James Sanders’s murder from the separately charged robbery. Id. Knight
had “completed” the first charged robbery when she and her accomplices took Sanders’s
ring and held him at gunpoint. Id. That is, the act of taking the ring had been
accomplished, but Knight and her accomplices had not completed the act of robbery; they
had not fled the scene, rather they continued to commit other takings and attempted
takings.
After the ring was taken, Sanders was hauled from the floor to show the intruders
the safe. The continuing crimes, including this second robbery of the safe, culminated in
Sanders’s death. Id. at 338-39. Sanders’s person or property was injured in a distinct
manner when he was robbed of his ring and then injured in a distinct manner when he
was shot during the robbery of the safe. Id. at 339. The majority’s discussion of the safe
coincides with the killing of James Sanders in order to explain the independent effect of
the robbery and murder.
Knight’s discussion of the “completed” robbery of the ring distinguished
this case from Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 769. 1 There, a defendant’s first degree assault and
1
The 2020 opinion’s use of the word “complete” may have caused confusion. Knight’s
insufficiency argument rests, in part, on her assertion that this court “held” that the robbery of the
rings was “complete.” However, the word “complete” was used in analyzing the separate effects
analysis under double jeopardy. It was not used to suggest the robbery was complete in the legal
6
No. 101068-1
Madsen, J., dissenting
first degree robbery charges were merged when the defendant ordered the victim at
gunpoint to hand over his valuables, the victim refused, and the defendant shot and
robbed the victim. Id. This court held that the shooting facilitated the robbery in a single
transaction, thus the charges had no independent purposes or effects. Id. at 779.
Knight’s convictions, by contrast, resulted in separate injuries. These injuries persuaded
this court to hold that Knight’s convictions against Sanders (robbery of his wedding ring
and murder) had independent effects from each other, did not merge, and therefore did
not violate double jeopardy. 2
It is worth noting that the facts supporting Knight’s felony murder charge are more
complicated than other felony murder cases. Though not directly involving a felony
murder charge, Freeman presents a common scenario for such an offense: a victim is
sense. In law, the State can charge either robbery or attempted robbery. RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c)
(a person is guilty of murder when they commit or attempt to commit the crime of robbery).
2
The Knight majority also disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ “transactional analysis of
robbery” to conclude the taking of the ring had not been completed until James Sanders was shot
and was only complete when Knight and her accomplices fled. 196 Wn.2d at 339. The court
explained that the transactional view concerns the force required to complete a robbery, not the
offense itself. Id. (citing State v. Johnson, 155 Wn.2d 609, 611, 121 P.3d 91 (2005)). Today’s
lead opinion reasons that our 2020 decision did not “make clumsy use of the word ‘complete’ . . .
[that] decision repeatedly, emphatically, and through the use of different synonyms insisted that
the murder of Mr. Sanders occurred in furtherance of a different robbery than the robbery of the
rings that formed the basis of Ms. Knight’s robbery conviction.” Lead opinion at 14 (footnote
and internal quotation marks omitted). Again, the lead opinion reads our past decision out of
context. By selecting portions of Knight that discuss James Sanders’s murder in reference to the
robbery of the safe, the lead opinion ignores the opinion’s analytical architecture—we were
reviewing Knight’s double jeopardy claim, specifically whether her convictions for felony
murder based on the robbery of the wedding ring must merge. It would be Kafkaesque indeed
for this court to rule counter to the record and Knight’s own claim that the predicate felony was
the robbery of the safe rather than robbery of the rings. Knight, 196 Wn.2d at 333 (“Knight now
challenges these convictions under double jeopardy . . . , arguing that her robbery and felony
murder conviction against James . . . should merge.”).
7
No. 101068-1
Madsen, J., dissenting
robbed and then shot to facilitate the robbery. 153 Wn.2d at 769, 779. Here, Knight and
her accomplices took the wedding rings, allowing the group to zip-tie the Sanders family;
continue ransacking the house for other valuables; and commit other crimes, including
the attempted robbery of the safe; and resulting in James Sanders’s murder. Unlike the
defendant in Freeman, who shot the robbery victim to facilitate the single predicate
crime, Knight and the other home invaders committed numerous offenses after taking the
wedding rings (the predicate crime). The murder did not simply facilitate the crime of
robbery of the rings. That robbery set up the subsequent offenses, ultimately leading to
murder.
