Knowles v. Longwood Management Corp. CA2/2

Filed 1/3/24 Knowles v. Longwood Management Corp. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

FABIAN KNOWLES, B314165

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
v. Nos. 19STCV31526,
20STCV44876,
LONGWOOD MANAGEMENT 21STCV11563)
CORP. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

JOANNA CHAVEZ et al., B321047

Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
v. No. 19STCV31526)

LONGWOOD MANAGEMENT
CORP. et al.,

Defendants and
Respondents.
 APPEAL from judgments and an order of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, Michelle Williams Court, Judge.
Judgment affirmed & order reversed in B314165; judgment
affirmed in part, reversed in part in B321047.
Matern Law Group, Matthew J. Matern, Debra J. Tauger,
Matthew W. Gordon and Vanessa M. Rodriguez for Plaintiff and
Appellant and Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Paul Hastings, Leslie L. Abbott, Chris A. Jalian and
Shera Y. Kwak for Defendants and Appellants and Defendants
and Respondents.

******

This appeal involves two related cases, both brought
pursuant to the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General
Act of 2004 as representative actions on behalf of the State of
California (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) (PAGA). The first, filed in
September 2019, was brought by plaintiff and appellant Fabian
Knowles against Longwood Management Corp. (Longwood),
Alden Enterprises, Inc. (Alden) and 38 other corporate
defendants (collectively, defendants) (the Knowles matter). The
trial court dismissed all defendants except one—Longwood, on
the ground that Knowles had not adequately alleged that the
other 39 defendants (sometimes collectively referred to as the
non-Longwood defendants) were his employers. Knowles
appeals, arguing that dismissal of these 39 defendants was
improper at the pleading stage because he adequately pled that
all of the defendants were his employer under the integrated
enterprise and joint employer theories. We find no error in the

2
trial court decision as to the Knowles matter and therefore affirm
the dismissal of the non-Longwood defendants.
The second action, filed in March 2021, was brought by
plaintiffs and appellants Joanna Chavez, Sharon Evans, and
Lakeisha Oglesby (collectively, the Chavez plaintiffs) (the Chavez
matter). The Chavez matter named the same 40 defendants that
Knowles sued and contained identical claims.1 The trial court
sustained without leave to amend defendants’ demurrer to the
Chavez plaintiffs’ complaint and entered a judgment dismissing
the Chavez matter with prejudice. The Chavez plaintiffs’ appeal,
arguing that the Chavez plaintiffs sufficiently pled employment
relationships with three of the defendants: Longwood, Green
Acres Lodge Inc. (Green Acres), and View Park Convalescent
Hospital, Inc. (View Park). The Chavez plaintiffs further argue
the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer as to all
defendants for the same reasons it erred in dismissing the
majority of the Knowles defendants. We reverse in part, as the
Chavez plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged employment
relationships with Green Acres and View Park.
We also address an appeal arising from the trial court’s
denial of the non-Longwood defendants’ motion for costs
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 in the Knowles
matter.2 As costs were mandatory under that statute, we reverse

1 Prior to bringing the second action, the Chavez plaintiffs
sought to join the Knowles matter. The trial court denied the
request. The Chavez plaintiffs do not appeal that ruling.
2 The non-Longwood defendants are the appellants in the
cost appeal. For consistency, we continue to refer to them as the
non-Longwood defendants in this portion of the opinion.

3
the trial court’s order granting Knowles’s motion to strike the
non-Longwood defendants’ costs.

BACKGROUND
Knowles and the Chavez plaintiffs allege they were
formerly employed by defendants as nonexempt employees.3
They all had the job title of certified nursing assistant.
The Knowles matter
On July 2, 2019, Knowles filed a “Notice Pursuant to
California Labor Code § 2699.3” (notice) with the California
Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA).4 The notice
listed all 40 defendants, and asserted that Knowles was “jointly
employed” by all 40.5 The letter listed numerous violations of

3 On July 3, 2019, Knowles filed a wrongful discharge case
against Alden and Longwood, two of the 40 defendants in the
Knowles matter.
4 Defendants filed a request for judicial notice asking this
court to take judicial notice of the relevant PAGA notices and
court records concerning related litigation. The request is
granted.
5 The 40 entities involved are Ability Homecare, Inc.; ADF
Investments, Inc.; Alden; Artesia Healthcare, Inc.; Broadway
Manor Care Center, Inc.; Burbank Healthcare, Inc.; Burlington
Convalescent Hospital, Inc.; Canoga Healthcare, Inc.; Casa
Bonita Convalescent Hospital, Inc.; Chino Valley Rehabilitation
Center LLC; Coldwater Care Center LLC; Colonial Care Center,
Inc.; Covina Care Center, Inc.; Crenshaw Enterprises, Inc.;
Crofton Manor Associates, L.P.; Green Acres; Hospice Cheer; ICC
Convalescent Corp.; Imperial Crest Healthcare Center, LLC; IRA
David Enterprises, Inc.; JRB Investments, Inc.; Laurel Wellness
and Nursing Center, LLC; Longwood; Longwood Manor

4
various Labor Code provisions and wage orders, including
overtime, meal period, and rest period violations. Knowles made
the allegations “on behalf of himself and all other similarly-
situated current and former non-exempt employees” of all
defendants within the State of California “during the four years
preceding the date” of the notice. Knowles did not assert any
specific facts regarding his alleged joint employment by all 40
entities.
On September 5, 2019, Knowles filed a PAGA complaint
against the 40 entities. Knowles alleged generally that he was
“employed by DEFENDANTS.” However, the complaint also
acknowledged that each of the 40 defendants was a separate
corporate entity. Knowles alleged that the 40 defendants “were
the joint employers” of Knowles and the other aggrieved
employees, and “were the alter egos, divisions, affiliates,
integrated enterprises, joint employers, subsidiaries, parents,
principals, related entities, co-conspirators, authorized agents,
partners, joint venturers, and/or guarantors, actual or ostensible,
of each other.” Each defendant answered the complaint, denying
Knowles’s allegations.
On September 24, 2020, defendants filed a motion for
judgment on the pleadings. Defendants argued they all could not

Investments LP; Magnolia Gardens Convalescent Hospital, Inc.;
Monterey Care Center, Inc.; Montrose Healthcare, Inc.;
Normandie/Wilshire Retirement Hotel, Inc.; Northridge Care
Center, Inc.; Norwalk Healthcare, Inc.; Park Anaheim Health
Care, LLC; Pico Rivera Healthcare, Inc.; S.G.V. Healthcare, Inc.;
San Dimas Retirement Center, Inc.; San Gabriel Convalescent
Center, Inc.; Shea Healthcare Center, Inc.; Studio City
Convalescent Hospital; Sunnyview Convalescent Hospital, Inc.;
Tzippy Care, Inc; and View Park.

5
be the employer that purportedly aggrieved Knowles under
PAGA, and Knowles was intentionally obscuring the identity of
the employer he contended committed violations against him.
Defendants argued that the letter to the LWDA was defective for
the same reason. In addition, defendants argued Knowles had
failed to plead facts showing that he properly named each entity
as alleged alter ego or joint employers with respect to the Labor
Code violations he asserted were committed against him.
Defendants argued that the complaint was barred as it was an
improper attempt to assign Knowles the PAGA claims of alleged
aggrieved employees who were not his coworkers and were
employed by different entities. Knowles opposed the motion.
On October 22, 2020, the trial court granted defendants’
motion. The court noted the allegations were insufficient to state
a cause of action against all defendants because “they lack
allegations concerning (1) any appointment or contract of hire
between [Knowles] and each defendant or (2) any defendant’s
exercise or control over [Knowles’s] wages, hours, or working
conditions.” The court permitted Knowles to file an amended
complaint consistent with its ruling by November 2, 2020.
Knowles filed his first amended complaint (FAC) on
November 2, 2020. Knowles did not alter his allegation that he
was “employed by DEFENDANTS.” He also alleged that all
defendants “exercised control over the wages, hours, and/or
working conditions” of Knowles and the other aggrieved
employees. However, he alleged, upon information and belief,
that Longwood “retained or assumed a general right of control
over the hiring, direction, supervision, discipline, discharge, and
day-to-day aspects of the working conditions” of Knowles and the
other aggrieved employees. He also alleged, on information and

6
belief, that his and other plaintiffs’ hiring documents stated they
were employees of Longwood. He added eight new paragraphs
upon information and belief attempting to fortify his allegations
concerning his joint employer theory. Knowles alleged that
defendants had an interrelation of operations, common
management, centralized control of labor relations, and common
ownership and financial control, among other things. Knowles
asserted that Longwood was the parent corporation, which
exercised financial control over all other 39 defendants.
On December 9, 2020, defendants demurred to Knowles’s
FAC. Defendants argued that Knowles had ignored the court’s
directive to sufficiently allege an employer. Instead, defendants
argued, Knowles continued to lump all 40 defendants together
and failed to identify which one was his actual direct employer
that hired and paid him. He continued to fail to allege any
appointment or contract of hire with any of the defendants, or
how any defendant exercised control of his wages, hours, or
working conditions. Defendants argued that Knowles’s general
allegations of corporate relationships between the entities were
insufficient.
On January 28, 2021, the trial court sustained defendants’
demurrer to the FAC in part. The court noted that “[w]hile the
FAC states facts sufficient to establish Longwood employed
[Knowles], the FAC does not allege sufficient facts alleging
appointment or contract existed between [Knowles] and all other
defendants.” The court noted that Knowles’s “mere conclusions,
contentions and deductions” regarding the relationship between
the separate entities were insufficient to support PAGA claims
against those other entities.

