Ex Parte William Antonio Alarcon Arriola v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-23-00203-CR

EX PARTE WILLIAM ANTONIO ALARCON ARRIOLA

On Appeal from the County Court
Maverick County, Texas
Trial Court No. 32532

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
 MEMORANDUM OPINION

Following his arrest and incarceration for criminal trespass1 in Maverick County,2

William Antonio Alarcon Arriola filed an application for a pretrial writ of habeas corpus seeking

immediate discharge from custody based on a lack of probable cause for his arrest. Without

conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Arriola’s requested relief. Arriola

appeals.

I. Background

As part of Operation Lone Star (OLS), Arriola was arrested for allegedly trespassing on

the premises of Shelby Park in Maverick County. According to the probable cause affidavit,

Trooper Zachary Perez encountered Arriola in Shelby Park. According to Perez, “Shelby Park is

private property under the care, custody and control of Rolando Salinas.” Further, Perez stated,

“Salinas has provided [the Department of Public Safety] with a criminal trespass statement that

states individuals are not allowed to be on the property without permission. . . . Shipping

containers, constantine wire,[3] fences, no trespassing signs, audio commands warning

individuals not to enter the premises are all tools utilized to inform individuals not to enter the

premises.”

1
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05(d)(1) (Supp.).
2
Originally appealed to the Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio, this case was transferred to this Court by the
Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Supp.).
We follow the precedent of the Fourth Court of Appeals in deciding this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.

Constantine wire, also known as concertina wire or razor wire, is “a coiled barbed wire used as an obstacle.”
3

Concertina wire, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).
2
 Arriola filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the County Court of Maverick

County, claiming that Shelby Park is public property and that Salinas is the mayor of Eagle Pass.

He further claimed that (1) it is not an offense to enter public property without permission from a

government official, (2) the probable cause affidavit failed to allege an offense, (3) he had

effective consent to be on public property, (4) he did not have notice that entry was forbidden,

(5) he did not receive notice to depart but failed to do so, (6) he was arrested without probable

cause, and (6) the complaint on which the State relies is devoid of sufficient facts based on

personal knowledge to support his continued detention. As a result, Arriola asked the trial court

to issue a writ of habeas corpus and, after a hearing on the merits, to discharge him from custody.

The trial court denied Arriola’s motion, stating, “[U]pon review of the Application

allegations and the Court taking Judicial Knowledge of the filings in this cause, the application

for Writ to bring the defendant to the Court is denied without further hearing and requested relief

is denied.”

II. Jurisdiction

As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether this Court has jurisdiction to

entertain Arriola’s appeal. Here, the trial court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing on

Arriola’s pretrial application for a writ of habeas corpus. If the trial court did not rule on the

merits of the application, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal. In re Perez, No. 04-23-

00294-CR, 2023 WL 5270488 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 16, 2023, orig. proceeding) (per

curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Ex parte Campos, No. 06-23-00133-CR,

2023 WL 5498955 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Aug. 25, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

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publication); Ex parte Vallesteros, No. 06-23-00134-CR, 2023 WL 5498965 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana Aug. 25, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). If the trial court

ruled on the merits of the application, even in the absence of the issuance of a writ and an

evidentiary hearing, then this Court has jurisdiction over Arriola’s appeal. See Ex parte Hargett,

819 S.W.2d 866, 869 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated

in Ex parte Villanueva, 252 S.W.3d 391, 397 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (appellate court had

jurisdiction when trial court ruled on merits of claim, even though it did not issue writ); Ex parte

McCullough, 966 S.W.2d 529, 530–31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (per curiam) (appellate court had

jurisdiction when trial court denied the relief requested).

Because the trial court denied the “requested relief” and went so far as to take judicial

notice of the trial court filings, it ruled on the merits of Arriola’s claim. As a result, this Court

has jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

III. Cognizability

“Pretrial habeas is an extraordinary remedy.” Ex parte Edwards, 663 S.W.3d 614, 616

(Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (citing Ex parte Ingram, 533 S.W.3d 887, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017)).

