State of New Jersey v. Christopher R. small/state of New Jersey v. Christopher M. Verity

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2255-19
A-3381-19

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CHRISTOPHER R. SMALL,
a/k/a STICKEY SMALL,
CHRISTOPHER J. SMALL,
STICKY SMALL, and
CHRISTOPHER SMALL,

Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CHRISTOPHER M. VERITY,
a/k/a CHRISTOPHER VERITY,
LEONARD C. VERITY, and
DENNISVIL VERITY,

Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
 Argued October 16, 2023—Decided November 16, 2023

Before Judges Sabatino, Mawla, and Chase (Judge
Sabatino concurring).

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Cape May County, Indictment No 19-06-
0291.

Tamar Yael Lerer, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant Christopher R. Small
(Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Tamar
Yael Lerer, of counsel and on the briefs).

Andrew Robert Burroughs, Designated Counsel,
argued the cause for appellant Christopher M. Verity
(Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Andrew
Robert Burroughs, on the briefs).

Gretchen Anderson Pickering, Senior Assistant
Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Jeffrey H.
Sutherland, Cape May County Prosecutor, attorney;
Gretchen Anderson Pickering, of counsel and on the
briefs).

PER CURIAM

In these back-to-back appeals, defendants Christopher M. Verity and

Christopher R. Small challenge their convictions and sentences for causing a

drug-induced death and other controlled dangerous substance (CDS) offenses.

We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part for the reasons expressed in

this opinion.

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 On October 3, 2018, J.C., a retired nurse, was driving north in Dennis

Township when she saw a man walking from a van parked on the side of the

road. She asked the man, whom she identified in court as Verity, whether he

needed a ride and Verity said he did. J.C. then drove Verity south and dropped

him off.

J.C. then drove back north on the same road and passed the van again and

noticed a man, later identified as Jan McCurdy, slumped over the steering wheel.

She pulled over, walked to the van, and noticed McCurdy's face was discolored

and had froth coming out of it. She called 9-1-1 and administered CPR. J.C.

also noticed another man lying down with his head partially under the driver's

seat. This individual, later identified as Kevin MacFarlane, was not breathing.

New Jersey State Trooper Brian McGinn arrived at the scene and did not

find any drug paraphernalia in the van. EMT John Sharp arrived and

unsuccessfully attempted to resuscitate MacFarlane who was later pronounced

dead at the hospital. McCurdy was administered Narcan, revived, and taken to

the hospital.

State Police Detective Kenneth Drake was the lead detective. He testified

he arrived at the scene shortly after MacFarlane was pronounced dead. After

interviewing J.C., Detective Drake visited Verity's residence and noticed a

A-2255-19
3
needle, which contained fentanyl, and Verity appeared to be intoxicated. Police

brought Verity back to State Police barracks for an interview. Detective Drake

and Trooper Grant Stambaugh conducted the first interview on October 3, 2018,

which was videoed and played for the jury.

Having been placed in custody, Verity was properly read his Miranda

rights, which he promptly waived before he was questioned. 1 He stated he called

McCurdy to ask for a ride to a convenience store to buy cigarettes. When

McCurdy arrived to pick up Verity, McCurdy had MacFarlane with him. Verity

did not know MacFarlane. Verity stated as they drove to the convenience store

McCurdy and MacFarlane appeared to be intoxicated. On the way back from

the store, McCurdy was driving erratically and had driven through a red light.

Thereafter, Verity exited the van and walked about 200 feet before J.C. offered

to give him a ride. Verity denied that drugs were "being done" in the car,

claimed he did not see MacFarlane and McCurdy doing drugs, and denied selling

both men drugs. Verity admitted he had a heroin problem and had ingested

heroin that morning.

Detective Drake and Trooper Stambaugh told Verity they did not believe

him. When Detective Drake informed Verity one of the men had survived,

1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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4
Verity stated he was told both men were dead. After correcting Verity, Detective

Drake stated:

I don't want to have to put words in your mouth about
what the truth is. 'Cause the truth is . . . you're not
telling us the truth right now because you're scared and
I understand that and a normal person would be scared
of this. We aren't here to get you in trouble for the guy
that died in the car we are here . . . .

[Trooper] Stambaugh: We're just trying to find out the
truth.

Detective Drake and Trooper Stambaugh told Verity his story did not

make any sense and then the detective stated:

I want to tell you right now you are not really . . . in any
trouble with us. However, if you keep lying to us and
we keep uncovering things that you're lying about I'm
going to make it my priority to make sure you are in
trouble, but as of right now I'm goin' to tell you right
now you are not in trouble with us, ok?

The detective reiterated he had "a pretty good idea why [MacFarlane] died . . .

because there was a person across the street that saw the interaction" and

McCurdy was alive and told police his version of the story, which did not align

with Verity's.

As the interview progressed, Detective Drake assured Verity he and the

trooper were not there "to put [Verity] in jail for some dead bodies . . . ." Later,

Detective Drake said:

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 I'm not really here to jam you up . . . . I know you don't
believe that, we're really not lookin' to put you in jail
we're looking to figure out why.

Verity: I'm already in trouble because I have
paraphernalia shit sittin' out.

[Trooper] Stambaugh: Right and if you want to keep it
at that we need to know.

There was a break in the interview and, when it resumed, police read

defendant his Miranda rights again. State Police Detective Desirae Kramer

joined in the interview and showed Verity security tape from the convenience

store. Verity recounted his story and stated on the drive back from the store,

McCurdy was driving but then both McCurdy and MacFarlane began nodding

off. Verity grabbed the wheel and hit the brakes. When McCurdy awoke, he

told Verity to get out of the vehicle and Verity complied. Verity denied

providing drugs to McCurdy and MacFarlane or seeing them use drugs.

Police interviewed Verity a second time on the evening of October 3,

2018. Verity was read his Miranda rights and signed a form acknowledging his

rights. He then agreed to let the police listen to recordings he made his phone

of his conversation with McCurdy prior to being picked up to go to the

convenience store.

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 Verity stated McCurdy called Verity that day asking if he could obtain

heroin. Verity took McCurdy's and MacFarlane's money and bought them each

"two wax folds" at five dollars per fold and purchased marijuana for himself.

Verity purchased the drugs from "his guy" who, according to Verity, was upset

Verity had come with two other individuals. Verity used McCurdy's phone to

contact the seller because his phone had died.

A day later, Detective Drake obtained surveillance footage showing

Verity, McCurdy, and MacFarlane arriving at the seller's location, a motel, in a

vehicle matching the one MacFarlane and McCurdy were later found in. The

video showed Verity leaving the vehicle and then returning. Small was the

seller. He was arrested on October 5, 2018. After conducting a search incident

to Small's arrest, blue wax folds, a scale, and baggies were found in his motel

room.

Police interviewed Verity a third time on October 22, 2018, and showed

him the surveillance video. He was read his Miranda rights on this date and

signed an acknowledgment. He confirmed he was the one who exited the vehicle

to meet the seller. Verity stated he believed the two wax folds he obtained for

McCurdy and MacFarlane contained heroin. At one point, Verity asked the

officers, "[h]ow many more deaths have you guys had?" Detective Drake replied

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"[a]fter this one, there was one that night, but there hasn't been any since really."

Verity responded, "So, I helped take out the killer." He offered to help police

"catch more people."

A Cape May grand jury indicted Small and Verity with first-degree drug-

induced death, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9(a), (counts one and

two); third-degree distribution of fentanyl, less than one ounce, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-

5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(5) (counts three and four); third-degree

conspiracy to distribute a CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(5)

and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1) (count five). Verity was also indicted on two counts

of third-degree endangering an injured victim, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(a) (counts six

and seven).

Verity moved to suppress his statements to the police. 2 Detective Drake

testified at the hearing Verity never invoked his right to remain silent or

requested an attorney. The detective testified Verity was being questioned as

part of the investigation of the overdose death and "at the time, he wasn't

charged" regarding the death. He was seeking information from Verity about

the incident and to gauge the level of his involvement because he was in the

2
At the suppression hearing, defense counsel clarified he was seeking to
suppress the October 3, 2018 statement.
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vehicle. Detective Drake explained he told Verity he was not in trouble because

he believed the seller was responsible and Verity "was a witness more than

anything else." The detective stated he was not lying to Verity when he assured

him both times that he was not in trouble. According to Detective Drake, it was

not until after the initial interview when he listened to the conversations

recorded on Verity's phone that he realized Verity played a larger role.

The motion judge denied Verity's suppression motion because he found

Detective Drake's testimony credible. The judge noted police did not charge

Verity until over a month after the initial interview. He concluded police did

not mislead Verity into a confession.

Defendants were tried together. The State presented the testimony of

fourteen witnesses, including: J.C.; McCurdy; Trooper Stambaugh; Detectives

Drake and Kramer; Ralph Gagliano, an expert forensic toxicologist; and Dr.

Frederick DiCarlo, an expert forensic pathologist. Verity and Small each

testified in their own defense.

