State v. Kennedy

[Cite as State v. Kennedy, 2024-Ohio-66.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 112563
v. :

HAROLD KENNEDY, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 11, 2024

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-03-437427-ZA

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Sarah E. Hutnik, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.

Kimberly Kendall Corral and Gabrielle M. Ploplis, for
appellant.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:

Defendant-appellant, Harold Kennedy (“Kennedy”), appeals from the

trial court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief. He raises the following

assignments of error for review:
 1. The trial court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Kennedy’s
postconviction petition as the evidence presented meets the requisite
standard required under R.C. 2953.23.

2. The trial court abused its discretion in applying the wrong standard
in assessing Mr. Kennedy’s postconviction petition.

3. The record demonstrates per se that Mr. Kennedy’s right to due
process and a fair and impartial judge and jury was violated.

4. The trial court erred in ruling that Kennedy’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel was barred by res judicata.

5. The trial court abused its discretion when it failed to hold an
evidentiary hearing where the state’s opposition shows why neutral
court intervention is imperative.

6. The trial court erred in ruling that issues regarding trial testimony
are barred by res judicata.

7. Res judicata does not apply where prior rulings were made by a
biased, non-neutral trial court.

After careful review of the record and relevant case law, we affirm the

trial court’s judgment.

I. Procedural and Factual History

On May 15, 2003, Kennedy was named in a three-count indictment,

charging him with aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2923.01(A)(1) (Count 1);

attempted aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2923.01(A)(1) and 2923.02 (Count

2); and having weapons while under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13 (Count

3). Counts 1 and 2 contained three- and five-year firearm specifications pursuant to

R.C. 2941.145 and 2941.146.

The matter proceeded to trial on July 29, 2003, where the following

facts were adduced:
According to the facts, one of the victims, Raiketta Finnie, graduated
from Collinwood High School in June 2002 and began dating Kennedy
the same month. Raiketta has known Kennedy, also known to her as
“Dude,” since the ninth grade. Soon after the two of them began dating,
Raiketta took out a car loan to purchase a 1998 Chevy Tahoe for
Kennedy. Raiketta purchased the truck in her name because Kennedy
did not have sufficient credit to purchase it himself. They agreed that
once Raiketta purchased the truck, Kennedy would make the
payments; however, Kennedy only made a few payments on the truck.
His last payment was in November 2002. Kennedy and Raiketta ended
their relationship in February 2003.

Kennedy eventually stopped making payments on the truck; however,
he still had possession of it.

In April 2003, Raiketta and her best friend, Ebony Strickland, went to
the Cleveland Police Department to file a report because Kennedy still
had possession of the truck and was not making payments of any kind.
After Raiketta and Ebony went to the police department, they noticed
that they were being followed by [Kennedy]. Raiketta pulled her car
into the parking lot at Ebony’s apartment and [Raiketta and Ebony] got
out of the car. [Kennedy] exited his vehicle and approached [Raiketta
and Ebony] as they were walking up to the apartment building.

[Kennedy] began screaming at Raiketta and they started physically
fighting. [Kennedy] was trying to hold Raiketta down on the ground,
but she escaped his hold and got to her feet. During the struggle,
Raiketta dropped her purse, which contained the title to the truck, on
the ground. [Kennedy] then took Raiketta’s purse and left the area.
[Raiketta and Ebony] went up to Ebony’s apartment. [Kennedy] called
Ebony’s cell phone and threatened to kill Raiketta if she did not leave
him alone. [Kennedy] also told Raiketta that he had a gun in his truck.
When Raiketta’s purse was later returned to her, the truck title was
missing from her purse and [Kennedy] still had possession of the truck.
Later, toward the end of April, Raiketta learned that the truck was in
the police impound lot, and she finally got the truck back in her
possession.

On May 2, 2003, Raiketta drove her truck to the hair salon. She was
getting her hair done with Ebony and three of her other friends. While
they were inside the salon, [Kennedy’s] cousin, Cynthia Pitts, and other
individuals entered the salon and told Raiketta to return [Kennedy’s]
belongings that were still inside of the truck. Raiketta opened the door
to the truck for them. While speaking on a cell phone, [Kennedy’s]
 relatives removed various objects, and [Kennedy’s] aunt reached
underneath the driver’s seat, lifted up the carpet, and removed a gun.

