Case: 22-40559 Document: 00517024849 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/08/2024
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
January 8, 2024
No. 22-40559 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Amber Ford; Regan Kimbrough; Donald Newsome,
Plaintiffs—Appellants,
versus
Anderson County, Texas; Taket Holdings, L.L.C.; Adam
Corley; Timothy Green; Greg Taylor; Robin Jones;
Jonathan Strong; Jessica Carpenter; Alicia Wilson;
Matthew Wickersham; Travis Wesson; Dakota Hughes;
Todd Choate,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 6:19-CV-384
______________________________
Before King, Willett, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:
On June 15, 2018, pretrial detainee Rhonda Newsome died in
Anderson County Jail due to complications from Addison’s disease.
Newsome’s family members filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Anderson County, Sheriff Greg Taylor, Dr. Adam Corley, Nurse Timothy
Green, and several jailers. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated
Newsome’s Fourteenth Amendment rights as a pretrial detainee by failing to
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treat her chronic illness, resulting in a preventable death. The district court
granted summary judgment for all Defendants and dismissed Plaintiffs’
lawsuit with prejudice. After reviewing the record, we find that Plaintiffs
have established genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether several
Defendants violated Newsome’s clearly established constitutional rights. We
accordingly REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment for
Defendants Timothy Green, Todd Choate, Jonathan Strong, Robin Jones,
Matthew Wickersham, Jessica Carpenter, and Dakota Hughes, but we
AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Defendants
Alicia Wilson, Travis Wesson, and TAKET Holdings, L.L.C. We AFFIRM
IN PART the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Adam Corley
as related to Plaintiffs’ supervisory claim against him, but we REVERSE the
district court’s grant of summary judgment for Dr. Corley as related to
Plaintiffs’ nonsupervisory claim. We also AFFIRM IN PART the district
court’s grant of summary judgment for Defendants Anderson County and
Greg Taylor, but we VACATE the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’
motion for leave to file a third amended complaint and REMAND with
instructions to grant Plaintiffs leave to amend their pleadings to include
additional supervisory and municipal liability claims. Finally, we AFFIRM
the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions.
I.
A.
This case involves the death of pretrial detainee Rhonda Newsome
while in the custody of Anderson County Jail. Newsome had a history of
several chronic conditions, including Addison’s disease, an uncommon
illness that occurs when the adrenal glands do not produce enough of certain
hormones. If left untreated, Addison’s disease can accelerate into an
“Addisonian crisis,” which requires immediate medical intervention. Early
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indicators of an Addisonian crisis may include severe weakness, pain in the
lower back or legs, abdominal pain, vomiting, and low blood pressure.
Addison’s disease requires lifelong treatment, which is primarily
accomplished through administering steroid medications. When Addison’s
disease patients are unmedicated for even brief periods of time, they can be
at a high risk of experiencing an Addisonian crisis.
During Newsome’s detainment, Anderson County contracted with
Dr. Adam Corley, a private physician who provided medical care for
detainees. Dr. Corley held the title of medical director of the jail. The County
also employed Timothy Green, a registered nurse who worked at the jail part-
time.
Anderson County Jail’s health services plan states that medical care is
to be provided to detainees twenty-four hours a day, and detainees are to be
medically screened upon admission. Detainees with chronic illnesses are to
undergo a medical assessment, and the jail physician is tasked with instituting
a treatment regimen.
B.
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed. Rhonda
Newsome, age fifty, was arrested on March 9, 2018, following a domestic
disturbance in which she allegedly chased her adult daughter with a pair of
scissors. Newsome was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon. After being treated at Palestine Regional Medical Center for back
issues, Newsome was taken to Anderson County Jail on March 10, 2018, for
pretrial detention.
According to her jail intake form, Newsome suffered from several
medical conditions, including Addison’s disease, fibromyalgia, seizures, joint
or disc disease, spinal stenosis, and osteoarthritis. The form also indicates
that Newsome was taking ten prescription medications at the time.
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On March 11, Nurse Green examined Newsome. According to
Green’s deposition testimony, Green and Newsome discussed her medical
history and medications, and Green instituted a verbal treatment plan to
“continue the medications that [Newsome] was on.” Green stated that this
verbal treatment plan involved asking the jail staff to monitor Newsome and
notifying Dr. Corley of any changes in her condition.
During the months of March, April, and May, Newsome had periodic
medical issues. On April 4, Newsome accidentally took an extra dose of blood
pressure medication. Nurse Green treated her with a liter of saline solution,
placed her on medical observation with repeated blood pressure readings,
and reexamined her the next day. Green noted in Newsome’s medical
activity log on April 5 that he would “attempt to obtain medical records.”
On April 16 and April 18, Newsome complained of acid reflux, and
jailers provided her with over-the-counter medication. On April 20, Nurse
Green personally examined Newsome again and noted low blood pressure
and bilateral leg swelling. Newsome was placed on medical observation, in
which jailers logged her actions every fifteen minutes. Nurse Green further
indicated that he would draw blood and report lab results to Dr. Corley, but
it is disputed whether this blood draw occurred.
On May 11, about two months into Newsome’s detention, Dr. Corley
personally examined Newsome for the first and only time at the jail. Dr.
Corley’s notes indicate that Newsome was in “no distress” during the
examination, and that her “chief complaint” was gas. Dr. Corley
acknowledged that Newsome suffered from Addison’s disease, and he made
a note to follow up on medical records requests.
Plaintiffs allege that Newsome was never prescribed or systematically
provided with steroids—the primary treatment for Addison’s disease—
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during her ninety-seven-day detention. They also allege that Newsome did
not have her blood drawn for monitoring until June 15, the day of her death.
On the evening of June 14, Newsome began vomiting and
experiencing pain in her stomach and right flank area. After she complained
to jail staff, Nurse Green visited the jail around midnight to personally
examine her. 1 Green claims that he consulted with Dr. Corley by phone, and
that per Dr. Corley’s instructions he administered one liter of saline and fifty
milligrams of Phenergan for nausea treatment. Green testified that Newsome
complained of “some mild nausea and some vomiting,” but that she had
stable vital signs and appeared alert and oriented. Green also claims that he
asked Newsome if she wanted to go to the hospital, but Newsome declined.
After Green purportedly treated Newsome late on June 14, Newsome
was placed on medical observation and jail staff were instructed to move her
into a holding cell where she could be observed through the night. Video
footage indicates that jail staff checked on Newsome thirty-one times during
the seventeen-hour period between midnight on June 14 and her death in the
afternoon of June 15.
Plaintiffs have presented affidavit evidence from other detainees in
nearby cells on the night of June 14 through June 15 indicating that during
this seventeen-hour period, Newsome was in grave distress from a severe
Addisonian crisis. Detainee Edward Jimenez, who was in a cell adjacent to
Newsome’s cell, testified that Newsome repeatedly cried and screamed
_____________________
1
Plaintiffs claim that there is a factual dispute regarding whether Nurse Green
made this midnight visit to Newsome. We express no view on whether Plaintiffs have
presented sufficient evidence to support a justifiable inference that Nurse Green fabricated
this visit. Even if we accepted as true Green’s claim that he treated Newsome that night,
we would still hold that the district court erred in granting him summary judgment due to
the events that transpired on June 15.
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during the night, repeating phrases such as “help-help,” “I’m hurting bad,”
“please help,” “Lord help me,” “take me to the hospital,” and “I need a
doctor.” Jimenez reports being unable to sleep due to the noise. He also
claims that nearby jailers appeared to be ignoring Newsome’s cries and pleas
for help.
Detainee Ashley Lyons, who was in a cell adjacent to Newsome’s cell
on June 15, testified that she repeatedly heard Newsome groaning and saying
that she needed to go to the hospital. Lyons reports that Newsome’s cries for
help were loud enough to wake her up on several occasions.
Detainee Charles Patrick Sweet, who was near Newsome’s holding
cell, testified that during the middle of the night he heard “a female voice
coming from the processing area repeatedly crying out loudly that she needed
[a] doctor and that she needed to go to the hospital.”
Around 1:30 a.m. on June 15, A’rhonda Kelli Schuckers, an inmate
and trustee at Anderson County Jail, assisted in removing Newsome from her
cell for a shower. Newsome was unable to walk on her own; she had to be
supported on both sides by a trustee and a jailer. While cleaning Newsome’s
cell during the shower, Schuckers noticed that Newsome had vomited a black
substance into a cup. After Newsome returned to her cell, Jailer-Defendant
Robin Jones took Newsome’s blood pressure and yelled out that it was
80/40.
At approximately 7:40 a.m. on June 15, Nurse Green examined
Newsome. Newsome’s medical activity log indicates that she was nauseated,
“had thrown up brown colored fluid but was still able to tolerate water,” and
was complaining of “right flank area pain.” Green drew a blood sample and
gave Newsome Phenergan and Tylenol #4. Green claims that he asked
Newsome if she wanted to go to the hospital, and that she declined. Green’s
notes indicate that upon receiving the results of Newsome’s blood work, Dr.
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Corley might order a CT scan and send Newsome to the hospital for further
evaluation. Following this visit, Green took Newsome’s blood sample to
Palestine Regional Medical Center for testing.
