State v. Shepard

[Cite as State v. Shepard, 2023-Ohio-4791.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 112225
v. :

ROBERT SHEPARD, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 28, 2023

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-21-664741-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Kristin M. Karkutt and Ayoub Dakdouk,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.

Joseph V. Pagano, for appellant.

ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J.:

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Robert Shepard (“Shepard”) appeals his

convictions for multiple offenses arising from the shooting of Frank Q. Jackson

(“victim”). We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Summary

{¶ 2} On September 19, 2021, the victim was shot and killed on Anita

Kennedy Road in Cleveland Metropolitan Housing Authority’s (“CMHA”) Garden

Valley area. Less than two hours before that shooting, a 12-year-old male (“Doe”)

was shot multiple times at Cleveland’s Lonnie Burten Recreation Center and Park

(“Burten Center”), an area from which the victim had recently departed. The

Cleveland Police Department (“CPD”) suspected that the shooter intended to kill the

victim at the Burten Center, shot Doe due to mistaken identity, and completed his

quest a short while later.

{¶ 3} CPD investigated, and the CPD real time crime center (“RTCC”)

compiled video footage from Cleveland and CMHA cameras. CPD posited that

Shepard aided or abetted the murder of the victim by leaving the victim’s dirt bike

in a CMHA housing area located on Anita Kennedy Avenue with knowledge that the

victim would be shot by others when he appeared to retrieve it. When the victim

approached the bike, the shooter exited a silver Chrysler parked on the street in front

of the walkway where the state asserted the bike was purposely placed by Shepard.

The victim was shot multiple times and died at the scene.

{¶ 4} The defense argued and CPD testimony confirmed, there was no

direct evidence to support the elements of the convictions. The defense claimed the

evidence demonstrated Shepard was not the shooter and was not at the scene at the

time the victim was shot. The defense also contended the state failed to show that

Shepard knew the identity of the shooters.
 {¶ 5} Shepard was arrested on October 27, 2021. On November 4, 2021,

Shepard was indicted for:

Count 1: Aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A), an
unclassified felony,

Count 2: Murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B), an unclassified
felony,

Count 3: Felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a second-
degree felony,

Count 4: Felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), a second-
degree felony.

Each count included one- and three-year firearm specifications.

{¶ 6} The case was placed on the court’s mental-health docket. The jury

trial commenced on October 24, 2022, and on October 31, 2022, the jury rendered

a verdict of guilty on all counts. Counts 2, 3, and 4 merged with Count 1. The state

elected to sentence on Count 1 and the three-year firearm specification. On

November 15, 2022, Shepard was sentenced to serve the three-year firearm

specification prior and consecutive to the base sentence of life with the possibility of

parole in 30 years for a total term of life with the possibility of parole in 33 years.

Shepard received jail-time credit for 384 days. Court costs were imposed but fines

waived.

{¶ 7} Shepard appeals.

II. Assignments of Error

I. The trial court erred when it denied appellant’s motion for judgment
of acquittal under Crim.R. 29 because the state failed to present
sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the elements
necessary to support the convictions.
 II. Appellant’s convictions are against the manifest weight of the
evidence.

III. The court erred by allowing the State to elicit inadmissible hearsay
testimony from the witnesses over defense objections and depriving
appellant of due process and a fair trial in violation of his federal and
state constitutional rights.

III. Discussion

A. Sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence

{¶ 8} The first two errors challenge the sufficiency and manifest weight of

the evidence and have been combined to facilitate our analysis. We find that the

assigned errors lack merit.

1. Standard of review

{¶ 9} “Crim.R. 29 mandates that the trial court issue a judgment of

acquittal where the state’s evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction for an

offense.” State v. Hoskin-Hudson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103615, 2016-Ohio-5410,

¶ 7. “[A]n appellate court reviews a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion for

acquittal using the same standard it applies when reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-

evidence claim.” Id.

{¶ 10} “‘Sufficiency of the evidence is the legal standard applied to determine

whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally sufficient as a

matter of law to support the jury verdict.’” State v. McFarland, 162 Ohio St.3d 36,

2020-Ohio-3343, 164 N.E.3d 316, ¶ 23, quoting State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89,

113, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997).
 {¶ 11} “‘[W]hen reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a

criminal conviction’” the function of an appellate court “‘is to examine the evidence

admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince

the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. at ¶ 24,

quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of

the syllabus, superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated

in Smith at 102, fn. 4.

{¶ 12} “‘[T]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), followed.)’” Id.,

quoting id.

{¶ 13} In contrast to an appellate court’s sufficiency of the evidence inquiry

of whether the state met its burden of production at trial, a manifest weight of the

evidence inquiry asks whether the state met its burden of persuasion. State v.

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 390, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997) (Cook, J., concurring.)

{¶ 14} In conducting a manifest weight inquiry, a reviewing court “‘weighs

the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and

determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [factfinder] clearly lost

its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must

be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Id. at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio

App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
 {¶ 15} “In weighing the evidence, the court of appeals must always be

mindful of the presumption in favor of the trier of fact.” Id., citing Eastley v.

Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 21. Thus, an

appellate court will overturn a conviction due to the manifest weight of the evidence

only in extraordinary circumstances where the evidence presented at trial weighs

heavily against the conviction. Thompkins at 388.

2. The trial

{¶ 16} DaNesha Terrell (“Terrell”) testified that she, her mom, and others

ran to the Burten Center to check on family and friends after being notified that

shots had been fired. Her family was fine, but she saw a young male lying on the

ground.

{¶ 17} Terrell ran into the victim who she “practically grew up” with. She

could not recall what he was wearing. The victim, who lived in the East 38th Street

area about eight blocks from the Burten Center, asked Terrell for a ride to pick up

his dirt bike. Terrell and her brother drove the victim to a street called Sidaway

Avenue in the Garden Valley area, about a five-minute drive from the Burten

Center.1 The only time the victim used his cell phone was as he exited the car, and

Terrell overheard him ask someone “where[’s] the bike at?” Tr. 351.

{¶ 18} The victim asked her to wait until he retrieved his bike. Terrell looked

at her phone momentarily, saw that her mother was calling, heard shots, and looked

1 Sidaway Avenue intersects Anita Kennedy Avenue, the street where the shooting

occurred.
up to see the victim on the ground. Terrell quickly pulled away from the area and

called 911 and the victim’s sister.

{¶ 19} The 9:03 p.m. 911 call was played for the jury (exhibit No. 72). Terrell

asked for police assistance for a shooting at East 72d Street and Sidaway Avenue and

advised that the shooter was in a gray Chrysler 300 with dark-tinted windows, and

was wearing Timberland boots, light blue jeans, a white pullover hoodie, and a

yellow face mask. Terrell did not provide her real name due to an outstanding

warrant involving a diversion program and was not receiving consideration for her

testimony.

{¶ 20} Terrell reviewed the CMHA portions of the CPD/CMHA video

compilation (exhibit No. 98). Terrell identified arriving in her mother’s car and the

victim exiting her car. Terrell pulled her car up in the middle of the street beside the

gray Chrysler parked to her left to wait for the victim. She and the driver could not

see each other due to the tinted windows. Terrell remained in the spot until the

shots were fired. Terrell did not know who the victim talked with when asking about

the bike or whether the call was made by the victim or was incoming.

{¶ 21} Terrell’s mother Shaunte Hooks (“Hooks”) confirmed the encounter

with the victim at the Burten Center and that she allowed Terrell to use her car to

drop off the victim and stated that she could not recall what the victim was wearing.

Terrell later returned home crying that the victim had been shot. Hooks did not see

anyone riding a dirt bike that day.
 {¶ 22} Janesha Jackson (“Jackson”) testified that the victim was her brother

with whom she was very close. At about 1:00 p.m., the victim arrived at the stadium

parking lot where Jackson and friends were tailgating. They lived on the same

street, and Jackson’s husband drove Jackson and the victim home about 4:00 p.m.

The victim went home, changed clothes, and left for the Burten Center on his dirt

bike wearing a black shirt and red Adidas jogging pants. Jackson learned of the

shooting when called by Terrell.

{¶ 23} Jackson identified the victim’s dirt bike in a video frame photograph

(exhibit No. 80). The photograph was taken in front of a gas station located at East

55th Street and Woodland Avenue with a time stamp of 7:08 p.m. Jackson said the

individual riding the bike was not the victim.

{¶ 24} Sergeant detective Ashley Jaycox (“Det. Jaycox”) of the CMHA police

department stated the department handles all felonies except homicides, which

were handled by the CPD homicide unit. The security camera systems are motion

activated though the newer system includes cameras with 24/7 recording. Det.

Jaycox provided the CMHA portions of the CPD video. The cameras where the

incident occurred only captured activity that was “big enough and close enough to

the camera.” Tr. 386. The detective had no other involvement with the

investigation.

{¶ 25} Dr. Erica Armstrong (“Dr. Armstrong”) was employed by the

Cuyahoga County Medical Examiner’s Office as a forensic pathologist and deputy
medical examiner at the time of the incident. Her primary responsibilities were to

determine the cause and manner of death.

{¶ 26} The doctor testified that EMS was unable to revive the victim at the

scene. Gunshot wounds were located in the right forehead, right temple, upper part

of the right arm, back of upper part of right arm, right arm, upper lip, and left back.

Testimony was also provided regarding autopsy photographs of the injuries and

recovery of bullet fragments. The shots were generally from close range and were

the official cause of death.

{¶ 27} Curtiss Jones, supervisor of the trace evidence unit of the Cuyahoga

County Medical Examiner’s Office, testified that his duties included the collection

and analysis of trace evidence such as fibers, hairs, debris, and bullet holes from the

decedent’s body and clothing. The decedent was wearing a black t-shirt, red

sweatpants, underwear, socks, shoes, and a head covering. Samples were

transferred to the DNA laboratory for testing.