J.C. described her encounter with Verity and later discovery of McCurdy

and MacFarlane in the vehicle. Detective Drake recounted the investigation and

testified as an expert in drug lingo. He explained heroin and fentanyl are

typically sold in wax folds commonly known as bags. Verity's phone-recorded

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conversations were admitted into evidence, and he was heard asking for two

"whole ones" and for "diesel." Detective Drake explained "whole ones" meant

ten folds of heroin.

Verity's defense counsel cross-examined Detective Drake regarding the

assurances he gave Verity during the interview. The following colloquy ensued:

[Defense counsel:] When you are dealing with a
defendant in police headquarters is there any police
obligation that you be truthful to them?

[Detective Drake:] Absolutely not.

[Defense counsel:] When . . . Verity is looking for
reassurances that everything was okay, is that a normal
practice to go along with that?

[Detective Drake:] It is a normal practice. It's a tactic
to get the truth out of the person that you're
interviewing.

Detective Kramer testified regarding her role in the investigation. On

direct, she explained that during investigations, police lie to defendants to find

out the truth. During cross-examination the following colloquy ensued:

[Defense counsel:] Now, when you talked to [Verity],
he wasn't forthcoming at first, was he?

[Detective Kramer:] He was not.

[Defense counsel:] . . . [W]hen you were questioning
him and when Detective Drake is in there with you,
were you two being truthful with him at that time?

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 [Detective Kramer:] At which point?

[Defense counsel:] Any part of the video. Were you
being truthful or was everything you were saying a lie?

[Detective Kramer:] I was being truthful.

....

[Defense counsel:] So when Detective Drake was
telling [Verity] that he wasn't in trouble, that was the
truth, correct?

[Detective Kramer:] That was not. No.

[Defense counsel:] That was a lie?

[Detective Kramer:] That part was, yes.

Gagliano testified MacFarlane's blood had 11.2 micrograms of fentanyl

per liter and an alcohol level of 0.023 percent. He explained anything above 3.0

micrograms per liter of fentanyl is considered fatal and the alcohol level was

minimal.

Dr. DiCarlo testified he did not perform the autopsy but wrote a report

based on the toxicology and autopsy reports. He concluded the cause of

MacFarlane's death was acute intoxication due to the toxic effects of fentanyl

and alcohol. The presence of fentanyl was at a high lethal level. Heroin was

not reported, and it would have been detected in the toxicology report if

MacFarlane had been a regular heroin user.

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 McCurdy testified he and MacFarlane wanted to buy drugs. He called

Verity, a co-worker of his, who had told him he could assist him if he ever

needed to buy drugs. McCurdy told Verity they were "looking for some weed

and some cocaine, primarily weed." Verity told McCurdy to pick him up at his

house and he would get them drugs. After McCurdy and MacFarlane picked up

Verity in McCurdy's vehicle they traveled to the motel. After leaving the motel,

McCurdy snorted what he believed to be cocaine when the van reached a stop

sign. The next thing he remembered he was waking up in the hospital.

Verity testified McCurdy called him asking if he could buy some heroin.

He told McCurdy to pick him up at his home and McCurdy, MacFarlane, and

Verity drove to the motel to pick up drugs. McCurdy and MacFarlane gave

Verity money and they each bought two bags of heroin and Verity bought

marijuana for himself. During cross-examination, Verity explained he paid for

the marijuana with his money but received two "free bags" of heroin based on

the money McCurdy and MacFarlane had given him. As they headed back

towards Verity's home, all three men snorted the heroin. When Verity noticed

McCurdy failed to proceed through a green light and was nodding off, he pushed

the gas pedal with his hand and steered the vehicle to the side of the road. Not

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wanting to get into trouble, Verity exited the van and was driven home by J.C.

Verity's video statements to police were played for the jury.

Small testified he was a long-time friend of Verity. He stated Verity

called him to purchase marijuana. He denied selling heroin or fentanyl to Verity

and claimed Verity "pulled out two . . . white bags" while he was in Small's

room. After Small's arrest, a search of his room yielded multiple empty blue

wax folds and a black scale; no drugs were found. The State adduced cellphone

records showing multiple calls from Verity to Small on the day of MacFarlane's

death.

The jury convicted Small on counts one, three, and five. The trial judge

denied Small's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which argued

the State failed to prove he knowingly and purposely distributed fentanyl. Small

was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment on count one and a consecutive

five-year term on count three. Count five was merged into count one.

Verity was convicted on counts two, five, six, and seven, and acquitted on

count four. He was sentenced to a ten-year term on count two, a concurrent

three-year term on count five, and three-year terms on counts six and seven,

which were concurrent to each other but consecutive to count two. Verity

received an aggregate sentence of thirteen years, with eight-and-one-half years

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13
of parole ineligibility subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43 -

7.2(d)(7).

Verity moved for a judgment of acquittal and alternatively for a new trial.

He argued because the State failed to prove he intended to distribute fentanyl he

could not be liable for causing MacFarlane's drug-induced death. The trial judge

denied the motion.

On appeal, Verity raises the following points:

POINT I AS DEFENDANT WAS MISLED AS TO
THE CONSEQUENCES OF PROVIDING A
STATEMENT, THE WAIVER OF HIS MIRANDA
RIGHTS WAS NOT VOLUNTARILY,
KNOWINGLY, AND INTELLIGENTLY MADE.

POINT II THE TRIAL COURT DENIED
DEFENDANT HIS CONFRONTATION RIGHTS
WHEN IT ALLOWED ANOTHER EXPERT TO
TESTIFY IN PLACE OF THE FORENSIC
PATHOLOGIST WHO HAD PERFORMED THE
ORIGINAL AUTOPSY WHEN THAT
PATHOLOGIST WAS LESS THAN [SIXTY] MILES
AWAY AND AVAILABLE TO TESTIFY.

POINT III THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
PLAIN ERROR BY PROVIDING THE JURY WITH
CONFUSING AND FAULTY JURY CHARGES. (Not
Raised Below).

POINT IV THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT
ALLOWED A STATE WITNESS TO TESTIFY TO
THE CONTENTS OF AN ALLEGED LETTER

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14
WRITTEN BY . . . SMALL TO THE PROSECUTOR'S
OFFICE WITHOUT PROPER AUTHENTICATION.

POINT V THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT
OVERRULED DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION WHERE
THE STATE WAS ALLOWED TO IMPROPERLY
QUESTION HIM ABOUT THE LEGAL MEANING
OF SHARING AND DISTRIBUTION.

POINT VI THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERRUPTION
OF TRIAL COUNSEL'S CLOSING REMARKS WITH
AN ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY
AND ITS FAILURE TO PROVIDE A TIMELY
CURATIVE INSTRUCTION WAS PREJUDICIAL.

POINT VII AS THE ILLOGICAL AND
IRRATIONAL VERDICT WAS THE PRODUCT OF
CONFUSING AND ERRONEOUS JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, A NEW TRIAL IS REQUIRED.
(Partially Raised Below).

POINT VIII AS THE TRIAL COURT ITSELF
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT DEFENDANT WAS
SHARING THE SUPPOSED HEROIN WITH HIS
FRIENDS, IT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO SUA
SPONTE INSTRUCT THE JURY ON "SHARING."
(Not Raised Below).

POINT IX THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT
DID NOT SUA SPONTE INSTRUCT THE JURY ON
MISTAKE OF FACT. (Not Raised Below).

POINT X AS THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT
ANY EVIDENCE BEYOND A SIMPLE
AGREEMENT TO BUY/SELL DRUGS BETWEEN
DEFENDANTS, A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
MUST BE ENTERED ON CONSPIRACY TO
DISTRIBUTE CDS. (Not Raised Below).

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15
 POINT XI THE TRIAL COURT'S CUMULATIVE
ERRORS DENIED DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL.
(Not Raised Below).

POINT XII THE PROSECUTOR'S EXHORTATION
THAT THE JURY MUST CONVICT DEFENDANT
DENIED HIM A FAIR TRIAL. (Not Raised Below).

POINT XIII TRIAL COUNSEL WAS
INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO ASK THE TRIAL
COURT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON MISTAKE
OF FACT. (Not Raised Below).

POINT XIV THE SENTENCE IMPOSED WAS
MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE. (Partially Raised
Below).

Small raises the following points on his appeal:

POINT I THE INSTRUCTION ON STRICT-
LIABILITY FOR DRUG-INDUCED DEATH WAS
FATALLY FLAWED, REQUIRING REVERSAL OF
THAT CONVICTION. (Not Raised Below).

POINT II THE ADMISSION OF THE CO-
DEFENDANT'S NUMEROUS PRIOR CONSISTENT
STATEMENTS AND OTHER HEARSAY
INCULPATING DEFENDANT WAS IMPROPER
AND REQUIRES REVERSAL. (Partially Raised
Below).

POINT III INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE OF
OTHER BAD ACTS AND DEFENDANT'S PRIOR
CONVICTIONS WITHOUT ANY INSTRUCTION
NECESSITATES REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT'S
CONVICTIONS. (Partially Raised Below).