7
 The trial court granted Knowles leave to amend “to state
allegations of a contract between [Knowles] and defendants
outside of Longwood or state allegations that defendants outside
of Longwood exercised control over [Knowles’s] wages, hours or
working conditions.”
Knowles filed his second amended complaint (SAC) on
February 16, 2021. Knowles added allegations that, on
information and belief, all defendants exercised control over
Knowles’s and other aggrieved employees’ “wages, hours, and
working conditions by, inter alia, jointly creating, implementing,
and enforcing uniform wage and hour policies, practices, and
procedures.” Knowles alleged upon information and belief that
all defendants “exercised control over the wages, hours, and/or
working conditions of” Knowles and the other aggrieved
employees, and that defendants collectively “retained or assumed
a general right of control over the hiring, direction, supervision,
discipline, discharge, and day-to-day aspects of the working
conditions” of Knowles and the other aggrieved employees.
Knowles added a new paragraph that he worked for all
defendants “at their Alden Terrace Convalescent Hospital facility
located at 1240 South Hoover Street, Los Angeles, California
90006.” Knowles did not allege that he worked for Alden, but
maintained he worked for all 40 defendants at Alden’s physical
location. Finally, Knowles added a paragraph about a news story
he located suggesting that all defendants jointly entered a
settlement agreement with the Department of Justice for their
alleged joint violations of the “False Claims Act,” including
“allegations of jointly submitting false claims to Medicare for

8
rehabilitation therapy services that were not reasonable or
necessary.”6
On March 22, 2021, the non-Longwood defendants filed
their demurrer or, in the alternative, motion to strike Knowles’s
SAC. Defendants argued that Knowles failed to identify which of
the non-Longwood defendants was his actual employer, including
who paid him, or allegedly failed to pay him. Defendants
asserted that because Knowles continued to decline to allege an
appointment or contract of hire between him and each defendant,
and continued to decline to assert any defendant’s control over
his wages, hours, or working conditions—with the exception of
Longwood—that the demurrer should be sustained with
prejudice.

6 Knowles attached to the SAC an Internet printout dated
July 13, 2020, stating that “Longwood Management Corporation
and 27 affiliated skilled nursing facilities . . . have agreed to
resolve allegations that they violated the False Claims Act by
submitting false claims to Medicare for rehabilitation therapy
services that were not reasonable or necessary . . . .” Defendants
asserted that the paragraph concerning the Web site press
release should be stricken as irrelevant and misleading. In light
of its order sustaining defendants’ demurrer to the SAC with
prejudice, the trial court deemed defendants’ motion to strike
moot. Defendants renew their objection to the press release as
somehow supporting Knowles’s joint-employer theory on appeal.
Defendants point out that Knowles never sought judicial notice of
the Internet printout in the trial court, nor would there be a basis
to grant such notice in any event. As discussed below, we find
the Internet printout insufficient to suggest an employment
relationship between Knowles and the 39 non-Longwood
defendants.

9
 On May 11, 2021, the trial court sustained the demurrer
without leave to amend. The court explained: “These facts . . . do
not set forth sufficient allegations to fully comply with the
Court’s October 22, 2020 or January 28, 2021 orders. First,
Plaintiff’s allegations regarding a contract between him and Non-
Longwood Defendants and Non-Longwood Defendants’ exercise of
control over Plaintiff’s wages, hours, or working conditions are
conclusory. . . . Second, Plaintiff cannot rely on his alter ego/joint
employer/integrated enterprise theory of liability to impose
liability on Non-Longwood Defendants when Plaintiff has not
established any employee-employer relationship with Non-
Longwood Defendants.” Because the court had twice granted
Knowles leave to amend to allege an employer-employee
relationship with non-Longwood defendants, the court found that
permitting further amendments would be futile and prejudicial.
On June 9, 2021, the trial court entered judgment
dismissing with prejudice all defendants except Longwood.
On July 13, 2021, Knowles filed his notice of appeal from
the judgment of dismissal.
The Carillo matter
On October 13, 2020, Knowles’s attorney filed a request for
leave to file an amended complaint adding 12 individuals as
additional named plaintiffs and PAGA representatives in the
Knowles matter. On November 13, 2020, the trial court denied
Knowles’s request for an ex parte order shortening time to hear
the motion. On November 20, 2020, Knowles’s attorneys filed a
new duplicate PAGA lawsuit against the same 40 defendants (the
Carillo matter). On December 2, 2020, Knowles filed a notice of
related cases conceding that the Knowles matter and the Carillo
matter were substantially similar. Knowles’s attorneys also filed

10
three more substantively identical LWDA letters under
Knowles’s LWDA case number, purporting to name further
PAGA representatives.
The Chavez matter
On January 5, 2021, the Chavez plaintiffs filed a “Notice
Pursuant to California Labor Code § 2699.3” with the LWDA.
The notice listed the same 40 defendants as were listed in
Knowles’s complaint and asserted the Chavez plaintiffs were
“jointly employed” by all 40. The notice was substantially similar
to that filed by Knowles and used the same LWDA case number.
On March 22, 2021, Knowles’s attorneys filed an ex parte
application for an order shortening time to file a third amended
complaint adding the Chavez plaintiffs as additional PAGA
representatives in the Knowles matter. The trial court denied
the application for order shortening time. Due to potential
statute of limitations issues with their claims, the Chavez
plaintiffs chose to file a separate complaint. On March 25, 2021,
Knowles’s attorneys filed the complaint in the Chavez matter.
On April 8, 2021, the operative FAC was filed in the Chavez
matter. On April 23, 2021, the trial court deemed the Knowles,
Carillo, and Chavez matters related, with Knowles designated as
the lead case.7

7 Knowles’s attorneys thereafter filed a fourth duplicative
action against the same defendants (Bertirotti v. Longwood
Management Corp, (Aug. 14, 2023, B323365) [app. dism.]), which
was on appeal in this court until the parties filed a joint
stipulation and remand informing this court that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14
Cal.5th 1104 had resolved the only issue pending in that appeal.
On August 14, 2023, the matter was reversed and remanded to
the Superior Court per stipulation of the parties.

11
 On June 8, 2021, defendants demurred to the Chavez
plaintiffs’ FAC. Defendants argued that this was the third
identically pled lawsuit filed by Knowles’s attorneys containing
identical PAGA claims against the same defendants. Because it
was a “carbon copy” of the Knowles lawsuit, defendants argued, it
suffered from the same pleading defects. Defendants argued the
lawsuit unfairly forced them to have to litigate the same issues in
multiple duplicate lawsuits, and it violated the rule against claim
splitting. Defendants cited Code of Civil Procedure section
430.10, subdivision (c), which permits a trial court to sustain a
demurrer where “[t]here is another action pending between the
same parties on the same cause of action.”
On July 9, 2021, the trial court sustained without leave to
amend defendants’ demurrer to the Chavez plaintiffs’ FAC. The
court noted that the allegations in the Chavez plaintiffs’ FAC
were almost identical to the allegations contained in the Knowles
SAC, with only two differences. First, the plaintiffs’ names in the
complaints were different, and second, paragraph 56 in the
Knowles SAC, which stated: “PLAINTIFF worked for
DEFENDANTS at their Alden Terrace Convalescent Hospital
facility located at 1240 South Hoover Street, Los Angeles,
California 90006,” had been replaced with paragraphs 56-58 in
the Chavez plaintiffs’ FAC, which stated:
“56. PLAINTIFF CHAVEZ worked for DEFENDANTS at
their Green Acres Lodge facility, located at 8101 Hill Drive,
Rosemead, California 91770. The entity listed on PLAINTIFF
CHAVEZ’s earnings statements was ‘GREEN ACRES LODGE
INC DBA GREEN ACRES LODGE’ and ‘CREEN ACRES
LODGE, INC. DBA GREEN ACRES LODGE.’

12
 “57. PLAINTIFF EVANS worked for DEFENDANTS at
their View Park Convalescent Hospital facility, located at 3737
Don Felipe Drive, Los Angeles, California 90008. The entities
listed on PLAINTIFF EVANS’ earnings statements were ‘VIEW
PARK CONVALESCENT HOSPITAL INC. DBA VIEW PARK
CONVALESCENT HOSPITAL,’ ‘VIEW PARK CONVALESCENT
HOSPITAL INC DBA VIEW PARK CONVALESCENT
HOSPITAL,’ and ‘FACILITIES PAYROLL SERVICES VIEW
PARK CONV HOSPITAL.’
“58. PLAINTIFF OGLESBY worked for DEFENDANTS at
their View Park Convalescent Hospital facility, located at 3737
Don Felipe Drive, Los Angeles, California 90008. The entities
listed on PLAINTIFF OGLESBY’s earnings statements were:
‘VIEW PARK CONVALESCENT HOSPITAL INC DBA VIEW
PARK CONVALESCENT HOSPITAL’ and ‘FACILITIES
PAYROLL SERVICES VIEW PARK CONV HOSPITAL.’”
The court noted it had twice previously sustained a
demurrer to the Knowles SAC due to Knowles’s failure to allege
any employment relationship with the non-Longwood defendants.
The Chavez plaintiffs’ FAC also did not show any employee-
employer relationship with 37 of the named defendants. Because
the Chavez plaintiffs’ FAC did not show such employee-employer
relationships with the other named defendants and was largely
“verbatim to the SAC in the Knowles case,” the demurrer to the
Chavez plaintiffs’ FAC was sustained.
The court noted that the Chavez plaintiffs offered to amend
the FAC to add facts regarding defendants’ “shared corporate
office, shared officers, shared agent for service of process and the
legal name of the hiring employer listed on the notice provided to
Plaintiffs.” The Chavez plaintiffs did not offer “to amend the

13
complaint to provide an employee-employer relationship” with
the remaining defendants, therefore the demurrer to the Chavez
plaintiffs’ FAC was sustained without leave to amend.
The trial court entered judgment dismissing the Chavez
matter with prejudice on August 5, 2021.
On August 30, 2021, the Chavez plaintiffs filed a notice of
appeal.
Consolidation
On October 20, 2021, Knowles filed a motion to consolidate
the appeals of the Knowles matter and the Chavez matter. On
November 15, 2021, this court granted the motion.
On June 13, 2023, on the court’s own motion, this court
ordered the non-Longwood defendants’ appeal of the denial of
their costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 to be
considered with the consolidated appeals for the purposes of
argument and decision.