Finally, the 2020 majority concluded that the State made a proper election.
Prosecutors listed each count and the acts supporting the charged offenses during closing
arguments. Knight, 196 Wn.2d at 340 (citing State v. Carson, 184 Wn.2d 207, 227, 357
P.3d 1064 (2015)). Though the State did not do so with precision for the felony murder
and robbery charges, it set out the sequence of events to show “the robbery of the ring
was complete before Knight’s accomplices engaged in another robbery” of the safe and
the resulting murder. Id. 3
3
According to the lead opinion, Knight’s reference to the transactional analysis and unit of
prosecution is an attempt to show “consisten[cy] with the jury instructions” that required two
separately charged robberies. Lead opinion at 16. Again, context provides the answer. Knight
disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ reliance on the transactional analysis and disagreed with
Knight’s argument that the jury instructions were insufficiently specific to connect which acts
support which convictions. Knight, 196 Wn.2d at 339-40. The Knight court noted that none of
the cases Knight cited held that a lack of specificity supported a double jeopardy violation. Id. at
340. The court then explained that Knight’s argument “seem[ed] to relate” to State v. Coleman,
159 Wn.2d 509, 150 P.3d 1126 (2007), and, depending on the prosecution’s statements at closing
8
No. 101068-1
Madsen, J., dissenting
Four members of the court dissented. Id. at 344 (Yu, J., dissenting). Importantly,
however, the dissent agreed with the majority’s logical approach to double jeopardy—
specifically, the offenses for robbery and felony murder were the same under
Blockburger and would merge but for the independent purpose and effects exception. Id.
at 344-45. The dissent faulted the majority for relying on the attempted robbery of the
safe as an independent effect of the murder when the jury instructions required the
murder to occur in the course of or furtherance of the robbery of James Sanders. Id. at
345. The dissent did not argue or characterize the majority as predicating felony murder
on robbery of the safe. The dissent read the majority as identifying the murder’s
“independent effect” of facilitating the attempted robbery of the safe. Id. at 345. 4
Read properly, the 2020 majority opinion did not hold the robbery of the safe was
the predicate offense for Knight’s felony murder conviction. It reviewed Knight’s claim
that her convictions for robbery of the wedding ring and felony murder must merge. See
id. at 333. To analyze this argument, the majority applied our double jeopardy case law,
specifically the independent purposes and effects inquiry. Id. at 337-38. In that context,
the majority identified the distinct injuries James Sanders suffered during the home
invasion and noted that during one criminal act (attempted robbery of the safe), Sanders
was murdered. While the robbery of the wedding rings, the original purpose of the home
argument, could have resulted in the separate and distinct issue of improper election. See id. at
339-40.
4
The dissent also disagreed that the State properly elected the facts it relied on for the murder
conviction and would have held the robbery of James merged with his murder.
9
No. 101068-1
Madsen, J., dissenting
invasion, resulted in the murder of James Sanders, it had the separate effect of setting up
a series of additional injuries to the Sanders family, including the attempted robbery of
the safe. Id. at 338-39. The dissent agreed that the independent purpose test is an
exception to the merger doctrine, but it parted ways with the majority’s application of the
test to the facts of this case.
Put another way, the 2020 majority opinion’s double jeopardy analysis presumes
the felony murder conviction was based on the robbery of the wedding ring. Otherwise
this court had no reason to consider whether two convictions that would generally merge
may nevertheless be separately punished if they have independent effects. See id. at 337-
38.
The majority’s references to the safe were intended to explain the independent
effects by identifying separate and distinct injuries to James Sanders. The independent
effects inquiry explores whether other effects or injuries exist in addition to the purpose
or effect of furthering the underlying felony. See Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 778-79. The
2020 decision’s references to the Sanders family’s safe did not transform the attempted
robbery of the safe into the predicate for felony murder; it was identified only as an
additional effect or injury.