The next evening, on May 3, 2003, Raiketta drove her truck to a
basketball game at Kennedy High School with her friends. During the
game, Desarae Green, the mother of [Kennedy’s] child, who was also at
the game, made menacing gestures toward Raiketta. After leaving the
game, Raiketta stopped at a traffic light. Desarae and her friends, who
were also at the stoplight, threw a bottle, some sticks, and another
object at Raiketta’s truck. Desarae also rear-ended Raiketta’s truck,
causing Raiketta to hit the car in front of her. Shortly thereafter,
Raiketta exchanged phone numbers and insurance information with
the pregnant woman she hit. [Raiketta] left and drove to Romanica
Gilham’s [home]. Romanica is Ebony’s sixteen-year-old cousin.

While [Raiketta was] on [her] way to Romanica’s house, [she] called
Cynthia Pitt’s cell phone trying to reach Desarae. Raiketta and Desarae
were going to fight later that night at Euclid Creek. Later that evening,
Desarae arrived at Romanica’s house with about six other girls. The
seven girls exited the car and another car pulled up behind Desarae, but
no one exited that car. At that point, Raiketta and Desarae started
physically fighting on the street near Romanica’s house. Several other
people became involved in the fight. [Kennedy] walked up to the area
where the girls were fighting with a gun in his pocket. Kennedy began
firing his gun toward the porch where others were standing.

Raiketta and Romanica heard several gunshots. The next thing she
knew, Raiketta had been shot in the pelvis. Raiketta fell to the ground
and rolled over. As she rolled over, she saw Ebony lying on the ground,
bleeding and coughing up blood. Ebony was pronounced dead upon
arrival at the hospital. The doctor was unable to remove the bullet from
Raiketta’s pelvic area because it was too close to her vital areas. The
day after the shooting, the police interviewed Desarae and Cynthia
Pitts.

(Footnotes omitted.) State v. Kennedy, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83445, 2004-Ohio-

6414, ¶ 5-12.

At the conclusion of the trial, Kennedy was found not guilty of

aggravated murder as charged in Count 1, but guilty of the lesser included offense of

murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02, with firearm specifications. Similarly, Kennedy
was found not guilty of attempted aggravated murder as charged in Count 2, but

guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted murder in violation of R.C.

2903.02 and 2923.02, with firearm specifications. Finally, the trial court found

Kennedy guilty of having a weapon while under disability as charged.

On August 6, 2003, Kennedy was sentenced to an aggregate prison

term of 31 years to life.

Postconviction Proceedings

On December 4, 2004, this court affirmed Kennedy’s convictions and

sentence on the lesser included offenses corresponding to Counts 1 and 2 of the

indictment. Kennedy, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83445, 2004-Ohio-6414. We found,

however, that the trial court failed to strictly follow the provisions of R.C. 2945.05

for the waiver of a jury trial on the having weapons while under disability offense

charged in Count 3 of the indictment. Count 3 was later nolled, and Kennedy was

resentenced to an aggregate prison term of 30 years to life on Counts 1 and 2.

While Kennedy’s direct appeal was pending, he filed a petition for

postconviction relief pursuant to R.C. 2953.21. See R.C. 2953.21(D). The petition

set forth claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that defense counsel

rendered deficient and prejudicial performance at trial by (1) failing to secure the

presence of an exculpatory witness, Lashawn Thomas (“Thomas”), at trial, (2)

requesting a defense witness, Cynthia Pitts (“Pitts”), to change her testimony to fit

the theory of the case, and (3) failing to contact a witness, Michael Scott (“Scott”),

who would have rebutted key testimony from the state’s witness, Officer Thomas
Bordonaro. Kennedy asserted that had he received competent representation, the

outcome of his trial would have been different.

In the petition, counsel for Kennedy expressed that the evidence

supporting the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel relied on “affidavits from

two individuals, and a letter from a third.” Counsel indicated that his office had not

received the documents from Kennedy as of the filing of the petition, but that the

petition would be amended to include the affidavits and the letter once they were

received. However, there is no indication in the record to suggest that the petition

was amended to include the purported evidence.

On August 25, 2004, the trial court summarily denied Kennedy’s

petition for postconviction relief. Kennedy did not appeal the trial court’s judgment.