DISCUSSION
I. Applicable law and standard of review
“The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the
complaint by raising questions of law.” (Aragon–Haas v. Family
Security Ins. Services, Inc. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 232, 238.)
“When a demurrer is sustained, we determine whether the
complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.”
(Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “‘“We treat the
demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but
not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.”’”
(Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6.) “[W]e give the
complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and
its parts in their context.” (Ibid.) “‘As a reviewing court we are

14
not bound by the construction placed by the trial court on the
pleadings but must make our own independent judgment
thereon, even as to matters not expressly ruled upon by the trial
court.’” (Aragon–Haas, supra, at p. 239.)
When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, “we
decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect
can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has
abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no
abuse of discretion and we affirm.” (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39
Cal.3d at p. 318.) “The burden of proving such reasonable
possibility is squarely on the plaintiff.” (Ibid.)
II. The Knowles matter8
The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer to the
SAC—with the exception of Longwood—after Knowles repeatedly
failed to allege an employment relationship with any of the other
39 defendants.
PAGA permits an “aggrieved employee” to bring a civil
action “on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former
employees” for violations of the Labor Code. (Lab. Code, § 2699,
subd. (a).) An “aggrieved employee” is defined as “any person
who was employed by the alleged violator and against whom one
or more of the alleged violations was committed.” (Lab. Code
§ 2699, subd. (c); Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc., supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 1116 [“To have standing to bring a PAGA action, a
plaintiff must be an ‘aggrieved employee,’ which the statute
defines as ‘any person who was employed by the alleged violator
and against whom one or more of the alleged violations was
committed.’”].) Thus, PAGA requires that in order to state a

8 We discuss the Knowles matter and the Chavez matter
separately, as the parties have done.

15
claim, a plaintiff must allege employment with the alleged
violator.
Knowles initially alleged that he was employed by all 40
defendants, whom, he admitted in his allegations, are separate
corporate entities. Knowles generally alleged that he was
employed by all 40 entities, and all 40 defendants were the “joint
employers” of Knowles and other aggrieved employees. The trial
court found these allegations overbroad and insufficient to
determine which entity or entities was Knowles’s employer for
the purposes of PAGA and thus directed Knowles to allege an
appointment or contract of hire between Knowles and each
defendant or any defendant’s exercise of control over Knowles’s
wages, hours, or working conditions.
The FAC suffered from the same flaw, as Knowles
continued to allege that he was employed by all 40 entities.
However, Knowles singled out Longwood as the “parent
corporation” of the other 39 defendants and alleged that his
hiring documents stated he was an employee of Longwood. The
trial court then sustained defendants’ demurrer to the FAC
except as to Longwood, finding the allegations of employment
with Longwood to be sufficient.
Upon being granted a second leave to amend, Knowles
added additional allegations regarding the defendants’ alleged
corporate relationships. He also added that he worked for all
defendants “at their Alden Terrace Convalescent Hospital
facility.” However, he did not include allegations suggesting that
Alden was his employer. Instead, Knowles continued to allege
that his hiring documents stated he was an employee of
Longwood.

16
 The trial court then sustained the non-Longwood
defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, finding that
Knowles had not sufficiently pled an employee-employer
relationship with these 39 defendants, therefore his PAGA
pleading was insufficient against them.
We find no error in the trial court’s ruling. The trial court
“need not accept as true . . . deductions, contentions or
conclusions of law or fact.” (Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 279, 292.) Nor must it credit material
facts that are “inconsistent with other allegations.” (Ibid.)
Having accepted Knowles’ allegation that Longwood was his
named employer, the trial court was not required to accept his
vague and contradictory allegations attempting to show that he
was employed by all 40 separate corporate entities named as
defendants.
In the SAC, Knowles continued to generally allege that
“DEFENDANTS exercised control over the wages, hours, and/or
working conditions of PLAINTIFF and other AGGRIEVED
EMPLOYEES.” He made no specific allegation that each alleged
defendant exercised such control. Further, he changed his earlier
allegation that Longwood “assumed a general right of control
over the hiring, direction, supervision, discipline, discharge, and
day-to-day aspects of the working conditions” of Knowles and the
other aggrieved employees and instead alleged that defendants
collectively exercised “a general right of control over the hiring,
direction, supervision, discipline, discharge, and day-to-day
aspects of the working conditions” of Knowles and the other
aggrieved employees. As set forth above, this general allegation
in the SAC conflicted with Knowles’s earlier allegation in the
FAC that Longwood controlled day-to-day aspects of his

17
employment. The trial court was not required to accept
Knowles’s conclusory allegations that 39 separate corporations
had joint control of his hiring, discharge, and day-to-day working
conditions when this allegation conflicted with his earlier, specific
allegation that Longwood did so.9 (Cantu v. Resolution Trust
Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 877 [“A plaintiff may not avoid a
demurrer by pleading facts or positions in an amended complaint
that contradict the facts pleaded in the original complaint or by
suppressing facts which prove the pleaded facts false.”].)
The Supreme Court discussed the question of joint-
employer liability for Labor Code violations in Martinez v. Combs
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 35 (Martinez). In Martinez, seasonal
agricultural workers were seeking unpaid minimum wages from
two produce merchants and a field representative, after the
farmer who had directly employed them became insolvent. (Id. at
pp. 47-48.)10 Despite recognizing that there may be situations in

9 At oral argument, Knowles’s counsel argued that the FAC
and the SAC were not inconsistent because the allegation that
defendants collectively exercised control over the “wages, hours,
and/or working conditions” of Knowles and the other aggrieved
employees remained the same in the two complaints. However,
the consistency between these two paragraphs does not cure the
inconsistency concerning the allegations regarding the right of
control over the “hiring, direction, supervision, discipline,
discharge, and day-to-day aspects of the working conditions” of
Knowles and the other aggrieved employees.
10 The plaintiffs in Martinez were suing for unpaid minimum
wages under Labor Code section 1194. The Supreme Court
discussed the Industrial Welfare Commission’s definition of
“employer,” which had “the obvious utility of reaching situations
in which multiple entities control different aspects of the

18
which “multiple entities control different aspects of the
employment relationship” (Martinez, at p. 76), the high court held
that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate an employment
relationship with any of the existing defendants—two produce
merchants through whom the farmer sold produce, together with
principals and field representatives (id. at pp. 42-43).11
Significantly, the plaintiffs’ factual assertions did not show that
the defendants’ “business relationship with [the farmer] allowed
[them] to exercise control over [the plaintiffs’] wages and hours.”
(Martinez, at p. 72.) Although the agent of one of the defendants
convinced the plaintiffs to return to work, this did not constitute
an offer of employment. (Id. at pp. 74-75.) And although the
defendants’ field employees “spoke with [the farmer’s] employees
about the manner in which strawberries were to be packed,” such
actions did “not indicate the field representatives ever supervised
or exercised control over [the farmer’s] employees.” (Id. at p. 76.)
While Martinez was before the high court after a grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the case sets a
standard for determining whether a plaintiff has adequately pled
a joint employer relationship. Under Martinez, to adequately
plead a joint employer situation, the plaintiff must adequately

employment relationship, as when one entity, which hires and
pays workers, places them with other entities that supervise the
work.” (Martinez, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 59.) Thus, the high
court noted that the definition of employer was “‘specifically
intended to include both temporary employment agencies and
employers who contract with such agencies to obtain employees.’”
(Ibid.)
11 The farmer had been granted a discharge in bankruptcy.
(Martinez, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 42.)

19
allege each alleged employer’s supervision or exercise of control
over the plaintiffs’ employment.
A specific allegation that each alleged violator of the Labor
Code was Knowles’s employer—i.e., had control over Knowles’s
wages or working conditions—is an essential element of a PAGA
claim against that entity. (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (c); Kim v.
Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 81 [“Not
every private citizen can serve as the state’s representative [in a
PAGA claim]. Only an aggrieved employee has PAGA
standing.”].) Despite repeated opportunities to cure his vague,
conclusory and contradictory allegations that he was employed by
the 39 non-Longwood defendants, Knowles did not correct this
omission. Because he was missing an essential element of his
claim against the 39 non-Longwood defendants, the demurrer as
to these defendants was properly sustained. (Robinson v.
Southern Counties Oil Co. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 476, 481 [“[I]f
the defendant negates any essential element [of a PAGA claim],
we will affirm the order sustaining the demurrer as to the cause
of action.”].)12
Knowles asserts the trial court erred in various ways. We
address his arguments below.
A. Dismissal of Alden
Knowles first argues that Alden should not have been
dismissed from the case because Alden and its counsel made
judicial admissions that Alden was Knowles’s true employer.

12 Because we find that the trial court did not err in finding
that Knowles’s pleading was insufficient as to the 39 non-
Longwood defendants, we decline to address defendants’
argument that Knowles’s LWDA letter was deficient as a matter
of law.

