ja/gg Doe 70 v. Diocese of Metuchen

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1919-22

JA/GG DOE 70,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
v. December 7, 2023
APPELLATE DIVISION
DIOCESE OF METUCHEN, a/k/a
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC
DIOCESE OF METUCHEN, a/k/a
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC
BISHOP OF METUCHEN, ST.
JOHN VIANNEY, and ST. JOHN
VIANNEY SCHOOL,

Defendants-Respondents,

and

DIOCESE OF RICHMOND,
a/k/a CATHOLIC DIOCESE
OF RICHMOND,

Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________

Argued October 10, 2023 – Decided December 7, 2023

Before Judges Gilson, Berdote Byrne, and Bishop-
Thompson.
 On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County,
Docket No. L-5430-21.

David P. Corrigan (Harman Claytor Corrigan &
Wellman) of the Virginia bar, admitted pro hac vice,
argued the cause for appellant (Santomassimo Davis
LLP, David P. Corrigan, and Melissa Y. York (Harman
Claytor Corrigan & Wellman) of the Virginia bar,
admitted pro hac vice, attorneys; Alexander J. Anglim
and Susan Schleck Kleiner, of counsel and on the
briefs).

Jack P. Boyd (Jeff Anderson & Associates PA) argued
the cause for respondent JA/GG Doe 70 (Gianforcaro
Law, attorneys; Jeffrey R. Anderson (Jeff Anderson &
Associates PA), Trusha P. Goffe (Jeff Anderson &
Associates PA), Gregory G. Gianforcaro, and Jack P.
Boyd, of counsel and on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

GILSON, P.J.A.D.

Plaintiff alleges that Father John Butler, a Catholic priest, sexually abused

him from approximately 1995 to 1998, when plaintiff was approximately nine

to twelve years old. 1 The issue presented is whether one of the defendants, the

1
Plaintiff used initials and a fictitious designation in his complaint. We use
initials to protect privacy interests concerning allegations of child sexual abuse.
See R. 1:38-3(c)(9).

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2
Catholic Diocese of Richmond (Richmond), is subject to personal jurisdiction

in New Jersey.

The record established that (1) Butler had been incardinated to Richmond

at the time of his ordination in 1957, and that Butler remained a priest

incardinated to Richmond until 2002; (2) in the 1960s, Richmond had been

aware of Butler's sexual propensities towards children; (3) in 1970, Richmond

encouraged and allowed Butler to go to New Jersey to serve as a priest; and (4)

Richmond maintained a significant degree of control over Butler while he served

in New Jersey. Based on those facts, the trial court held that Richmond was

subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New Jersey regarding Butler's actions

in New Jersey.

Richmond appeals, arguing it is not subject to personal jurisdiction in New

Jersey because it did not purposefully avail itself of any benefit from New

Jersey. Because the factual findings by the trial court are supported by

substantial, credible evidence in the record, and because those facts establish

that Richmond purposefully availed itself of the benefits of allowing Butler to

go to New Jersey to serve as a priest, we agree that there is specific personal

jurisdiction over Richmond and affirm.

I.

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 We discern the facts from the record developed during jurisdictional

discovery. We note that although Richmond and plaintiff vigorously dispute

how those facts should be characterized, the material jurisdictional facts are

supported by credible evidence in the record.

Richmond is a non-profit, religious organization based in Henrico County,

Virginia. Its area of service is entirely in Virginia. Butler had been ordained

and incardinated as a priest of Richmond in 1957.

Incardination is an ecclesiastical term indicating a priest's acceptance into

a diocese. See Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 628 (11th ed. 2003).

A priest is subject to the authority of the bishop of the diocese where he is

incardinated. Glossary of Terms, The Diocese of Springfield, Mass.,

https://diospringfield.org/osevaglossaryofterms/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2023);

see also Stevens v. Roman Cath. Bishop of Fresno, 123 Cal. Rptr. 171, 176 (Cal.

Ct. App. 1975). To minister, a priest must be incardinated in a diocese and may

only be incardinated in one diocese at a time. See Stevens, 123 Cal. Rptr. at

176.

Butler served as a priest within Richmond's geographic boundaries for

approximately the first four years of his priesthood; that is, from 1957 to 1960.

In 1958, Butler was accused of grooming a young boy and was reprimanded by

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the Chancellor of Richmond for taking the boy on a trip out of town. In 1960,

Butler was arrested in Washington, D.C. for "public homosexual activity."