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 POINT IV REPEATED PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT REQUIRES REVERSAL OF
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS. (Not Raised
below).

POINT V EVEN IF ANY ONE OF THE
COMPLAINED-OF ERRORS WOULD BE
INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT REVERSAL, THE
CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THOSE ERRORS WAS
TO DENY DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS AND A
FAIR TRIAL. (Not Raised Below).

POINT VI BECAUSE NO EVIDENCE WAS
PRESENTED BEYOND A SIMPLE AGREEMENT
TO BUY DRUGS, A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
MUST BE ENTERED ON CONSPIRACY TO
DISTRIBUTE DRUGS. (Not Raised Below).

POINT VII THE TRIAL COURT MADE A NUMBER
OF ERRORS IN FINDING AND WEIGHING
AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS
AND INAPPROPRIATELY RAN TWO COUNTS
CONSECUTIVELY, RESULTING IN AN
EXCESSIVE SENTENCE.

I.

Verity argues the judge erred in finding his Miranda rights waiver prior to

the initial statement was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. He asserts the

police repeatedly told him he was not in trouble and was only going to be

charged with possession of CDS, which negated the waiver.

To admit a statement obtained during a custodial interrogation "the State

must 'prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect's waiver was knowing,

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17
intelligent, and voluntary in light of all the circumstances.'" State v. Tillery, 238

N.J. 293, 316 (2019) (quoting State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000)). The

court considers factors including the defendant's "age, education, intelligence,

previous encounters with law enforcement, advice received about [their]

constitutional rights, the length of detention, the period of time between

administration of the warnings and the volunteered statement, and whether the

questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature or involved physical or mental

abuse." State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 614 (1999).

A waiver of a defendant's Miranda rights must not be the product of police

coercion but instead must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary based on "the

totality of the circumstances surrounding the custodial interrogation . . . ." State

v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 398 (2019). The evidence must establish beyond a

reasonable doubt the statement was given voluntarily and not because the

defendant's will was overborne. State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449, 462 (2005).

Generally, on appellate review, a trial court's factual findings on a motion

to suppress a defendant's statement to the police will be upheld when they are

supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. State v. S.S., 229 N.J.

360, 374 (2017). We do not disturb the motion court's factual findings unless

those findings are so clearly mistaken as to demand intervention in the interests

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of justice. Ibid. However, we owe no deference to the motion court's

conclusions of law, which are reviewed de novo. A.M., 237 N.J. at 396.

New Jersey affords interrogees additional rights beyond those guaranteed

by the United States Constitution. State v. Diaz, 470 N.J. Super. 495, 514 (App.

Div.), leave to appeal denied, 251 N.J. 8 (2022). Thus, for a waiver of rights to

be knowing and intelligent, police must inform an interrogee that a crimi nal

complaint has been filed or an arrest warrant issued, State v. A.G.D., 178 N.J.

56, 68-69 (2003), and the nature and seriousness of the charges that have been

filed. State v. Vincenty, 237 N.J. 122, 134 (2019).

Nonetheless, during a custodial interrogation, an officer may use trickery

or deceit regarding the investigation without violating a defendant's right against

self-incrimination. State v. Patton, 362 N.J. Super. 16, 29-31 (App. Div. 2003).

Misrepresentations by police officers alone are usually insufficient to justify a

determination of involuntariness or lack of knowledge unless the

misrepresentation induced the confession. State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326, 355

(1997). See also State v. Baylor, 423 N.J. Super. 578, 588-89 (App. Div. 2011)

(no violation where the police's use of trickery "did not result in defendant

making a statement he would not have otherwise made voluntarily."). In State

v. Manning, 165 N.J. Super. 19, 30-31 (App. Div. 1978), we upheld the

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admission of a confession given after the police had lied by telling the defendant

that a co-suspect had already confessed to the crime and implicated him. See

also Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969) (holding confession was

voluntary where police lied to the defendant that his co-defendant had

implicated him in the crime).

Furthermore, our Supreme Court has held police are not required to inform

a person of his suspect status in addition to his Miranda warnings. State v.

Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 406 (2009). Rather, "the failure to be told of one's

suspect status . . . would be only one of many factors to be considered in the

totality of the circumstances." Id. at 407. Miranda does not require that the

police "supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his

self-interest in deciding whether to speak" or to remain silent because the

additional information "could affect only the wisdom of a Miranda waiver, not

its essentially voluntary and knowing nature." Ibid. (quoting Colorado v.

Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1987)). Therefore, a valid waiver does not

require that the person in custody be informed of all information that could be

useful in making the decision to remain silent or to speak. Ibid.

Diaz involved a prosecution for drug-induced death where the defendant

argued his custodial statements to the police should have been suppressed

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because the police deliberately did not inform him about the overdose death.

470 N.J. Super. at 502. We held the police misled the defendant as to his "true

status" when they gave a "deliberately vague and incomplete answer to his

question as to the reason why he was taken into custody." Id. at 518. This

"investigative stratagem" was intended to withhold information concerning the

overdose death until after the defendant admitted that he had sold heroin to the

decedent the day before. Ibid. "The reasonably likely if not intended effect of

that artifice was to lead defendant—at the critical moment he waived his Fifth

Amendment rights—to believe that he had been arrested for a less serious

offense than strict liability homicide." Id. at 518-19. We added:

It is one thing for police to withhold information.
It is another thing entirely for them to provide an
explanation that creates or reinforces a false impression
as to the seriousness of the sentence that a defendant is
facing. Any such deception or trickery as to the true
reason a defendant is taken into custody . . . is an
important circumstance to be considered as part of the
totality of circumstances when determining whether the
State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of the
right against self-incrimination.

[Id. at 519.]

We concluded:

the detectives were following a deliberate investigative
strategy to withhold information about the overdose

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 death from defendant until after he admitted that he sold
heroin to [a witness] the day before. . . . The
interrogation strategy was designed to keep defendant
from realizing that he faced possible prosecution for
homicide . . . until after he had waived his right against
self-incrimination and made incriminating admissions
that would support a homicide prosecution.

[Id. at 522.]

Recently, our Supreme Court affirmed the suppression of a defendant's

pre-Miranda statements where he was clearly in police custody and assured he

was not in trouble. State v. Bullock, 253 N.J. 512, 538-39 (2023). The Court

held the Miranda rights the officer read the defendant were deficient and the

officer undermined those rights by telling defendant he was not in trouble. Id.

at 539. The Court noted the circumstances clearly showed "defendant was in

some peril" because he made statements about harming others. Ibid. Therefore,

"[t]elling defendant that he was 'not in trouble' was an affirmative

misrepresentation[,]" which under the totality of the circumstances invalidated

"any waiver and agreement to speak to police . . . ." Ibid.

At the outset, Miranda rights were read to Verity before any questioning

occurred. And there is no assertion the Miranda rights were lacking. Moreover,

police did not give Verity a deliberately vague and incomplete answer to a

question of why he was taken into custody. He was under arrest because of the

A-2255-19
22
drug paraphernalia in his residence. Nor did they withhold information about

the fact they were investigating a drug overdose death. In fact, they corrected

Verity's misapprehension that both McCurdy and MacFarlane had died.

Therefore, Diaz and Bullock are distinguishable.

In State v. Puryear, the interrogating officer told the defendant that "[t]he

only thing you can possibly do here is help yourself out. You cannot get yourself

in any more trouble than you're already in. You can only help yourself out here."

441 N.J. Super. 280, 288 (App. Div. 2015). We held the officer's comment

neutralized the Miranda warnings that had been given and, as a result, the

defendant's ensuing statement was held to be inadmissible. Id. at 298-99. We

concluded the comment was not a "permissible interrogation technique." Id. at

298. See also State in the Int. of A.S., 203 N.J. 131, 151 (2010) (improper to

tell suspect that answering questions "would actually benefit her").

Here, the officers did not tell Verity that he could not get himself in any

more trouble and could only help himself if he spoke to them. The officers told

Verity he was not in "trouble" as to the overdose death. This was true at the

time, there is nothing in the record to indicate that at the time of the initial

interview, Verity was under investigation for purchasing the drugs consumed by

MacFarlane. Detective Kramer joined the interview later. Therefore, her

A-2255-19
23
statement that police lied to defendant had no bearing on the portion of

defendant's statement involving Detective Drake and Trooper Stambaugh.

Verity made the most crucial inculpatory statements during his second and third

interviews, both under Miranda, which occurred well after the initial interview.

Therefore, Puryear is distinguishable.

Verity cites State v. L.H., 239 N.J. 22 (2019). There, the defendant was

in custody on suspicion of sexual assault. Id. at 28. During the interrogation,

the police officers repeatedly promised the defendant counseling and told him

that he would not go to jail if he cooperated. Ibid. They also told him that "the

truth would set him free." Ibid. The defendant eventually provided

incriminating statements. Ibid. In affirming the suppression of the statements,

the Court noted although officers have "leeway to tell some lies during an

interrogation," certain lies "may have the capacity to overbear a suspect's will

and to render a confession involuntary[,]" such as false promises of leniency.