20
Knowles contends that Alden’s counsel made multiple oral and
written statements to this effect, and that these statements
should be treated as binding judicial admissions. Knowles cites
various parts of the record where defendants’ counsel noted
“[Knowles] only ever worked at Alden Enterprises.”13

13 At other points in oral proceedings, the court asked
defendants’ counsel, “it’s my understanding that . . . defendants
contend that Alden is the only proper defendant; is that correct?”
To which counsel responded, “Yes, Your Honor. That is correct.”
Later in the proceedings, defendants’ counsel argued that
Knowles “should have sued his employer. And we know who that
is, actually. It’s Alden Terrace or Enterprises. Because he sued
that entity as his employer in his individual wrongful
termination action that he filed in the court.” During the same
argument, counsel commented: “[W]hat this case should be about,
Your Honor, is Mr. Knowles’ right to bring a PAGA case against
his employer on behalf of the employees who work with him, for
that employer, which was Alden Terrace, or Alden Enterprises.
And he chose not to do that and instead to file this extremely
convoluted complaint against 39 entities to attempt to expand
PAGA in a way that it’s never been expanded before by any other
court.” During further argument, counsel stated, “there’s one
plaintiff, Fabian Knowles, and he worked for Alden Enterprises.
And plaintiffs have alleged in their complaint that he worked for
39 different employers.” Finally, defendants’ counsel noted,
“Knowles, plaintiff[,] works for Alden Enterprises, Inc., even
though he won’t admit that in his complaint. That’s what his pay
stubs show, and that’s what he admitted at deposition.”
Defendants’ written statements to this effect were included in a
July 2020 joint case management statement, a September 2020
joint initial status conference statement, an October 2020 joint
status conference statement, a January 2021 joint status
conference statement, and a May 2021 joint status conference
statement.

21
 Knowles relies on People v. Jackson (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th
129, 161, for the proposition that “[o]ral statements of counsel
may be treated as judicial admissions if they were intended to be
such or reasonably construed by the court or the other party as
such.” Knowles argues that Alden’s counsel’s repeated
statements to this effect meet this test.
“‘Judicial admissions may be made in a pleading, by
stipulation during trial, or by response to request for admission.’”
(Barsegian v. Kessler & Kessler (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 446, 451
(Barsegian).) A judicial admission must be conceded by both
sides. (Id. at p. 452.) Throughout the proceedings, Knowles did
not plead that Alden was his employer, instead asserting that he
had 40 different employers. Knowles continues to advance his
contradictory argument that the 39 non-Longwood defendants
should all be considered his employers under theories of joint
employment and integrated enterprise. For a factual statement
to be considered a judicial admission, neither party may attempt
to contradict it. (Ibid. [a judicial admission is “removed from the
issues in the litigation because the parties agree to its truth”].) A
judicial admission “is therefore conclusive both as to the
admitting party and as to that party’s opponent. [Citation.]
Thus, if a factual allegation is treated as a judicial admission,
then neither party may attempt to contradict it—the admitted
fact is effectively conceded by both sides.” (Ibid.)
Knowles’s attempt to argue that he was employed by all 40
defendants, with his hiring documents naming Longwood as his
employer, undermines his argument that defendants have
created a judicial admission that he was employed by Alden. As
the purported admission by defendants that Knowles was
employed by Alden was never admitted by Knowles—and in fact,

22
was contradicted by Knowles—it cannot be treated as a judicial
admission. (Barsegian, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 452.)
The trial court was not required to accept Knowles’s vague
and conclusory allegations that he was employed by 40 entities
for the purposes of a PAGA claim. As Knowles never pled that he
had an employee-employer relationship with Alden, or that Alden
exercised control over his wages, hours, and working conditions,
the trial court did not err in dismissing the matter as to Alden.
B. Pleading of joint employer/integrated enterprise
theories
Knowles next argues that because his SAC sufficiently pled
joint employer and integrated enterprise theories, he sufficiently
established an employment relationship with all 40 defendants.
Knowles cites Burke v. Zanes (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 773, 780, for
the proposition that a plaintiff may plead the existence of an
employee-employer relationship through allegations from which
an inference of such a relationship can be drawn. In Burke, the
plaintiff sought to invoke Labor Code section 2850, although
there was no allegation in the complaint that described an
employee-employer relationship between any of the parties “or
allegations from which an inference of this relationship could be
drawn.” (Burke, at p. 780.) The Burke court held that because
there was no allegation from which an inference of an employee-
employer relationship could be drawn, “the inapplicability of [the
Labor Code] section [was] patent.” (Ibid.) The case does not
suggest that Knowles has sufficiently inferred an employment
relationship with any of the non-Longwood defendants.
As to the joint employment theory, Knowles cites
Henderson v. Equilon Enterprises, LLC (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th
1111, 1129. In Henderson, summary judgment was affirmed in

23
favor of the defendant on the ground that the defendant was not
the plaintiff’s joint employer. (Id. at p. 1114.) In reaching this
conclusion, the Henderson court explained the joint employer
theory in wage and hour claims: “In a joint employer claim, the
worker is an admitted employee of a primary employer, and is
subject to the protection of applicable labor laws and wage orders.
The distinct question posed in such claims is whether ‘another
business or entity that has some relationship with the primary
employer should properly be considered a joint employer of the
worker and therefore also responsible, along with the primary
employer, for the obligations imposed by the wage order.’” (Id. at
p. 1128.) Joint employer cases are relevant in situations “such as
when the primary employer is unwilling or no longer able to
satisfy claims of unpaid wages and workers must look to another
business entity that may be separately liable as their employer.”
(Ibid.) Knowles has included no allegations suggesting that the
39 non-Longwood entities should be responsible for Knowles’s
claims under a joint employer theory. Knowles has alleged that
Longwood is the primary employer and the parent corporation of
the other entities. Under the circumstances, there is no alleged
reason that the other 39 entities should be held responsible for
Longwood’s alleged violations.
Knowles cites Laird v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (1998) 68
Cal.App.4th 727, 737 (Laird), overruled on other grounds in Reid
v. Google (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 524, for the proposition that
“[t]wo corporations may be treated as a single employer for
purposes of liability” under the integrated enterprise theory. In
Laird, a former employee sued her employer and her employer’s
parent corporation alleging employment discrimination and
wrongful termination. (Laird, at p. 731.) The parent corporation

24
moved for summary judgment on the ground that it was not
liable for any acts or omissions of its corporate subsidiary as to
the subsidiary’s former employee. (Id. at p. 732.) The trial court
granted summary judgment on the ground that the parent
corporation was not the plaintiff’s employer and there was no
material issue of fact on this point requiring trial. (Id. at p. 735.)
In affirming the trial court judgment, the Laird court discussed
the plaintiff’s argument that the parent corporation was her
employer under the integrated enterprise theory. Significantly,
the Laird court limited its discussion to “whether two
corporations [could] be considered a single employer” (id. at
p. 737) under the integrated enterprise test—it did not come close
to suggesting that 40 separate corporations could be considered a
single employer under this test. The court stated, “Corporate
entities are presumed to have separate existences, and the
corporate form will be disregarded only when the ends of justice
require this result.” (Ibid.) The court further noted that “[i]n
particular, there is a strong presumption that a parent company
is not the employer of its subsidiary’s employees.” (Ibid.) The
integrated enterprise test requires a plaintiff to show that the
two corporate entities have “interrelation of operations, common
management, centralized control of labor relations, and common
ownership or financial control.” (Ibid.) The most important of
these factors, according to the Laird court, is whether the parent
corporation “exercised day-to-day control” over the subsidiary’s
“employment decisions in general.” (Id. at p. 739.) The Laird
plaintiff had failed to raise disputed issues of fact suggesting that
the parent corporation maintained control of the subsidiary’s
employment decisions. (Ibid.)

25
 Laird does not provide support for Knowles’s conclusory
allegation that he was employed by the 39 non-Longwood
defendants as a single integrated enterprise.14 Knowles provides
no specific allegations that all 39 non-Longwood defendants
exercised day-to-day control over the employment decisions as to
Knowles, as required under Martinez. Nor does he provide any
authority that the integrated enterprise theory permits a PAGA
lawsuit against 40 defendants. Thus, we reject Knowles’s
position that the SAC survives under a theory of integrated
enterprise.
C. Evidentiary versus ultimate facts
Knowles next argues that the trial court erred by
improperly requiring evidentiary, instead of ultimate, facts in the
pleadings. Knowles contends that general allegations of an
employment relationship are allegations of an ultimate fact and
thus are sufficient against a demurrer. In support of this
contention, Knowles cites Kiseskey v. Carpenters’ Trust for So.
California (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 222, 230 (Kiseskey), in which
the plaintiffs alleged that two individuals were “agents and/or
employees” of the respondent union “acting within the scope of

14 Knowles lists 12 allegations in the SAC, which he suggests
meet the criteria for integrated enterprise set forth in Laird.
Those allegations include using the same employee handbook;
creating, implementing and enforcing uniform wage and hour
policies; using the same employment application at all their
facilities; and requiring employees to sign the same
acknowledgements as part of the onboarding process, among
other things. None of the 12 listed allegations state that the non-
Longwood defendants exercised day-to-day control over the
employment decisions related to Knowles. (Laird, supra, 68
Cal.App.4th at p. 739.)