Yet Knight now contends that our 2020 decision did just that. Today’s lead
opinion inexplicably agrees—despite hearing this case only three years ago and, as
explained above, no member of the 2020 court ever viewed the safe robbery as the
predicate offense to felony murder. See Knight, 196 Wn.2d at 338-39; id. at 344 (Yu, J.,
10
No. 101068-1
Madsen, J., dissenting
dissenting). Indeed, the dissent to our order denying reconsideration and the dissent to
the 2020 opinion expressly accepted that the “key question for us was whether Knight’s
convictions of both (1) felony-murder-based-on-robbery of James Sanders and (2)
robbery of James Sanders, violated double jeopardy.” Ord. Den. Mot. for Recons., In re
Pers. Restraint of Knight, No. 97066-1, at 2 (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added); Knight, 196 Wn.2d at 344-45 (Yu, J., dissenting). Where the court disagreed was
the application of the exception to merger pursuant to the independent purposes test.
Ord. Den. Mot. for Recons., supra, at 3; Knight, 196 Wn.2d at 345 (Yu, J., dissenting).
From the Court of Appeals to the reconsideration order in this court, no opinion
disagreed that the robbery of the ring served as the predicate offense for felony murder.
In re Pers. Restraint of Knight, No. 49337-3-II, slip op. at 10-11 (Wash. Ct. App.
March 14, 2019) (unpublished) (Melnick, J., lead opinion) (concluding James Sanders’s
death occurred in the course of or furtherance of the robbery of the ring),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2049337-3-
II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf; id. at 17 (Bjorgen, J.P.T., concurring in part,
dissenting in part); id. at 22 (Sutton, J., dissenting in part); Knight, 196 Wn.2d at 336, 338
(concluding Knight’s convictions for felony murder and robbery of the ring do not violate
double jeopardy); id. at 345 (Yu, J., dissenting) (disagreeing that the robbery of the ring
served independent effects from the murder); see also Ord. Den. Mot. for Recons., supra,
at 6-7 (noting the State affirmatively relied on the taking of the ring when explaining the
11
No. 101068-1
Madsen, J., dissenting
robbery on which the felony murder was based and did not assert that it was the taking of
the safe as predicate for the murder).
The lead opinion charges the State with recharacterizing the basis of Knight’s
felony murder conviction. Lead opinion at 13. For example, the State argued the second
robbery (the predicate for felony murder) was the taking of any number of other
valuables from the Sanders home, but the State then changed course at oral argument
saying that there were never two distinct robberies. Id. at 13-14. The lead opinion
misunderstands two points. First, any shifting basis on the State’s part for the predicate
felony in its appellate briefing and at oral argument was offered as a response to Knight’s
insufficiency of the evidence claim, not to a claim of double jeopardy. The “critical
inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must
be . . . to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S. Ct. 2781,
61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). “[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319 (emphasis
omitted). The record, not an attorney’s argument, guides our inquiry. See id. at 318-19.
Second, if the State had succeeded in showing that evidence of other robberies could
have supported Knight’s felony murder conviction, separate issues may have arisen, such
as whether the State properly elected at trial which of the several robberies it was relying
12
No. 101068-1
Madsen, J., dissenting
on for the felony murder charge. In that case, the remedy would not be reversal based on
insufficient evidence but on the State’s failure to elect.
The lead opinion’s analysis rests entirely on the meaning of our 2020 decision.
Tellingly, the lead opinion devotes little time to explaining how it arrived at its
conclusion that “[t]he decision governing Ms. Knight’s prior petition held the robbery
that provided the basis for the felony murder charge was the robbery of the safe.” Lead
opinion at 12 (citing Knight, 196 Wn.2d at 339 (“concluding that Mr. Sanders was fatally
shot ‘in furtherance of Knight’s accomplices robbing the Sanderses of their safe’”)).
Instead of analyzing the facts and law as set out in the 2020 decision, the lead opinion
here cites a different case for the assertion that double jeopardy as a general matter
precludes punishing felony murder separately from its underlying felony. Lead opinion
at 17 (citing State v. Muhammad, 194 Wn.2d 577, 619, 626, 451 P.3d 1060 (2019)
(plurality opinion); id. at 637 (Madsen, J., concurring/dissenting)). This is problematic
for three reasons.
First, the lead opinion has little recourse but to look outside of our Knight opinion
because that decision plainly did not hold Knight’s felony murder conviction was
predicated on the robbery of the safe. See lead opinion at 15.