Id. at 44-45. Telling Verity that he was not a suspect in the overdose death did

not have the potential to subvert his will in the manner in the manner L.H.'s will

was subverted by the promise that he would not go to jail if he cooperated.

The totality of the circumstances show there was a valid Miranda warning,

an ongoing investigation, and facts that were not misrepresented by police.

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24
These circumstances and the fact Verity does not on appeal challenge any of the

other factors in Timmendequas, 161 N.J. at 614, do not convince us his will was

overborne. For these reasons, his statements were properly admitted.

II.

"[P]roper jury instructions are essential to a fair trial," and "'erroneous

instructions on material points are presumed to' possess the capacity to unfai rly

prejudice the defendant." State v. McKinney, 223 N.J. 475, 495 (2015) (quoting

State v. Bunch, 180 N.J. 534, 541-42 (2004)). When a defendant fails to object

to the instruction at trial, Rule 1:7-2 provides that a showing of plain error must

be made. "[P]lain error requires demonstration of '[l]egal impropriety in the

charge prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant sufficiently

grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince the court that

of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result.'"

State v. Burns, 192 N.J. 312, 341 (2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting

State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997)).

Where a defendant raises error in a jury instruction on appeal, the charge

must be read as a whole. State v. Wilbely, 63 N.J. 420, 422 (1973). We do not

consider just the allegedly erroneous portion. Ibid. All that is necessary is that

A-2255-19
25
the overall instruction be accurate. State v. Thompson, 59 N.J. 396, 411 (1971);

Borowicz v. Hood, 87 N.J. Super. 418, 423 (App. Div. 1965).

We review inconsistencies in jury verdicts to determine whether "there

exists a sufficient evidential basis in the record to support the charge on which

the defendant is convicted." State v. Banko, 182 N.J. 44, 46 (2004). "We accept

inconsistent verdicts in our criminal justice system, understanding that jury

verdicts may result from lenity, compromise, or even mistake." State v.

Goodwin, 224 N.J. 102, 116 (2016) (citing Banko, 182 N.J. at 53). Our review

determines only "whether the evidence in the record was sufficient to support a

conviction on any count on which the jury found the defendant guilty." Ibid.

(quoting State v. Muhammad, 182 N.J. 551, 578 (2005)).

Inconsistent jury verdicts are permissible so long as they remain supported

by evidence within the record. Banko, 182 N.J. at 46. Courts should not

speculate as to the reasons why a jury reaches a particular verdict. Id. at 54-55.

However, where "inconsistent verdicts preclude the establishment of an element

of the offense," such verdicts may be invalid. State v. Peterson, 181 N.J. Super.

261, 267 (App. Div. 1981). When considering whether a verdict is

impermissibly inconsistent, "it is appropriate to consider the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution and to determine whether a rational trier

A-2255-19
26
of fact could have found each element of the offense beyond a reasonable

doubt." Id. at 267-68 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317-19 (1979)).

A.

Small argues the trial judge erred by instructing the jury it could convict

him and Verity for drug-induced death if they found either defendant had

knowingly or purposely sold the fentanyl that killed MacFarlane. Verity raises

the same argument and further asserts the faulty instruction lowered the State's

burden of proof.

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9(a) provides:

Any person who manufactures, distributes or dispenses
. . . any other controlled dangerous substance classified
in Schedules I or II, or any controlled substance analog
thereof, in violation of subsection [(a)] of N.J.S.[A.]
2C:35-5, is strictly liable for a death which results from
the injection, inhalation or ingestion of that substance,
and is guilty of a crime of the first degree.

Our Supreme Court has explained "[n]o criminal intent to cause death is

required to establish culpability. A defendant may be found guilty under

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9 even if he 'has absolutely no idea that [death] may occur.'"

State v. Ferguson, 238 N.J. 78, 95 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting State

v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536, 547 (1994)).

In sum, the elements required to prove a violation
of the strict-liability drug-induced death statute are (1)

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27
 the defendant "distributed" a [CDS]; (2) the defendant
did so knowingly or purposely; (3) the victim used the
substance distributed by the defendant; and (4) the
victim died as a result of the use of the substance
distributed by the defendant, "and the death was not too
remote in its occurrence or too dependent upon the
conduct of another person." Model Jury Charges
(Criminal), "Strict Liability for Drug[-]Induced Deaths
(N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9)" (approved Sept. 1997).

[Id. at 95-96.]

The trial judge instructed the jury on the drug-induced death counts, as

follows:

Any person who distributes any other controlled
dangerous substance classified as Schedule I or II is
strictly liable for a death which results from the
injection, inhalation or ingestion of that substance, and
is guilty of a crime. The statute, read together with the
indictment, identifies the elements which the State must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt to establish the guilt
of the defendants on these counts of the indictment.

The elements are that, [(1)], one or both of the
defendants distributed fentanyl, which is classified as a
Schedule II drug, [(2)], one or both of the defendants
acted knowingly or purposely in distributing the
fentanyl, [(3)], . . . [MacFarlane] inhaled or ingested
fentanyl distributed by one or both of the defendants,
and [(4)], . . . [MacFarlane] died as a result of inhaling
or ingesting the fentanyl distributed by one or both of
the defendants. That is, the defendant's act of
distributing the fentanyl caused . . . [MacFarlane's]
death.

[(Emphasis added).]

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28
 Though trial counsel did not object to the charge, we are convinced the

jury instruction was clearly capable of producing an unjust result because the

repeated use of the "one or both" language meant Small could have been

convicted based solely on the jury finding Verity guilty of the charge and vice

versa. Therefore, the jury was deprived of a means of considering and

articulating the individual guilt of each defendant, namely who distributed the

fentanyl and whether they did so knowingly or purposely. The model instruction

for drug-induced death does not provide guidance on how it should be adapted

for a seller-to-seller co-defendant, as is the case here. Model Jury Charges

(Criminal), "Strict Liability for Drug-Induced Deaths (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9)"

(approved Sept. 1997). Unfortunately, the modified charge the court improvised

here, containing the "one or both" language, provided the jury with an erroneous

framework for analysis.

We acknowledge the jury verdict sheet did not lump defendants together

regarding the strict liability offense. Further, we do not ignore the fact the judge

later instructed the jury as follows:

Each offense and each defendant in this
indictment should be considered by you separately.
The fact that you may find a particular defendant guilty
or not guilty of a particular crime should not control
your verdict as to any other offense charged against that

A-2255-19
29
 defendant, and it should not control your verdict as to
the charges against any other defendant.

However, we are unconvinced this instruction, which came at the end of the

instructions for other offenses in addition to the strict liability offense, reversed

the effect of the problematic and repeated use of the "one or both" in the strict

liability instruction. Indeed, "[g]eneral jury instructions may not always

sufficiently impart to a jury its responsibilities and limitations." Jordan, 147

N.J. at 428.

Defendants are entitled to a new trial solely on this ground. For these

reasons, defendants' convictions on the strict liability offenses are reversed.

B.

Small argues the conspiracy to distribute CDS conviction should be

reversed because the evidence showed there was only an agreement to purchase

CDS. He asserts the judge should have instructed the jury to consider whether

he was engaged in a conspiracy or a simple buy-sell transaction. Verity raises

a similar argument on his appeal.

"[A] simple agreement to buy drugs is insufficient to establish a

conspiracy between the seller and the buyer." State v. Roldan, 314 N.J. Super.

173, 182 (App. Div. 1998). "However, when the evidence shows that two or

more parties have entered into an agreement to engage in concerted criminal

A-2255-19
30
activity which goes beyond the kind of simple agreement inevitably incident to

the sale of contraband . . . the participants may be found guilty of conspiracy."

Id. at 182-83. "The amount of drugs involved in a transaction also may give rise

to an inference that each of the participants had to have been aware 'he was "a

part of a venture which extended beyond his individual participation."'" Id. at

183 (quoting United States v. Prieskorn, 658 F.2d 631, 635 (8th Cir. 1981)).

The activity may take the form of a "chain conspiracy[,]" which involves

individuals in addition to the buyer and seller. Id. at 181. "Under the chain

analysis, the government need not prove a direct connection between all the

conspirators." Id. at 182 (quoting United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384,

1392 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).

The trial judge read the jury the following instruction regarding

conspiracy:

In order for you to find defendant guilty of the
crime of conspiracy, the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the following elements, [(1)], that the
defendant agreed with another person or persons that
they or one or more of them would engage in conduct
which constitutes a crime, [(2)], that the defendant's
purpose was to promote or facilitate the commission of
the crime of distribution of a [CDS].

Here, the agreement to buy drugs did not simply involve the two

defendants. Verity sought out Small to purchase drugs not just for himself, but

A-2255-19
31
also for MacFarlane and McCurdy. Moreover, there is evidence that Verity, in

effect, was compensated for his services to McCurdy and MacFarlane and "[o]ff

of what [he] charged there was extra bags" of heroin for him. The amount of

the drugs sold, and that Verity stated he had separately purchased both heroin

and marijuana from Small, supports the conclusion Small knew there were

others involved in the transaction beyond Verity. Further, Small knew Verity

had come to the motel with other individuals because Small was unhappy about

it. The evidence established a chain conspiracy and did not support a simple

buy-sell transaction. The conspiracy charge was accurate.