“It is reserved for cases where ‘the protection of the applicant’s substantive rights or the

conservation of judicial resources would be better served by interlocutory review.’” Id. (quoting

Ex parte Weise, 55 S.W.3d 617, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). “Whether a claim is cognizable

on pretrial habeas is a threshold issue that we must address first.” State v. Colin-Tapio, No. 04-

23-00156-CR, 2023 WL 6133444, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 20, 2023, no pet.)

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(citing Ex parte Dominguez Ortiz, 668 S.W.3d 126, 132 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, no

pet.)).

As in Colin-Tapio, Arriola’s “habeas petition sought dismissal of his prosecution on the

ground that officers lacked probable cause to arrest him for criminal trespass.” Id. at *1. In that

case, Colin-Tapio was arrested for trespassing and filed a habeas application seeking dismissal of

his prosecution because he claimed that officers lacked probable cause to arrest him for

trespassing. Colin-Tapio argued that he did not receive notice that entry was forbidden, even

though the complaint alleged “the property also ha[d] barbed wire fencing all around the

property.” Id. At the evidentiary hearing, “one witness . . . testified to the lack of posted signage

or . . . fencing around the area” of the alleged trespassing. Id. Our sister court, whose precedent

we follow, determined that Colin-Tapio’s “habeas petition [was] predicated on a factual dispute

regarding an element of the alleged offense—the presence (or lack) of fencing or signage

providing notice that entry was forbidden. Such a factual dispute is precisely the type of claim

appropriately vindicated at trial.” Id.

Arriola’s application states that he is “seeking the immediate discharge . . . from custody

based on a lack of probable cause [to] arrest Applicant.” Arriola claims that the complaint on

which the State relies is devoid of sufficient facts based on personal knowledge to support his

continued detention. Arriola contends that the complaint failed to state that he had notice that

entry was forbidden and was therefore insufficient.4 Beyond that, Arriola contends that he did

4
The complaint in this Court’s record alleges, among other things, “Arriola, did then and there intentionally and
knowingly enter property of another, namely Shelby Park, Rolando Salinas, hereafter styled the complainant,
without the effective consent of the complainant, and the defendant had notice that the entry was forbidden.” In his
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not have notice that entry was forbidden and that he did not receive notice to depart but failed to

do so. Arriola further claims that he had effective consent to be present on the property because

it was public property. These issues are predicated on at least two factual disputes: (1) whether

Arriola had notice that entry into Shelby Park was forbidden and (2) whether Shelby Park is

public or private property. These factual disputes, as in Colin-Tapio, are “precisely the type of

claim[s] appropriately vindicated at trial.” Colin-Tapio, 2023 WL 6133444, at *1. As a result,

Arriola’s “claim[s] [are] not cognizable by pretrial writ of habeas corpus.”5 See id. at *2.

IV. Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s order denying Arriola’s pretrial application for a writ of

habeas corpus.

Charles van Cleef
Justice

Date Submitted: November 20, 2023
Date Decided: November 30, 2023

Do Not Publish

application, Arriola also attacked the probable cause affidavit because it alleged that he entered the park without
permission rather than without effective consent.
5
Arriola attempts to distinguish this case from Colin-Tapio stating that Colin-Tapio only applies to probable cause
writs seeking dismissal of criminal charges. Arriola contends that, because he requested discharge from custody, as
well as dismissal of the criminal charges, his discharge claim is still cognizable, citing Ex parte Smith, 178 S.W.3d
797, 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (per curiam). The substance of Arriola’s application, though, is based on lack of
probable cause to arrest, which would result in the dismissal of criminal charges. We, therefore, believe Colin-
Tapio is applicable here. This is true even though the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing in Colin-Tapio.
Our sister court determined that, “because Colin-Tapio’s claim [was] not cognizable in a pretrial habeas proceeding,
the State had no burden to discharge at the pretrial habeas hearing.” Colin-Tapio, 2023 WL 6133444, at *2.
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