Those charges were dropped on the condition that Richmond "remove [Butler]

from [the] area."2

Thereafter, the Bishop of Richmond "ordered Butler" to go on a short

retreat. In 1961, Butler obtained permission from Richmond to serve as a priest

in the Diocese of Rockville Centre, New York (the Rockville Diocese). In 1965,

while Butler was serving in the Rockville Diocese, he was accused of and

admitted to sexually abusing two boys, aged thirteen and fourteen years old at

the time. Butler was terminated by the Rockville Diocese and the Bishop of

Richmond was notified.

In 1968, the Bishop of Richmond wrote to Butler informing him that he

could not give him any further assignments within the geographic area of

Richmond because Butler would not be able to "successfully exercise [his]

priestly ministry in [Richmond]" due to Butler's "past problems." The Bishop

of Richmond went on to tell Butler: "I recommend that you seek a benevolent

[b]ishop in some diocese where you could get an entirely new and fresh start."

2
Many of the facts confirming that Richmond knew of Butler's sexual
propensities in the 1960s are set forth in a summary of "accusations against
[Butler]" prepared by the Bishop of Richmond in 2004.
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Nevertheless, Butler was assigned to two parishes within the geographic area of

Richmond between 1968 and 1970.

In 1970, Butler sought permission from Richmond to serve as a priest in

the Diocese of Trenton in New Jersey. Richmond gave its permission, and the

Bishop of Richmond described Butler's service as an "experiment."

In 1982, the Diocese of Metuchen was formed out of the Diocese of

Trenton. At that time, Richmond again gave Butler permission to serve in New

Jersey as an "extern priest."

In 1986, Butler was determined to be eligible for Richmond's retirement

plan and credited with eight years of service for the time he had spent working

within Richmond's geographic area. Butler was also offered the opportunity to

be credited with an additional thirteen years of service if he paid into the plan

from 1986 to 1999. In other words, Butler was offered the right to be part of

Richmond's retirement plan even as he continued to work as a priest in New

Jersey.

Butler served as a priest in New Jersey from 1970 to 2002. During the

entire time Butler served as a priest in New Jersey, he remained incardinated in

Richmond. In July 2002, Richmond suspended Butler from "all priestly

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ministry." Thereafter, he did not receive any further priestly assignments and,

in 2005, the Vatican dismissed Butler from the priesthood.

In September 2021, plaintiff filed a complaint in New Jersey, alleging that

Butler had sexually assaulted him from 1995 to 1998, while Butler was assigned

to the parish of St. John Vianney Church in the Diocese of Metuchen. Plaintiff

named as defendants the Diocese of Metuchen, Richmond, the parish of St. John

Vianney and its affiliated school, as well as fictitiously named entities and

persons. The complaint alleges causes of action of negligence, negligent

training and supervision, and negligent retention, all in connection with the

sexual abuse that plaintiff allegedly suffered. In that regard, plaintiff alleges

that Butler was under the direct supervision, employment, and control of

defendants, that defendants knew or should have known of Butler's history of

child sexual abuse, and that defendants were negligent in placing Butler in a

priestly position where he had access to children.

In February 2022, Richmond moved to dismiss the claims against it for

lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied that motion without

prejudice and ordered discovery on the issue of jurisdiction. After the close of

jurisdictional discovery, Richmond refiled its motion to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction.

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 On January 23, 2023, after hearing oral argument, the trial court issued an

order and written statement of reasons denying Richmond's motion to dismiss.

The trial court found that Richmond knew of Butler's history of child sexual

abuse, encouraged and allowed him to serve as a priest in New Jersey as a way

of sending him outside of Richmond's geographic boundaries, and maintained a

significant degree of control over Butler while he was serving as a priest in New

Jersey. Based on those facts, the trial court held that Richmond was subject to

specific personal jurisdiction in New Jersey.

We granted Richmond's motion for leave to appeal the January 23, 2023

order.

II.

On appeal, Richmond makes four primary arguments. First, it contends

that the trial court's factual findings are not supported by the record. Second, it

argues that the trial court erred in concluding that Richmond was subject to

specific jurisdiction in New Jersey. In making that argument, Richmond

contends that a determination on personal jurisdiction is separate from a

determination of liability and the trial court incorrectly considered liability.

Richmond also asserts that the trial court erred in holding that Richmond

purposefully availed itself of benefits from New Jersey. In its third argument,

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Richmond asserts that the trial court's conclusion that Butler remained an

employee of Richmond was impermissibly based on the ecclesiastical doctrine

of incardination. Finally, Richmond argues that the trial court did not determine

that plaintiff's injuries arose from or were related to Richmond's purposeful

contact with New Jersey.