The parties dispute whether Nurse Green learned of Newsome’s
blood test results that morning, or later that afternoon when Newsome was
found unresponsive. The test results indicate that Newsome’s blood urea
nitrogen level was critically high, and her potassium level was critically low.
The blood work report’s notation indicates that lab technician Wesley Wood
called Nurse Green at approximately 10:40 a.m. on June 15 and reported a
“critical value,” which indicates a medical emergency that requires
immediate attention. The report further indicates that Nurse Green “read
back” the critical value to confirm understanding. However, Wood could not
recall in his deposition—taken over two years later—what values he read to
Green. Green, on the other hand, has repeatedly testified that he does not
recall being informed of any critical values on the morning of June 15. He
states that had he received the critical values that morning, he would have
immediately called Dr. Corley.
Plaintiffs highlight that shortly after this call discussing lab results,
Nurse Green called Jail Captain Todd Choate. Throughout the day on June
15, Choate undertook efforts to call the district attorney’s office and obtain a
personal recognizance bond (“PR bond”) for Newsome. Choate explained
in his deposition that he requests PR bonds “[a]nytime that [jail staff] believe
someone is going to go to the hospital.” He also acknowledged that this
practice exists because of staffing issues; when a detainee is admitted to the
hospital under a PR bond, the jail does not need staff to sit at the hospital
with the detainee. This plan to secure a PR bond for Newsome had been
discussed with Sheriff Greg Taylor, the undisputed policymaker at Anderson
County Jail during Newsome’s detainment. Furthermore, in an affidavit,
former jailer Jacob P. Mobley testified that Nurse Green confided to him that
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Sheriff Taylor had limited Green’s ability to send people to the hospital due
to cost concerns. The request for a PR bond was canceled when Newsome
was finally taken to the hospital in the afternoon.
At approximately 4:20 p.m. on June 15, Jailer-Defendants Jessica
Carpenter, Matthew Wickersham, and Dakota Hughes assisted Newsome to
the toilet. On the way to the toilet, Newsome grabbed the wall, fell, and
vomited, and Carpenter retrieved a wheelchair for her. Wickersham told
Newsome to let the jailers know when she was finished using the toilet, and
he left the cell door open a crack. At around 5:00 p.m., Jailer-Defendant
Wickersham checked on Newsome and found her unresponsive. As multiple
Jailer Defendants began to locate emergency equipment, Wickersham called
Nurse Green, who instructed him to notify emergency medical services
(“EMS”). Green testified that he learned about Newsome’s critical blood
work results around the same time that Newsome was found unresponsive.
After Wickersham called Nurse Green, Carpenter wheeled Newsome
into the processing area. Newsome was laid onto a mat, and Jailer-
Defendants Alicia Wilson, Hughes, and Carpenter left to retrieve a
defibrillator. Two Anderson County deputies took turns providing chest
compressions to Newsome until EMS arrived.
Newsome was pronounced dead at the hospital at 5:37 p.m.
Newsome’s autopsy indicates that she died of “[c]omplications of Addison’s
disease, hypertensive and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, obesity, and
pulmonary emphysema.”
C.
Plaintiffs-Appellants in this action are Amber Ford (Newsome’s
daughter), Regan Kimbrough (Newsome’s son), and Donald Newsome
(Newsome’s father). Plaintiffs filed their first complaint in federal court on
August 21, 2019. Defendants-Appellees are Anderson County, Texas; Greg
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Taylor, the Sheriff of Anderson County during the relevant period; jailers
Robin Jones, Jonathan Strong, Jessica Carpenter, Alicia Wilson, Matthew
Wickersham, Travis Wesson, Dakota Hughes, and Todd Choate
(collectively, the “Jailer Defendants”); Nurse Timothy Green; Dr. Adam
Corley; and TAKET Holdings, L.L.C., a medical services company formed
by Dr. Corley and Nurse Green. Plaintiffs’ lawsuit arises under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, and they claim that Defendants violated Newsome’s Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights as a pretrial detainee.
Plaintiffs sought leave to file a third amended complaint on January
13, 2021. They intended to add as a defendant Lieutenant Tia Pierson,
another jailer who is alleged to have been aware of Newsome’s critical
condition. The proposed third amended complaint would also include
allegations about a policy of delaying medical treatment to seek detainees’
release on PR bonds.
On May 5, 2022, the district court granted summary judgment for all
Defendants except for Anderson County, finding that these individual
Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court first
addressed the claims against Sheriff Taylor, who was not personally involved
in Newsome’s treatment, but who was alleged to have: (1) failed to train or
supervise his staff; (2) implemented a policy prohibiting jail staff below the
rank of sergeant from contacting EMS without permission from superiors;
and (3) implemented a policy requiring staff to secure PR bonds when
detainees needed hospitalization. 2 The district court found that Plaintiffs’
_____________________
2
The policy regarding PR bonds was not properly raised before the district court
because it was not alleged in the operative second amended complaint. See Jackson v.
Gautreaux, 3 F.4th 182, 188 (5th Cir. 2021). The district court nevertheless determined
that even if the claim had been properly raised, Plaintiffs’ evidence did not show that this
policy contributed to Newsome’s death or was implemented with deliberate indifference.
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evidence was insufficient to show that Sheriff Taylor acted with the requisite
level of deliberate indifference to establish a constitutional violation.
Turning to the Jailer Defendants, the district court found that each
jailer lacked subjective knowledge of Newsome’s dire medical situation, and
that their responses to Newsome’s medical issues were reasonable. The
district court then addressed the Defendants responsible for Newsome’s
medical treatment. The district court found that, at best, Plaintiffs had shown
that additional or different treatment may have prevented Newsome’s death,
but that they had not shown that Dr. Corley exhibited “deliberate
indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” 3 The district court
similarly found that Nurse Green’s actions, even if negligent, did not rise to
the level of deliberate indifference required to find a constitutional violation.
The district court also granted summary judgment for TAKET Holdings,
L.L.C., because the company was not contracted with Anderson County at
the time of Newsome’s detainment and death. 4
On July 29, 2022, the district court granted summary judgment for
Anderson County, the last remaining Defendant in the case. The district
court first found, as a threshold matter, that the municipality could not be
held liable when there was no finding of an underlying constitutional violation
committed by an individual defendant, citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475
U.S. 796, 799 (1986). Then, addressing the two alleged policies of prohibiting
jailers from calling EMS without approval and delaying hospitalization to
request PR bonds, the district court found that there was insufficient
_____________________
3
As a threshold issue, the district court concluded that Dr. Corley was entitled to
assert qualified immunity. Plaintiffs do not contest this determination on appeal.
4
On appeal, Plaintiffs do not contest the grant of summary judgment for TAKET
Holdings, L.L.C. We accordingly AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for this Defendant.
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evidence that these policies existed or contributed to Newsome’s death. The
district court issued a final judgment in favor of Defendants on July 29, 2022.
Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a third amended complaint was
denied as moot when the district court granted summary judgment for all
individual Defendants. In its order denying Plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider
the granting of Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the district
court clarified that there was insufficient evidence of the alleged PR bond
policy, and that granting Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a third amended
complaint would have been futile.
II.
A.
We first address the district court’s grant of summary judgment for
each individual Defendant. This court reviews grants of summary judgment
de novo. Moore v. LaSalle Mgmt. Co., 41 F.4th 493, 502 (5th Cir. 2022).
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is “no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute about a material fact
is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). The court views all evidence and draws all justifiable
inferences in favor of the nonmovant. Moore, 41 F.4th at 502.
“A qualified immunity defense alters the usual summary judgment
burden of proof.” Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). To
overcome an official’s qualified immunity defense, a plaintiff must establish:
“(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that
the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.”
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). For a right to be clearly established, “[t]he contours
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of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Although this does not mean that “a case directly
on point” is required, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. The salient
question is whether the state of the law gives the official “fair warning” that
his or her conduct is unconstitutional. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741
(2002).
“The constitutional rights of a pretrial detainee are found in the
procedural and substantive due process guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Est. of Henson v. Wichita County, 795 F.3d 456, 462 (5th Cir.
2015). For claims related to the medical treatment of a pretrial detainee, this
court will find a constitutional violation where an officer: (1) subjectively
knew of a substantial risk of serious harm to the detainee; and (2) responded
to that risk with “deliberate indifference.” Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 206–
07 (5th Cir. 2021). 5
We have described deliberate indifference as “an extremely high
standard to meet.” Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th
_____________________
5
The Eighth Amendment prohibits deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s medical
needs, while the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits deliberate indifference to a pretrial
detainee’s medical needs. Cleveland v. Bell, 938 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 2019). Because there
is “no significant distinction between pretrial detainees and convicted inmates concerning
basic human needs such as medical care,” Gibbs v. Grimmette, 254 F.3d 545, 548 (5th Cir.
2001), case law related to a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right to medical care can clearly
establish a pretrial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care for the
purposes of qualified immunity. See, e.g., Sims v. Griffin, 35 F.4th 945, 951–52 (5th Cir.
2022) (finding that a pretrial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care was
clearly established by Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459 (5th Cir. 2006), an Eighth Amendment
case); Kelson v. Clark, 1 F.4th 411, 421 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Eighth Amendment cases,
including Easter, to find that a pretrial detainee’s right to medical care was clearly
established).
