In re R.D.

NOTICE 2023 IL App (4th) 230669-U FILED
This Order was filed under January 2, 2024
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NOS. 4-23-0669 and 4-23-0670 cons. Carla Bender
not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed
IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re R.D. and A.D., Minors ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
(The People of the State of Illinois, ) Winnebago County
Petitioner-Appellee, ) Nos. 20JA343
v. ) 20JA344
Tabitha A., )
Respondent-Appellant). ) Honorable
) Francis M. Martinez,
) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court.
Justice Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
Justice Steigmann specially concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment terminating respondent’s
parental rights, holding she failed to establish her claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel.

¶2 The State filed motions to terminate the parental rights of respondent, Tabitha A.,

to her minor children, R.D. (born in 2019) and A.D. (born in 2017). The parental rights of the

minors’ father are not at issue in this appeal. He appealed the termination of his parental rights in

appellate court case Nos. 4-23-0636 and 4-23-0637. The trial court found respondent unfit and

later determined it was in the minors’ best interest to terminate her parental rights. In this

consolidated appeal, respondent argues her counsel provided ineffective assistance at the

permanency hearings and at the fitness hearing. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. The Adjudicatory Proceedings

¶5 On September 4, 2020, the State filed petitions seeking to adjudicate the minors

neglected under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(a),

(b) (West 2020)). The State alleged the minors were neglected because (1) respondent’s mental

health issues prevented her from properly parenting, thereby presenting a risk of harm to the

minors (id. § 2-3(1)(b)), (2) the minors’ parents failed to provide proper support, education, or

medical care for R.D. in that R.D. was not receiving the required medication for his heart

condition (id. § 2-3(1)(a)), and (3)the minors’ father allowed respondent to care for the minors

for over one week after being told not to leave them in her care (id. § 2-3(1)(b)).

¶6 On September 8, 2020, the parties waived a shelter care hearing, and the trial

court awarded temporary custody and guardianship of the minors to the Illinois Department of

Children and Family Services (DCFS). At the adjudicatory hearing on February 24, 2021,

respondent stipulated to count I of the petition, and the State voluntarily dismissed counts II and

III. The court found the minors neglected based on a statement of facts filed by the parties.

¶7 B. The Permanency Proceedings

¶8 Following the May 21, 2021, dispositional hearing, the trial court found

respondent unfit or unable to have custody of the minors until she received the recommended

services. The court determined temporary custody and guardianship would remain with DCFS.

¶9 Over the two years that followed, the trial court conducted several permanency

hearings. After the first hearing on October 14, 2021, the court entered an order finding

respondent had made reasonable efforts toward the permanency goal. The goal remained for the

minors to return home within a period not to exceed one year. At the next hearing on April 13,

2022, the court determined respondent had failed to make reasonable efforts or reasonable

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progress, but the goal remained for the minors to return home. The court also reminded both

parents they were expected to participate in the minors’ medical appointments.

¶ 10 On January 4, 2023, the trial court held another permanency hearing where the

State argued respondent had not made reasonable efforts or reasonable progress toward the return

of the minors. The State noted, out of nine drug screens during the relevant period, respondent

failed to appear for four, tested positive on one, and tested negative on four. The positive drug

screen indicated use of cocaine, amphetamine, and methamphetamine. The State also noted

visitation had been inconsistent and respondent had been discharged unsuccessfully from her

parenting classes. Respondent’s counsel argued the court should find respondent made

reasonable efforts and asked the court to defer judgment on her progress. Counsel noted

respondent had engaged in counseling, and he asserted she had trended toward negative drug

screens at the end of the relevant time period. Counsel also asserted respondent was on wait lists

for counseling and parenting education services. Following the hearing, the court found

respondent had not made reasonable efforts or reasonable progress. The goal remained for the

minors to return home, but the court indicated it would be considering a goal change at the next

permanency hearing if the parents did not show improvement.