Second, Muhammad does not stand for the proposition the lead opinion says it
does. According to the lead decision, Muhammad held that double jeopardy precludes
punishing felony murder separately from its predicate offense and that a defendant can be
convicted separately only if felony murder is based on a different felony from other
13
No. 101068-1
Madsen, J., dissenting
felonies found by a jury. Id. at 17-18 (citing Muhammad, 194 Wn.2d at 619, 626, 637).
Therefore, Knight had to conclude the murder and robbery convictions were based on
separate conduct in order to justify separate convictions and punishments. Id. As I have
just explained, Knight did not make this conclusion nor was it required to because it
relied on the exception to merger.
My partial concurrence and dissent provided the votes necessary to achieve a
holding in Muhammad. In my view, the felony murder charge encompassed all of the
elements of first degree rape, constituting one crime under Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
Therefore, two offenses containing the same elements must merge to protect against
double jeopardy. Muhammad, 194 Wn.2d at 637 (Madsen, J., concurring/dissenting). I
said then and I agree now with this general rule. However, I did not agree with and
therefore did not sign Justice Gordon McCloud’s opinion concluding that separate
convictions and punishments can stand only if felony murder is based on a felony
different from its predicate. See lead opinion at 18 (citing Muhammad, 194 Wn.2d at
626); Muhammad, 194 Wn.2d at 626 (“The exception to the merger rule and felony
murder are irreconcilable and cannot coexist.”).
When there is no majority opinion in a case, the holding is the narrowest ground
on which a majority agreed. In re Pers. Restraint of Francis, 170 Wn.2d 517, 532 n.7,
242 P.3d 866 (2010) (citing State v. Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379, 391, 219 P.3d 651 (2009)).
Justice Gordon McCloud’s opinion in Muhammad received three votes. That opinion
concludes, in relevant part, that the two convictions (rape and felony murder) must merge
14
No. 101068-1
Madsen, J., dissenting
so as not to violate double jeopardy. Muhammad, 194 Wn.2d at 622. The opinion also
concluded that the exception to merger (independent purpose and effects) did not apply,
in response to the lead opinion by Justice Wiggins. See id. My partial concurrence
agreed with Justice Gordon McCloud on the issue of double jeopardy, specifically
“[b]ecause felony murder encompasses all of the elements of first degree rape, they
constitute one crime” and must merge. Id. at 637 (Madsen, J., concurring/dissenting).
My opinion did not discuss the exception to merger doctrine, unlike Justice Gordon
McCloud’s opinion. Accordingly, the conclusion that “[t]he exception to the merger rule
and felony murder are irreconcilable and cannot coexist” did not receive five votes and is
not precedential. Id. at 626; see Francis, 170 Wn.2d at 532 n.7. The lead opinion in this
case persists in citing the proposition as binding law. See, e.g., majority at 18 n.12, 20
n.13. It is not. It was not decided in Muhammad and, until today, had yet to be
resolved. 5
Third, our double jeopardy case law holds the opposite—as this court’s 2020
decision made clear, viz., applying the independent purpose exception. See Knight, 196
Wn.2d at 337-38 (“[U]nder the merger doctrine, ‘even if on an abstract level two
5
If the lead opinion wished to resolve the issue, it should have done so openly and in the
appropriate circumstance; namely, a case squarely presenting the issue with responsive briefing
from parties and amici curiae, rather than retrofitting a previous case to support its holding in the
current case. This willingness to rewrite and quietly transform settled case law is alarming. As
the highest court in Washington State, our duty is not just producing a correct and just
outcome—equally important is the way by which we arrive at that outcome. Ignoring the rules
that guide our analysis can be inconvenient, even maddening at times. Yet each time we ignore
and flout those rules, we lessen the weight of our opinions and devalue the judicial process. This
court must hold itself to a higher standard.
15
No. 101068-1
Madsen, J., dissenting
convictions appear to be for the same offense or for charges that would merge, if there is
an independent purpose or effect to each, they may be punished as separate offenses.’”