A. The Law Concerning Personal Jurisdiction.

Personal jurisdiction is a "'mixed question of law and fact' that must be

resolved at the outset, 'before the matter may proceed.'" Rippon v. Smigel, 449

N.J. Super. 344, 359 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Citibank, N.A. v. Est. of

Simpson, 290 N.J. Super. 519, 532 (App. Div. 1996)). We review a trial court's

findings of fact with respect to jurisdiction "to determine if those findings are

supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record." Id. at 358. The trial

court's conclusions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. See ibid. "A trial

court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from

established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty,

L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).

"A New Jersey court may exercise in personam jurisdiction over a non-

resident defendant 'consistent with due process of law.'" Bayway Refin. Co. v.

State Utils., Inc., 333 N.J. Super. 420, 428 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting R. 4:4-

A-1919-22
9
4(b)(1)). Courts "exercise jurisdiction over non[-]resident defendants 'to the

uttermost limits permitted by the United States Constitution.'" Jardim v.

Overley, 461 N.J. Super. 367, 377 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Avdel Corp. v.

Mecure, 58 N.J. 264, 268 (1971)).

For a non-resident defendant to be subject to personal jurisdiction in the

forum state, due process requires that the defendant "have certain minimum

contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional

notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326

U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940));

Blakey v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 164 N.J. 38, 65 (2000). "[T]he requisite quality

and quantum of contacts is dependent on whether general or specific jurisdiction

is asserted." Citibank, 290 N.J. Super. at 526. General jurisdiction "requires

affiliations 'so "continuous and systematic" as to render'" a non-resident

organizational defendant "'essentially at home in the forum State.'" Daimler AG

v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 133 n.11 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires

Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). Plaintiff and Richmond

agree that Richmond is not subject to general jurisdiction in New Jersey.

Accordingly, we focus on whether there is specific jurisdiction.

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 "In order for a state court to exercise [specific] jurisdiction over a non [-

]resident defendant, the lawsuit 'must aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant's

contacts with the forum.'" Jardim, 461 N.J. Super. at 376 (third and fourth

alterations in original) (quoting Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 127); accord Waste

Mgmt., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 106, 119 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S.

1183 (1995); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S.

___, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1025 (2021). In other words, courts examine the

"relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation." Lebel v.

Everglades Marina, Inc., 115 N.J. 317, 323 (1989) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner,

433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)).

"The 'minimum contacts' requirement is satisfied so long as the contacts

resulted from the defendant's purposeful conduct and not the unilateral activities

of the plaintiff." Ibid. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444

U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980)); see also Waste Mgmt., 138 N.J. at 126 (explaining

that "the existence of minimum contacts turns on the presence or absence of

intentional acts of the defendant to avail itself of some benefit of a forum state").

"The contacts must be the defendant's own choice and not 'random, isolated, or

fortuitous.'" Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1025 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465

U.S. 770, 774 (1984)). Moreover, courts determine, based on the defendant's

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"'conduct and connection' with the forum state . . . whether the defendant should

'reasonably anticipate being haled into court [in the forum state].'" Bayway

Refin., 333 N.J. Super. at 429 (alteration in original) (quoting World-Wide

Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297).

In determining whether the requirement to comport with "fair play and

substantial justice" is satisfied, courts evaluate several factors. Asahi Metal

Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987). A court "must consider

the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintiff's

interest in obtaining relief." Ibid. It must also weigh "the interstate judicial

system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and

the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive

social policies." Ibid. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).

B. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact Related to Jurisdiction.

In evaluating whether Richmond was subject to specific jurisdiction, the

trial court found (1) Richmond "was aware of Butler's sexual propensities

towards children" in the 1960s; (2) Richmond "released Butler and allowed him

to go to New Jersey as [Richmond] felt it was not safe to assign [Butler] to [the]

Virginia-Washington area due to his prior arrest;" and (3) Richmond

"maintained a significant degree of control and influence over Butler" while he

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was serving as a priest in New Jersey. Richmond challenges those factual

findings. Having reviewed the record, we determine that the trial court's

findings of material fact related to jurisdiction are supported by substantial ,

credible evidence in the record.