C.

Verity claims the trial judge erred by not sua sponte charging the jury that

it could find he was sharing the CDS with MacFarlane and McCurdy rather than

engaging in distribution. And since distribution is an element of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-

9, Verity maintains his conviction for that offense should be reversed. Verity

also contends the court erred by not sua sponte instructing the jury on the

defense of mistake of fact pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:2-4(a) to the strict liability

and the conspiracy charges because he believed he had purchased heroin when

in fact the drug was fentanyl. He asserts trial counsel was ineffective for not

requesting a curative instruction on the mistake of fact.

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32
 "[I]f the parties do not request a lesser-included-offense charge, reviewing

courts 'apply a higher standard, requiring the unrequested charge to be "clearly

indicated" from the record.'" State v. Fowler, 239 N.J. 171, 188 (2019) (quoting

State v. Alexander, 233 N.J. 132, 143 (2018)); see also State v. Denofa, 187 N.J.

24, 42 (2006); N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(e).

The "clearly indicated" standard does not require trial
courts either to "scour the statutes to determine if there
are some uncharged offenses of which the defendant
may be guilty," . . . or "to meticulously sift through the
entire record . . . to see if some combination of facts
and inferences might rationally sustain' a lesser
charge" . . . . Instead, the evidence supporting a lesser-
included charge must "jump[] off the page" to trigger a
trial court's duty to sua sponte instruct a jury on that
charge.

[Alexander, 233 N.J. at 143 (third and fifth alterations
in original) (citations omitted).]

i.

Where "'two individuals simultaneously and jointly acquire possession of

a drug for their own use, intending only to share it together,' they have not

committed distribution" under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5. State v. Morrison, 188 N.J. 2,

18 (2006). The record does not clearly indicate Verity, MacFarlane, and

McCurdy simultaneously and jointly acquired the CDS. At best, the record

shows Verity acted as a middleman between Small and McCurdy and

A-2255-19
33
MacFarlane. When McCurdy inquired about procuring the drugs, Verity said he

could contact "his guy." He then went to Small's room, purchased the drugs

with McCurdy and MacFarlane's money, which was separate from his own, and

charged a commission by retaining two bags of heroin that the

McCurdy/MacFarlane money funded.

ii.

Under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-4(a), "ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact" is

a defense if the defendant "reasonably arrived at the conclusion underlying the

mistake" and either the mistake "negatives the culpable mental state required to

establish the offense," or "[t]he law provides that the state of mind established

by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense."

In State v. Edwards, 257 N.J. Super. 1, 3-4 (App. Div. 1992), the

defendant argued the trial judge should have sua sponte charged the jury on

mistake of fact because she believed that she was in possession of hashish when

it turned out the CDS was cocaine. We found no plain error because the nature

of the CDS was not an element of the offense. Id. at 4. "In such circumstances

the State must prove that the defendant knew that she possessed a [CDS]. It

does not have to prove that a defendant knew precisely what [CDS] was

possessed." Ibid.

A-2255-19
34
 Here, heroin and fentanyl are Schedule I and II drugs. N.J.S.A. 24:21-5

and -6. Any person who distributes a Schedule I or II drug may be held liable

for a drug-induced death under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9(a). Therefore, it did not matter

whether Verity thought he had purchased heroin or fentanyl. The same is true

for conspiracy to distribute a CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-

5(b)(5) and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1). The trial judge did not err.

iii.

Claims attacking trial counsel's assistance "are particularly suited for post-

conviction review because they often cannot reasonably be raised in a pri or

proceeding." State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 460 (1992). "Our courts have

expressed a general policy against entertaining ineffective-assistance-of-counsel

claims on direct appeal because such claims involve allegations and evidence

that lie outside the trial record." Ibid.

Verity's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel implicate

potential strategic decisions by counsel about whether to seek an instruction on

mistake of fact. We cannot assess this claim on appeal because the record is not

"adequately developed" to help us understand why counsel did not seek an

instruction. State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 313 (2006) (citing State v. Allah,

170 N.J. 269, 285 (2002)). Although we express no view on the merits, this

A-2255-19
35
claim is better reserved for a petition for post-conviction relief.

III.

Verity argues he is entitled to a new trial because his acquittal for third-

degree distribution of fentanyl and conviction on the first-degree causing a drug-

induced death are fatally inconsistent. He maintains the judge erred in not

granting his motion for a judgment of acquittal on this basis.

Although we have reversed Verity's strict liability conviction, we address

this argument for the sake of completeness. In denying Verity's motion for a

judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the judge agreed Verity "is correct that

there is at face value a logical inconsistency with respect to the jury's verdict."

However, the judge found there was sufficient evidence to support each charge.

With respect to the distribution predicate of the drug-induced death count, the

judge concluded:

The narrative which develops herein indicates that the
victims wanted . . . Verity to provide CDS to them, and
[he] provided CDS to them. This evidence provides the
inference that . . . Verity did possess CDS and intended
to provide the victims with the CDS (a "distribution
event"). Accordingly, construing this evidence in the
light most favorable to the State, there was sufficient
evidence to support a finding, beyond a reasonable
doubt, of the factual predicate of possession (with
intent to distribute) and [the] distribution at issue.

A-2255-19
36
 In reviewing a post-trial motion for a judgment of acquittal or a motion

for a new trial, the motion judge may consider all the evidence presented, direct

or circumstantial, giving the State the benefit of all the favorable evidence and

all the favorable inferences drawn from the evidence, and then determine

whether the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Williams,

218 N.J. 576, 594 (2014). A motion for a new trial based on the weight of the

evidence may be granted in the interests of justice if the evidence "clearly and

convincingly appears that there was a manifest denial of justice under the law."

R. 3:20-1.

We review such rulings de novo, applying the same standard as the trial

judge to determine if a judgment of acquittal was warranted. Williams, 218 N.J.

at 593-94; State v. Felsen, 383 N.J. Super. 154, 159 (App. Div. 2006). However,

we defer to the trial court's credibility determinations and its "feel of the case."

State v. Gaikwad, 349 N.J. Super. 62, 82-83 (App. Div. 2002).

Inconsistent verdicts are permissible so long as the evidence is sufficient

to establish guilt on the convicted offense. Banko, 182 N.J. at 53-55. Such

verdicts may be the result of compromise or jury nullification, which is beyond

the power of a court to prevent. Id. at 54. Thus, "even verdicts that acquit on a

predicate offense while convicting on the compound offense" need not

A-2255-19
37
"necessarily be interpreted as a windfall" to the prosecution. Ibid. (quoting

United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984)). Each count should be treated

as if it were a separate indictment. Id. at 53.

There was ample evidence presented to support the drug-induced death

conviction. As we noted, there was testimony that: Verity purchased a Schedule

I or Schedule II drug from Small; gave the drug to MacFarlane; and MacFarlane

ingested the drug. Why the jury acquitted Verity on the distribution count is not

an issue we need address because the acquittal was not fatal to the charge, which

resulted in a conviction. State v. Grey, 147 N.J. 4, 11 (1996).

IV.

Verity argues the trial judge violated his right of confrontation by

allowing DiCarlo to testify as an expert witness instead of the pathologist who

performed the autopsy of MacFarlane. He claims the judge erred by permitting

testimony regarding a letter Small had sent to the prosecutor about a meeting

with Verity without proper authentication. Further, Verity argues the

prosecutor's repeated questioning of Verity regarding his understanding of the

terms "sharing" and "distribution" of CDS despite the judge's admonition

otherwise was improper. Verity asserts the judge should have stricken the entire

line of questioning.

A-2255-19
38
 Small maintains he was denied a fair trial because the judge permitted the

State to introduce prior consistent statements to bolster Verity's testimony that

Small had sold him drugs even though there had been no challenge to Verity's

testimony as fabricated. Further, the court erroneously admitted Verity's phone

calls during Small's cross-examination. Small argues the judge improperly

admitted prior bad act evidence and failed to give a limiting instruction when

evidence of his prior convictions was introduced.

We review a trial judge's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an

abuse of discretion. State v. Terrell, 452 N.J. Super. 226, 248 (App. Div. 2016).

Considerable latitude is afforded the trial judge's evidentiary determinations.

State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 385 (2015). The admission of expert

testimony also rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be

reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Free, 351 N.J. Super.

203, 221 (App. Div. 2002).

A.

At trial, Verity objected to DiCarlo's testimony on confrontation grounds

because the forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy was available and

the State could have her testify. However, the prosecutor asserted the

pathologist who prepared the report was now out of state and claimed that

A-2255-19
39
witness was beyond the State's subpoena power. The judge ruled DiCarlo could

testify because he had "engaged in a sufficient independent analysis of [the]

evidence" to support his conclusions. We discern no error.