{¶ 28} CPD detective Robby Prock (“Det. Prock”) responded to the scene

along with detectives Peoples and Connole. Det. Prock described the photographic

exhibits of the scene and evidence markers (exhibit Nos. 1-71). The shooting took

place in a walkway area between the townhouse style buildings with decorative

fencing located to the left and right of the walkway. The dirt bike was behind the

fence portion to the right. The walkway extended from Anita Kennedy Avenue to

the parking lot behind the buildings. DNA swabs were taken from four Sellier and

Bellot .40 caliber Smith & Wesson casings, one Blazer .40-caliber Smith & Wesson
casing, the dirt bike, and cell phone collected at the scene. A gas can that detectives

were advised could be relevant to the investigation was also swabbed.

{¶ 29} The shooting occurred five to six feet from the first-floor window of

the townhouse unit to the right of the building, and an occupant would potentially

have heard the encounter. Det. Prock estimated that the gas can was located 8 to 12

housing units from the scene.

{¶ 30} CPD detective Kevin Warnock (“Det. Warnock”) with the gang impact

unit responded to the scene while it was being secured. He and other CPD personnel

interviewed residents and bystanders and canvassed the area for witnesses.

Generally, people did not want to be seen cooperating with police or simply refused

to speak. CPD initially believed the victim was the “sole operator of the bike

throughout the incident.” Tr. 498. Information was received that he was not. The

gas can was recovered from the residence of Kimberlie Davis who police interviewed

twice. Based on the interviews, Shepard became a person of interest

{¶ 31} Kimberlie Davis (“Davis”) reluctantly testified that she knew Shepard

through her friend who had a child with Shepard. Davis initially advised police that

Shepard had touched the gas can that police took as evidence. Shepard was at the

house while it was light outside, and Davis gave him something to eat. Davis stated

she did not see Shepard with the bike and later said she only saw Shepard with the

bike during the day.

{¶ 32} During cross-examination, Davis added that Shepard was cool and

calm during the visit and came alone. The gas can that was recovered by CPD
belonged to her, but she did not know whether the can was full or empty when

Shepard was there, whether Shepard obtained gas, or whether he returned to her

house again that day.

{¶ 33} CPD investigative research analyst Macie Pierse (“Pierse”) was

employed with the RTCC that assisted with video evidence including creating

compilations. Pierse prepared the video compilation exhibit in the instant case.

Pierse also authored a report of the camera views that she examined to prepare the

compilation, created a map identifying the camera locations, and a list of the 58

video clips selected to complete the video.

{¶ 34} Pierse stated that the time stamps on the CPD video clips were

accurate and in sequential time order as much as possible but could not say that the

same was true for the motion-activated CMHA clips. Pierse was aware that

investigators thought the shootings of the victim and at the Burten Center were

related.

{¶ 35} Pierse described the video compilation for the jury. Pierse stated the

scene of a male crossing a CMHA parking lot near East 40th and Bohn Avenue was

the male who later shot Doe at the Burten Center. Several clips at the beginning of

the compilation depicted a black male in a white shirt who was riding the victim’s

dirt bike in the general area of East 49th Street and Outhwaite Avenue at

approximately 7:34 p.m. to 7:46 p.m.

{¶ 36} A clip from a camera located at the East 46th Street entrance of the

Burten Center showed the victim walking down East 46th Street at 7:51 p.m. looking
at or talking on his cell phone. He was wearing tennis shoes, a black shirt, red

sweatpants, and a black hair cap.

{¶ 37} The next clip was of Doe, described by the witness as, “wearing red

pants with a white stripe and a white and red or black striped shirt,” walking through

the baseball field at the Burten Center. Tr. 536. At 7:53 p.m., the victim was walking

through the playground area of the Burten Center and interacting with his cell

phone. On parallel walkways divided by tall, thick shrubs, the victim was leaving

the playground area as Doe entered.

{¶ 38} Also, at 7:53 p.m., the “suspect shooter” was captured by the camera

in front of the Burten Center walking down East 46th Street, the same street the

victim walked down, as though following the victim. At 7:54 p.m., Doe was walking

out of the playground area toward the street when the shooter walked up to him and

fired until Doe fell. The shooter ran back up East 46th Street. People began running

through the park, including the victim, and gathered near the football field sign. At

7:56 p.m., the gray Chrysler drove through the immediate area and the Scoville

Avenue portion of the Burten Center parking lot as others ran from the park to the

Outhwaite Homes CMHA property adjacent to the Burten Center.

{¶ 39} At 8:03 p.m., the victim and several others assisted an individual who

was also wounded by the gunfire into a red car that was flagged down at East 55th

Street and Outhwaite Avenue. Tr. 551. Also, at 8:03 p.m., another clip depicted the

Chrysler stopping at the light, then proceeding through the intersection of East 55th
Street and Quincy Avenue. The Chrysler proceeded east on Quincy Avenue and, at

8:04 p.m., was at Quincy Avenue and Opportunity Corridor Boulevard.