First, there is evidence that Richmond knew of Butler's propensity to

sexually abuse children. That evidence includes (1) a January 1958 letter from

the Chancellor of Richmond to Butler reprimanding him for taking a boy he was

accused of grooming on a trip out of town; and (2) documents establishing that

Richmond knew of Butler's admission of abusing two boys while he was serving

as a priest in the Rockville Diocese in 1965. Indeed, Richmond's knowledge of

Butler's sexual predilections was confirmed in a document the Bishop of

Richmond prepared in 2004. In that document's "summary of accusations

against" Butler, the then-Bishop of Richmond acknowledged that by 1965,

Richmond was aware of Butler's sexual abuse of at least three different children.

Second, there is evidence that Richmond encouraged and allowed Butler

to serve as a priest in New Jersey. On February 1, 1968, the then-Bishop of

Richmond wrote to Butler and informed him that he would not allow Butler to

serve as a priest in the geographic area of Richmond. The Bishop also

"recommended" that Butler seek to serve as a priest in another diocese.

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Thereafter, Richmond gave its permission for Butler to serve as a priest in New

Jersey two times. The first permission was given when Butler began to serve in

the Diocese of Trenton in 1970, and the second permission was given when

Butler began to serve in the Diocese of Metuchen in 1982.

Richmond criticizes the trial court, pointing out that it relied on a letter

from the Bishop of Richmond to the Diocese of Norwich, Connecticut.

Richmond contends that the trial court added a reference to New Jersey to the

letter, then erroneously relied on the letter to conclude that Richmond sought

out a position for Butler in New Jersey. Although the trial court made an

alteration to this letter that added a reference to New Jersey in its written

opinion, we do not discern that as reversible error. The important facts from the

letter to Norwich are that Richmond acknowledged that Butler would not be

allowed to work in Richmond's geographical area, and that Richmond hoped that

Butler could work somewhere else as a priest.

Third, there is ample evidence that Richmond maintained significant

control over Butler while he was serving as a priest in New Jersey. As already

summarized, Butler could only serve as a priest in New Jersey with the

permission of the Bishop of Richmond. An important jurisdictional fact is that

throughout the time Butler served as a priest in New Jersey, Richmond had the

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sole authority to recall Butler and end Butler's priestly ministry. That fact is

confirmed because Richmond exercised that authority in 2002. While 2002 is

after the alleged sexual abuse occurred, Richmond's authority existed

throughout the time that Butler was serving in New Jersey. So, Richmond could

have ended Butler's priestly ministry at any time between 1970 and 2002.

We also reject Richmond's contention that the trial court impermissibly

interpreted and applied the ecclesiastical doctrine of incardination. The trial

court correctly stated that it was not interpreting the ecclesiastical doctrine.

Instead, it evaluated Richmond's actions. Richmond does not dispute that Butler

remained a priest incardinated to the Bishop of Richmond throughout his career.

That meant that the Bishop of Richmond always had the authority to suspend all

of Butler's activities as a priest. That factual reality is not based on the

ecclesiastical doctrine of incardination; rather, it is based on the factual

implication of the doctrine.

C. Analysis.

Applying the jurisdictional facts to the well-established law concerning

specific personal jurisdiction confirms that New Jersey has specific personal

jurisdiction over Richmond related to plaintiff's action. Richmond purposefully

encouraged Butler to go to another diocese. When Butler reached out to the

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Diocese of Trenton, Richmond approved Butler going to the diocese to serve as

a priest. Plaintiff alleges he was sexually abused by Butler while Butler was

serving as a priest in New Jersey in the mid-1990s. Accordingly, plaintiff's

claims arise out of Richmond's deliberate and intentional actions to allow Butler

to serve as a priest in New Jersey. Butler was not in New Jersey because of his

unilateral actions. The record establishes that Butler needed permission from

Richmond to serve as a priest in New Jersey. As already detailed, the facts also

establish that Richmond always had the authority to end Butler's priestly

ministry. Accordingly, Richmond should have reasonably anticipated being

haled into court in New Jersey related to Butler's priestly service in New Jersey.

Exercising specific jurisdiction over Richmond also comports with "fair

play and substantial justice." Richmond does not contend that it would be

burdensome for it to appear in New Jersey. New Jersey has a substantial interest

in ensuring that residents of New Jersey are protected from sexual abuse. See,

e.g., Child Victims Act, L. 2019, c. 120, § 9 (codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2b(a))

(providing a two-year revival window for victims to file otherwise time-barred

claims in New Jersey for sexual abuses committed against them while minors).

Finally, the plaintiff has a substantial interest in obtaining relief. Moreover,

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both Virginia and New Jersey have a shared interest in holding persons

responsible for the sexual abuse of minors.