26
their employment” at the time of their tortious conduct towards
the plaintiffs. (Id. at p. 226.) As one of their arguments
supporting demurrer, the defendants argued that such
allegations were insufficient with respect to the right to recover
compensatory damages. The Kiseskey court disagreed, stating
“[t]he general allegation of agency is one of ultimate fact,
sufficient against a demurrer.” (Id. at p. 230.) Kiseskey is
distinguishable because there is no suggestion that the individual
plaintiffs were employed by 40 different corporate entities.15 The
allegation that certain individuals alleged to have committed
torts are employed as agents of a union does not equate to the
allegation that a single individual is employed by 40 separate
entities for the purposes of a PAGA lawsuit. As set forth above,
Knowles was required to allege an employment relationship with
the named defendants in this matter. With the exception of
Longwood, he did not adequately allege such a relationship.
Knowles asserts that he was only required to plead, not
prove, his employee status at this stage of the litigation. He
argues that any doubt that defendants have regarding the
employment relationship should be resolved in discovery. (Citing

15 The operative complaint in Kiseskey alleged that the
persons undertaking the tortious conduct were “‘agents and/or
employees of their co-defendants Carpenters and/or Local 1506
and/or Does XI through XX.’” (Kiseskey, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d at
p. 235.) There is no discussion of the possibility that this
included multiple defendants—in fact, the discussion proceeds
with reference to a single employer: “the conclusional words
‘permission and consent’ used in the FAC, coupled with the
factual allegations therein, constitute an allegation, sufficient if
proven, upon which punitive damages may be assessed against
defendant for the conduct of its agents.” (Ibid.)

27
Filipoff v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 443, 451 [purpose of
discovery is to “ascertain the facts and to take the ‘game’ out of
litigation”].) As set forth above, Knowles’s conclusory and
contradictory allegations were insufficient as a matter of law to
create a prima facie case that the 39 non-Longwood defendants
were Knowles’s employer under PAGA.
D. Case conduct
Knowles argues that the non-Longwood defendants’ attack
on the SAC is at odds with their initial conduct in the case,
namely, that they each answered the initial complaint. Knowles
cites no legal authority suggesting that by answering Knowles’s
initial complaint, these defendants somehow conceded that the
later iterations of the complaint were factually sufficient to
survive demurrer. On appeal, an appellant must provide
reasoned argument and citations to legal authority, or we may
treat the point as waived. (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc.
(2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277.) We disregard Knowles’s
conclusory argument that is unsupported by pertinent legal
authority.
E. Joint settlement agreement
Knowles also argues that defendants’ act of jointly entering
into a settlement agreement with the Department of Justice for
their alleged violations of the False Claims Act further supports
the joint employer and integrated enterprise theories. Knowles
emphasizes that the joint settlement agreement supports the
allegation that defendants jointly own and operate numerous
skilled nursing facilities in California, despite their separate
corporate forms. As set forth in Laird, the separate corporate
structures of the 39 non-Longwood defendants must be respected.
(Laird, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 737.) In the absence of

28
sufficient allegations that each of the 39 non-Longwood
corporations exerted control over employment decisions relevant
to Knowles, Knowles failed to state a claim under PAGA. The
joint settlement agreement does not assist Knowles on this point.
F. PAGA cases with multiple employer-defendants
Knowles cites three PAGA cases in which PAGA plaintiffs
named numerous employer-defendants in a single case. All are
distinguishable and do not address the precise issue raised by
defendants in this matter.
Jarboe v. Hanlees Auto Group (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 539
(Jarboe) was a PAGA action brought by a former employee
against an auto group, its 12 affiliated dealerships, and three
individual defendants who owned the group. (Id. at pp. 543-544.)
The plaintiff was hired by “DKD of Davis, Inc., doing business as
Hanlees Davis Toyota” (DKD of Davis), but shortly after he began
working was transferred to “Leehan of Davis, Inc., doing business
as Hanlees Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram Kia.” (Ibid.) Following his
termination, he brought the wage and hour action individually
and on behalf of a purported class against all the defendants
described above.
The issue on appeal was whether the defendants could
collectively move to compel arbitration based on an arbitration
agreement that the plaintiff signed with DKD of Davis.
Significantly, the defendants in the Jarboe matter did not contest
that they were all affiliated entities for the purpose of the PAGA
action. In fact, their position was that the arbitration agreement
applied to all defendants in the matter based on their status as
affiliated companies. (Jarboe, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 545.)
The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration as to all
the defendants except DKD of Davis, finding that “the defendants

29
failed to establish that the [arbitration agreement] applied to
entities other than [DKD of Davis].” (Id. at pp. 546-547.) The
Jarboe court affirmed. The court rejected the defendants’
argument that they should be treated as “‘joint employer[s]’”
based on the plaintiff’s allegations that they were “‘joint
employer[s]’” and that “Jarboe’s complaint treats all defendants
as a single enterprise.” (Id. at p. 554.) The Jarboe court found
the plaintiff’s “boilerplate allegations” of joint employment
insufficient to support the defendants’ equitable estoppel claim.
(Ibid.) Thus, Jarboe does not support Knowles’s position that the
defendants in this matter should be treated as joint employers.
Bridgeford v. Pacific Health Corp. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th
1034 was a putative class action brought against eight different
hospital entities for wage and hour violations. The operative
complaint contained allegations that “Pacific Health Corporation
owns and operates hospitals and exercises control over the daily
operations and working conditions of health care facilities
operated by the other defendants.” (Id. at p. 1037.) The issue on
appeal was whether the trial court properly denied class
certification based on a previous decision in a substantially
similar case. (Id. at p. 1040.) The Bridgeford court reversed the
lower court’s decision, finding that the present plaintiffs were not
bound by the previous denial of class certification. (Id. at
p. 1044.) The Bridgeford court noted that the lower court “did
not separately address plaintiffs’ individual claims or their
representative claims under PAGA,” and the defendants conceded
as much. (Ibid.) The case is unhelpful in advancing Knowles’s
efforts to assert that the 40 entities here were all his collective
employer.

30
 Finally, Knowles cites Callahan v. Brookdale Senior Living
Communities, Inc. (9th Cir. 2022) 42 F.4th 1013 (Callahan). In
Callahan, an employee brought a putative class action under
PAGA against 10 senior living facilities that she alleged were her
employer. The Callahan court collectively referred to the entities
as “Brookdale,” explaining that “Brookdale owns and operates
senior living communities throughout the United States.” (Id. at
p. 1017.) The issues on appeal were whether the district court
properly denied a motion to intervene filed by a plaintiff in an
overlapping PAGA case, and whether the proposed intervenor
was entitled to appeal an order approving a settlement reached
in the underlying case. (Ibid.) The case has no relevance and
does not suggest that the 40 defendants here may all be
collectively considered Knowles’s employer for the purposes of
this PAGA matter.
G. Applicability of Labor Code section 245.5
Knowles argues that the trial court erroneously relied on
the definition of the term “employer” set forth in Labor Code
section 245.5 to conclude that Knowles’s SAC was insufficient.
Knowles cites Mathews v. Happy Valley Conference Center, Inc.
(2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 236 (Mathews) as authority that he need
not allege a contract for hire with the non-Longwood defendants
when that employment relationship is based on an integrated or
joint enterprise theory of employment.
Mathews involved a former employee that brought an
action against a church and his employer, a conference center
that was the church’s subordinate affiliate, for retaliatory
termination and other claims. (Mathews, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th
at p. 240.) The defendants contested a jury finding that the
church and conference center could be considered a single

31
employer for the purposes of the plaintiff’s title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.), California Fair
Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.), and
Labor Code violation claims. In concluding that the jury’s
decision was reasonable, the Mathews court considered the four
factors considered by the Martinez court: “interrelation of
operations, common management, centralized control of labor
relations, and common ownership or financial control.” (Id. at
p. 251.) The Mathews court acknowledged that “centralized
control of labor” is often “considered the most important factor.”
(Id. at p. 252.) The evidence supporting the jury verdict on this
point included evidence that sexual harassment complaints
“make their way up the chain of command to the church itself”
and extensive involvement of an individual from the church in
the plaintiff’s termination. (Ibid.)
The two defendants involved in Mathews were
unquestionably in a “‘parent-subsidiary’” relationship, and
conceded common ownership. (Mathews, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th
at p. 251.) There is a difference between alleging that two
entities, related in a parent-subsidiary relationship, are an
individual’s employer, and alleging that 40 different entities are
an individual’s employer. Further, for the purposes of PAGA, the
plaintiff is required to plead more than common ownership or
affiliation between defendants. The plaintiff is required to plead
that the defendant was his or her employer. As discussed in
detail above, Knowles did not do so in this matter.
Knowles faults the trial court for relying on the definition
of “employee” found in Labor Code section 245.5 because the
definition falls under the “Healthy Workplaces, Healthy Families
Act of 2014.” (Lab. Code, § 245, subd. (a).) Knowles points out

32
that the Healthy Workplaces, Healthy Families Act of 2014
specifies that the provisions contained in the article “do not
diminish, alter, or negate any other legal rights, remedies, or
procedures available to an aggrieved person.” (Lab. Code, § 245,
subd. (b).) While Knowles criticizes the trial court for using this
definition, he fails to provide an alternative definition that he
believes is more applicable. Thus, Knowles’s argument is not
well taken. The PAGA statute does not define the term
“employer,” thus the trial court did not err in relying generally on
the definition of the term set forth in Labor Code section 245.5
and in Martinez, supra, 49 Cal.4th at page 68.
Knowles has failed to show error in the trial court’s
decision sustaining the non-Longwood defendants’ demurrer
without leave to amend.16