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Cir. 2001). A detainee can establish a jail official’s deliberate indifference by
showing that the official “refused to treat him, ignored his complaints,
intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that
would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” See
Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985). Deliberate indifference
can also be shown where a jail official knows that a detainee faces “a
substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take
reasonable measures to abate it.” See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847
(1994). On the other hand, “[u]nsuccessful medical treatment, acts of
negligence, or medical malpractice do not constitute deliberate
indifference.” Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006).
B.
We begin with Defendant Adam Corley. It is undisputed that Dr.
Corley’s first and only significant personal interaction with Newsome was on
May 11, when he addressed her complaints of gas. During this interaction,
Dr. Corley was aware that Newsome had Addison’s disease, and he may have
reviewed her medical activity log to find that Newsome had experienced low
blood pressure and leg swelling on April 20. Based on this interaction,
whether Dr. Corley committed a constitutional violation hinges on: (1)
whether Dr. Corley’s knowledge that Newsome had Addison’s disease
constituted subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm; and
(2) whether Dr. Corley’s failure to provide any follow-up treatment or
monitoring until the date of Newsome’s death constituted deliberate
indifference. We find that both questions can be answered in the affirmative.
Plaintiffs have presented a genuine dispute of material fact regarding
whether Dr. Corley had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious
harm to Newsome. It is undisputed that Dr. Corley subjectively knew that
Newsome had Addison’s disease, and it is undisputed that Dr. Corley had
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basic knowledge about Addison’s disease. A reasonable jury could therefore
find that Dr. Corley subjectively knew that Newsome suffered from a chronic
illness that could become life-threatening if left untreated. This should
suffice to establish Dr. Corley’s subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of
serious harm. 6
Plaintiffs have also presented a genuine dispute of material fact
regarding whether Dr. Corley’s failure to treat or monitor Newsome’s
Addison’s disease constituted deliberate indifference. Had Dr. Corley simply
mistreated Newsome’s Addison’s disease or made negligent treatment
decisions, that would not constitute deliberate indifference. See Gobert, 463
F.3d at 346. But Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Dr. Corley did not
monitor or treat Newsome’s Addison’s disease whatsoever. 7 Accordingly,
_____________________
6
We note that a patient does not need to be experiencing an acute medical crisis
requiring emergency intervention to be facing a substantial risk of serious harm—suffering
from a known chronic issue that requires ongoing or long-term treatment may also suffice.
See, e.g., Lawson v. Dallas County, 286 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding a sufficient
risk of harm for a deliberate indifference claim where jail medical staff were on notice that
an inmate had ulcers that required diligent day-to-day treatment); Delaughter v. Woodall,
909 F.3d 130, 138–41 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding that an inmate in need of a hip replacement
and reconstructive surgery stated a deliberate indifference claim that should have survived
a summary judgment challenge); Dauzat v. Carter, 670 F. App’x 297, 298 (5th Cir. 2016)
(affirming that a prisoner with a “serious medical need for physical therapy” stated a valid
deliberate indifference claim).
7
While Dr. Corley did treat Newsome’s immediate symptom of gas with anti-gas
medication, Plaintiffs have presented evidence that he did not treat Newsome for
Addison’s disease. Responding to a serious medical issue with such a cursory level of care
may still constitute deliberate indifference. See Austin v. Johnson, 328 F.3d 204, 206, 210
(5th Cir. 2003) (finding that a nearly two-hour delay in calling an ambulance could
constitute deliberate indifference, even though a defendant had administered first aid);
Ledesma v. Swartz, 134 F.3d 369, 1997 WL 811746 at *1 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that treating
complaints of a broken jaw with only over-the-counter pain medication and a liquid diet
could constitute deliberate indifference); see also Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 789 (11th
Cir. 1989) (“When the need for treatment is obvious, medical care which is so cursory as
to amount to no treatment at all may amount to deliberate indifference.”).
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Plaintiffs have presented a factual dispute regarding whether Dr. Corley
responded to Newsome’s potentially life-threatening illness with deliberate
indifference by failing to provide any treatment.
Dr. Corley counters Plaintiffs’ allegation of deliberate indifference by
referencing the well-established principle that questions regarding proper
diagnosis and treatment are “classic example[s] of . . . matter[s] for medical
judgment,” and not bases for finding a constitutional violation. See Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107–08 (1976). But treating Addison’s disease is not
particularly complex—as Plaintiffs point out, typical treatment involves
administering common steroids such as hydrocortisone. A reasonable jury
could conclude that failing to provide steroid medications to an Addison’s
disease patient is not a legitimate exercise of “medical judgment.” See
Delaughter, 909 F.3d at 138 (reversing summary judgment for a defendant
where it was “not clear” that the cancellation of the plaintiff’s surgery and a
medical center’s refusal to accept the plaintiff as a patient were “medical-
judgment decisions”).
In summary, Plaintiffs have presented facts indicating that Dr. Corley:
(1) subjectively knew that Newsome had Addison’s disease—a potentially
fatal but eminently treatable condition; and (2) did nothing to treat this
chronic illness. A jury considering these facts could find that Dr. Corley
violated Newsome’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Dr. Corley has invoked qualified immunity. Under our case law,
Plaintiffs must show that Newsome’s rights “were clearly established at the
time of the violation.” Roque v. Harvel, 993 F.3d 325, 331 (5th Cir. 2021). In
Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d at 465, we held that the law is clearly established
that a prisoner’s rights are violated if “a prison official ‘refuse[s] to treat him,
ignore[s] his complaints, intentionally treat[s] him incorrectly, or engage[s]
in any similar conduct that . . . clearly evince[s] a wanton disregard for any
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serious medical needs.’” (quoting Domino, 239 F.3d at 756). And in Sims v.
Griffin, 35 F.4th at 951, we reiterated that Easter illustrates circumstances
where a detainee “can show [that] his clearly established rights . . . were
violated.” In Easter, the plaintiff prisoner had chronic heart problems and
visited the prison infirmary complaining of severe chest pain. Easter, 467
F.3d at 461. The prison nurse, who knew of the prisoner’s heart problems,
denied the prisoner’s request for medicine after learning that the prison
pharmacy was closed. Id. at 461, 463–64. We held that the nurse was not
entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity because her
actions may have violated the prisoner’s clearly established constitutional
rights. Id. at 465.
Like the nurse in Easter, Dr. Corley knew that an inmate had a serious
medical condition but failed to treat her for that condition. We recognize that
the prisoner in Easter was denied treatment during an acute period, while Dr.
Corley denied Newsome ongoing, day-to-day treatment for her known
chronic condition—Addison’s disease. But our case law clearly establishes
that refusal to treat in both types of circumstances is a violation of an inmate’s
constitutional rights. In Lawson v. Dallas County, 286 F.3d at 260, a
paraplegic inmate developed decubitus ulcers (bed sores) while
incarcerated. 8 The inmate’s doctor provided mandatory medical orders to
the jail’s medical staff. Id. The medical staff knew that the inmate had a
serious ailment but “did not provide the prescribed treatments, seek
alternative placement for [the inmate], or monitor the progression of his
_____________________
8
While Plaintiffs themselves do not cite to Lawson, in a qualified immunity inquiry
“we needn’t limit our analysis to the cases cited by Plaintiffs.” See Joseph ex rel. Est. of
Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 338 (5th Cir. 2020); Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516
(1994) (“A court engaging in review of a qualified immunity judgment should . . . use its
‘full knowledge of its own [and other relevant] precedents.’” (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468
U.S. 183, 192 n.9 (1984))).
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wounds.” Id. at 261. We determined that the medical staff’s refusal to
provide the inmate with ongoing treatment, “despite their actual knowledge
of the seriousness of [the inmate’s] condition,” could constitute deliberate
indifference. Id. at 263. 9
We also note that several of our sister circuits have found that failing
to provide treatment for a chronic illness may constitute deliberate
indifference. In Egebergh v. Nicholson, 272 F.3d 925, 927–28 (7th Cir. 2001),
the Seventh Circuit held that a jury could find that two jail officials were
deliberately indifferent for failing to provide a diabetic detainee with a
morning insulin shot. In Roberson v. Bradshaw, 198 F.3d 645, 648 (8th Cir.
1999), the Eighth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment for a
deputy sheriff who was accused of denying diabetes medication to an inmate.
The Sixth Circuit and Fourth Circuit have held that jail officials could be held
_____________________
9
Several of our unpublished opinions are also worth highlighting. This court’s
unpublished opinions cannot clearly establish the law for the purposes of qualified
immunity, but they nevertheless may “aptly illustrate[] the established right.” Cooper v.
Brown, 844 F.3d 517, 525 n.8 (5th Cir. 2016). Of particular relevance is this court’s decision
in Dauzat v. Carter, 670 F. App’x at 298, where we affirmed that a prisoner stated a valid
deliberate indifference claim in alleging that a doctor ignored his “serious medical need for
physical therapy” by only providing a wellness program conducted by inmates. We further
held that the prisoner’s constitutional rights were clearly established by Easter and Lawson.
