134 Nev., Advance Opinion IS
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
GLENN MILLER DOOLIN, No. 73698-COA
Appellant,
vs. Fl , D
THE STATE OF NEVADA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, DEC
Respondent. ELI 7 P ■. .TH ' aTZCOMI
• rc; IRT
Pro se appeal from a district court order denying a
postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 1 Eighth Judicial District
Court, Clark County; Linda Marie Bell, Chief Judge.
Affirmed.
Glenn Miller Doolin, Indian Springs,
in Pro Se.
Adam Paul Laxalt, Attorney General, and Jessica E Perlick, Deputy
Attorney General, Carson City,
for Respondent.
BEFORE SILVER, C.J., TAO and GIBBONS, JJ.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
The issue presented in this appeal is whether an offender may
have statutory credit earned pursuant to NRS 209.4465 applied to the
'This appeal has been submitted for decision without oral argument.
NRAP 34(0(3).
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offender's parole eligibility and minimum term for a sentence imposed
pursuant to NRS 207.010. We conclude that both the sentence and category
of conviction are enhanced when an offender is adjudicated a habitual
criminal pursuant to NRS 207.010. And because such an adjudication will
always enhance a conviction for a lower category felony to either a category
A or B felony, we hold NRS 209.4465(8)(d) precludes application of statutory
credit to an offender's parole eligibility and minimum term for a sentence
imposed pursuant to MRS 207.010. Because Glenn Miller Doolin was
adjudicated a habitual criminal pursuant to MRS 207.010(1)(a), we conclude
the district court correctly determined Doolin was not entitled to the
application of credit to his parole eligibility and minimum term.
Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Doolin was convicted of grand larceny of a motor vehicle, a
category C felony, see NRS 205.228(2), and possession of burglary tools, a
gross misdemeanor, see NRS 205.080(1), for crimes he committed in 2012.
For the grand larceny of a motor vehicle count, the district court adjudicated
Doolin a habitual criminal and sentenced him, pursuant to the small
habitual criminal enhancement, to a prison term of 60 to 150 months. See
NRS 207.010(1)(a). The district court also sentenced Doolin to serve a
consecutive term of 12 months in the Clark County Detention Center for his
possession of burglary tools conviction.
Doolin filed a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus
and supplemental petition in which /he challenged the computation of time
served for his prison sentence. Doolin claimed the Nevada Department of
Corrections has failed to apply statutory credit toward his parole eligibility
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and minimum term. The district court concluded Doolin was not entitled to
relief and denied the petition. This appeal follows.
ANALYSIS
Doolin claims the district court erred by finding he is not
entitled to have the statutory credit he has earned applied to his parole
eligibility and minimum term. He asserts the exclusion in NRS
209.4465(8)(d) does not apply to him because, although he was punished as
a category B felon under the habitual criminal statute, he was only
convicted of a category C felony.
Doolin observes that NRS 209.4465(8)(d) excludes the
application of statutory credit to the parole eligibility and minimum term
for a sentence for an offender who is "convicted of: . . . [a] category A or B
felony" (emphasis added), but NRS 207.010(1)(a) states that an offender
who is adjudicated a habitual criminal "shall be punished for a category B
felony" (emphasis added). Doolin urges this court to conclude that the
Legislature's use of convicted in NRS 209.4465(8)(d) and punished in NRS
207.010(1)(a) indicate NRS 209.4465(8)(d) was not intended to preclude the
application of statutory credit to a sentence imposed pursuant to NRS
207.010. See Williams v. State Dep't of Corr., 133 Nev. „ 402 P.3d
1260, 1264 (2017) (stating courts "must presume that the variation in
language indicates a variation in meaning").