{¶ 40} The video review shifted to an 8:50 p.m. clip at East 55th Street and

Outhwaite Avenue where the dirt bike and alleged rider Shepard were headed

toward East 55th Street and Kinsman Avenue. The remaining video was from

CMHA motion clips and activities on Anita Kennedy Road at cited points of the

24:10 minute video and focused on the dirt bike rider, the victim, and the Chrysler.

{¶ 41} Pierse described:

21:52 – “[W]e are seeing a dirt bike and dirt bike rider that are entering
the scene from the west going eastbound.”

22:20 – “[T]he silver Chrysler 300 is driving westbound on Anita
Kennedy” “and stopped next to the black vehicle.” “Looks like they may
have been talking.”

22:28 – “[T]he [Chrysler] vehicle is backing up down the street and it
looks like the dirt bike rider is no longer on the dirt bike but is walking
next to that [Chrysler] vehicle.”

Tr. 561-563.

{¶ 42} The narration continued briefly without video point specifications:

[T]he vehicle is stopped and it looks like that rider * * * may be speaking
with the occupants of the vehicle. * * * The Chrysler has now pulled
forward again just out of the view of the camera. * * * The individual in
the white t-shirt is now speaking with the black vehicle at the bottom of
the screen. * * * It looks like that [black] vehicle opened the back door
of that vehicle and then it did disappear from the bottom of the screen.

Tr. 563-564.

{¶ 43} Pierse continued:

22:57 – The silver Chrysler 300 is traveling eastbound on Anita
Kennedy * * * [and] was backing into a parking spot on the side of the
 road right there [indicating]. * * * [A] lighter colored vehicle traveling
eastbound on Anita Kennedy, and this is the video—the vehicle that
[the victim] was a passenger in.

23:36 – There’s a person that’s exiting the rear passenger side of that
vehicle, and that’s believed to be the victim. * * * [The victim] was on
the south side of the road when he exited the vehicle and then returned
to the north side of the road going in front of that vehicle. * * * So [the
victim] goes northbound towards the area in which his dirt bike was
later found and we see somebody approach him and extend their arm
and shoot.

Tr. 565-567. Pierse was unable to locate the Chrysler in any of the CPD videos after

the shooting. The state did not inquire about CMHA videos.

{¶ 44} Pierse confirmed during cross-examination that the video clips did

not depict the person riding the dirt bike near the Burten Center around the time of

the first shooting incident. She also agreed that the dirt bike rider and black SUV

arrived about the same time and came from the same direction. The Chrysler

arrived from the opposite direction, and the dirt bike rider eventually entered the

SUV and road away. There were no video clips showing where the SUV went. There

was a brief interaction of a few seconds between the Chrysler and what appeared to

be the person riding the dirt bike. Tr. 583.

{¶ 45} Forensic DNA analyst Christine Scott (“Scott”) was employed by the

Cuyahoga County Regional Forensic Science Laboratory in the medical examiner’s

office. She examined evidence for DNA, interpreted the DNA profiles recovered,

and prepared reports. Scott examined body swabs from the victim, the victim’s

clothing, the left- and right-hand handlebar of the dirt bike, casings, and the gas can

recovered from the scene. Swabs from parts of the victim’s body and clothing
indicated a mixture of DNA with the victim’s. The handlebars contained a mixture

of the victim and four other individuals. An insufficient amount of DNA was

obtained from the gas can and bullet casings. A DNA match with Shepard was

identified on the left and right handlebar of the dirt bike.

{¶ 46} Edward Lattyak (“Lattyak”) was the supervisor of the firearms and

toolmark unit of the Cuyahoga County Medical Examiner’s regional forensic science

laboratory. Lattyak examined the bullet casings, a fired bullet, and several bullet

fragments. He concluded that the bullets were fired from a Glock firearm but no

firearm was submitted. Examination of the National Integrated Ballistic

Information Network database revealed a potential match for one of the bullet

casings that indicated the same weapon may have been used in several other

shooting events but none on the same day.

{¶ 47} Special Agent Andrew Burke (“Agent Burke”) of the Federal Bureau

of Investigation was assigned to the CPD Homicide Unit’s Violent Crime Task Force.

Agent Burke performed a forensic software download of data from two iPhones that

belonged to the victim. One phone had very little call activity, no data for the period

of the shooting, and no references to Shepard. The other phone with a number

ending in 1523 appeared to be the victim’s primary phone. The investigation focused

on data for the period of September 19-23, 2021.

{¶ 48} The shooting occurred “around 9:10 p.m.” Tr. 628. Seven

consecutive outgoing calls were made by the victim to the same number ending in

9510 between 8:49 p.m. and 9:03 p.m. The 8:53 p.m. and 8:55 p.m. calls lasted a
minute and 12 seconds, and the others may not have connected, including the last

call at 9:03 p.m. The 9510 number called the victim’s 1523 number two days before

the shooting.