Here, we similarly hold that Newsome’s right to not be denied, by deliberate indifference,
treatment for her chronic condition was clearly established by Easter and Lawson.
Furthermore, in several other unpublished opinions, we have recognized that an
official is deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious medical needs when he or she
delays treatment or provides only cursory care. See, e.g., Loosier v. Unknown Med. Dr., 435
F. App’x 302, 306 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that a prisoner stated a deliberate indifference
claim where a doctor knew that the prisoner had injured his neck but “chose not to provide
him any treatment or medication for his injury”); Ledesma, 1997 WL 811746, at *1 (finding
that an inmate stated a deliberate indifference claim where a doctor treated complaints of a
broken jaw with nothing more than Motrin and a liquid diet); Vasquez v. Dretke, 226 F.
App’x 338, 340 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding that a prisoner stated a deliberate indifference claim
where dentists knew that the prisoner needed dentures but refused to provide care).
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liable for overseeing medical systems that denied treatment to inmates with
chronic conditions. See Young ex rel. Est. of Young v. Martin, 51 F. App’x 509,
515 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that a jail director was not entitled to qualified
immunity for implementing a policy that provided minimal care to inmates
with chronic illnesses); Gordon v. Schilling, 937 F.3d 348, 360–61 (4th Cir.
2019) (finding that a chief physician could be held liable for implementing
policies that denied treatment to inmates with the hepatitis C virus).
Considering the foregoing authorities, we find that Dr. Corley’s
alleged failure to provide any treatment to a detainee with a chronic illness
that can become life-threatening if left untreated may have violated
Newsome’s clearly established constitutional rights. A jury may ultimately
find that the absence in the record of Newsome affirmatively requesting
Addison’s disease medication weighs against Plaintiffs’ case, or they may
find that Newsome’s medication list—which contained a long list of
medications but not steroid medications—ultimately did not provide Dr.
Corley with clear enough notice that Newsome was not being treated for
Addison’s disease. However, construing the evidence in Plaintiffs’ favor, a
jury could also reasonably conclude that a patient with untreated Addison’s
disease presents a serious, obvious risk that is in line with our prior cases
finding deliberate indifference for failing to provide medical care. We find
that these factual issues regarding Dr. Corley’s notice of the risk facing
Newsome and his actions following his encounter with Newsome preclude
summary judgment.
We briefly note that Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint appears to
plead a supervisory claim against Dr. Corley. However, as Dr. Corley
correctly points out, Plaintiffs have abandoned their supervisory claim
against him by failing to raise the issue on appeal. See United States v. Ogle,
415 F.3d 382, 383 (5th Cir. 2005). We accordingly AFFIRM IN PART the
district court’s grant of summary judgment for Dr. Corley as related to
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Plaintiffs’ supervisory claim, but we REVERSE the district court’s grant of
summary judgment for Dr. Corley as related to Plaintiffs’ nonsupervisory
deliberate indifference claim.
C.
We next address Defendant Timothy Green. In opposing Nurse
Green’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs centered on Nurse
Green’s conduct on June 14 and June 15, the dates on which Newsome
exhibited symptoms of an acute Addisonian crisis. We find that Plaintiffs
have presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that
Nurse Green’s actions on June 15, the day of Newsome’s death, constituted
a violation of Newsome’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.
To establish that Nurse Green subjectively knew of a substantial risk
of serious harm to Newsome, Plaintiffs have presented evidence indicating
that the results of Newsome’s blood work put Nurse Green on notice that
Newsome needed emergency care. In his deposition, lab technician Wesley
Wood acknowledged that a lab report of Newsome’s blood work indicates
that: (1) Newsome’s blood work revealed “critical values”; (2) Wood called
Nurse Green on the morning of June 15 to notify him of these results; and (3)
Nurse Green “understood those results and read them back.” We find that
the call that occurred between Wood and Nurse Green around 10:40 a.m. on
June 15 establishes a genuine dispute of material fact regarding Nurse
Green’s subjective knowledge that Newsome was at risk of an Addisonian
crisis.
Additionally, Plaintiffs have presented evidence indicating that Nurse
Green’s response to this information was deliberately indifferent, not merely
negligent or inadequate. Immediately after getting off the phone with Wood,
Nurse Green called Jail Captain Todd Choate, who worked on June 15 to
release Newsome via a PR bond. The affidavit of former jailer Jacob Mobley
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suggests that Nurse Green deliberately delayed sending Newsome to the
hospital due to restrictions placed upon him by Sheriff Taylor.
Viewing this evidence in Plaintiffs’ favor, a reasonable jury could
determine that on the morning of June 15, Nurse Green: (1) knew that
Newsome had vomited “brown colored fluid” and was in a serious enough
condition to warrant blood work and potential hospitalization; (2) received
lab results indicating that Newsome was in a critical condition and needed
emergency care; and (3) delayed sending Newsome to the hospital due to
restrictions from Sheriff Taylor. These factual conclusions could support a
finding that Nurse Green violated Newsome’s Fourteenth Amendment
rights as a pretrial detainee by responding to a substantial risk of serious harm
to Newsome with deliberate indifference.
Turning to the second prong of our qualified immunity inquiry, we
find that Newsome’s Fourteenth Amendment rights were clearly established
at the time of Nurse Green’s alleged constitutional violation. There is ample
case law in this circuit indicating that denying or unreasonably delaying
medical treatment to someone in need of immediate medical assistance
constitutes deliberate indifference. We again reference Easter, where we
found that a nurse’s refusal to provide any treatment to a prisoner in need of
medication could constitute a clearly established violation of the prisoner’s
constitutional rights. Easter, 467 F.3d at 464–65.
Additionally, in Austin v. Johnson, 328 F.3d at 210, this court held that
the plaintiffs had stated a deliberate indifference claim sufficient to survive a
motion for summary judgment when there was a one-hour and forty-two-
minute delay in calling an ambulance for a heat stroke victim who was
unconscious and vomiting. Even though a defendant at the court-ordered
boot camp had administered first aid, id. at 206, the extensive delay in calling
an ambulance rose to the level of deliberate indifference, id. at 210.
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Here, there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether
Nurse Green learned of Newsome’s critical blood work results and failed to
act on this information for over six hours until Newsome’s death. A jury
could conclude that Nurse Green’s failure to act in light of this critical
information was a total refusal of care to a patient known to be suffering from
chronic, serious medical issues, as in Easter. Alternatively, a jury could
conclude that Nurse Green’s failure to act for over six hours when presented
with indications of a medical emergency constituted deliberate indifference
like the delay alleged in Austin.
We conclude that there is a genuine dispute of material fact over when
Nurse Green knew of the critical values, and thus whether he acted with
deliberate indifference. We further conclude that under Easter and Austin,
Nurse Green was on notice that deliberate indifference to a detainee’s serious
medical needs is a Fourteenth Amendment violation. We accordingly
REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Nurse Green.
D.
We next address the district court’s grant of summary judgment for
Jailer-Defendants Jonathan Strong, Robin Jones, Matthew Wickersham,
Jessica Carpenter, Dakota Hughes, Todd Choate, Alicia Wilson, and Travis
Wesson.
1. Jailer-Defendants Jonathan Strong and Robin Jones
Jailer-Defendant Jonathan Strong was working during the night of
June 14 through June 15, and he used a wheelchair to place Newsome into a
holding cell near midnight for medical observation. Jailer-Defendant Robin
Jones was also working during the night of June 14 through June 15, and she
took Newsome’s blood pressure around 2:00 a.m. Plaintiffs have presented
evidence that during that evening, Newsome: (1) repeatedly cried out that
she needed to go to the hospital; (2) vomited a black or brown substance in
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her cell; (3) had a blood pressure reading of 80/40, which was measured by
Jailer-Defendant Jones; and (4) was unable to ambulate without assistance.
In granting summary judgment in favor of the Jailer Defendants, the
district court primarily relied on two unpublished cases that it considered
substantially similar to the present case: Trevino v. Hinz, 751 F. App’x 551
(5th Cir. 2018), and Rombach v. Culpepper, No. 20-30554, 2021 WL 2944809
(5th Cir. July 13, 2021). In Trevino, an arrestee died after she surreptitiously
ingested methamphetamine during a traffic stop. Trevino, 751 F. App’x at
552. While the arrestee was sitting on the curb waiting for an officer to
complete paperwork, the arrestee started vomiting, shaking, and dry heaving.
Id. The arrestee claimed to be having a seizure, but the officers on the scene
thought that she was faking her symptoms to avoid jail. Id. at 552–53. Once it
became clear to the officers that the distress was genuine, they called an
ambulance. Id. at 553. This court found that the officers did not act with
deliberate indifference when initially failing to take the arrestee’s symptoms
seriously, since they were not unreasonable in initially believing that the
arrestee’s “ambiguous” symptoms did not require immediate medical
attention. Id. at 556.