¶ 11 At the final permanency hearing on April 13, 2023, the State asked the trial court

to take judicial notice of the permanency hearing report and the service plan. Respondent

appeared by Zoom for the hearing, and respondent’s counsel asked to call her to testify. The

court stated respondent had been “sort of floating around her apartment or wherever she is. I

need her to sit down somewhere.” After respondent sat down and prepared to testify, the court

noticed another person in the background. When the court indicated that person would have to

leave before respondent testified, respondent stated, “Hang on. This is going to make me really

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f*** antsy.” The court then decided respondent was not “in any shape to testify.” Respondent’s

counsel provided a proffer as to her testimony, stating she had engaged in domestic violence

classes, she was required to get a psychological examination before continuing individual

counseling, she had not been asked to perform a drug screen recently, and some of her missed

visits were due to the children being sick and she had communicated with her caseworker on

those occasions.

¶ 12 The State argued respondent failed to make reasonable efforts or reasonable

progress and asked the trial court to change the goal to substitute care pending court

determination of termination of parental rights. Respondent’s counsel asked for the goal to

remain returning the minors home given “what my client’s done so far, even though some things

are outstanding.” The court noted approximately 25 months had passed since the adjudication of

neglect and respondent had failed to make reasonable efforts or reasonable progress toward the

return of the minors up to that point. The court, therefore, changed the goal to substitute care

pending court determination of termination of parental rights.

¶ 13 C. The Termination Proceedings

¶ 14 On May 19, 2023, the State filed motions to terminate respondent’s parental rights

to both minors. The motion for each minor alleged respondent was an unfit parent because she

(1) failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions forming the basis for their removal

during a nine-month period after the adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West

2022)) and (2) failed to make reasonable progress toward their return to her care during a

nine-month period after the adjudication of neglect (id. § (1)(D)(m)(ii)). The State alleged

nine-month periods from October 14, 2021, to July 14, 2022, and from July 13, 2022, to April

13, 2023.

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¶ 15 1. The Fitness Hearing

¶ 16 Respondent was not present at the fitness hearing held on June 21, 2023. A copy

of an e-mail respondent sent to her caseworker was provided to the trial court. The court

described the e-mail as “almost a farewell note, in terms of appearing,” and found respondent

had waived her right to be present.

¶ 17 The State called Monica Gallagher, who testified she had been employed by

Youth Service Bureau (YSB) for approximately two years. Her duties and responsibilities

included observing home visits, meeting monthly with parents to ensure they were participating

in services, having parents complete drug tests, and providing documentation and court reports.

Gallagher was assigned as the minors’ caseworker in March 2022. A.D. was currently five years

old, and R.D. was three years old.

¶ 18 Gallagher identified People’s exhibit No. 1 as respondent’s integrated assessment

completed on December 2, 2020. The exhibit was admitted without objection. The integrated

assessment stated the primary concerns with respondent’s ability to safely parent the minors

involved her “mental health difficulties, chronic substance and alcohol abuse, concerns of

interpersonal violence and limitations in judgment especially related to her child’s medical

needs.” Given those concerns, the integrated assessment recommended respondent participate in

medication monitoring and individual therapy, abstain from substance and alcohol use,

participate in substance abuse treatment and random drug testing, participate in parenting

education, and participate in a domestic violence support program for victims.

¶ 19 Gallagher identified People’s exhibit Nos. 2 through 6 as respondent’s service

plans dated March 9, 2021, September 5, 2021, March 4, 2022, September 14, 2022, and March

1, 2023. The service plans were admitted without objection. Gallagher testified the service plans

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detailed the services for respondent and the tasks to be completed. According to Gallagher,

service plans are reviewed every six months at a minimum and submitted for permanency

hearings.

¶ 20 Gallagher testified the service plans recommended respondent complete a

substance abuse assessment and drug testing, engage in parenting education, complete a mental

health assessment and counseling, and cooperate with medication monitoring. The service plans

also recommended respondent attend the minors’ medical appointments, participate in

visitations, and cooperate with her caseworker.