{¶ 49} CPD attempted to identify the owner of the 9510 number. There was

no name associated with the number in the victim’s phone, no text message

exchanges, and no text references to Shepard. A subpoena to the phone provider

revealed there was no subscriber name listed for the 9510 prepaid phone account.

However, phone records were secured for 9510 and reviewed for call patterns during

the relevant time frame.

{¶ 50} A search was conducted of the Securus jail-phone records for calls

made by Shepard to numbers of interest selected from the call pattern reviews. Six

calls were discovered from Shepard to a number ending in 1949 between

November 11 and December 27, 2021, a number that also appeared in the 9510

records (exhibit No. 159). Shepard also made calls that appeared in the 9510 phone

records to numbers ending in 8220 and 4520 (exhibit Nos. 160, 161).

{¶ 51} Agent Burke confirmed during cross-examination that there were no

incoming calls to the victim from the 9510 number the day of the shooting. There

also was no evidence of who possessed the 1949, 2220, and 4520 numbers at the

time Shepard called them. And there was no direct evidence that Shepard owned

the 9510 phone.

{¶ 52} Detective Shane Bauhof (“Det. Bauhof”) of CPD’s Fourth District

Homicide Unit worked on the case with detectives Gonzalez and Diaz. Through
canvassing by the CPD gang-impact unit and CMHA, along with videos provided by

CMHA, Det. Bauhof “learned of a subject that delivered [the victim’s] dirt bike to the

area and * * * why [the victim] was instructed to go to Garden Valley [by East 70th

Street and Kinsman Avenue] to pick up his dirt bike” though the victim lived in the

East 38th Street area. Tr. 673. At that point, Shepard was suspected of being the dirt

bike rider.

{¶ 53} Det. Bauhof narrated his perspective of the CMHA motion-activated

camera portion of the video compilation that echoed the perspectives presented by

Pierse of the events at the Burten Center and on Anita Kennedy Road where the

victim’s shooting occurred. The detective later in his testimony identified the bike

rider as Shepard in video excerpts and still shots of the video.

{¶ 54} Det. Bauhof added that CPD was unable to identify the license plates

on the black SUV and Chrysler and that when the Chrysler backed up beside the bike

rider, there appeared to be a brief conversation and a gesture by the bike rider

toward the place where the bike had been left. The Chrysler parked directly in front

of that area. Police assumed the shooter entered the Chrysler, which pulled off

quickly afterward.

{¶ 55} Det. Bauhof also testified regarding still shots of the video scenes

including Doe, Doe’s shooter, and the victim at the Burten Center. The similarity of

the attire between Doe and the victim and the presence of the Chrysler near the

Burten Center bolstered the conclusion that Doe was a victim of mistaken identity

and that the victim was the target.
 {¶ 56} CPD received tips regarding the Chrysler that had a distinctive

oversized sunroof. A tip directed CPD to an individual named Cam who had a

Chrysler 300 but disposed of it after the shooting. A picture secured from social

media was identified by the gang-impact unit as Rashad Bilal (“Bilal”) who owned a

light blue Chrysler 300 that fit the description. Bilal was the target of a narcotics

investigation. Despite efforts including checking CPD’s street license reader

records, the Chrysler was not located.

{¶ 57} Cell phone records revealed calls to and from Bilal and the 9510

number CPD attributed to Shepard on multiple days prior to the shooting. The day

of the shooting, Bilal called 9510 at 7:36 p.m., which was shortly before the Burten

Center shooting at 7:45 p.m., again at 8:08 p.m., and at 3:39 a.m., the morning after

the shooting (exhibit Nos. 155 and 181.) Records show calls were made from the

9510 number to Bilal on September 16, the day of the shooting, at 2:46 p.m., 5:52

p.m., and 8:08 p.m.

{¶ 58} Det. Bauhof also testified that the date September 16, 2021, became

significant because that was the date that James Greathouse (“Greathouse”) was

either indicted or a warrant was issued for arson in connection with a homicide. The

arson was for a “vehicle that listed back to” the victim. Tr. 716. At the time of the

victim’s shooting, Greathouse was in Texas. The detective said cell phone records

for the 9510 number and for Bilal contained calls with a Texas area code. Police

determined that Shepard, Bilal, and Greathouse were associates but were unable to

identify the owner of the Texas phone.
 {¶ 59} During cross-examination, the defense emphasized that the evidence

was circumstantial and based on the state’s speculation. Bilal was not identified as

the driver of the Chrysler and was still considered a suspect in the shooting but had

not been arrested or charged at the time of trial. CPD also provided no proof that the

car was titled to Bilal. The investigation was still pending at the time of trial.

{¶ 60} The state rested; the defense motion for judgment of acquittal under

Crim.R. 29 was denied. The defense rested, and the renewed Crim.R. 29 motion was

denied.

3. Analysis

{¶ 61} The state argued that Shepard aided and abetted the offenses.