In Rombach, the plaintiffs provided evidence that the decedent
detainee told a group of jailers that he needed to go to the hospital because he
was vomiting and going through drug withdrawal. Rombach, 2021 WL
2944809, at *5. One guard allegedly told the detainee that he would have to
suffer through his symptoms, while another guard provided the detainee with
castor oil for his constipation. Id. A few days later, the detainee passed away
due to a perforated duodenal ulcer (stomach ulcer). Id. at *1. This court
found that the jailers were not deliberately indifferent because, among other
things: the detainee had written in his medical information sheet that he did
not regularly take drugs; the detainee later told the officers that “he was fine”
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when they followed up with him about his withdrawal symptoms; and no jail
personnel were aware of the detainee’s undiscovered ulcer issue. Id. at *6.
This case is materially distinguishable from Trevino and Rombach.
Perhaps most significantly, Newsome was on medical observation at the jail.
Unlike the officers in Trevino, the Jailer Defendants had no reason to believe
that Newsome’s pleas for help or symptoms were not genuine; because she
was placed on medical observation, the jailers were on notice that Newsome
might be at risk of experiencing a medical emergency. Furthermore, Trevino
involved a delay in care where the officers had reason to believe that there
was not an emergency health situation; once they realized that there was a
genuine emergency, they sought help. Here, there were many reasons to
think that there was an emergency health situation—Newsome’s pleas for
help, that she was on medical observation, and her alarming symptoms.
Despite these indicators, Jailer-Defendants Strong and Jones did not seek
emergency medical assistance.
Furthermore, viewing the evidence in their favor, Plaintiffs’ case is
distinguishable from that of the plaintiffs in Rombach. In Rombach, the
decedent told his jailers that he was experiencing withdrawal from heroin,
and the warden had testified that a nearby hospital “routinely explained to
the jail facility . . . that there is no real treatment of withdrawal symptoms and
it is sufficient for the jail to observe the inmate in withdrawal and provide
plenty of hydration, aspirin, and malox-type [sic] products to assist the
inmate.” Rombach, 2021 WL 2944809, at *1. Here, Newsome’s pleas for
help, vomiting of a black or brown substance, inability to ambulate without
assistance, and medical observation status present distinguishable facts
indicating that hospitalization was necessary.
Plaintiffs argue that Sims v. Griffin, 35 F.4th 945, presents a more
comparable fact pattern. In Sims, a pretrial detainee who may have ingested
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a bag full of drugs cried out for medical attention over the course of several
hours, and he vomited a “dark black liquid” that he smeared all over the floor
and his face. Id. at 948. The jailers consciously decided to not call EMS, and
one guard made disparaging comments about the detainee’s condition. Id.
After hours of vomiting black liquid and crying out with no response from
jailers, the detainee died. Id. This court determined that the guards’ refusal
of care was comparable to the nurse’s refusal of care in Easter v. Powell, 467
F.3d at 465, which was cited as the case law that clearly established the
detainee’s constitutional rights. Sims, 35 F.4th at 951–52.
Plaintiffs are correct that there are some significant similarities
between Sims and the present case. Like the detainee in Sims, Newsome died
a slow, seemingly preventable death. She vomited a dark substance, and
evidence indicates that she cried out for help and begged to go to the hospital.
Granted, Plaintiffs have not presented evidence of the Jailer Defendants
directly admitting that they were subjectively aware of Newsome’s cries or
her dark-colored vomit. Nevertheless, at this summary judgment stage, we
find that Plaintiffs have presented a genuine dispute of material fact regarding
whether Jailer-Defendants Strong and Jones heard Newsome’s cries and saw
the dark-colored vomit. If a jury concludes that Strong and Jones heard these
repeated cries for help and did nothing to assist Newsome, they could
reasonably find that this conduct constituted deliberate indifference because
they “refused to treat [her], ignored [her] complaints,” and evinced “a
wanton disregard for [her] serious medical needs.” Easter, 467 F.3d at 465
(quoting Domino, 239 F.3d at 756).
We also find that Newsome’s constitutional rights were clearly
established by Easter. 10 Plaintiffs have presented evidence that, like the nurse
_____________________
10
Our conclusion is bolstered by a line of prior cases in which we found that officials
may have exhibited deliberate indifference by ignoring or providing only a cursory response
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in Easter, Jailer-Defendants Strong and Jones ignored an inmate’s complaints
and refused to provide any medical assistance. See id. at 461. Furthermore,
because Newsome was on medical observation, a reasonable jury could infer
that Strong and Jones knew that Newsome faced a substantial risk of serious
harm if they were unresponsive to her medical needs.
While Plaintiffs have failed to provide a direct admission from Jailer-
Defendants Strong and Jones that they heard Newsome’s cries for help, we
agree with Plaintiffs that they have raised legitimate “fact issues as to each
jailer’s knowledge of [Newsome’s] emergency condition in the . . . hours
prior to her death.” Because of these disputed fact issues, we REVERSE
the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Jailer-Defendants
Jonathan Strong and Robin Jones.
2. Jailer-Defendants Matthew Wickersham, Jessica Carpenter, and
Dakota Hughes
Jailer-Defendants Matthew Wickersham, Jessica Carpenter, and
Dakota Hughes all assisted Newsome to the toilet in her cell on June 15.
Plaintiffs have presented evidence that during this trip to the toilet,
Newsome was unable to walk, collapsed, and vomited upon collapsing.
Despite these signs of a medical emergency, Wickersham, Carpenter, and
Hughes did not seek medical assistance or closely monitor Newsome.
_____________________
to medical complaints. See, e.g., Rodrigue v. Grayson, 557 F. App’x 341, 342, 346–47 (5th
Cir. 2014) (finding deliberate indifference where a nurse responded to complaints of
nausea, vomiting, and severe abdominal pain with nausea medicine and an enema); Galvan
v. Calhoun County, 719 F. App’x 372, 374–75 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding that an inmate stated
a deliberate indifference claim where prison officials responded to his complaints of
excruciating stomach pain by providing Pepto-Bismol and a home remedy); Harris v.
Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 159–60 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that a prisoner stated a deliberate
indifference claim where prison officials ignored his repeated complaints of excruciating
pain after his jaw broke); Ledesma, 134 F.3d 369, 1997 WL 811746, at *1.
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Instead, they left her alone on the toilet for about thirty minutes, where
Newsome experienced her final moments of consciousness.
While Wickersham, Carpenter, and Hughes lacked the benefit of
hindsight when they assisted Newsome to the toilet, the fact that Newsome
would be found unresponsive thirty minutes later raises factual issues
regarding what kind of condition Newsome was in at the time. Based on the
evidence that Plaintiffs have presented, a reasonable jury could conclude that
Newsome’s collapse and vomiting episode indicated that she faced a
substantial risk of serious harm, and that Jailer-Defendants Wickersham,
Carpenter, and Hughes’s failure to monitor Newsome or provide immediate
medical assistance constituted deliberate indifference.
We find that Newsome’s rights were clearly established, especially
considering the parallels between the present case and Austin v. Johnson, in
which boot-camp personnel potentially exhibited deliberate indifference in
their delay to call an ambulance after the plaintiff collapsed and vomited.
Austin, 328 F.3d at 210. 11 Because fact issues exist regarding Newsome’s
medical condition during her collapse, and because the Jailer Defendants
responded to Newsome’s potentially serious condition by failing to seek
immediate medical assistance, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of
summary judgment for Jailer-Defendants Matthew Wickersham, Jessica
Carpenter, and Dakota Hughes.
_____________________
11
In addition to Austin, several of our prior cases support our conclusion that a jail
official exhibits deliberate indifference by failing to provide care when an inmate faces a
serious medical emergency. See, e.g., Loosier, 435 F. App’x at 306; Perez v. Anderson, 350 F.
App’x 959, 962–63 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding that a prisoner stated a deliberate indifference
claim by alleging that jail officials failed to provide him with pain relief or x-rays until several
months after an attack by other prisoners); Hughes v. Noble, 295 F.2d 495, 496 (5th Cir.
1961) (holding that a pretrial detainee with dislocated and fractured vertebrae stated a valid
claim for relief where officials provided him with no medical attention).
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3. Jail Captain Todd Choate
Plaintiffs argue that “[b]ecause a jury could conclude [Captain]
Choate improperly denied and delayed emergency medical care for
Newsome for non-medical reasons, fact issues exist as to whether Choate was
deliberately indifferent to Newsome’s serious medical needs.” Their
argument has merit. Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Nurse Green
contacted Captain Choate shortly after receiving Newsome’s blood work
results. It is also undisputed that Captain Choate attempted to secure
Newsome’s release via a PR bond on June 15. When asked in his deposition
what the purpose of his call to the district attorney on June 15 was, Choate
replied that “[a]nytime that we believe someone is going to go to the hospital,
we will call the DA’s office, [to] see if they will entertain a PR bond.” Choate
also suggested that Anderson County Jail seeks these PR bond releases due
to staffing concerns—a non-medical reason.
Defendants offer an alternative explanation for Captain Choate’s
actions. Relying on Choate’s affidavit, they claim that Choate believed that
Newsome may have been suffering from a stomach bug, and that Choate
seeks releases on PR bonds for detainees who “ha[ve] a history of medical
issues and [are] not feeling well.”