In State v. Roach, 219 N.J. 58, 79-80 (2014), the Court rejected a

Confrontation Clause argument holding a co-worker of an analyst who

performed DNA testing in the case could testify in their colleague's stead. The

Court conditioned the testimony on whether the witness was "a truly

independent and qualified reviewer of the underlying data and report" and did

not "merely parrot the findings of another." Id. at 79. The testimony was

deemed admissible because the witness explained how she used her scienti fic

expertise and knowledge to independently review the DNA data generated by

the unavailable analyst. Id. at 81, 83.

In State v. Bass, the Court held an assistant medical examiner could not

testify regarding an autopsy report prepared by a fellow medical examiner who

had died where the assistant had only reviewed the autopsy report and agreed

with its conclusions regarding the manner of death. 224 N.J. 285, 317 -18

(2016). The Court held the State could not ask whether the examiner agreed

with the autopsy report because this improperly "parrot[ed]" the report and

violated the defendant's confrontation rights. Id. at 318-19.

A-2255-19
40
 Here, Dr. DiCarlo prepared his own report based on his independent

review of the initial autopsy report and Gagliano's toxicology report. This

satisfied the concerns raised in Roach and Bass and the judge did not abuse his

discretion.

B.

The State called a Cape May Prosecutor's Office detective who testified

that on September 6, 2019, his office received a letter from Small d ated

September 4, 2019, in which Small stated he met with Verity on "the day in

question." Prior to and after the testimony defendants objected based on lack of

authentication. Small's attorney then cross-examined the witness as to how he

knew the letter came from Small. The witness replied the letter had Small's

name at the bottom. Small's attorney also inquired whether the letter indicated

the time Small and Verity met. The witness said it did not.

Under N.J.R.E. 901, to satisfy "the requirement of authenticating or

identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must present evidence sufficient

to support a finding that the item is what its proponent claims." This rule does

not require "absolute certainty or conclusive proof." State v. Mays, 321 N.J.

Super. 619, 628 (App. Div. 1999). Courts generally play the role of screener,

leaving to the jury a more intense review of the evidence. Konop v. Rosen, 425

A-2255-19
41
N.J. Super. 391, 411 (App. Div. 2012).

There is no indication the letter was admitted into evidence. Regardless,

some of its contents were revealed to the jury at a point in time where it was not

clear Small would testify because the State had not rested. However, neither the

testimony nor the failure to authenticate the letter constituted reversible error

because we are unconvinced the limited information revealed in this instance,

as compared to the totality of the evidence presented, was clearly capable of an

unjust result.

C.

During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Verity whether he

understood the difference between possession and distribution. Verity said that

he did not, and his counsel objected on grounds the State was asking Verity legal

questions. The judge permitted the prosecutor to rephrase the question and

Verity answered that to "possess something it would be in your pocket," and to

distribute something would be trying to make a profit from the pocket's contents.

When the prosecutor asked whether handing one of his detectives a cough

drop constituted sharing, defense counsel renewed his objection. The prosecutor

then asked Verity whether during his interviews he had ever used the word

sharing. Verity responded he did not use the word at that time and trial was the

A-2255-19
42
first time he referred to sharing. When defense counsel objected, the prosecutor

withdrew the question, and the judge told the jury to disregard the question. The

judge denied defense counsel's request to strike the entire line of questioning.

The trial judge controls the scope of cross-examination. N.J.R.E. 611(b).

We typically will not interfere with a judge's authority to control the scope of

cross-examination unless clear error and prejudice are shown. Gaikwad, 349

N.J. Super. at 87.

Verity claims this line of cross-examination denied him a fair trial because

the judge permitted the State to ask legal questions and Verity was a fact witness.

Although the questioning was irrelevant to Verity's role as a witness, it was not

plain error because it did not clearly lead to an unjust result. The jury acquitt ed

Verity of distribution.

D.

During cross-examination, Verity testified Small had been his drug

supplier. He also said he was not sure the story he told police that, during the

drive back from purchasing the drugs, McCurdy suddenly started "acting weird"

was true and a replay of his interview would refresh his memory.

The State argued because Verity's testimony had satisfied Small's right to

confrontation, it intended to play portions of Verity's statements that implicated

A-2255-19
43
Small, which had previously redacted Small's name. The trial judge asked

defense counsel whether they had an objection to the State introducing the non -

redacted videos and both did not. Small now challenges the admission of this

evidence.

Under the doctrine of invited error, alleged trial errors that were

acquiesced in or consented to by defense counsel ordinarily are not a basis for

reversal on appeal. State v. Harper, 128 N.J. Super. 270, 277 (App. Div. 1974).

For these reasons, we discern no reversible error on this issue.

E.

During Small's cross-examination, the State wanted to play a recorded

conversation between Small and Verity that took place on September 24, 2018,

to refresh Small's memory. Small objected because there was no evidence

showing where the call originated. The judge permitted the State to refresh

Small's memory and noted the conversation was already in evidence in written

form.

The State played the recording and the jury heard Verity ask Small if he

had any "ice cream." Verity also said he would "take a Big Boy." Detective

Drake had already explained these were both drug references. Small claimed

the recordings did not refresh his recollection.

A-2255-19
44
 Small argues this evidence was inadmissible hearsay used to improperly

bolster the State's theory of his culpability. We are unpersuaded.

N.J.R.E. 803(b)(5) governs the co-conspirator exception to hearsay. The

exception permits the admission of an out of court statement where it was made

"in furtherance of the conspiracy," was made "during the course of the

conspiracy," and there is "evidence independent of the hearsay of the existence

of the conspiracy and the defendant's relationship to it." State v. Savage, 172

N.J. 374, 402 (2002) (quoting State v. Phelps, 96 N.J. 500, 509-10 (1984)).

We discern no reversible error in this instance. Small was charged with

conspiracy to distribute CDS, and the conversations in question took pla ce

within two weeks of MacFarlane's death and involved the purchase of drugs.

Moreover, independent of these conversations, the State adduced other

testimony showing the drugs were purchased on October 3, 2018, and Small's

role in the sale and distribution.

F.

Small argues the court improperly admitted multiple pieces of evidence

of his prior bad acts. He asserts the evidence had no purpose because it was not

used to impeach him.

A-2255-19
45
 Under N.J.R.E. 404(b)(1), "evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is

not admissible to prove a person's disposition in order to show that on a

particular occasion the person acted in conformity with such disposition." The

evidence is admissible for other purposes, such as "proof of motive, opportunity,

intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or

accident. . . ." N.J.R.E. 404(b)(2).

The party seeking to introduce the evidence must satisfy a four-prong test

under State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328 (1992). A prior bad act is admissible if:

(1) it is "relevant to a material issue"; (2) the prior act is "similar in kind and

reasonably close in time to the offense charged"; (3) the evidence of the prior

act is clear and convincing; and (4) its probative value is not "outweighed by its

apparent prejudice." Id. at 338 (quoting Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the

Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence, 38 Emory L.J. 135, 160 (1989)). 3 If the

evidence is admissible, the trial judge must instruct the jury on the limited use

of the evidence to "explain precisely the permitted and prohibited purposes of

the evidence." Id. at 340-41. We afford great deference to a trial court's

determination of the admissibility of bad act evidence and will not reverse unless

3
We recognize that the Supreme Court has held that the second prong of the
Cofield formulation need not be applied in all cases. See State v. Williams, 190
N.J. 114, 131 (2007).
A-2255-19
46
there is an abuse of discretion or a clear error in judgment. State v. Brown, 170

N.J. 138, 147 (2001).

During the State's cross-examination of Verity, it played an excerpt of

Verity's October 22, 2018 interview in which he asked the officer, "[h]ow many

more deaths have you guys had?" The officer replied, "there was one that night,

but there hasn't been any since really." Verity then stated, "[r]eally good. So I

helped take out the killer." To which the officer replied, "Yeah, yeah, you did

a good job, man. I think."

Small did not object to this evidence. Regardless, N.J.R.E. 404(b)(1)

pertains to "a person's disposition." Verity's conversation with the officer did

not constitute prior bad acts evidence because Verity neither identified Small in

the conversation nor claimed Small was responsible for the other death.

Small next claims the State improperly introduced text messages sent to

him, which indicated he had dealt drugs on other occasions. In one instance, the

State asked Small about a reference to "hoagie" in a text sent to him. Small

responded that the text was from a friend who was "asking [Small] for

marijuana." Small's attorney objected but then withdrew the objection.

Evidence that is necessary to prove the charged crime is intrinsic and not

other crime evidence under N.J.R.E. 404(b). State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 180

A-2255-19
47
(2011). There was no question whether a drug deal between defendants took

place on October 3, 2018. Evidence of the nature of the drugs Small sold was

intrinsic to the conspiracy charge. For these reasons, N.J.R.E. 404(b) did not

apply and a limiting instruction was not required.