On November 12, 2008, Kennedy filed a pro se motion for leave to file

a delayed motion for new trial pursuant to Crim.R. 33, based on the discovery of new

evidence. In the motion, Kennedy argued that his convictions and sentence were

the product of (1) perjured and coached prosecution witnesses, (2) prosecutorial

misconduct, (3) witness misconduct, and (4) ineffective assistance of counsel. In

relevant part, Kennedy alleged that the state knowingly relied on perjured testimony

and withheld exculpatory evidence from the defense, including a police report that

provided a description of the shooter that was not consistent with Kennedy’s size or

weight.

On the same day, Kennedy filed a pro se petition to vacate or set aside

the sentence, setting forth analogous claims to those raised in the motion for leave
to file a delayed motion for new trial pursuant to Crim.R. 33. Kennedy also filed a

pro se motion for recusal, requesting the trial judge to recuse herself from his case

because she presided over the criminal trial that resulted in Kennedy’s allegedly

“wrongful imprisonment.”

On January 22, 2009, the trial court summarily denied each of

Kennedy’s pro se motions. The trial court subsequently issued findings of fact and

conclusions of law, stating, in relevant part:

After reviewing all the documents connected with Case No. 437427,
petition to vacate or set aside judgment of conviction or sentence * * *
and all files and records pertaining to the proceedings against
Petitioner, the trial court finds no substantial grounds for
postconviction relief exist.

Kennedy appealed from the trial court’s judgment. On December 29,

2009, however, this court dismissed the appeal due to Kennedy’s failure to file an

appellate brief.

On March 10, 2022, Kennedy filed a successive petition for

postconviction relief pursuant to R.C. 2953.21 and 2953.23, arguing that his

convictions “lack reliability and credibility” due to ineffective assistance of defense

counsel, judicial bias, and the state’s failure to disclose material exculpatory

evidence. With respect to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct, Kennedy argued

that the state prejudicially withheld exculpatory evidence during the discovery

process, including various investigation reports that contained statements from

state witnesses that were inconsistent with their testimony at trial. Kennedy also

reiterated his claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by
(1) failing to adequately impeach the identification testimony of state witnesses, (2)

failing to secure the presence of Thomas at trial, and (3) engaging in unlawful and

unethical conduct by compelling Pitts to “lie on the stand.” Finally, Kennedy

presented a claim of judicial bias, arguing that he was materially prejudiced by the

trial court’s failure to disclose a personal relationship with a state witness, Rosalyn

Wynn (“Rosalyn”). Kennedy further suggested that the trial court failed to disclose

a personal relationship with a nonwitness who was reportedly dating “another

suspect in this case.”

In support of his constitutional claims, Kennedy attached the

following materials to his petition: (1) the affidavit of Pitts (Exhibit A); (2) the

affidavit of trial counsel, G. Michael Goins, Esq. (“Attorney Goins”) (Exhibit B); (3)

an excerpt from the trial court’s statement in an unrelated judicial proceeding

(Exhibit C); (4) investigatory reports produced by the Cleveland Division of Police,

dated May 4, 2003, May 5, 2003, May 6, 2003, May 18, 2003, May 29, 2003, and

June 15, 2003 (Exhibits D, E, F, G, H, I, and J); (5) the affidavit of Kennedy (Exhibit

K); and (6) the affidavit of postconviction counsel, Kimberly Kendall Corral, Esq.

(“Attorney Kendall Corral”) (Exhibit L).

The state opposed the successive petition, arguing that Kennedy’s

claims were barred by res judicata or otherwise failed to satisfy the jurisdictional

requirements of R.C. 2953.23(A). The state summarized its position as follows:

Many of [Kennedy’s] claims are barred by res judicata because he could
have raised them on direct appeal of his convictions but failed to do so.
Kennedy’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not supported
 by credible affidavits and are contradicted by the record. Kennedy’s
claims of judicial bias are not supported by credible evidence. And
Kennedy’s claim of Brady violations are belied by the record and his
own exhibits. Thus, Kennedy has not shown he is entitled to relief. His
petition should be denied without a hearing.

The state supported its brief in opposition with (1) the trial judge’s

written response to Kennedy’s filing of an affidavit of disqualification with the Ohio

Supreme Court, (2) a copy of Kennedy’s original petition for postconviction relief

filed in August 2004, and (3) the affidavit of trial counsel, Attorney Goins.

On May 2, 2022, the trial court issued an order recusing itself from

Kennedy’s case, and the matter was transferred to the docket of a newly assigned

trial judge.