Shepard contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish the requisite elements

of the convictions based on complicity. R.C. 2923.03(A) provides in pertinent part

that [n]o person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of

an offense, shall * * * aid or abet another in committing the offense.” R.C. 2923.03

(A)(2). “[C]onviction of the principal offender is not a prerequisite to finding a

defendant guilty of complicity.” State v. Gardner, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111506,

2023-Ohio-307, ¶ 34, citing R.C. 2923.03(B) (“It is no defense to a charge under this

section that no person with whom the accused was in complicity has been convicted

as a principal offender.”). The state is not required to establish the principal’s

identity to convict an offender of complicity, but only that the state proves that a

principal committed the offense. Id., citing R.C. 2923.03(C) and State v. Perryman,

49 Ohio St.2d 14, 358 N.E.2d 1040 (1976), paragraph four of the syllabus, vacated
on other grounds, sub nom., Strodes v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct. 3135, 57

L.Ed.2d 1154 (1978).

{¶ 62} Counts 2, 3, and 4 merged into Count 1, and Shepard was sentenced

on one three-year gun specification and Count 1, aggravated murder, only, “so we

consider the sufficiency of the evidence on [that conviction] only.” (Footnote

omitted). McFarland, 162 Ohio St.3d 36, 2020-Ohio-3343, 164 N.E.3d 316, at ¶ 25,

citing State v. Whitfield, 124 Ohio St.3d 319, 2010-Ohio-2, 922 N.E.2d 182, ¶ 24 (“A

‘conviction’ consists of a guilty verdict and the imposition of a sentence or penalty

[emphasis sic].”). State v. Myers, 154 Ohio St.3d 405, 2018-Ohio-1903, 114 N.E.3d

1138, ¶ 138 (merger of kidnapping count with aggravated-robbery and aggravated-

burglary counts moots sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim regarding kidnapping

count).

{¶ 63} R.C. 2923.03, entitled “Complicity,” does not define aiding and

abetting. The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that to aid or abet means to “‘[t]o assist

or facilitate the commission of a crime, or to promote its accomplishment.’” State

v. Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 240, 243, 754 N.E.2d 796 (2001), quoting Black’s Law

Dictionary 69 (7th Ed.1999).

“To support a conviction for complicity by aiding and abetting pursuant
to R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), the evidence must show that the defendant
supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited
the principal in the commission of the crime, and that the defendant
shared the criminal intent of the principal.” Johnson at syllabus.
“‘Participation in criminal intent may be inferred from presence,
companionship and conduct before and after the offense is
committed.’” Id. at 245, quoting State v. Pruett, 28 Ohio App.2d 29,
34, 273 N.E.2d 884 (4th Dist.1971). “The court must view the evidence
 in the light most favorable to the prosecution and defer to the trier of
fact on questions of credibility and the weight assigned to the evidence.
State v. Fry, 125 Ohio St.3d 163, 2010-Ohio-1017, 926 N.E.2d 1239,
¶ 146.” State v. Kirkland, 140 Ohio St.3d 73, 2014-Ohio-1966, 15
N.E.3d 818, ¶ 132.

McFarland at ¶ 29.

{¶ 64} R.C. 2903.01(A), aggravated murder, provides that “[n]o person shall

purposely, and with prior calculation and design, cause the death of another.” “The

element of prior calculation and design ‘require[s] a scheme designed to implement

the calculated decision to kill.’” Id. at ¶ 31, quoting State v. Cotton, 56 Ohio St.2d 8,

11, 381 N.E.2d 190 (1978). “A person acts purposely when it is the person’s specific

intention to cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition

against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to

accomplish thereby, it is the offender’s specific intention to engage in conduct of that

nature.” R.C. 2901.22(A).

{¶ 65} There is substantial support in the record that the Chrysler was in the

immediate vicinity of the Burten Center during the shooting. The shooter followed

the route taken by the victim into the area that the victim had just exited and shot

Doe whom CPD believe was mistaken for the victim. Witness Terrell testified that

the victim called someone on his cell phone and asked where the bike had been left

as he exited her car. The cell phone evidence confirmed that the call was made to the

9510 cell phone number. The cell phone evidence also established that the owner of

the Chrysler and the 9510 number made calls to each other the day of the shooting.

Shepard’s DNA was found on the handles of the bike.
 {¶ 66} The CMHA motion-activated video excerpts showed the dirt-bike

rider entering eastbound into the area followed by a dark SUV that waited for the

rider. The Chrysler appeared from the opposite direction and stopped by the black

SUV. The drivers’ sides of the vehicles were aligned for a few moments, then the

Chrysler pulled off.

{¶ 67} The rider approached from behind the trees heading east toward the

black SUV as the Chrysler entered the picture heading west and slowly backed up

with the rider walking alongside the Chrysler’s passenger side. They stopped and

interacted briefly, and the rider gestured to the area where the bike was left. The

rider entered the black SUV and departed. The Chrysler drove out of view, returned

heading eastbound, parked in front of the place that the bike had been left, and

turned off its lights.