Doolin asserts Howard v. State, 83 Nev. 53,422 P.2d 548 (1967),
and Parkerson v. State, 100 Nev. 222, 678 P.2d 1155 (1984), support such a
conclusion. Howard and Parkerson state the habitual criminal
enhancement is not a separate offense and only acts to increase an
offender's punishment. Howard, 83 Nev. at 56, 422 P.2d at 550; Parkerson,
100 Nev. at 224, 678 P.2d at 1156. Doolin argues Howard and Parke rson
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thus imply that sentencing under the habitual criminal enhancement does
not equate to a conviction. He further argues that this, in turn, means
imposition of the habitual criminal enhancement does not alter the category
of felony he was convicted of committing, and he is entitled to application of
statutory credit toward his parole eligibility and minimum term as an
offender convicted of a category C felony.
The ultimate question we must answer is whether NRS
209.4465(8)(d) precludes an offender sentenced pursuant to NRS 207.010
from having statutory credit applied to his or her parole eligibility and
minimum term for that sentence. To answer this question, we must first
decide whether habitual criminal adjudication pursuant to NRS 207.010
enhances both the sentence and category of conviction, i.e., whether an
offender who is "punished for a category B felony" under NRS 207.010(1)(a)
is also convicted of a category B felony. The resolution of this issue is a
matter of statutory interpretation.
"Statutory interpretation is an issue of law subject to de novo
review." Hobbs v. State, 127 Nev. 234, 237, 251 P.3d 177, 179 (2011). The
goal of statutory interpretation "is to give effect to the Legislature's intent."
Id. To ascertain the Legislature's intent, we first focus our inquiry on the
statute's plain language, "avoid [ingi statutory interpretation that renders
language meaningless or superfluous." Id. "[Whenever possible, [we] will
interpret a rule or statute in harmony with other rules or statutes." Watson
Rounds v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 131 Nev. 783, 789, 358 P.3d 228, 232
(2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[W]hen a statute's language is
clear and unambiguous, the apparent intent must be given effect, as there
is no room for construction." Edgington v. Edgington, 119 Nev. 577, 582-83,
80 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2003).
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Doolin is correct in that the statutes he compares use different
language and the habitual criminal enhancement is not considered a
separate conviction apart from the underlying offense, see Howard, 83 Nev.
at 56, 422 P.2d at 550. However, Doolin's argument that habitual criminal
adjudication does not enhance the category of felony an offender is convicted
of fails to consider NRS Chapter 207's overall habitual criminal scheme and,
in particular, ignores a key provision that governs the imposition of the
habitual criminal enhancement.
Pursuant to NRS 207.010(1)(a), offenders sentenced under the
small habitual criminal enhancement are "punished for a category B
felony." Similarly, NRS 207.010(1)(b) states that offenders sentenced under
the large habitual criminal enhancement are "punished for a category A
felony." Although NRS 207.010 uses the word punished, NRS 207.016(1)
states "[al conviction pursuant to NRS 207.010 . . . operates only to
increase, not to reduce, the sentence otherwise provided by law for the
principal crime" (emphasis added). Thus, NRS 207.016(1) states an
offender who has been sentenced under NRS 207.010 has been convicted
under NRS 207.010. Reading NRS 207.010 and NRS 207.016(1) in
harmony, we conclude the plain language of those statutes demonstrates
the Legislature intended for both the sentence and category of conviction to
be enhanced when an offender is adjudicated a habitual criminal pursuant
to NRS 207.010.
This conclusion is not contrary to, and does not alter, prior
decisions explaining that the habitual criminal enhancement is not a
separate offense, but rather a status that "allows enlarged punishment,"
Howard, 83 Nev. at 57, 422 P.2d at 550, because the enhancement of the
category of conviction does not change the elements of the underlying crime
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or create a new crime; rather, it only operates to increase the punishment
for a recidivist. This is consistent with the Legislature's approach to other
criminal enhancements that are based on prior convictions, such as the
enhancements for battery constituting domestic violence and driving under
the influence. For each of those crimes, an offender's sentence and category
of conviction may be enhanced following submission of evidence of the
offender's prior criminal convictions. See NRS 200.485(1)(a)-(c); NRS
484C.400( 1)(a)-( c).