In making that last point, we clarify that we are not expressing any view

on the merits of plaintiff's liability claims. Richmond challenges the trial court's

decision, contending that the trial court improperly focused on liability as

opposed to specific personal jurisdiction. We agree with Richmond that an

analysis of personal jurisdiction is independent of the question of whether the

defendant is liable to the plaintiff. While the trial court's statement of reasons

referenced liability, we do not deem that discussion reversible error. The trial

court correctly focused on the facts giving rise to specific personal jurisdiction

over Richmond. Similarly, our analysis is focused on the facts establishing that

Richmond purposefully availed itself of sending Butler to New Jersey.

Richmond also challenges the trial court's conclusion that Butler remained

an employee of Richmond. We do not believe that specific personal jurisdiction

over Richmond is dependent on whether Butler was an employee of Richmond

while serving as a priest in New Jersey. Instead, the material jurisdictional fact

is that Richmond exercised a significant degree of control over Butler serving

as a priest in New Jersey. To repeat, it was Richmond that always had the

authority to suspend Butler from all priestly ministry, and the decision not to

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exercise that authority was a purposeful and intentional act that impacted

plaintiff while he was a resident of New Jersey.

We also reject Richmond's argument that its contacts with New Jersey

only involved communications sent from Virginia. The cases Richmond cites

concerning the limitations on communications establishing specific personal

jurisdiction are distinguishable. See Baanyan Software Servs., Inc. v. Kuncha,

433 N.J. Super. 466 (App. Div. 2013) (holding no specific personal jurisdiction

over defendant non-resident employee who was hired to work remotely in

Illinois and whose only contacts with New Jersey were communications with

the plaintiff company); Pfundstein v. Omnicom Grp. Inc., 285 N.J. Super. 245

(App. Div. 1995) (holding no specific personal jurisdiction over a New York

corporation in severance agreement dispute with plaintiff, a New Jersey

resident, where the corporation's only contacts with New Jersey were its

telephone and mail communications with plaintiff); Cath. Diocese of Green Bay,

Inc. v. John Doe 119, 349 P.3d 518 (Nev. 2015) (holding no specific personal

jurisdiction over non-resident diocese where non-resident diocese allegedly

knew of priest's past sexual abuse, gave him permission to leave, and wrote a

letter of recommendation, but was not alleged to have affirmatively sent him

away).

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 In contrast, the facts here establish that Richmond acted with intent to

avail itself of a benefit in New Jersey by sending one of its troubled priests to

New Jersey. The credible evidence in the record establishes that Richmond was

not willing to suspend Butler from his priestly duties until 2002. In 1970, and

again in 1982, Richmond purposefully availed itself of New Jersey by

encouraging and allowing Butler to go and remain as an active priest in New

Jersey.

Finally, Richmond cites to several cases from other jurisdictions and

argues those cases provide support for holding that Richmond is not subject to

personal jurisdiction in New Jersey. The cases from other jurisdictions all turn

on their specific facts. Indeed, some of those cases found personal jurisdiction

over non-resident Catholic dioceses, while others did not. Our review of those

cases supports our holding that Richmond is subject to specific personal

jurisdiction in New Jersey based on the jurisdictional facts of this case. 3 See

Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Superior Ct., 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 154 (Cal. Ct. App.

2003) (finding personal jurisdiction where non-resident diocese knew of priest's

prior sexual abuse, facilitated his transfer to California, and excardinated him so

3
The parties also cite to unpublished opinions, but we do not rely on or cite to
unpublished cases because they do not constitute binding precedent. R. 1:36-3.
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he could be incardinated in a California diocese); Tercero v. Roman Cath.

Diocese of Norwich, 48 P.3d 50 (N.M. 2002) (finding no personal jurisdiction

over non-resident diocese where non-resident diocese had dismissed priest prior

to his arrival in forum state and priest was under exclusive control of resident

archdiocese at the time of the abuse); Archdiocese of Detroit v. Green, 899 So.

2d 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (finding no personal jurisdiction where priest

moved to forum state without non-resident archdiocese's permission); Doe v.

Roman Cath. Diocese of Boise, Inc., 918 P.2d 17 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (finding

no personal jurisdiction where non-resident diocese was not alleged to have had

knowledge of any prior sexual abuse by priest and took no action to facilitate

priest's placement in forum state beyond approving the transfer).

In summary, having reviewed the record, we determine that the trial

court's findings of jurisdictional fact are supported by substantial , credible

evidence in the record. We hold that those facts establish specific personal

jurisdiction over Richmond in this action.

Affirmed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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