{¶ 68} Witness Terrell’s vehicle entered heading eastbound and stopped in

the middle of the street to the left of the parked Chrysler facing west. The victim

exited as he asked the individual on the cell phone where the bike was located. The

motion-activated camera showed the victim quickly cross the street in front of

Terrell’s car and behind the parked Chrysler to get the bike. The shooter

immediately followed and began firing. The shooting stopped, and the Chrysler

pulled away.

{¶ 69} Shepard argues that the state’s case was based on mere speculation

and circumstantial evidence and that mere presence at the scene is not enough to

establish complicity. “‘“Participation in criminal intent may be inferred from
presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense is committed.”’”

Gardner, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111506, 2023-Ohio-307, at ¶ 35, quoting State v.

Cartellone, 3 Ohio App.3d 145, 150, 444 N.E.2d 68 (8th Dist.1981), quoting State v.

Pruett, 28 Ohio App.2d 29, 34, 273 N.E.2d 884 (4th Dist.1971). Additionally,

“[a]iding and abetting may be shown by both direct and circumstantial evidence.”

Id., citing State v. High, 2018-Ohio-2236, 115 N.E.3d 702, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.).

{¶ 70} The trial court properly instructed the jury on the definitions of

circumstantial and direct evidence. The jury was also informed:

It is your job to decide how much weight to give to the direct and the
circumstantial evidence. The law makes no distinction between the
weight that you should give to either one, nor does it say that one is any
better evidence than the other. You should consider all of the evidence,
both direct and circumstantial, and give it whatever weight that you
believe it deserves.

Tr. 814.

{¶ 71} We add that this court has held:

“To be convicted as an aider and abettor such person must: (1) engage
in an overt act ‘with a view’ towards producing the result for which he
[or she] is held; and (2) such person must himself [or herself] possess
the felonious intent that the principal possesses.” State v. Boigner, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 34514, 1976 Ohio App. LEXIS 7630, 3 (Mar. 25,
1976), citing Woolweaver v. State, 50 Ohio St. 277, 288, 34 N.E. 352
(1893). “It is not necessary that the accused be in a position to foresee
the precise consequence of his [or her] conduct; only that the
consequence be foreseeable in the sense that what actually transpired
was natural and logical in that it was within the scope of the risk created
by his [or her] conduct.” State v. Losey, 23 Ohio App.3d 93, 95-96, 23
491 N.E.2d 379 (10th Dist.1985).

Gardner at ¶ 33.
 {¶ 72} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and

giving due deference to the trier of fact on questions of credibility and adequacy, this

court does not find that the evidence in this case was insufficient as a matter of law

to support the elements of complicity to aggravated murder. This court also does

not find that this is the exceptional case where the jury clearly lost its way. The

weight of the evidence supports the conviction.

{¶ 73} The first and second assignments of error are overruled.

B. Hearsay

1. Standard of Review

{¶ 74} “A trial court has broad discretion regarding the admission of

evidence, including whether evidence constitutes hearsay and whether it is

admissible hearsay.” State v. Wingfield, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107196, 2019-Ohio-

1644, ¶ 29, citing Solon v. Woods, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100916, 2014-Ohio-5425,

¶ 10. “We therefore will not disturb a trial court’s decision regarding the

admissibility of hearsay evidence absent an abuse of discretion and the defendant

suffers material prejudice.” Id., citing Woods, citing State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d

239, 265, 473 N.E.2d 768 (1984).

{¶ 75} An “abuse of discretion” occurs where “a court exercise[s] its

judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has

discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-

3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35. No court has discretionary authority to apply the law

incorrectly, which is why courts apply a de novo standard when reviewing issues of
law. Id. at ¶ 38, citing Hudson v. Petrosurance, Inc., 127 Ohio St.3d 54, 2010-Ohio-

4505, 936 N.E.2d 481, ¶ 30; State v. Boles, 187 Ohio App.3d 345, 2010-Ohio-278,

932 N.E.2d 345, ¶ 26 (2d Dist.).

2. Analysis

{¶ 76} Shepard contends that the trial court erred when, over defense

objections, it allowed the state to elicit inadmissible hearsay testimony resulting in

the deprivation of due process and a fair trial under the state and federal

constitutions. We disagree.

{¶ 77} “Hearsay is ‘a statement, other than one made by the declarant while

testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter

asserted.’” Id. at ¶ 30, quoting Evid.R. 801(C). “If either element is missing — (1) a

statement or (2) offered for its truth — the testimony is not hearsay.” Id., citing State

v. Holt, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 97CA006985, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4149, 8 (Sept. 8,

1996).

{¶ 78} Shepard argues that the admission of the evidence amounted to

unfair prejudice that outweighed its probative value, in violation of Evid.R. 403(A).