Because we conclude the meaning of the statutory language in
NRS 207.010 and NRS 207.016 is plain, there is no need to look to legislative
history. See State v. Lucero, 127 Nev. 92, 95, 249 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011)
(stating courts should look to legislative history when the statute is
ambiguous, i.e., "when the statutory language lends itself to two or more
reasonable interpretations" (internal quotation marks omitted)). We
nevertheless note the legislative history also supports this interpretation.
NRS 207.010 was enacted in 1995 after approval of Senate Bill
416, which made "various changes regarding sentencing of persons
convicted of felonies," Hearing on S.B. 416 Before the Senate Comm. on
Judiciary, 68th Leg. (Nev., May 1, 1995). See 1995 Nev. Stat., ch. 443,
§§ 180-81, at 1237-38. The legislative history for Senate Bill 416 includes a
crimes category chart that listed the small habitual criminal enhancement
with the category B felonies and the large habitual criminal enhancement
with the category A felonies. Hearing on S.B. 416 Before the Senate Comm.
on Judiciary, 68th Leg. (Nev., May 1, 1995) (Exhibit F). Given this chart, it
appears the Legislature did not intend for habitual criminal adjudication to
retain the category of felony of the underlying crime and only enhance the
range of punishment that may be imposed. Accordingly, we conclude the
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legislative history indicates that the Legislature intended for both the
sentence and category of conviction to be enhanced when an offender is
adjudicated a habitual criminal pursuant to NRS 207.010. 2
For the reasons stated above, we conclude the plain language of
the statutes demonstrates that both the sentence and category of conviction
are enhanced when an offender is adjudicated a habitual criminal pursuant
to NRS 207.010, and note this conclusion is also supported by legislative
history. Therefore, when an offender is adjudicated a habitual criminal
pursuant to NRS 207.010(1)(a), the conviction is enhanced and the offender
is convicted of a category B felony, and when an offender is adjudicated a
habitual criminal pursuant to NRS 207.010(1)(b), the conviction is
enhanced and the offender is convicted of a category A felony.
Turning to the application of statutory credit under NRS
209.4465, we note NRS 209.4465(8)(d) precludes the application of statutory
credit to an offender's parole eligibility and minimum term for a sentence
on a conviction for a category A or B felony. Because we conclude
adjudication as a habitual criminal pursuant to NRS 207.010 enhances both
the sentence and category of conviction, we hold that an offender who is
adjudicated a habitual criminal pursuant to NRS 207.010 is not entitled to
have statutory credit applied to the eligibility for parole and minimum term
for that sentence.
2To the extent Doolin argues the rule of lenity requires resolution of
any ambiguity in his favor, this argument lacks merit. Because there is no
unresolved ambiguity, the rule of lenity does not apply. See Lucero, 127
Nev. at 99, 249 P.3d at 1230 ("Because ambiguity is the cornerstone of the
rule of lenity, the rule only applies when other statutory interpretation
methods, including the plain language, legislative history, reason, and
public policy, have failed to resolve a penal statute's ambiguity.").
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Here, although grand larceny of a motor vehicle is a category C
felony, because Doolin was adjudicated a habitual criminal pursuant to
NRS 207.010(1)(a), his category of conviction was enhanced to a category B
felony. Therefore, NRS 209.4465(8)(d) precludes application of statutory
credit to his parole eligibility and minimum term. Accordingly, we conclude
the district court did not err by denying Doolin's petition.
CONCLUSION
We conclude habitual criminal adjudication pursuant to NRS
207.010 enhances both the sentence and category of conviction. Thus,
habitual criminal adjudication pursuant to NRS 207.010 will always
enhance a conviction for a lower category felony, and the offender will be
convicted of either a category A or B felony. We therefore hold that NRS
209.4465(8)(d) precludes application of statutory credit to an offender's
parole eligibility and minimum term for a sentence imposed pursuant to
NRS 207.010. Because Doolin was adjudicated a habitual criminal
pursuant to NRS 207.010(1)(a), NRS 209.4465(8)(d) precludes application
of statutory credit to his parole eligibility and minimum term. Accordingly,
we conclude the district court properly denied Doolin's petition. Therefore,
we affirm.
C.J.
Silver
Akre"- J.
Tao
J.
Gibbons
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