16 Knowles states he should have been granted leave to
amend the SAC because he proposed to allege “the name and
address of the legal entity on the wage statements he received
during his employment,” among other things. We find the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend
despite Knowles’s offer to add the legal entity on the wage
statements he received. Knowles did not indicate which entity it
was. Having already alleged that his and other plaintiffs’ hiring
documents stated they were employees of Longwood, the trial
court had no reason to assume that such allegation would change
its ruling. In other words, Knowles failed to suggest any
amendments that would change the ruling of the court. Knowles
had been given two chances to allege an employment relationship
with the non-Longwood defendants, and under the
circumstances, the trial court was not required to allow him an
additional opportunity without further specifying proposed
allegations that would change the court’s ruling. (Brown v. Los
Angeles Unified School Dist. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1110

33
III. The Chavez matter
The Chavez plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in
dismissing the Chavez matter in its entirety despite finding that
the Chavez plaintiffs sufficiently pled an employment
relationship with Longwood, Green Acres and View Park, and
despite those entities’ judicial admissions that they employed the
Chavez plaintiffs.
A. The Chavez plaintiffs’ allegations
Like Knowles, the Chavez plaintiffs alleged generally that
the same 40 defendants were “joint employers” of the Chavez
plaintiffs and other aggrieved employees, and the entities were
the “alter egos, divisions, affiliates, integrated enterprises, joint
employers, subsidiaries, parents, principals, related entities, co-
conspirators, authorized agents, partners, joint venturers, and/or
guarantors, actual or ostensible, of each other.” Like Knowles,
the Chavez plaintiffs alleged upon information and belief that
Longwood “was the parent corporation of and exercised financial
control over” the 39 non-Longwood defendants. Like Knowles,
the Chavez plaintiffs alleged that their “hiring documents stated
that [they] were employees of [Longwood].”
As did Knowles, the Chavez plaintiffs pled generally that
all 40 defendants “exercised control over [their] wages, hours, and
working conditions by, inter alia, jointly creating, implementing,
and enforcing uniform wage and hour policies, practices, and
procedures at all of their facilities, including, but not limited
to . . . the wages to be paid to [them], . . . the hours to be worked

[“leave to amend is warranted when the complaint is in some way
defective, but the plaintiff has shown in what manner the
complaint can be amended and ‘“how that amendment will
change the legal effect of [the] pleading”’”].)

34
by [them], . . . and the working conditions that [they] would be
subject to.” The Chavez plaintiffs also alleged that the same 40
defendants “retained or assumed a general right of control over
the hiring, direction, supervision, discipline, discharge, and day-
to-day aspects of the working conditions of [the Chavez
plaintiffs].”
Unlike Knowles, the Chavez plaintiffs alleged that they
“worked for DEFENDANTS at their Green Acres Lodge facility,
located at 8101 Hill Drive, Rosemead, California 91770. The
entity listed on [their] earnings statement was ‘GREEN ACRES
LODGE INC DBA GREEN ACRES LODGE’ and ‘GREEN
ACRES LODGE, INC. DBA GREEN ACRES LODGE.’” The
Chavez plaintiffs similarly alleged that Evans worked for
defendants at their View Park Convalescent Facility located at
3737 Don Felipe Drive, Los Angeles, California 90008, and that
this entity was listed on Evans’s earnings statement. The
Chavez plaintiffs similarly alleged that Oglesby worked for
defendants at the same View Park facility, and was paid by that
entity.17
B. The demurrer was properly sustained as to
Longwood
These allegations were sufficient to show an employment
relationship between the Chavez plaintiffs and Longwood.
However, to the extent that the Chavez plaintiffs bring an
identical PAGA action against Longwood, the demurrer was

17 Knowles did not include in the SAC allegations that the
entity listed on his earnings statement was Alden. Knowles
alleged only that he worked for defendants “at their Alden
Terrace Convalescent Hospital facility located at 1240 South
Hoover Street, Los Angeles, California 90006.”

35
properly sustained as a duplicate action. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 430.10, subd. (c) [permitting party to demur to a pleading if
“[t]here is another action pending between the same parties on
the same cause of action”].) Although the named plaintiffs are
different, all are suing as proxies of the state. (ZB, N.A. v.
Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 185 [named plaintiff “acts as
‘“the proxy or agent of the state’s labor law enforcement
agencies”’ and ‘“represents the same legal right and interest as”’
those agencies”]; Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969,
986 [“An employee plaintiff suing, as here, under [PAGA], does so
as the proxy or agent of the state’s labor law enforcement
agencies.”].)18 Thus, because the Chavez plaintiffs have brought
identical claims against Longwood, the Chavez plaintiffs’ action
is a duplicate action to Knowles’s action and Longwood’s
demurrer was properly sustained.

18 In support of the Chavez plaintiffs’ position that multiple
employees may prosecute separate, overlapping PAGA actions
simultaneously against the same employer, the Chavez plaintiffs
cite Julian v. Glenair, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 853, 866. While
the Julian court noted that “nothing in the PAGA statutory
scheme forecloses separate but similar actions by different
employees against the same employer,” the court went on to
explain that “the doctrine of collateral estoppel, rather than the
statutory scheme, shields the employer from . . . a series of PAGA
actions by different employees . . . .” (Id. at pp. 866-867.) The
Julian court explained, “Because an employee’s PAGA action
‘functions as a substitute for an action brought by the
government itself,’ under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a
judgment unfavorable to the employee binds the government, as
well as all aggrieved nonparty employees potentially entitled to
assert a PAGA action.” (Id. at p. 867, citing Arias v. Superior
Court, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 986.)

36
 The Chavez plaintiffs argue that the redundancy of the two
complaints should cause the latter of the two complaints to be
stayed, rather than dismissed on demurrer. Both parties discuss
Shaw v. Superior Court (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 245 (Shaw), which
involved duplicative PAGA claims filed against Beverages &
More!, Inc. (BevMo) in Los Angeles County and Contra Costa
County. BevMo brought a motion to stay the Contra Costa
County action under the doctrine of exclusive concurrent
jurisdiction and under the court’s inherent authority. (Id. at
p. 252.) The Shaw court affirmed the trial court’s decision to stay
the matter under the pending concurrent jurisdiction doctrine.
(Id. at p. 263.) In so doing, the court noted, “[w]e do not believe
the absence of an express statutory prohibition on the filing of
duplicative PAGA representative actions manifests the requisite
unequivocal intent to repeal the well-established exclusive
concurrent jurisdiction rule, especially considering the rule’s
important policies of avoiding conflicting decisions and
preventing vexatious litigation and multiplicity of suits.” (Id. at
p. 259.) While the Shaw decision involved a stay, and not a
dismissal after demurrer, we note that this case differs from the
duplicative action in Shaw in that it was brought in the same
court by the same attorneys. Nothing in Shaw suggests that a
dismissal is improper where duplicative lawsuits filed by the
same attorneys in the same court would “duplicate court efforts,
waste resources, and potentially produce divergent results.” (Id.
at p. 262.) Plant Insulation Co. v. Fibreboard Corp. (1990) 224
Cal.App.3d 781—a case involving numerous pending asbestos
actions—is distinguishable for the same reason. And in Boyd v.
Freeman (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 847, the court noted in dicta that
“when a plea of abatement based on a pending prior action is

37
established in a second action, the appropriate remedy is the
entry of an interlocutory judgment postponing trial, rather than
dismissal of the action.” (Id. at p. 858, fn. 6.) The Boyd court
concluded that the plaintiff’s second action against the defendant
in that matter “did not contravene the rule against splitting a
cause of action,” thus it does not stand for the proposition that
the trial court’s dismissal of the Chavez plaintiffs’ action against
Longwood was erroneous under the circumstances of this case.
(Ibid.)
Nothing in Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10,
subdivision (c) limits a trial court’s ability to dismiss a matter
following demurrer on the ground that it is duplicative of another
action. Further, other courts have affirmed dismissals following
demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10,
where plaintiffs file substantially similar cases against the same
defendants. (See, e.g., Bistawros v. Greenberg (1987) 189
Cal.App.3d 189, 192-193 [affirming dismissal of a second action
by the same party against the same defendants and sanctioning
plaintiff for the frivolous appeal].) Thus, we reject the Chavez
plaintiffs’ suggestion that the trial court was required to stay the
Chavez matter against Longwood, rather than dismiss it after
sustaining the demurrer.
Further, the allegations that Longwood was the entity
listed on the Chavez plaintiffs’ hiring documents is inconsistent
with the allegations that Green Acres and View Park were the
entities listed on the Chavez plaintiffs’ earnings statements. The
trial court was not required to accept these conflicting
allegations. For these reasons, the demurrer in the Chavez
matter was properly sustained, without leave to amend, as to
Longwood.

38
 C. The Chavez plaintiffs adequately pled an
employment relationship with Green Acres and
View Park
The allegation that the entity listed on the Chavez
plaintiffs’ earning statement was Green Acres is sufficient to
suggest an employment relationship between the Chavez
plaintiffs and Green Acres because it is essentially an allegation
that Green Acres had control over the Chavez plaintiffs’ wages.
The same is true for the allegations that the entity listed on
Evans’s and Oglesby’s earnings statements was View Park.
These allegations are sufficient to indicate that Green Acres and
View Park had control over the wages of the Chavez plaintiffs.19
Therefore, we agree with the Chavez plaintiffs that the trial court
erred in sustaining the demurrer as to these two defendants in
the Chavez matter.
The trial court acknowledged that the Chavez plaintiffs
alleged an employer-employee relationship with Longwood,
Green Acres, and View Park, stating, “The FAC in this case does
not include any facts that allege any sort of employee-employer
relationship with anyone but Longwood Management Corp, the
Green Acres Lodge, and View Park Convalescent Hospital.
Plaintiffs have not shown any relationship between Plaintiffs and
the remaining thirty-seven (37) defendants.” Despite its
acknowledgement of the allegations concerning employment with
Longwood, Green Acres and View Park, the trial court concluded
“[b]ecause the FAC does not allege any facts showing an

19 Labor Code section 226, subdivision (a), requires an
employer to provide its employees an accurate statement in
writing showing items such as gross wages earned, total hours
worked, and deductions, among other things.