“Evid.R. 403(A) mandates the exclusion of even relevant evidence if its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the

issues or misleading the jury.” Hunt v. E. Cleveland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105953,

2019-Ohio-1115, ¶ 46. In addition,

[a] judge has “broad discretion” to admit or exclude evidence under
Evid.R. 403(A), and we will not reverse the ruling absent a “clear
abuse” of that discretion. This standard of review flows from the
uniquely factual nature of the Evid.R. 403(A) determination, which
 must balance probative value against the risk of unfair prejudice in light
of all the circumstances. “The issue of whether testimony is relevant or
irrelevant, confusing or misleading, is best decided by the trial judge
who is in a significantly better position to analyze the impact of the
evidence on the jury.”

State v. Hruby, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81303, 2003-Ohio-746, ¶ 8, quoting State

v. Hanna, 95 Ohio St.3d 285, 2002-Ohio-2221, 767 N.E.2d 678, ¶ 29, and Columbus

v. Taylor, 39 Ohio St.3d 162, 164, 529 N.E.2d 1382 (1988).

{¶ 79} Shepard also states that the testimony was substantially more

prejudicial than probative, needlessly cumulative, and showed inadmissible crimes.

Evid.R. 404(B) precludes the admission of evidence regarding a
defendant’s prior criminal acts when such evidence is offered to prove
the defendant’s character and that his actions were in conformity with
that character. State v. Herring, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104441, 2017-
Ohio-743, 81 N.E.3d 133, ¶ 12. However, evidence of the defendant’s
prior criminal acts may be admissible for other purposes, such as to
prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Evid.R. 404(B).

State v. Nunez, 2017-Ohio-4295, 92 N.E.3d 294, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.).

{¶ 80} Shepard argues the testimony of Det. Bauhof was offered to prove the

truth of the matter asserted that the two alleged suspects had a motive to kill the

victim and that Mr. Shepard, as their associate, shared that intent. Appellant’s brief,

p. 29.

{¶ 81} Shepard objected as follows:

State: As you began to investigate this case, Detective, were you looking
for some information with respect to a motive, like who would want to
kill [the victim]?

Witness: Yes.
 State: Did you develop a theory throughout your investigation with
respect to that?

Counsel: Objection.

Tr. 710.

{¶ 82} Discussed at sidebar and proffered for the record, counsel argued that

a response would involve the detective’s purely speculative theory of how people and

events were connected and who had a motive to kill the victim, specifically that the

victim loaned a car to someone, a murder occurred, the vehicle was torched, and the

victim was killed because he was a witness. No charges had been filed against

anyone. Counsel asserted that the information should not be introduced by the

detective’s theory and would confuse the jury. The trial court advised that the state

would be allowed to ask “very specifically if there were additional steps in the

investigation, and that’s it.” Tr. 712. Both parties responded, “[O]kay.” Id.

{¶ 83} The trial court continued, “I am not going to allow the state to link it

or create it as a motive, but outlining an investigation and what occurred is

logical * * * it’s the jury’s purview to make any connection that they would choose to

make.” Tr. 714. The state was advised, “[Y]ou can withdraw the question and then

just simply ask what additional steps were taken if there’s relevance to that date, and

move forward just in a straightforward manner.” Tr. 715. Defense counsel stated,

“Okay.”

{¶ 84} The defense conducted a thorough cross-examination and recross-

examination addressing the information provided by Det. Bauhof during direct and
redirect examination. Counsel walked through perspectives of what the exhibits did

and did not reveal for the jury’s consideration.

{¶ 85} Shepard further asserts that withdrawal of the question was not

enough because the jury had heard the withdrawn question and “it was nearly

impossible for the jury not to make the connection that this was the detective’s

theory of who had a motive to kill the victim” and that “the state implied to the jury”

through the testimony “that these unknown perpetrators could possibly either be

Bilal or Greathouse.” Appellant’s brief, p. 28.

{¶ 86} The testimony in the instant case was presented to establish Det.

Bauhof’s investigation of the events and individuals involved in the shooting of the

victim. State v. Henderson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88185, 2007-Ohio-2372, ¶ 45.

See also State v. Dakdouk, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 77701, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS

741 (Mar. 1, 200) (court held that the admission of the detective’s testimony about

an anonymous tip was not inadmissible hearsay evidence because it was not offered

to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to merely establish the

detective’s reason for investigating the appellant); State v. Carpenter, 6th Dist.

Lucas No. L-05-1219, 2006-Ohio-4296, ¶ 15 (“When a statement is offered into

evidence to explain the conduct of a police officer’s investigation of a crime, it is not

considered to be hearsay.”); State v. Craft, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2006-06-145,

2007-Ohio-4116, ¶ 51 (“Where a statement made by an individual to a law

enforcement officer is offered to prove the officer’s subsequent investigative

activities, the statement does not constitute hearsay and is properly admissible.”).
 {¶ 87} This court does not find that the trial court abused its discretion. The

third assignment of error is overruled.

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 88} The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_____
ANITA LASTER MAYS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., and
LISA B. FORBES, J., CONCUR