¶ 21 Gallagher testified she attempted to initiate contact with respondent frequently

either in person or by e-mail, phone, or text message. When asked whether respondent stayed in

contact with her, Gallagher stated it “varied month to month,” but “[m]ore so, there was a big

lack of communication.” Gallagher also testified respondent had not completed a mental health

assessment. Respondent completed the recommended domestic violence services. Respondent

was asked to complete random drug testing a “couple times a month.” Gallagher testified

respondent completed less than half of those tests and some of the tests she completed came back

positive for tetrahydrocannabinol and one was positive for cocaine. Respondent had not

completed the substance abuse assessment required before starting any treatment.

¶ 22 Gallagher further testified she had concerns about respondent’s parenting skills.

When Gallagher observed visitations, respondent looked at her phone while the children played.

If they misbehaved, respondent would usually have R.D. sit in a corner in a time-out for most of

the visit. Gallagher did not observe any engagement with the children or parenting skills.

Respondent was referred to a parenting class when the case was opened in 2020, and she was

later referred to classes at YSB, but she did not complete either class. Gallagher testified

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respondent attended “[m]aybe half to less than half” of the visits with the minors. Her last visit

with the minors was in March 2023. Gallagher also testified R.D. has a heart condition requiring

special care. Respondent had participated in one training appointment on his condition.

¶ 23 Gallagher testified respondent still needed to complete “[a] substance abuse

assessment, her individual counseling, parenting, [and] domestic violence [services].” She

further testified concerns about respondent’s ability to safely parent the minors remained due to

her “lack of consistency, communication and the motivation to work towards getting her children

home. The positive drops, the lack of going to drops are all major concerns.”

¶ 24 On cross-examination, respondent’s counsel inquired whether Gallagher had

earlier testified respondent completed her domestic violence services. Gallagher clarified that

respondent engaged in those services, but she did not receive confirmation of respondent’s

completion of services. Gallagher acknowledged respondent mentioned transportation as “an

overall issue,” but she asserted respondent did not “really use that as the reason” for not

attending visits or performing drug drops.

¶ 25 Following Gallagher’s testimony, the State rested. Respondent did not present any

evidence.

¶ 26 The trial court took the matter under advisement and announced its decision at a

hearing on July 19, 2023. Respondent failed to appear at the hearing, and the court found she

waived her right to be present. The court began by noting the State alleged respondent was unfit

on two grounds, failure to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions forming the basis for

the minors’ removal (count I) and failure to make reasonable progress toward their return (count

II). The court found the State proved both counts by clear and convincing evidence. The court

observed respondent did not complete her mental health services and she had “positive drug tests

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during the life of this case, and there were also a number of drug tests referred but not engaged

in.” The “lack of effort negatively affected progress to be made.” The court also noted

respondent was disengaged during visitations and failed to complete parenting education.

Accordingly, the court concluded the State met its burden of proving respondent unfit by clear

and convincing evidence.

¶ 27 2. The Best Interest Hearing

¶ 28 The trial court proceeded to the best interest hearing on July 19, 2023. Following

the presentation of evidence and the parties’ arguments, the court found it was in the minors’ best

interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights.

¶ 29 This appeal followed.

¶ 30 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 31 On appeal, respondent contends she received ineffective assistance of counsel at

the permanency hearings and at the fitness hearing. The State initially claims this court lacks

jurisdiction to consider respondent’s arguments involving the permanency hearings. We address

our jurisdiction first because it is a threshold issue. See Village of Kirkland v. Kirkland

Properties Holdings Co., 2023 IL 128612, ¶ 37, 221 N.E.3d 300 (stating jurisdiction is a

threshold issue to be addressed before considering the merits of an appeal).

¶ 32 A. Jurisdiction

¶ 33 The State contends in In re J.J., 316 Ill. App. 3d 817, 737 N.E.2d 1080 (2000), the

appellate court held a trial court’s findings and orders entered following a permanency review

hearing are immediately appealable. The State argues this court lacks jurisdiction to consider

respondent’s claims from the permanency review proceedings because she failed to file a notice

of appeal within 30 days after the last permanency review order was entered on April 13, 2023.