39
employee-employer relationship and is verbatim to the SAC in
the Knowles case, the demurrer is SUSTAINED.”
At the time the trial court issued this ruling, the court had
already sustained, without leave to amend, the demurrer as to
the 39 non-Longwood defendants in the Knowles case.20 Thus,
the only remaining defendant in the Knowles matter was
Longwood. As such, the two matters were no longer identical in
terms of the identities of the defendants. Further, the Chavez
plaintiffs’ FAC was different in a significant way: it alleged that
two specific entities, Green Acres and View Park, were the
entities listed on the three Chavez plaintiffs’ earnings
statements. The trial court erred in failing to acknowledge these
differences between the two pleadings.
For this reason, the judgment is reversed in part, with
directions to the trial court to reverse its ruling sustaining the
demurrer in the Chavez matter as to Green Acres and View Park.
Based on the discussion above in part II as to the Knowles
matter, the demurrer was properly sustained as to the remaining
defendants in the Chavez matter.

20 The demurrer to Knowles’s SAC was sustained as to the
non-Longwood defendants, without leave to amend, on May 11,
2021. The demurrer to the Chavez plaintiffs’ FAC was sustained,
without leave to amend, on July 9, 2021.

40
IV. Costs in the Knowles matter21
A. Proceedings regarding costs in the Knowles
matter
The trial court entered judgment dismissing the 39 non-
Longwood defendants in the Knowles matter on June 9, 2021.
The court’s order specified that “[c]osts may be claimed and
contested in accordance with the rules adopted by the Judicial
Council. CCP § 1034(a); Cal Rules of Ct 3.1700(a)(1).”
On June 25, 2021, the 39 non-Longwood defendants timely
filed their memorandum of costs in the amount of $23,627.08.
The costs consisted of filing and motion fees, court reporter fees
established by statute, and fees for electronic filing or service.
The non-Longwood defendants sought to receive only the costs
they incurred, not any costs incurred by Longwood, the party that
remained in the lawsuit.
On July 3, 2021, Knowles filed a motion to strike
defendants’ costs, arguing that a prevailing employer in a PAGA
action is not entitled to an award of costs as a matter of law. The
non-Longwood defendants opposed Knowles’s motion, arguing
that the applicable costs statute—Code of Civil Procedure section
1032, subdivision (b) (section 1032(b)), entitles a prevailing party
to an award of ordinary costs in any action or proceeding unless
another statute expressly precludes such recovery—which PAGA
does not do.
The trial court heard Knowles’s motion to strike on
December 7, 2021. The written tentative decision was to deny
the motion. At the hearing, the court requested the parties

21 Knowles and the non-Longwood defendants have each filed
requests for judicial notice accompanying their briefing in the
cost appeal. We grant both requests.

41
address two issues. First, the court requested that Knowles
provide legislative history that he had referenced in his briefing.
Further, the court asked Knowles’s counsel to provide additional
argument specific to the facts of this case. The court provided a
supplemental briefing schedule for the parties to address these
issues and continued the hearing.
On January 10, 2022, the trial court posted a tentative
ruling that adhered to the first tentative. Following argument,
the court took the matter under submission.
On December 13, 2021, Knowles’s counsel filed a new,
largely identical matter with a different plaintiff, Meghan
Bertirotti (the Bertirotti matter) (see footnote 7, ante.). The
Bertirotti matter was a PAGA action against the same 40
defendants named in the Knowles and Chavez matters. On
January 12, 2022, Knowles’s counsel filed a notice of related
cases regarding Knowles and Bertirotti. On January 28, 2022,
the court ordered the cases related and assigned to her court,
with Knowles as the lead case.
On February 14, 2022, Knowles’s counsel filed a
peremptory challenge in the Bertirotti matter pursuant to Code
of Civil Procedure section 170.6, declaring that Judge Williams
Court was prejudiced such that Bertirotti could not, or believed
she could not, have a fair and impartial trial of the matter.
On February 15, 2022, Judge Williams Court issued an
order granting Knowles’s motion to strike the non-Longwood
defendants’ costs. The order did not mention section 1032(b),
pursuant to which the non-Longwood defendants sought costs.
On the same date, Judge Williams Court filed an order
noting that the peremptory challenge was “filed and accepted”

42
and that Knowles and all related cases were referred to
department 1 for “review and reassignment purposes.”
On February 24, 2022, Knowles’s counsel electronically
served defendants’ counsel with the order granting the motion to
strike costs. On February 25, 2022, Knowles’s counsel
electronically served defendants’ counsel with Judge Williams
Court’s order accepting their peremptory challenge and
transferring the Knowles matter and related cases for
reassignment.
On April 16, 2022, the non-Longwood defendants filed their
notice of appeal from the trial court’s order granting Knowles’s
motion to strike costs.
B. Applicable law and standard of review
“‘The right to recover costs exists solely by virtue of
statute.’” (Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17
Cal.4th 985, 989 (Murillo).) The statutory provision on which the
non-Longwood defendants relied in seeking costs in the Knowles
matter was section 1032(b), which provides, “Except as otherwise
expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a
matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” The
term “prevailing party” includes “a defendant in whose favor a
dismissal is entered.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) It is
undisputed that the 39 non-Longwood defendants were
prevailing parties in the Knowles matter.
A prevailing party’s right to recover costs under section
1032(b) is mandatory except as otherwise expressly provided by
statute. “‘“[C]osts are available as ‘a matter of right’ when the
prevailing party is within one of the four categories designated by
statute.”’” (Charton v. Harkey (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 730, 738;
see Acosta v. SI Corp. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1375 [“‘If a

43
party fits one of the definitions of “prevailing” listed in C.C.P.
1032(a)(4) . . . that party is entitled as a matter of right to recover
costs.’”].) Caselaw “cautions against engrafting exceptions onto
the clear language of section 1032.” (Crib Retaining Walls, Inc. v.
NBS/Lowry, Inc. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 886, 890.)
Because there is no dispute as to the non-Longwood
defendants’ status as prevailing parties, the only issue before us
is whether there exists an applicable exception to section 1032(b)
“expressly provided by statute.” “Where, as here, the
determination of whether costs should be awarded is an issue of
law on undisputed facts, we exercise de novo review.” (City of
Long Beach v. Stevedoring Services of America (2007) 157
Cal.App.4th 672, 678.)
C. The trial court erred in denying costs
1. PAGA does not provide an express exception to
section 1032(b)
Section 1032(b) provides that “a prevailing party is entitled
as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.”
The only exception is where “otherwise expressly provided by
statute.” (§ 1032(b).) Thus, we must first determine whether
PAGA contains an express exception to section 1032(b). (Murillo,
supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 991.)
Although Labor Code section 2699, subdivision (g)(1)
provides that “[a]ny employee who prevails in any action shall be
entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs,” the
statute makes no mention of prevailing employers. “In other
words, it does not expressly disallow recovery of costs by
prevailing [employers].” (Murillo, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 991
[discussing prevailing sellers under Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).].)

44
 We reject Knowles’s argument that the language of Labor
Code section 2699, subdivision (g)(1) permitting a prevailing
employee to recover “an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and
costs” is the equivalent of an express exception to Code of Civil
Procedure section 1032(b) for prevailing employers. Instead,
Knowles’s argument is based on an interpretation that this
provision implicitly prohibits costs to a prevailing employer. The
California Supreme Court rejected such an argument in Murillo,
supra, 17 Cal.4th at page 991.
In Murillo, the court considered a one-way fee and cost
shifting provision in the Song-Beverly Act that expressly
permitted a prevailing plaintiff-buyer to recover costs and fees,
but was silent as to a prevailing defendant-seller. The Supreme
Court affirmed that a prevailing seller should receive an award of
costs under section 1032(b) due to the Song-Beverly Act’s silence
on the issue of prevailing seller costs. The high court reasoned
that because the Song-Beverly Act “makes no mention of
prevailing sellers[,] . . . it does not expressly disallow recovery of
costs by prevailing sellers.” (Murillo, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 991.)
Murillo provides guidance for the interpretation of similar
one-way fee and cost shifting statutes found in the Labor Code.
(Plancich v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th
308, 312 (Plancich).) In Plancich, an employee sued his employer
for various Labor Code violations including failure to pay
overtime compensation pursuant to Labor Code section 1194,
which contains a one-way fee and cost recovery provision in favor
of prevailing employees. The employer prevailed in the action.
The Plancich court recognized that the Labor Code provision in
question “gives a prevailing employee the right to recover
attorney’s fees and costs; however, the statute makes no mention

45
of prevailing employers. (Plancich, at p. 313.) Relying on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Murillo, the Plancich court
determined that “any suggestion that a prevailing employer is
prohibited from recovering its costs is, at most, implied by the
language of [Labor Code] section 1194.” (Plancich, at p. 313.)
Thus, the provision did not “provide an ‘express’ exception to the
general rule permitting an employer, as a prevailing party, to
recover costs under [section 1032(b)].” (Ibid.) Similarly, because
PAGA contains no provision creating an express exception to
section 1032(b)’s mandate, the prevailing alleged employers in
the Knowles matter—the non-Longwood defendants—should
have been granted their costs.
2. The legislative history
We need not delve into the legislative history of PAGA
because the words of the relevant statutes are clear. Section
1032(b) is mandatory in the absence of an express exception, and
PAGA provides no such express exception. Knowles’s only
argument is that such an exception should be implied.
As the Supreme Court stated in Murillo, “We could not, of
course, ignore the actual words of the statute in an attempt to
vindicate our perception of the Legislature’s purpose in enacting
the law. ‘“This court has no power to rewrite the statute so as to
make it conform to a presumed intention which is not
expressed.”’” (Murillo, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 993.) Because the
words of section 1032(b) are clear, and there is no express
exception found in PAGA, we need not look further.
Knowles argues that the Legislature’s intent in enacting
PAGA was to protect employees and encourage aggrieved
employees to seek legal redress for Labor Code violations. (Citing
Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59