(quoting Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 773)). Knight relied on Freeman’s articulation of the
exception, reasoning that the robbery of the rings was the predicate of felony murder and
constituted one complete robbery; the robbery of the safe was a second, incomplete
robbery leading to James Sanders’s murder—independent and additional effects. Id. at
338-40 (quoting and citing Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 769, 779; quoting Arndt, 194 Wn.2d
at 819). Freeman involved first degree robbery premised on assault in one transaction
with the shooting furthering the robbery. See 153 Wn.2d at 769, 779. That is, one
predicate offense (assault) and the subject offense (robbery). Because we found no
independent effect, we concluded the exception to merger did not apply. But we did not
hold or even caution that the exception could never apply in such a circumstance. Nor
did Muhammad. Even if it did, Muhammad did not overrule Freeman and neither has the
lead opinion in the present case. Instead, the lead opinion has elevated Muhammad to
binding precedent: that felony murder cannot be punished separately from its underlying
felony. This is plainly in tension with Freeman. 6
6
Readers will no doubt ask, “Which is correct, Muhammad or Freeman?” The lead opinion
leaves this question for another day, setting up an inevitable conflict future courts must muddle
through and should give pause to the members of this court who signed both the concurrence in
Muhammad and today’s lead opinion, as well as the dissenting justices in Knight, who
acknowledged the independent purpose and effect exception. Future courts and parties will also
be left to determine whether the exception to merger continues to exist in the context of felony
murder. The lead opinion’s declaration that the issue is settled rings hollow when it relies on a
three-vote concurrence in Muhammad that does not carry the weight of precedent. See 194
Wn.2d at 626 (opinion of Gordon McCloud, J.) (stating the predicate felony always merges with
16
No. 101068-1
Madsen, J., dissenting
The lead opinion acknowledges the existence of the independent purpose
exception but cautions that it “‘would not apply’ based on facts ‘not found by the jury.’”
Lead opinion at 19 (quoting Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 779). The lead opinion latches on to
this correct statement of the law to declare that the exception has no bearing here because
it cannot save a jury finding based on insufficient evidence and insufficient evidence
supports Knight’s felony murder conviction, which our 2020 decision held was premised
on robbery of the Sanderses’ safe. Lead opinion at 13-20. Such circular reasoning is all
the lead opinion can offer because insufficient evidence and jury instructions are
irrelevant. Knight’s argument, and that of the lead opinion, rests not on the facts but on
how the 2020 decision characterized those facts. To be clear, our 2020 decision
thoroughly and thoughtfully considered those facts in the context of double jeopardy and
upheld Knight’s convictions pursuant to the independent purpose exception.
2. The Lead Opinion Effectively Overrules the 2020 Decision
The lead opinion fails to read our 2020 decision in context. The lead opinion
focuses only on the statements about the robbery of the Sanders family’s safe without
situating those statements in the framework of double jeopardy, which was the only issue
the court was asked to decide. This does significant harm.
felony murder); see also id. at 637 (Madsen, J., concurring/dissenting) (concluding the
conviction for rape merged with the conviction for felony murder); State v. Barber, 170 Wn.2d
854, 864, 248 P.3d 494 (2011) (explaining that a past decision is “incorrect if it relies on
authority to support a proposition that the authority itself does not actually support”).
17
No. 101068-1
Madsen, J., dissenting
As I have explored in detail above, our 2020 decision simply does not hold what
the lead opinion says it does. By claiming the opposite, the lead opinion suggests the
previous court did not understand double jeopardy, the facts of Knight’s case, or both.
See lead opinion at 2 (stating the 2020 decision did “not anticipate[]” Knight would raise
a challenge that insufficient evidence of a complete robbery of the safe was presented to
support felony murder). Yet it is the lead opinion that appears to misunderstand double
jeopardy when it fails to contextualize how the 2020 decision discussed the safe
robbery—the resulting injury (death of James Sanders) was an independent effect from
the robbery of the ring.
Moreover, the lead opinion does not misconstrue a minor fact or point of law in
the 2020 decision. The lead opinion replaces the predicate felony of the robbery of the
ring with the robbery of the safe. This is the critical fact of the 2020 decision. This is
more than interpreting. It is rewriting.
While rewriting settled case law is convenient, it ignores the established process
that this court and all appellate courts must use when revisiting a prior decision.