During Small's cross-examination, the State asked whether his mention of

"bricks" in two of the texts was a reference to heroin or to a person. Small's

counsel objected because he never received a copy of the message. Although

the judge initially permitted the State to ask the question, he subsequently ruled

it could not and instructed the jury to disregard and not consider it during

deliberations. Therefore, this evidence was not admitted as N.J.R.E. 404(b)

evidence or otherwise.

Small claims prior bad acts evidence was admitted during Verity's cross-

examination where Verity was asked whether the person he went to see for the

drugs was his supplier. Verity responded he "had a couple of different

suppliers." Again, this was not improper N.J.R.E. 404(b) evidence because

Verity did not name Small during the exchange and there was already evidence

admitted that Verity was Small's long-time friend and Small had sold drugs to

Verity on the date of MacFarlane's death.

A-2255-19
48
 Small further points to the prosecutor's summation during which he stated

defendants "had a relationship before, a drug relationship." Defendant did not

object. Regardless, this did not violate N.J.R.E. 404(b) because there was n o

dispute Verity had purchased drugs from Small prior to October 3, 2019, because

Small testified to that effect. The only question was the kind of drugs defendants

believed they were buying and selling on that date.

Small challenges the admission of a portion of Verity's second statement

to police that Small had "up to a quarter-pound of heroin," and was a "one-stop-

shop" for drugs. There was no objection to this statement, and Small did not

deny he had previously sold drugs to Verity. Additionally, Verity testified he

sought and purchased what he believed to be heroin from Small on October 3.

Therefore, the admission of this evidence did not constitute plain error.

Small argues evidence was improperly adduced, without a limiting

instruction, that he had two third-degree and one fourth-degree conviction in

2014 and 2015, respectively, and served prison time. The evidence was elicited

by the defense on direct examination and the convictions were sanitized. Small

did not ask for a limiting instruction and the court did not give one. A limiting

instruction is required when the State seeks to impeach a testifying defendant

A-2255-19
49
through introduction of the defendant's prior convictions. State v. Brunson, 132

N.J. 377, 391 (1993). For these reasons, we discern no reversible error.

V.

Verity asserts the State's summation deprived him of a fair trial. He points

us to the following passage:

Trials are many things for many people, ladies
and gentlemen. It is forced responsibility. You must
force responsibility on two men who enjoy under the
same law that I submit to you is going to convict them,
the benefit of innocence, the same law. The same laws
that have protected them for a year, if you follow the
law, and that presumption today, tomorrow when you
come back and you return verdicts that I submit to you
should be guilty.

Verity claims the "forced responsibility" remarks constituted prosecutorial

misconduct because the State told the jury it was its duty to convict.

"Prosecutors are afforded considerable leeway in closing arguments as

long as their comments are reasonably related to the scope of the evidence

presented." State v. Patterson, 435 N.J. Super. 498, 508 (App. Div. 2014)

(quoting State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 332 (2005)). "Telling jurors that their

sworn obligation is to convict or that they would not have met their

'responsibility' unless they convicted is disapproved." State v. Stewart, 162 N.J.

A-2255-19
50
Super. 96, 104 (App. Div. 1978) (quoting State v. Knight, 63 N.J. 187, 193

(1973)).

"In deciding whether prosecutorial conduct deprived a defendant of a fair

trial, 'an appellate court must take into account the tenor of the trial and the

degree of responsiveness of both counsel and the court to improprieties when

they occurred.'" State v. Williams, 244 N.J. 592, 608 (2021) (quoting State v.

Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 83 (1999)). "In reviewing closing arguments, we look, not

to isolated remarks, but to the summation as a whole." State v. Atwater, 400

N.J. Super. 319, 335 (App. Div. 2008) (citing State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 105

(1982)).

Reversal is appropriate only where the misconduct was so egregious as to

deprive the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158, 181 (2001).

The question is "whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury

would have returned a guilty verdict if the questioned conduct had not occurred."

State v. Walden, 370 N.J. Super. 549, 562 (App. Div. 2004).

We are unconvinced the prosecutor's remarks deprived defendants of a

fair trial. At the outset, we note although there were objections by the defense

during the State's summation, the defense did not object to the comments now

raised on appeal. Moreover, our review of the entirety of the summation

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51
convinces us the prosecutor's remarks fell short of suggesting the jury had a duty

to convict. The first "forced responsibility" comment was the prosecutor

reminding the jury of the purpose of a trial. The second mention of this phrase

reminded the jury defendants were presumed innocent, but requested they find

defendants guilty by applying the law. Moreover, because defendants were

accused of causing MacFarlane's drug-induced death, it was not unreasonable

for the State to argue "responsibility" to ascribe the death to defendants' conduct

rather than MacFarlane's illicit drug use. We are unconvinced the uncontested

comments during summation were so egregious as to deprive defendants of a

fair trial.

VI.

Verity contends the court erred by first interrupting his attorney's

summation and then improperly instructing the jury contrary to the final charge

it would later give them. During his summation, Verity's attorney stated: "On

the first charge of the verdict sheet is going to be a drug-induced death charge

and in order for [Verity] to be charged with that, he had to distribute the drugs

to MacFarlane and McCurdy, and he also had to . . . know . . . there was fentanyl

in those drugs." The State objected and argued the defense mischaracterized the

law because the State did not have to prove defendants distributed fentanyl. The

A-2255-19
52
judge told the prosecutor "do your closing with you being able to say that . . .

Verity would have had to have known that it was a [CDS]. Doesn't necessarily

have to know it was fentanyl." The judge stated he would correct the general

jury charge to reflect a correct statement of the law. The trial judge then

instructed the jury as follows:

I'm just going to give you a brief instruction with regard
to the objection to [the] last comment that was made by
[Verity's attorney], which was that essentially it's the
State's burden to show that . . . Verity knew that the
substance was fentanyl. And the way the law reads, and
I'll give you more specific instruction on this tomorrow,
is that . . . under this charge . . . a defendant must know
that the substance was a [CDS] in either Schedule I or
Schedule II. So with that correct, I'll ask you to
disregard the last comment specific[ally] as to
fentanyl . . . .

The following day, the judge informed counsel he decided because the

indictment referred only to fentanyl "the jury charge should say fentanyl," not

heroin or fentanyl or Schedule I or II drugs. After a colloquy, the prosecutor

asked for a stay pending appeal of the judge's ruling. 4 The judge denied the stay

because the toxicological evidence only revealed the existence of fentanyl and

mentioning heroin would be inconsistent with the indictment.

4
The State filed an emergent appeal but withdrew it after the verdict.
A-2255-19
53
 Verity's attorney then requested a "limiting" instruction regarding the trial

judge's interruption of his summation the previous day. The judge offered to

instruct the jury that summations do not constitute evidence. However, counsel

withdrew the request for the instruction, telling the judge "you don't need to say

anything else. . . . Just read them the [general] charges."

Where a defendant fails to request a curative instruction, they "must show

that the failure to give such an instruction sua sponte constitutes an error 'clearly

capable of producing an unjust result.'" Mays, 321 N.J. Super. at 633 (quoting

State v. Loftin, 287 N.J. Super. 76, 97 (App. Div. 1996)). Although Verity's

counsel withdrew the request for a curative instruction, the instruction the judge

proposed to give to correct his error was ultimately given when he read the jury

the final charges before it deliberated. Indeed, the judge stated:

Regardless of what counsel said or I may have
said recalling the evidence in this case, it is your
recollection of the evidence that should guide you as
judges of the facts. Arguments, statements, remarks,
openings and the summations or closings of counsel are
not evidence and must not be treated as evidence.

These instructions tracked model jury charges 1.12B and 1.12C. We

discern no reversible error.

VII.

A-2255-19
54
 Both defendants argue the cumulative effect of the errors at trial

undermined their constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial. We are

satisfied that none of the unreversed errors alleged by defendant, individually or

cumulatively, warrant the granting of a new trial. State v. T.J.M., 220 N.J. 220,

238 (2015); State v. Orecchio, 16 N.J. 125, 129 (1954).

VIII.

Finally, we address each defendant's arguments regarding sentencing.

Sentencing decisions are discretionary in nature. State v. Cuff, 239 N.J. 321,

347 (2019). Therefore, we review for an abuse of discretion. State v. Jones,

232 N.J. 308, 318 (2018). We defer to the sentencing court's factual findings

and should not "second-guess" them. State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014).

"To facilitate meaningful appellate review, trial judges must explain how

they arrived at a particular sentence." Id. at 65. We will reverse a sentence

where: the findings of fact on the aggravating and mitigating factors were not

based on competent and credible evidence in the record; the court applied the

incorrect sentencing guidelines enunciated in the criminal code; and the

application of the facts to the law constituted such an error of judgment as to

shock the judicial conscience. State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363-65 (1984).

A-2255-19
55
 Because we have reversed the drug-induced charge convictions, each

defendant's sentence must be remanded for reconsideration. However, we

address the sentencing arguments raised on the appeals for sake of completeness

and to provide guidance to the sentencing judge.

A.