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The State also asserts this court lacks jurisdiction to consider respondent’s claims involving the

permanency proceedings because her notice of appeal only specified the July 19, 2023, order

terminating her parental rights.

¶ 34 In J.J., the respondent claimed the trial court erred in failing to make the required

statutory findings and she received ineffective assistance of counsel at the permanency review

hearings. Id. at 825. To confer jurisdiction to review her claims, the appellate court held the

respondent was required to appeal within 30 days following entry of the trial court’s permanency

review orders because they were immediately appealable. Id. at 826. The appellate court

determined it lacked jurisdiction to consider the respondent’s claims pertaining to the

permanency hearings because she failed to file her notice of appeal within 30 days of the most

recent permanency review order. Id.

¶ 35 The decision in J.J. does not support the State’s argument in this case. The trial

court’s holding was based on the version of section 2-28(3) of the Juvenile Court Act in effect at

the time, which provided, “Any order entered pursuant to this subsection (3) shall be

immediately appealable as a matter of right under [Illinois] Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(1) [(eff.

Feb. 1, 1994)]” (705 ILCS 405/2-28(3) (West 1998)). J.J., 316 Ill. App. 3d at 826. The language

relied upon by the court in J.J. was subsequently removed from the statute. See P.A. 95-182, § 5

(eff. Aug. 14, 2007). The version of section 2-28(3) applicable to this case does not include that

language. See 705 ILCS 405/2-28(3) (West 2022). Thus, the J.J. court’s basis for finding it

lacked jurisdiction to consider the respondent’s claims based on the permanency orders has been

eliminated by the subsequent change to the statute. Additionally, while Rule 304(b)(1) provides

for immediate appeals of certain orders, the permanency orders at issue here are not included

within the rule’s provisions.

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¶ 36 The State’s argument that we lack jurisdiction due to respondent’s failure to

specifically list the permanency orders in her notice of appeal is also not persuasive. In all

proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act other than delinquency proceedings, appeals from final

judgments are governed by the rules applicable to civil cases. Ill. S. Ct. R. 660(b) (eff. Mar. 12,

2021). Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and Rule 303 (eff. July 1, 2017)

provide for appeals from final judgments in civil cases. Under Rule 303(b)(2), a notice of appeal

must “specify the judgment or part thereof or other orders appealed from and the relief sought

from the reviewing court.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(b)(2) (eff. July 1, 2017). A notice of appeal confers

jurisdiction on the appellate court to consider the judgments or parts of judgments specified.

Village of Kirkland, 2023 IL 128612, ¶ 38. We construe notices of appeal liberally, however. Id.

A notice of appeal confers jurisdiction to review an order not expressly listed if the order was a

step in the procedural progression leading to the judgment specified in the notice of appeal. Id.

¶ 41.

¶ 37 In this case, respondent’s notice of appeal specified the order terminating her

parental rights. The trial court found respondent unfit on two grounds, including failure to make

reasonable progress toward the return of the minors to her care. The permanency hearings

involved a review of respondent’s progress over a two-year period in addressing the conditions

leading to the removal of the minors. If the court had found respondent made reasonable efforts

and progress during those hearings, the motion for termination of parental rights would not have

been filed. We find the permanency hearing orders were a step in the procedural progression

leading to the order terminating respondent’s parental rights. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to

consider respondent’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the permanency hearings.

¶ 38 B. Counsel’s Performance

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¶ 39 Respondent contends she was denied her right to effective assistance of counsel at

both the permanency hearings and the fitness hearing. In proceedings under the Juvenile Court

Act, parents have a statutory, not a constitutional, right to counsel. In re Br. M., 2021 IL 125969,

¶ 41, 182 N.E.3d 693 (quoting 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 2016)). The statutory right to counsel

implies the right to effective assistance. Id. ¶ 42.