As Plaintiffs point out, Captain Choate’s “stomach bug” explanation
is contradicted by his deposition testimony, which indicates that Choate
knew that Newsome needed hospitalization. A jury could conclude that
Choate indeed knew that Newsome needed to go to the hospital and that she
had a “history of medical issues,” and thus that he had subjective knowledge
that she faced a substantial risk of serious harm. Furthermore, a jury could
find that delaying the provision of emergency medical care for a detainee in
need of hospitalization to secure her release on a PR bond was a “refus[al] to
treat” Newsome or a “wanton disregard for [her] serious medical needs”
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that would constitute deliberate indifference. See Domino, 239 F.3d at 756
(quoting Johnson, 759 F.2d at 1238). While a jury may ultimately credit the
explanation contained in Captain Choate’s affidavit, we find that Plaintiffs
have presented a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Choate
subjectively knew of Newsome’s critical condition and responded with
deliberate indifference.
Furthermore, as discussed in our analysis of Nurse Green’s potential
liability, it is clearly established that delaying care for a detainee in need of
emergency medical intervention may constitute a Fourteenth Amendment
violation. A jury could conclude that Captain Choate’s failure to order
emergency medical care for a detainee in need of hospitalization constituted
a refusal of care, see Easter, 467 F.3d at 465, or that he exhibited deliberate
indifference by delaying emergency medical care for over six hours, see
Austin, 328 F.3d at 210. 12
Because Plaintiffs have submitted evidence establishing genuine
disputes of material fact regarding Choate’s liability, we REVERSE the
district court’s grant of summary judgment for Jail Captain Todd Choate.
_____________________
12
Additionally, as we noted in Delaughter, 909 F.3d at 138 n.7, “We have previously
suggested that a non-medical reason for delay in treatment constitutes deliberate
indifference, and several of our sister circuits have held so explicitly.” See Thibodeaux v.
Thomas, 548 F. App’x 174, 175 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding that a claimant stated a colorable
Eighth Amendment claim where prison officials allegedly delayed a surgery by sending him
to the wrong facility and failing to file appropriate paperwork); Reed v. Cameron, 380 F.
App’x 160, 163 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[Plaintiff’s] allegations raise an inference that prison
officials were deliberately indifferent to his suffering and delayed medical care for non-
medical reasons.”); Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004)
(“When prison officials are aware of a prisoner’s obvious and serious need for medical
treatment and delay medical treatment of that condition for non-medical reasons, their
conduct in causing the delay creates the constitutional infirmity.”).
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4. Jailer-Defendant Alicia Wilson
Plaintiffs allege that Jailer-Defendant Alicia Wilson denied
Newsome’s request to see a doctor for “severe stomach pain” on June 12,
three days before Newsome’s death. Even accepting this allegation as true,
we find that Plaintiffs have presented insufficient evidence for a jury to
conclude that Wilson’s singular denial of a request to see a doctor amounted
to deliberate indifference. “[D]eliberate indifference cannot be inferred
merely from a negligent or even a grossly negligent response to a substantial
risk of serious harm.” Thompson v. Upshur County, 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th
Cir. 2001). To prevail under a deliberate indifference theory, a plaintiff must
show that the defendant official “was aware of facts from which an inference
of substantial risk of serious harm could be drawn,” and that “the official
actually drew that inference.” Id. at 458–59.
Plaintiffs have alleged that Jailer-Defendant Wilson denied
Newsome’s request to see a doctor, but they have not supported this
allegation with sufficient evidentiary detail to allow a jury to conclude that
Wilson was subjectively aware that Newsome faced a substantial risk of
serious harm at that moment. A singular denial of a request to see a doctor—
absent more details that would unambiguously indicate a medical crisis—
does not amount to deliberate indifference. See Rombach, 2021 WL 2944809,
at *5. Because Plaintiffs’ evidence is insufficient to establish that Jailer-
Defendant Wilson exhibited deliberate indifference, we AFFIRM the
district court’s grant of summary judgment for Alicia Wilson.
5. Jailer-Defendant Travis Wesson
On appeal, Plaintiffs’ only allegation against Jailer-Defendant Travis
Wesson is that he failed to adequately aid the other jailers after Newsome was
found unresponsive. Wesson was asked to assist in an emergency situation
that he seemingly had no knowledge of, and his alleged failure to
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No. 22-40559
meaningfully contribute while other jailers offered assistance does not
constitute deliberate indifference. Moreover, because Newsome was already
unresponsive when Wesson arrived, there is insufficient evidence to
conclude that Wesson’s actions “result[ed] in substantial harm.” See
Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993). We accordingly
AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Travis
Wesson.
III.
In arguing that the district court erred by granting summary judgment
for Defendants Greg Taylor and Anderson County, Plaintiffs primarily
reference the alleged policy of attempting to secure PR bonds when detainees
require hospitalization. However, Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding this PR
bond policy are not contained in the operative second amended complaint.
Instead, these allegations were raised for the first time in response to
Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, and thus they were not
properly raised before the district court. See Jackson, 3 F.4th at 188 (“[A]
claim which is not raised in the complaint but, rather, is raised only in
response to a motion for summary judgment is not properly before the
court.” (quoting Cutrera v. Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State Univ., 429 F.3d 108, 113
(5th Cir. 2005))). Plaintiffs attempted to add allegations related to the PR
bond policy by filing a motion for leave to file a third amended complaint, but
the district court denied this motion as moot, and alternatively denied it as
futile. Because the alleged PR bond policy is central to Plaintiffs’ claims
against Defendants Greg Taylor and Anderson County, we address the
district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a third amended
complaint before turning to the grants of summary judgment for these
Defendants.
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A district court’s decision to deny a motion for leave to amend
pleadings is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp.,
332 F.3d 854, 863 (5th Cir. 2003). When a denial of a motion for leave to
amend a complaint is based on the futility of the amendment, the court
applies “the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule
12(b)(6).” Ariyan, Inc. v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 29 F.4th 226,
229 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863, 873
(5th Cir. 2000)). The question therefore is whether in the light most
favorable to Plaintiffs the amended complaint states any valid claim for relief.
See Stripling, 234 F.3d at 873.
Plaintiffs’ proposed third amended complaint makes two substantive
additions to their pleadings: (1) it adds Lieutenant Tia Pierson as a Jailer
Defendant; and (2) it adds allegations of the purported PR bond policy.
We first address Plaintiffs’ attempt to add Lieutenant Pierson as a
defendant, which faces a statute of limitations issue. In Texas, the statute of
limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims is two years. Shelby v. City of El Paso,
577 F. App’x 327, 330–31 (5th Cir. 2014). Newsome died on June 15, 2018,
so a § 1983 claim related to this incident became untimely in June 2020.
Plaintiffs filed their motion for leave to file a third amended complaint on
January 13, 2021.
When a plaintiff adds a defendant after the limitations period has run,
Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the plaintiff to
relate the claims filed against the new defendant back to the date of the
original filing. Winzer v. Kaufman County, 916 F.3d 464, 470 (5th Cir. 2019).
But Rule 15(c) is intended to correct a mistake concerning the identity of a
defendant; it does not permit adding a new defendant when the plaintiff did
not originally know of that defendant’s identity. Id. In this case, Plaintiffs
sought to add Lieutenant Pierson as a new defendant based on facts that they
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learned during discovery. This is not a case of “a mistake concerning the
proper party’s identity,” and thus the claim against Pierson is time-barred.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii).
Even if Plaintiffs’ claim against Pierson was not time-barred, we
would still find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that adding Pierson as a defendant would be futile. The only
non-conclusory information related to Pierson in Plaintiffs’ proposed third
amended complaint is a brief allegation that on June 15, Pierson exchanged
text messages with Nurse Green. Even accepting these facts as true, these
allegations do not “properly set[] forth a claim of a deprivation of rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States caused by persons acting under color of state law.” Ariyan, 29 F.4th
at 229 (quoting S. Christian Leadership Conf. v. Supreme Ct. of State of La.,
252 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2001)). Plaintiffs’ claim against Pierson would not
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and thus the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs leave to amend to add Pierson as a
defendant.
Turning to Plaintiffs’ proposed claims of municipal liability against
Anderson County and supervisory liability against Sheriff Taylor, we find
that the district court abused its discretion in determining that pleading these
claims would be futile.
We begin with Plaintiffs’ municipal liability claim against Anderson
County. To establish municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff
must show: “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy maker
can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a
constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy (or custom).”
Newbury v. City of Windcrest, 991 F.3d 672, 680 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting
Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002)). Generally, a
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plaintiff must show that the policy was implemented with “deliberate
indifference” to the “known or obvious consequences” that a constitutional
violation would result. 13 Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 390 (5th
Cir. 2018) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397, 407 (1997)). Proving deliberate indifference in a municipal liability
action generally requires showing that a policy caused a pattern of
constitutional violations, and proving deliberate indifference based on a
single incident requires showing that the injury suffered was a “highly
predictable” consequence of the policy. See Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d
536, 547, 549 (5th Cir. 2010).
Plaintiffs’ proposed third amended complaint properly pleads a
municipal liability claim against Anderson County for its alleged policy of
requesting PR bonds for detainees requiring hospitalization. The district
court abused its discretion in deciding that Plaintiffs’ evidence of the PR
bond policy was so inadequate that it would be futile for Plaintiffs to amend
their complaint. Jail Captain Choate admitted that Anderson County Jail
seeks PR bonds “[a]nytime that [jail staff] believe someone is going to go to
the hospital.” Furthermore, Choate admitted that this practice was carried
_____________________
13
On appeal, Plaintiffs claim that they have pleaded facts that raise a “conditions-
of-confinement” theory of liability. Under this theory of liability, a plaintiff challenges the
“general conditions, practices, rules, or restrictions of pretrial confinement.” Sanchez v.