Verity's remaining sentencing argument not related to the drug-induced

death conviction is that his sentence was excessive because the mitigating

factors outweighed the aggravating factors. The judge found the following

aggravating factors: the risk that defendant would commit another offense,

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3); the extent and seriousness of his prior criminal record,

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6); and the need to deter Verity and others, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(a)(9). The judge found the following mitigating factors: Verity did not

contemplate that his conduct would cause or threaten serious harm, N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1(b)(2); the victim induced or facilitated its commission, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(b)(5); and Verity cooperated with law enforcement, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(12).

The judge accorded each aggravating factor substantial weight, mitigating

factor one moderate weight, and the remaining mitigating factors slight weight.

He concluded the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the mitigating

factors. But for the now-reversed drug-induced death conviction, we discern no

A-2255-19
56
error in the sentence as whole. However, the sentence must now be reconsidered

in light of the vacatur of the Verity's first-degree offense.

B.

Small also argues his sentence is excessive, disparate, and the trial judge

improperly weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors. He also claims the

judge's imposition of consecutive sentences was error.

The trial judge sentenced Small as a persistent offender but denied the

State's application to sentence him to an extended term. He noted Small 's

criminal history included "[forty-three] adult arrests with . . . six indictable

convictions." The judge found the following aggravating factors: the risk of re -

offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3); the extent and seriousness of Small's prior

criminal record, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6); and the need to deter Small and others,

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9). The judge found no mitigating factors. He concluded

the aggravating factors substantially outweighed any potential mitigating

factors.

Given Small's criminal history, the trial judge found the ordinary

maximum first-degree sentence of twenty years was appropriate on the drug-

induced death conviction. He imposed a consecutive five-year sentence on the

A-2255-19
57
distribution of CDS conviction and merged the conspiracy conviction into the

distribution conviction. In imposing the consecutive sentences, the judge stated:

[W]hether a sentence for distribution should be
consecutive or concurrent . . . would essentially ask the
[c]ourt to find distinguishing characteristics between
the two offenses . . . . [T]he continued conclusion of
the [c]ourt and review of the factors reveal and the
[c]ourt finds that they stem from the same one act. And,
as a result of that, they are not distinct, but . . . the
Legislature intended that the drug-induced death should
stand on its own as it relates to distribution and vice-
versa.

The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in weighing the aggravating

and mitigating factors. Contrary to Small's assertions the judge gave too much

weight to his prior criminal record, his criminal history revealed he had several

convictions that were not for minor offenses.

Small claims the judge failed to consider he was sixty years of age in

assessing whether he was at risk of re-offending and the need to deter. Our

Supreme Court has stated: "[A]ge alone cannot drive the outcome. An older

defendant who commits a serious crime . . . cannot rely on age to avoid an

otherwise appropriate sentence." State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246, 273 (2021).

Therefore, the judge's application of the aggravating factors was supported by

the record.

A-2255-19
58
 Small contends the judge should have applied mitigating factor N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1(b)(2) because he did not contemplate his conduct would cause serious

harm. Regardless of whether Small believed he was selling heroin or fentanyl,

either drug was dangerous and could cause serious harm. We are unconvinced

by this argument.

Small argues his sentence was nearly twice that of Verity's and the judge

erred when he failed to consider the disparity. A sentence "is not erroneous

merely because a co-defendant's sentence is lighter." State v. Roach, 146 N.J.

208, 233 (1996) (quoting State v. Hicks, 54 N.J. 390, 391 (1969)). The central

question in assessing disparity in sentences is "whether the disparity is

justifiable or unjustifiable." Ibid. The court must determine "whether the co-

defendant is identical or substantially similar to the defendant regarding all

relevant sentencing criteria." Ibid.

Here, the record shows Small and Verity did not stand in identical or

substantially similar positions at sentencing. They played different roles in the

underlying offenses: Small provided the drugs, Verity was an addict, and there

was no evidence Verity was aware the drugs contained fentanyl. Therefore, we

reject the sentence disparity argument.

A-2255-19
59
 In determining whether sentences should be concurrent or consecutive,

the sentencing court must consider the following guidelines:

(1) There should be no "free crimes" in a system where
punishment fits the crime.

(2) The reasons for consecutive or concurrent sentences
should be separately given.

(3) The court should consider the facts of the crime,
including whether:

(a) the crimes and their objectives were
independent of each other;

(b) the crimes involved separate acts of violence;

(c) the crimes were committed at separate times
or places, rather than indicating a single period of
aberrant behavior;

(d) the crimes involved multiple victims;

(e) the convictions are numerous.

(4) There should be no double counting of aggravating
factors.

(5) Successive terms for the same offense should
ordinarily not equal the punishment for the first
offense.

[Torres, 246 N.J. at 264 (citing State v. Yarbough, 100
N.J. 627, 643-44 (1985)).]

A-2255-19
60
 Small claims the trial judge did not conduct a Yarbough analysis and to

the extent he did, the findings support a concurrent rather than a consecutive

sentencing. Although we have reversed the strict liability offense, our review

of the sentencing transcript reveals the judge appeared to believe he was

required to impose consecutive sentences due to the nature of the first -degree

strict liability conviction. The State acknowledges this was an error as well.

An explicit statement for imposing consecutive sentences remains

essential to a proper Yarbough sentencing assessment. Torres, 246 N.J. at 268.

The judge did not perform a Yarbough analysis. Regardless, defendant's

sentence is remanded for reconsideration given the reversal of the strict liability

conviction.

Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part for further

proceedings in A-2255-19 and A-3381-19 with respect to the strict liability

drug-induced death convictions and related sentencing consequences. We do

not retain jurisdiction.

A-2255-19
61
_________________________________

SABATINO, P.J.A.D., concurring.

I join in nearly all of the majority's well-crafted opinion. I write separately

to express a few words of concern about the interrogation issue raised by

defendant Verity.

Last term the Supreme Court in State v. Bullock disapproved of police

investigating a serious crime and assuring someone in their custody that the

person is "not in trouble[,]" and then obtaining incriminating statements from

that person. 253 N.J. 512, 519-20 (2023). I acknowledge the assurances the

Court criticized in Bullock preceded the issuance of a Miranda warning, whereas

the present case involves "not in trouble" assurances that followed a Miranda

warning. Yet, the sequence here also presents constitutional concerns because

the assurance has the capacity to dilute the practical impact of the warning t hat

was issued. The message the detainee undoubtedly hears is that, despite the

formal warning, it's safe to speak freely to the officers.

The majority opinion correctly states that certain forms of trickery have

traditionally been deemed acceptable during police interrogations. See, e.g.,

State v. Baylor, 423 N.J. Super. 578, 588-89 (App. Div. 2011); State v. Patton,

362 N.J. Super. 16, 29-31 (App. Div. 2003). However, trickery is not

permissible if it undermines the Miranda warning itself and causes the detainee
to disregard or discount the warning's importance. See, e.g., Bullock, 253 N.J.

at 538-39; State v. O.D.A.C., 250 N.J. 408, 420-21 (2022); State v. Diaz, 470

N.J. Super. 495, 503 (App. Div.), leave to appeal denied, 251 N.J. 8 (2022);

State v. Puryear, 441 N.J. Super. 280, 298-99 (App. Div. 2015).

The majority reasons that the "not in trouble" assurances to Verity were

inconsequential because the record did not reflect that the police considered

Verity to be a suspect in MacFarlane's drug-induced death at the time the police

interviewed him. Even if that lack of realization is true—and, for what it's

worth, another officer testified at trial she believed her fellow officer had lied to

Verity about him not being in trouble for the death—that does not vitiate the

assurance's likely impact on the detainee.

As this court recently noted in another Miranda context in the juvenile

case of State in Interest of M.P., the pertinent legal standards are objective, and

do not hinge upon the subjective state of mind of the interviewing police

officers. 476 N.J. Super. 242, 290 (App. Div. 2023). We held "the critical issue

. . . is not what police knew about M.P. and whether they could be expected to

know about his intellectual and educational challenges. Rather, . . . the critical

issue is whether, considering the totality of the relevant circumstances, M.P.

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his constitutional right against

A-2255-19
2
self-incrimination." Ibid. This court "reject[ed] the notion that a reviewing

court can disregard circumstances deemed relevant under the case law on the

grounds those circumstances were not known by or 'noticeable' to police." Ibid.

In my own view, I respectfully submit it would be a better practice for

police officers who have detained persons and given them Miranda warnings to

refrain from assuring them that they are "not in trouble." I recognize it is human

nature to not unduly alarm or antagonize a person in custody that something

adverse may occur, but the constitutional rights at stake must be carefully

protected.

That said, I do not dissent from the majority's disposition of the Miranda

issue in Verity's case but recommend that future similar post-Miranda

assurances that undermine the warning—even if made in good faith—be

discouraged. And, if such "not in trouble" assurances are nonetheless made,

they should be considered as negative factors within the totality of

circumstances in evaluating whether a post-warning admission was voluntary.

That approach is consistent with the principles expressed in Bullock and our

judiciary's tradition of guarding with care the privilege against self-

incrimination set forth in the Fifth Amendment, New Jersey common law, and

N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19.

A-2255-19
3