Adherence to past decisions, stare decisis, is fundamental to our judicial system. See
State v. Barber, 170 Wn.2d 854, 863, 248 P.3d 494 (2011). It promotes predictable and
consistent development of legal doctrines and furthers the actual and perceived integrity
of the judicial process. See id.; In re Rights to Waters of Stranger Creek, 77 Wn.2d 649,
653, 466 P.2d 508 (1970). This court will revisit a prior decision only on “‘a clear
18
No. 101068-1
Madsen, J., dissenting
showing that an established rule is incorrect and harmful.’” State v. Otton, 185 Wn.2d
673, 678, 374 P.3d 1108 (2016) (quoting Stranger Creek, 77 Wn.2d at 653).
No party in this case argued that the 2020 decision was incorrect and harmful. 7
Rather, Knight advanced an erroneous reading of that decision and the lead opinion
eagerly adopted it. Inherent in Knight’s (and now the lead opinion’s) argument is that the
2020 decision stands for a proposition it does not. The lead opinion did not overrule
what the 2020 decision plainly held—the lead opinion rewrites it, disregarding our
precedent and the fundamental principle of stare decisis. The lead opinion creates
confusion under the guise of clarification and undermines the public perception that this
court follows its own rules.
The lead opinion answers the criticism that it is breaking with the decision-making
process of this court by doubling down on its original error—reimagining the holding of
our 2020 decision that the robbery of the safe was the predicate offense for felony
murder. The lead opinion goes on to say the dissenting justices in Knight focused on the
jury instructions requiring a completed robbery, which the safe robbery was not; thus, in
the dissenting justices’ view, the robbery of the rings and felony murder convictions had
to merge. See lead opinion at 21 n.15. But, as I have repeatedly attempted to explain in
this dissent, our 2020 decision held that the robbery of the rings and felony murder did
7
Nor did any party argue the independent purpose exception was incorrect. Today’s lead
opinion is obviously dissatisfied with that exception, but rather than grappling with its
application in Knight, the lead opinion rewrites the case. The dissatisfaction with the
independent purpose exception remains unresolved and now operates in a more confusing
precedential framework.
19
No. 101068-1
Madsen, J., dissenting
not merge because they resulted in independent purposes and effects. In other words, the
jury instructions were not implicated in Knight’s analysis because the robbery of the rings
was always understood to be the predicate felony and a completed robbery.
Regardless of the lead opinion’s best efforts, our decision in 2020 did not disturb
the predicate offense for felony murder. It was then and remains now the robbery of
James Sanders’s wedding ring. The lead opinion may console itself that it is merely
following precedent, but even a casual reader will see that is not the case. See, e.g., id. at
17-18 (discussing the separate opinions and holdings on felony murder in Muhammad).
3. The 2020 Decision Is the Law of the Case
Knight’s first PRP challenged her felony murder and robbery convictions as
violating double jeopardy. As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the 2020 court
reviewed Knight’s claim and reasoned that an independent effect resulted from the
robbery of the safe as compared to the robbery of the ring, and therefore no double
jeopardy violation occurred. The 2020 decision is now the law of the case for Knight’s
second petition, which depends entirely on that decision.
The law of the case doctrine “stands for the proposition that once there is an
appellate holding enunciating a principle of law, that holding will be followed in
subsequent stages of the same litigation.” Roberson v. Perez, 156 Wn.2d 33, 41, 123
P.3d 844 (2005). Therefore, questions an appellate court has answered will not be
reconsidered in a subsequent appeal if there is no substantial change in the evidence.
Lutheran Day Care, 119 Wn.2d at 113.
20
No. 101068-1
Madsen, J., dissenting
Here, as previously noted, Knight contends that the 2020 decision identified the
robbery of the safe as the predicate offense for felony murder. Because the safe robbery
was not complete when the jury instructions required a completed offense, Knight claims
insufficient evidence supports her murder conviction. This is an incorrect reading of our
decision and does not point to any substantial change in the evidence warranting a second
look at her original case.
Our 2020 decision makes resolving Knight’s second PRP a straightforward matter.
The 2020 majority opinion held (and the dissenting justices agreed), the robbery of James
Sanders’s wedding ring served as the predicate offense for the felony murder charge. A
majority of the court concluded that these offenses do not merge because the injuries
Sanders sustained were distinct and separate from each other, satisfying the independent
purpose exception to merger. Therefore, I would dismiss Knight’s petition as untimely.
See RCW 10.73.100(4).
With these considerations in mind, I respectfully dissent.
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No. 101068-1
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