Young County, 956 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d
633, 644 (5th Cir. 1996)). A plaintiff challenging a condition of confinement is “relieved
from the burden of demonstrating a municipal entity’s or individual jail official’s actual
intent to punish.” Shepherd v. Dallas County, 591 F.3d 445, 452 (5th Cir. 2009). Because
Plaintiffs never raised a conditions-of-confinement theory of liability below, we cannot say
that the district court erred in failing to consider it. We leave the door open for Plaintiffs to
raise this theory of liability on remand, and for the district court to address the viability of
this theory in the first instance. See Browning v. Kramer, 931 F.2d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 1991)
(“As a court for review of errors, we are not to decide facts or make legal conclusions in
the first instance. Our task is to review the actions of a trial court for claimed errors.”).
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out due to jail staffing concerns, and Nurse Green allegedly admitted that his
ability to send detainees to the hospital was curtailed by Sheriff Taylor.
Sheriff Taylor also admitted to participating in the process of coordinating a
PR bond for Newsome. Because Plaintiffs have presented evidence that this
policy existed, that Sheriff Taylor seemingly knew of the policy, and that the
delay caused by the policy contributed to Newsome’s death, Plaintiffs’
attempt to state a municipal liability claim against Anderson County should
not have been considered futile.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ proposed third amended complaint states
that the PR bond policy applied “anytime an inmate/detainee was
experiencing a serious medical need,” including “emergency situations such
as Rhonda Newsome’s.” Plaintiffs have not pleaded a pattern of prior
constitutional violations, as is typically required to establish that a municipal
policy was implemented with deliberate indifference. However, given our
prior cases indicating that a delay in medical care to a critically ill detainee
can constitute deliberate indifference, see, e.g., Austin, 328 F.3d at 210, we
find that a constitutional violation would be a “highly predictable”
consequence of a policy that purposefully delays emergency care to detainees
requiring hospitalization.
We note that at this stage in the litigation, we decline to determine
whether Plaintiffs’ evidence of the alleged PR bond policy is sufficient to
overcome a motion for summary judgment. For Plaintiffs to establish that
this policy was implemented with deliberate indifference and prevail on their
municipal liability claim based on a single incident, they will have to show
that the PR bond policy indeed was a blanket practice that applied even to
emergency situations. Alternatively, they could establish deliberate
indifference by showing a pattern of prior constitutional violations. At this
juncture, however, Plaintiffs simply need to plead allegations that are
sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Ariyan, 29 F.4th at
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229. They have done so. Because Plaintiffs have presented evidence
indicating that their allegations related to the PR bond policy are not the
products of pure speculation, we find that the district court abused its
discretion in denying Plaintiffs the opportunity to properly plead these
allegations against Anderson County.
A similar analysis applies to Plaintiffs’ proposed supervisory liability
claim against Sheriff Taylor. See Southard v. Tex. Bd. of Crim. Just., 114 F.3d
539, 551 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting “the close relationship between the elements
of municipal liability and an individual supervisor’s liability”). Liability
under the doctrine of respondeat superior is not cognizable in actions brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Par. Council-President
Gov’t, 279 F.3d 273, 286 (5th Cir. 2002). “Rather, a plaintiff must show
either [that] the supervisor personally was involved in the constitutional
violation or that there is a ‘sufficient causal connection’ between the
supervisor’s conduct and the constitutional violation.” Brown v. Taylor, 911
F.3d 235, 245 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Evett v. DETNTFF, 330 F.3d 681, 689
(5th Cir. 2003)). Liability may be found where “supervisory officials
implement a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of
constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional
violation.’” Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting
Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 169, 170 (5th Cir. 1985)).
Furthermore, “[i]n order to establish supervisor liability for constitutional
violations committed by subordinate employees, plaintiffs must show that
the supervisor act[ed], or fail[ed] to act, with deliberate indifference to
violations of others’ constitutional rights committed by their subordinates.”
Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Gates v. Tex. Dep’t
of Protective & Regul. Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 435 (5th Cir. 2008)).
Based on the evidence of the alleged PR bond policy outlined above,
Plaintiffs can plead a colorable supervisory liability claim against Sheriff
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Taylor, who is the undisputed policymaker in this case. Plaintiffs’ proposed
third amended complaint contains allegations that Sheriff Taylor
implemented the policy of delaying care for detainees with serious medical
needs, and that he was personally involved in Newsome’s delay of care on
the date of her death. While we decline at this stage to address whether
Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence for their supervisory liability
claim to survive a summary judgment challenge, we find that Plaintiffs, at the
very least, have shown that amending their pleadings would not be futile.
Furthermore, we find that Plaintiffs’ allegations against Sheriff Taylor
are sufficient to overcome his defense of qualified immunity at the motion to
dismiss stage. Newsome had a clearly established right to not be denied, by
deliberate indifference, attention to her serious medical needs under the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Austin, 328 F.3d at 210; Easter, 467 F.3d at
464–65. Additionally, “[t]his court has interpreted ‘clearly established law’
on the subject of policy promulgation to require ‘an intentional choice’”
where it is “obvious that the likely consequences . . . will be a deprivation of
civil rights.” Brown, 623 F.3d at 257 (quoting Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973
F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1992)). Because our prior case law makes clear to a
reasonable officer that a delay in medical care may constitute a Fourteenth
Amendment violation, and because an unconstitutional delay in care is a
highly predictable consequence of Sheriff Taylor’s alleged policy of delaying
medical care for critically ill detainees, we find that Plaintiffs’ pleadings are
sufficient to overcome Taylor’s qualified immunity defense at the motion to
dismiss stage.
* * *
In summary, we find that the district court abused its discretion in
determining that granting Plaintiffs leave to file a third amended complaint
would be futile. As discussed above, Plaintiffs have presented evidence that
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Anderson County Jail seeks PR bonds for detainees who may need
hospitalization. Whether Plaintiffs’ municipal and supervisory liability
claims related to this alleged PR bond policy would survive a summary
judgment challenge is a question we decline to answer at this time; we simply
hold that Plaintiffs’ pleadings are sufficient to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss. On the other hand, we find that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that adding Lieutenant Tia Pierson as a defendant
would be futile. We accordingly VACATE the district court’s denial of
Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a third amended complaint, and
REMAND with instructions to permit the addition of municipal and
supervisory claims related to the alleged PR bond policy.
IV.
Having addressed Plaintiffs’ unpled claims relating to the alleged PR
bond policy, we turn to the district court’s grant of summary judgment for
Sheriff Taylor in his supervisory capacity. In their second amended
complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Sheriff Taylor failed to adequately train jail
staff and implemented a policy prohibiting lower-ranking jail staff from
contacting EMS. On appeal, the only claim that Plaintiffs specifically raise
against Sheriff Taylor in his individual capacity is their allegation that Taylor
implemented the PR bond policy. We find that Plaintiffs’ fleeting reference
to other “associated policies” is insufficient to preserve their failure-to-train
claim and permission-to-contact-EMS policy claim against Sheriff Taylor.
Because Plaintiffs did not “address the district court’s analysis and explain
how it erred” by granting summary judgment for Sheriff Taylor on these
issues, we consider these claims abandoned on appeal due to inadequate
briefing. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Hallam, 42 F.4th 316, 327 (5th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 n.1 (5th Cir. 2021)).
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Thus, while Plaintiffs should be permitted to properly plead their PR
bond policy claim against Sheriff Taylor, the supervisory claims against
Sheriff Taylor that were pleaded in their second amended complaint have
been abandoned on appeal. We accordingly AFFIRM IN PART the district
court’s grant of summary judgment for Sheriff Taylor for the supervisory
claims pleaded in the operative second amended complaint.
V.
We reach a similar conclusion in addressing the district court’s grant
of summary judgment for Anderson County in its municipal capacity. To
hold a municipality liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a
deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution or federal law is inflicted
pursuant to “official policy,” which may include “duly promulgated policy
statements, ordinances or regulations,” or “a persistent, widespread practice
of [municipal] officials or employees, which . . . is so common and well-
settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.”
Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984)).
On appeal, Plaintiffs contend that, in addition to the PR bond policy,
Anderson County had other “policies restricting hospitalization and thereby
delaying critical care,” including the permission-to-contact-EMS policy, as
well as a policy of delaying immediate medical care by calling medical staff to
ask for instructions. While we agree with Plaintiffs that they should be
permitted to properly plead their PR bond policy claim against Anderson
County, we find unavailing Plaintiffs’ other policy-based claims.