¶ 40 Illinois courts routinely apply the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984), when considering claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in proceedings

under the Juvenile Court Act. See Br. M., 2021 IL 125969, ¶ 43; In re A.P.-M., 2018 IL App (4th)

180208, ¶¶ 37-44, 110 N.E.3d 1126. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance under

Strickland, a parent must show (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness and (2) a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s deficient

performance, the result of the proceedings would have been different. In re M.D., 2022 IL App

(4th) 210288, ¶ 92, 193 N.E.3d 933. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” In re A.R., 295 Ill. App. 3d 527, 531, 693 N.E.2d 869,

873 (1998). “A reviewing court ‘may dispose of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim by

proceeding directly to the prejudice prong without addressing counsel’s performance.’ ” M.D.,

2022 IL App (4th) 210288, ¶ 93 (quoting People v. Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 17, 996 N.E.2d 607).

¶ 41 1. The Permanency Hearings

¶ 42 While respondent contends her counsel provided deficient performance at the

permanency hearings in multiple ways, including failing to inquire into the services being

recommended or provided and failing to insist on testimony from the caseworker, respondent

concedes she cannot show prejudice as a result of counsel’s alleged shortcomings under the

applicable Strickland standard. Instead, respondent argues we should apply the ineffective

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assistance of counsel standard from United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), to presume

prejudice in this case. The standard from Cronic has been applied in criminal cases as an

alternative to Strickland and allows prejudice to be presumed if the defendant’s counsel has

entirely failed to subject the State’s case to meaningful adversarial testing. Id. at 659-61. This

court has previously found the Cronic standard is not applicable to termination of parental rights

proceedings. In re C.C., 368 Ill. App. 3d 744, 748, 859 N.E.2d 170, 172 (2006). In C.C., this

court reasoned it would be “counterintuitive to apply a test that depends upon a determination of

whether the proceeding was sufficiently adversarial in nature when the legislature has specified

that proceedings under the [Juvenile Court Act] are not meant to be adversarial in nature.” Id. at

748 (citing 705 ILCS 405/1-5 (West 2004)). We believe our decision in C.C. is sound and

respondent has not presented a persuasive argument to reconsider it. Accordingly, we decline to

apply the Cronic standard to this case.

¶ 43 Respondent also asserts this court should alter the prejudice analysis from

Strickland to examine only whether counsel’s representation provided her “with the opportunity

to demonstrate progress by ensuring that the services actually [gave her] a chance.” Respondent

has not supported her request to alter the applicable Strickland prejudice inquiry with relevant

authority or persuasive reasoning. In the absence of a persuasive argument, we decline to adopt

an alternative formulation of the Strickland prejudice standard for the permanency hearings in

this case. Under Strickland, respondent bears the burden of demonstrating she was prejudiced by

the alleged deficient performance. See In re M.F., 326 Ill. App. 3d 1110, 1119, 762 N.E.2d 701,

709 (2002). We conclude respondent has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a

different outcome absent the alleged deficient performance of counsel at the permanency

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hearings. Accordingly, respondent has not established the prejudice prong of Strickland and her

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the permanency hearings fails.

¶ 44 2. The Fitness Hearing

¶ 45 Respondent also argues she received ineffective assistance of counsel at the

fitness hearing. She contends her counsel provided deficient performance by (1) failing to

effectively cross-examine Gallagher, the State’s sole witness, (2) failing to effectively minimize

the weight given to documentary evidence, and (3) failing to present any evidence in opposition

to the termination motion.

¶ 46 In a proceeding to involuntarily terminate parental rights, the State must prove the

parent is unfit by clear and convincing evidence. In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d 234, 244, 850

N.E.2d 172, 177 (2006). In making this determination, the trial court considers whether the

parent’s conduct falls within one or more of the grounds of unfitness described in section 1(D) of

the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)). In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 417, 752 N.E.2d