46
Cal.4th 348, 390, abrogated on other grounds in Viking River
Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. ___ [142 S.Ct. 1906,
1910].) Under PAGA, the Legislature has provided “two financial
incentives for aggrieved employees to pursue the recovery of civil
penalties under PAGA.” (Provost v. YourMechanic, Inc. (2020) 55
Cal.App.5th 982, 991.) First, the aggrieved employee receives a
portion of the civil penalties recovered, and second, “any
employee who prevails in an action is entitled to his or her
reasonable attorney fees and costs.” (Ibid.) Knowles argues that
this one-way costs and fees provision is a strong incentive for
aggrieved employees to bring PAGA claims, and the Legislature
could not have intended to saddle unsuccessful proxies with an
onerous costs bill and thereby discourage them from bringing
PAGA claims. Knowles refers to discussion in the legislative
history that various employer groups objected to the one-way
attorney fee and cost provision. Knowles points out that the
provision was kept despite the employers’ objections.
Knowles is correct that the one-way attorney fee and cost
provision was left in the statute despite the objections of the
employer advocates. However, this does not change our analysis.
The Legislature could have, but did not, create in PAGA an
express exception to section 1032(b). Therefore, the mandatory
cost provision found in section 1032(b) applies. (See Murillo,
supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 991.)
3. The caselaw cited by Knowles is unpersuasive
Knowles relies heavily on two cases that the trial court
cited in its ruling. Neither addresses the issue before us, thus
neither is persuasive.
The first case, a class action captioned Earley v. Superior
Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1420 (Earley), makes no mention of

47
section 1032(b). Instead, the appeal addressed two unrelated
issues: “(1) if relevant provisions of the Labor Code allow for a
successful defendant’s recovery of attorney’s fees in a case
involving a claim for overtime compensation, and (2) whether
absent class members, who have failed to ‘opt out,’ may be held
liable for a successful defendant’s fees or costs.” (Id. at p. 1424.)
As Knowles acknowledges, it was not a PAGA case and addressed
attorney’s fees. Knowles emphasizes the Earley court’s
discussion of the public policies underlying the overtime wage
laws in rendering its decision that the one-way fee shifting
provision in Labor Code section 1194 trumped the reciprocal
attorney fee provision found in Labor Code section 218 in that
matter. (Earley, at pp. 1430-1431.) The public policies
underlying the Labor Code claims at issue in Earley cannot
override the plain language of the statutes at issue in this
matter. Further, as costs under section 1032(b) were not at issue
in Earley, any reference to costs in the Earley decision are dicta
and not controlling here.
In Ling v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc. (2016) 245
Cal.App.4th 1242 (Ling), disapproved on other grounds in
Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (2022) 13 Cal.5th 93,
117, the plaintiff sued her former employer for various Labor
Code violations including unpaid overtime wages, waiting time
penalties, and premium pay for failure to provide meal and rest
periods. The matter was ordered into arbitration. At issue on
appeal was whether the arbitrator “exceeded his power by
awarding statutory attorney fees to a defendant employer for
work performed in defeating an employee’s . . . claims, contrary to
public policy embedded in Labor Code section 1194’s one-way fee-
shifting provision.” (Id. at p. 1247.) The Ling court concluded

48
that the arbitrator did exceed his power by awarding such fees.
(Ibid.) As Knowles acknowledges, the Ling court correctly stated
that “[i]n the absence of a specific Labor Code provision, costs are
awarded in employment dispute matters under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1032.” (Id. at p. 1253.) Although Ling involved
attorney fees, Knowles argues that the same reasoning
underlying the decision applies to a prevailing employer’s
entitlement to costs under Labor Code section 1194. Knowles
argues that there is no reason to believe that Ling would have
been decided differently had the issue been whether a prevailing
employer had the right to recover costs under that statute.
We disagree. The analysis is different when a prevailing
employer requests costs under section 1032(b). Under the plain
language of that statute, a prevailing party is entitled to costs in
any action or proceeding unless another statute expressly
precludes such recovery. We are not permitted to ignore the
actual words of the statute in an attempt to further the perceived
policies behind the law. (Murillo, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 993.)
Finally, we address Cruz v. Fusion Buffet, Inc. (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 221 (Cruz), the most recent appellate decision on the
issue of a one-way fee and cost shifting provision in the Labor
Code. Without discussing Murillo, the Cruz court disagreed with
Plancich, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th 308 and instead relied on Ling
and Earley in interpreting “[Labor Code] section 1194’s silence
with respect to prevailing employers” as signifying “a legislative
intention to provide a one-way cost and fee shifting provision.”
(Cruz, supra, at p. 242.) The Cruz court concluded that “where
Labor Code section 1194 applies, it displaces any application of
Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (b).” (Ibid.)

49
 We decline to follow Cruz for several reasons, primarily
because of the Cruz court’s failure to discuss, or even mention,
the Supreme Court’s clear direction in Murillo that where a
statute “makes no mention of prevailing sellers[,] . . . it does not
expressly disallow recovery of costs by prevailing sellers.”
(Murillo, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 991; see Cruz, supra, 57
Cal.App.5th at p. 242.)22 Further, we note that the Cruz matter
did not involve PAGA, but involved two Labor Code provisions
with specific fee-shifting provisions. Labor Code section 1194
contained a one-way fee shifting provision providing that a
prevailing employee was entitled to “‘reasonable attorney’s fees,
and costs of suit.’” (Id. at p. 240, italics omitted.) Labor Code
section 218.5 “is a unique two-way fee shifting statute, providing
for an award of attorney fees and costs to the prevailing
party . . . ; however, where the prevailing party is someone other
than an employee, that party is entitled to recover fees and costs
only if the covered action was brought in bad faith by the
employee.” (Cruz, supra, at p. 240.)
In Cruz, the plaintiff-employee sued a corporation and its
officers for various Labor Code violations. The claims against the
officers were brought under an alter ego theory of liability, and
the plaintiff-employee recovered nothing against the two

22 Knowles attempts to distinguish Murillo because a plaintiff
brings a case under the Song-Beverly Act to enforce his or her
own rights under the statute, while plaintiffs in PAGA actions
are suing on the state’s behalf to vindicate the state’s interests.
Had the Legislature intended to make this distinction, it could
have done so in the express wording of either section 1032(b) or
PAGA. Instead, section 1032(b) applies broadly to “any action or
proceeding,” unless “otherwise expressly provided by statute.”
(Italics added.)

50
individual defendants. The trial court granted the plaintiff-
employee’s motion to strike the individual defendants’ costs, and
the Cruz court agreed. The individual defendants argued that
the plaintiff-employee “should be precluded from obtaining
attorney fees and costs from them for the period after they each
made a Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer, and that they,
in fact, ‘are entitled, at a minimum, to costs.’” (Cruz, supra, 57
Cal.App.5th at p. 239.)23
After discussing the public policy behind Labor Code
section 1194, the Cruz court determined that “public policy is not
served by allowing for a more general cost-shifting provision,
such as that expressed in Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, to
apply to require the shifting of costs in favor of a prevailing
defendant employer . . . .” (Cruz, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at
p. 242.) Relying on Earley and Ling, the Cruz court “declin[ed] to
interpret [Labor Code] section 1194’s silence with respect to
prevailing employers as anything other than a legislative
intention to provide a one-way cost and fee shifting provision.”
(Ibid.) In short, the Cruz court found that “section 1032 does not
apply where the fee and cost provisions of [Labor Code] sections
1194 or 218.5 apply.” (Id. at p. 241.) The Cruz court did not
discuss section 1032(b)’s requirement of an express exception to
its mandate.
The Cruz court failed to consider the Supreme Court’s
directive that “we must attempt to effectuate the probable intent

23 The Cruz court described the individual defendants’
argument as “a short argument in their opening brief that is not
further addressed on reply.” (Cruz, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at
p. 239.) Thus, the Cruz court’s incomplete analysis of section
1032(b) may have resulted from inadequate briefing.

51
of the Legislature, as expressed through the actual words of the
statutes in question.” (Murillo, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 990.)
“Because section 1032(b) grants a prevailing party the right to
recover costs ‘[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by statute’
(italics added), we must first determine whether [the statute at
issue] provides an ‘express’ exception.” (Id. at p. 991.) Following
the Murillo court’s reasoning, where a statute gives a prevailing
employee the right to recover costs and fees, but does not mention
prevailing employers, it cannot be read to expressly disallow costs
by prevailing employers. (Ibid.) We decline Knowles’s suggestion
that we find that “legislative intent overrides the letter of section
1032.” Because the words of section 1032(b) are clear, and there
is no express exception in PAGA, the non-Longwood defendants
are entitled to their costs.

DISPOSITION
The judgment in the Knowles matter is affirmed.
The postjudgment order granting Knowles’s motion to tax
costs is reversed.
The judgment in the Chavez matter is reversed as to Green
Acres and View Park only.
Each party is to bear its own costs of appeal.

___________________________
CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

___________________________ ___________________________
LUI, P. J. HOFFSTADT, J.

52