Regarding the permission-to-contact-EMS policy, the only evidence
that Plaintiffs have provided of such a policy existing is a single statement
from Jailer-Defendant Alicia Wilson, who testified that she lacked the
independent authority to call 911 because she “wasn’t a sergeant, just a
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regular jailer.” The district court did not err in determining that this
statement was insufficient evidence of a municipal policy, especially
considering consistent testimony from other Defendants that no such policy
existed. Moreover, even if we were convinced that such a policy existed,
Plaintiffs have not sufficiently shown that this policy was a “moving force”
behind the violation of Newsome’s constitutional rights. See Piotrowski, 237
F.3d at 578. While Plaintiffs have presented evidence that the Jailer
Defendants may have ignored Newsome’s cries for help or failed to provide
emergency medical assistance, they have not presented enough evidence that
a Jailer Defendant sought to assist Newsome but was delayed in doing so by
a policy preventing him or her from contacting EMS to create a genuine
dispute of material fact.
Plaintiffs’ claim that Anderson County had a policy of seeking
instructions from medical staff before administering emergency aid fares no
better. For starters, Jailer-Defendant Matthew Wickersham did not exhibit
deliberate indifference by deciding to call Nurse Green for instructions after
finding Newsome unresponsive in her cell, and we do not hold municipalities
liable under § 1983 absent an underlying violation of the Constitution or
federal law. See Heller, 475 U.S. at 799; Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d
458, 467 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Because [Plaintiff] has alleged no constitutional
injury attributable to the [o]fficers, [Plaintiff] has failed to state a claim that a
[c]ity policy was the moving force behind a violation of his constitutional
rights.”). Moreover, Plaintiffs have provided insufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to determine that Wickersham’s decision to call Nurse Green
for instructions reflected “official policy” or “a persistent, widespread
practice” of Anderson County.
The only alleged municipal policy that Plaintiffs sufficiently pressed
on appeal is the PR bond policy. The municipal policies alleged in Plaintiffs’
second amended complaint, on the other hand, are either unsupported by
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Plaintiffs’ evidence or abandoned on appeal for inadequate briefing. See
Hallam, 42 F.4th at 327. Therefore, while we will permit Plaintiffs to plead
their PR bond policy claim against Anderson County, we AFFIRM IN
PART the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Anderson County
for the municipal claims pleaded in the operative second amended complaint.
VI.
In addition to contesting the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for Defendants on appeal, Plaintiffs also raise on appeal the issue
of Defendants’ alleged spoliation of electronic data. Specifically, Plaintiffs
highlight that a series of text messages between Nurse Green, Captain
Choate, and Lieutenant Pierson sent on June 15 are unavailable. Plaintiffs
moved for discovery sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e),
which the district court addressed and denied in its order granting summary
judgment for the individual Defendants.
A trial court’s decision on a motion for sanctions for spoliation of
evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Guzman v. Jones, 804 F.3d
707, 713 (5th Cir. 2015). This court permits an adverse inference or sanctions
against the spoliator only upon a showing of “bad faith” or “bad conduct.”
Id. (quoting Condrey v. SunTrust Bank of Ga., 431 F.3d 191, 203 (5th Cir.
2005)). A party seeking an adverse inference—i.e., a presumption that “the
lost information was unfavorable to the [spoliating] party”—must establish
that “the [spoliating] party acted with the intent to deprive another party of
the information’s use in the litigation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2).
Because the Texas Rangers conducted an investigation following
Newsome’s death, it may be reasonable to conclude that Defendants had a
duty to preserve electronically stored information. It also seems likely that
the text messages at issue contained information related to Newsome.
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs are unable to effectively rebut Defendants’
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explanation that they purchased new phones and, as a result, lost access to
these text messages. While it may be true that Defendants intended to
“frustrate future discovery by destroying incriminating evidence,” we find
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Plaintiffs
have failed to present evidence of bad faith sufficient to warrant spoliation
sanctions. We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for
sanctions.
VII.
We conclude by addressing Defendants’ evidentiary objections that
are preserved on appeal. “Properly preserved evidentiary objections are
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704,
716 (5th Cir. 2011).
Defendant Timothy Green objects to Plaintiffs’ citations to recorded
interviews conducted by a Texas Ranger, as well as a transcript of those
interviews. We need not rely on these interviews, however, because the
record contains deposition excerpts from the Ranger’s interviewees that
corroborate the pertinent information contained in the Ranger’s interviews.
Because our conclusions would be the same regardless of the admissibility of
these interviews, we need not address the merits of Defendant Green’s
evidentiary objections. See United States v. Wells, 525 F.2d 974, 976 (5th Cir.
1976) (declining to decide whether the district court erred in admitting
testimony, noting that “inasmuch as the testimony was merely cumulative
and in light of the record taken as a whole, any error was harmless”); Weaver
v. U.S. Coast Guard, 53 F.3d 1282, 1995 WL 295978, at *2 (5th Cir. 1995)
(declining to determine whether certain statements were hearsay where
admission of these statements would have no bearing on the case’s ultimate
disposition); East v. Walgreen Co., 860 F. App’x 367, 369 n.1 (5th Cir. 2021)
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(declining to address a hearsay issue where the admission of a contested
statement would not affect the outcome of summary judgment).
Defendant Green also objects to a chart created by Plaintiffs’ counsel
that purports to reflect Green’s telephone calls. We need not rely on this
chart, however, because Plaintiffs have provided the underlying phone
records. We leave it to the district court to determine in the first instance
whether Plaintiffs’ evidentiary aids are appropriate. We also need not rely on
an order issued by the Texas Board of Nursing suspending Defendant
Green’s nursing license, which Green objects to on hearsay and
authentication grounds, since the facts contained in this order are cumulative
of information contained elsewhere in the record. 14
Defendant Green and Defendant Adam Corley both preserve their
objections to Plaintiffs’ use of sworn expert reports, but we find these
objections unpersuasive. Defendant Green argues that the expert reports
were outside the scope of the district court’s discovery order, which limited
discovery to the issue of qualified immunity. But the district court’s
discovery order made no mention of prohibiting expert disclosure, and
Plaintiffs’ experts’ reports are relevant to the issue of qualified immunity
because they help explain the substantial risk that Addison’s disease patients
face when their condition is left untreated. The district court’s several cites
to the expert reports in its order granting summary judgment for the
_____________________
14
We also note that we do not deem the Texas Board of Nursing’s conclusions of
law that Defendant Green violated state regulations relevant to our analysis of Green’s
alleged violation of Newsome’s constitutional rights. See Davis, 468 U.S. at 194 (“Officials
sued for constitutional violations do not lose their qualified immunity merely because their
conduct violates some statutory or administrative provision.”); Gagne v. City of Galveston,
805 F.2d 558, 560 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[A]llegations about the breach of a statute or regulation
are simply irrelevant to the question of an official’s eligibility for qualified immunity in a
suit over the deprivation of a constitutional right.”).
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individual Defendants bolsters Plaintiffs’ argument that their inclusion of
expert reports did not violate the district court’s discovery order.
Defendants Green and Corley also object to the expert reports as
containing hearsay and hearsay within hearsay. Defendants’ broad hearsay
objections are arguably too “loosely formulated and imprecise” to be
considered preserved on appeal, since Defendants did not point the district
court to the portions of the extensive expert reports that they find
objectionable. See United States v. Lewis, 796 F.3d 543, 546 (5th Cir. 2015)
(quoting United States v. Polasek, 162 F.3d 878, 885 (5th Cir. 1998)).
Furthermore, evidence may be considered on summary judgment provided
“[its] contents can be presented in admissible form at trial,” Patel v. Tex. Tech
Univ., 941 F.3d 743, 746 (5th Cir. 2019), and Plaintiffs have properly
submitted sworn declarations from their experts pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) indicating that Plaintiffs intend to rely on their
experts’ testimony at trial. Defendants have made no effort to specify which
portions of the experts’ reports fall outside the scope of permissible expert
testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Finally, in a one-sentence footnote, Anderson County and the Jailer
Defendants attempt to reassert their objections to Plaintiffs’ affidavit
evidence. The district court overruled these objections in its order granting
summary judgment for the individual Defendants, finding that personal
knowledge could be inferred from each affidavit itself. See DIRECTV, Inc. v.
Budden, 420 F.3d 521, 530 (5th Cir. 2005). Because Defendants undertook
no effort to address the district court’s analysis and explain how it abused its
discretion in overruling Defendants’ evidentiary objections, we consider
these objections forfeited on appeal. See Hallam, 42 F.4th at 327.
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VIII.
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of
summary judgment for Defendants Timothy Green, Todd Choate, Jonathan
Strong, Robin Jones, Matthew Wickersham, Jessica Carpenter, and Dakota
Hughes. We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment for
Defendants Alicia Wilson, Travis Wesson, and TAKET Holdings, L.L.C.
We AFFIRM IN PART the district court’s grant of summary judgment
for Defendant Adam Corley as related to Plaintiffs’ supervisory claim against
him, but we REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment for
Dr. Corley as related to Plaintiffs’ nonsupervisory claim. We also AFFIRM
IN PART the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Defendants
Anderson County and Greg Taylor for the claims alleged in Plaintiffs’ second
amended complaint, and we VACATE the district court’s denial of
Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a third amended complaint and REMAND
with instructions to grant Plaintiffs leave to amend their pleadings to include
additional supervisory and municipal liability claims based on the alleged
policy of delaying treatment to obtain PR bonds. Finally, we AFFIRM the
district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions.
44