1112, 1119 (2001). “A parent’s rights may be terminated if even a single alleged ground for

unfitness is supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 340, 349,

830 N.E.2d 508, 514 (2005).

¶ 47 Here, the trial court found the State proved respondent was unfit by clear and

convincing evidence on two grounds, including the failure to make reasonable progress toward

the return of the children to her care during a nine-month period following the adjudication of

neglect. The State alleged two nine-month periods, from October 14, 2021, to July 14, 2022, and

from July 13, 2022, to April 13, 2023. Reasonable progress is measured by an objective

assessment of a parent’s progress toward reunification with the child during a given nine-month

period, which includes compliance with the service plans and court orders. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d

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181, 216-17, 752 N.E.2d 1030, 1050-51 (2001). Reasonable progress will be found only if the

parent’s actions during the relevant period indicate the court will be able to return the child to the

parent’s care in the near future. In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 461, 577 N.E.2d 1375, 1387

(1991).

¶ 48 In finding respondent unfit, the trial court noted she (1) failed to complete her

mental health services, (2) had positive drug tests throughout the case, (3) failed to complete her

parenting education, and (4) was disengaged in visitation. The State presented substantial

evidence establishing respondent’s lack of progress in the required services, including

Gallagher’s testimony and the service plans. Respondent does not argue the evidence was

insufficient to support the court’s findings.

¶ 49 Respondent claims counsel failed to cross-examine Gallagher about alleged

inconsistencies between her testimony and specific statements in the service plans. Respondent

also argues counsel failed to minimize the weight of the service plans by identifying

inconsistencies within those documents. However, the service plans were admitted into evidence.

We presume the trial court considered all evidence admitted at the hearing in making its decision.

T2 Expressway, LLC v. Tollway, LLC, 2021 IL App (1st) 192616, ¶ 38, 197 N.E.3d 236. The

court was in a position to assess the evidence presented in Gallagher’s testimony and the service

plans and assign it the appropriate weight. See People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 211, 808 N.E.2d

939, 949 (2004) (stating the trier of fact assesses the credibility of the witnesses, determines the

appropriate weight of testimony, and resolves conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence).

¶ 50 Respondent also argues she was not promptly referred for services and was on

waiting lists at times for parenting education and mental health counseling, but she does not

identify any progress in completing those services over the prolonged duration of this case or

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explain how the alleged deficient representation at the fitness hearing would have helped

establish reasonable progress on those services. Additionally, some of respondent’s claims of

deficient performance, including those related to respondent’s cooperation and completion of

domestic violence services, are not directed at the trial court’s specific findings on lack of

reasonable progress. The court did not find a lack of reasonable progress based on those

concerns.

¶ 51 Overall, respondent identifies many alleged instances of deficient performance,

but she does not specifically demonstrate prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability of a different

result absent the deficient performance. Satisfying the prejudice prong of an ineffective

assistance claim requires a demonstration of actual prejudice, not simply speculation about

possible prejudice. People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 81, 25 N.E.3d 526. The State

presented strong evidence supporting the trial court’s findings in this case. Respondent does not

explain how her alleged claims of deficient performance would undermine the court’s specific

findings.

¶ 52 In sum, the record as a whole shows respondent failed to make reasonable

progress toward the return of the children. As Gallagher testified, significant concerns remained

about respondent’s ability to safely parent the minors based on her “lack of consistency,

communication and the motivation to work towards getting her children home. The positive

drops, the lack of going to drops.” Even accounting for the alleged deficiency of counsel, there is

no reasonable probability of a different result given the strong evidence of respondent’s failure to

complete mental health counseling and parenting services, her continued problems with

completing drug tests and positive drug tests, and her disengagement from visitation. Those

concerns are all critical issues in this case and prevent returning the children to respondent’s care.

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The evidence confirms Gallagher’s concerns about respondent’s ability to safely parent the

minors, and it shows respondent was nowhere near the point where the trial court could order

returning the minors home in the near future. L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d at 461. Respondent has

failed to demonstrate prejudice as a result of the alleged deficient performance. Accordingly,

respondent has failed to establish her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the fitness

hearing.

¶ 53 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 54 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 55 Affirmed.

¶ 56 JUSTICE STEIGMANN, specially concurring:

¶ 57 Although I agree with the result in this case, my preference would be to not

include any reference to the permanency hearings.

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