On March 8, 2023, the trial court denied Kennedy’s petition for

postconviction relief without a hearing. The judgment states, in relevant part:

The court notes that petitioner has filed previous petitions, and in this
case failed to file a motion for leave to file his petition. The case has
been transferred to this court for review based upon recusal by the
original trial court. This court, having reviewed the entire record and
proceedings, dismisses the petition for the following reasons: The
successive petition is untimely R.C. 2953.21(A)(2), and, issues raised
regarding ineffective assistance of counsel and trial testimony are
barred under res judicata.

Kennedy now appeals from the trial court’s judgment.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Successive Petition for Postconviction Relief

In the first and fifth assignments of error, Kennedy argues the trial

court abused its discretion in denying his petition for postconviction relief pursuant

to R.C. 2953.21 and 2953.23 without a hearing. In the fourth and sixth assignments
of error, Kennedy argues the trial court erred in ruling that his claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel and issues relating to trial testimony are barred by the doctrine

of res judicata. We address these assignments of error together because they are

related.

Standard of Review

R.C. 2953.21 through 2953.23 set forth how a convicted defendant

may seek to have the trial court’s judgment or sentence vacated or set aside pursuant

to a petition for postconviction relief. A defendant’s petition for postconviction relief

is a collateral civil attack on his or her criminal conviction. State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio

St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 48. The statute affords relief from

judgment where the petitioner’s rights in the proceedings that resulted in his

conviction were denied to such an extent the conviction is rendered void or voidable

under the Ohio or United States Constitutions. R.C. 2953.21(A); State v. Perry, 10

Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967), paragraph four of the syllabus. A

postconviction petition, however, does not provide a petitioner a second opportunity

to litigate the conviction. State v. Hessler, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 01AP-1011, 2002-

Ohio-3321, ¶ 32.

Pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a)(i), any person who has been

convicted of a criminal offense and who claims that there was such a denial or

infringement of the person’s rights as to render the judgment void or voidable under

the Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United States, may file a petition in

the court that imposed sentence, stating the grounds for relief relied upon, and
asking the court to vacate or set aside the judgment or sentence or to grant other

appropriate relief. The petitioner may file a supporting affidavit and other

documentary evidence in support of the claims for relief. R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(b).

R.C. 2953.21(A)(2) provides that a petition for postconviction relief

shall be filed within 365 days from the filing of the trial transcripts in the petitioner’s

direct appeal or, if a direct appeal was not pursued, 365 days after the expiration of

the time in which a direct appeal could have been filed. Because more than 19 years

have passed since the date of Kennedy’s direct appeal, there is no dispute that his

successive petition for postconviction relief was filed well beyond the timeframe set

forth under R.C. 2953.21. Thus, the successive petition is untimely.

R.C. 2953.21(A) precludes the trial court from entertaining an

untimely petition for postconviction relief unless the petition meets two conditions.

First, the petitioner must show either that he or she was unavoidably prevented from

discovering the facts upon which the petition relies, or that the United States

Supreme Court has recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively

to the petitioner. R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a). Second, the petitioner must show by clear

and convincing evidence that a reasonable factfinder would not have found him or

her guilty but for the constitutional error at trial. R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b).

Because the timeliness requirement of R.C. 2953.23 is jurisdictional,

a trial court does not have jurisdiction to entertain an untimely filed petition for

postconviction relief that does not meet the exceptions set forth in R.C.
2953.23(A)(1). State v. Barrow, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108832, 2020-Ohio-3719,

¶ 7, citing State v. Kleyman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93896, 2010-Ohio-3612, ¶ 35.

Relevant to this appeal, it is well-settled that the doctrine of res

judicata applies to proceedings involving postconviction relief. State v. Szefcyk, 77

Ohio St.3d 93, 95, 671 N.E.2d 233 (1996).

Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars
a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising
and litigating in any proceeding except an appeal from that judgment,
any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could
have been raised by the defendant at the trial, which resulted in that
judgment of conviction, or on an appeal from that judgment.

Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967), paragraph nine of the syllabus.

“Therefore, ‘any issue that could have been raised on direct appeal and was not is

res judicata and not subject to review in subsequent proceedings.’” State v. Segines,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99789, 2013-Ohio-5259, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Saxon, 109

Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 824, ¶ 16.

Similarly, “res judicata operates to bar successive petitions for

postconviction relief that raise claims that were or could have been raised * * * in a

prior petition.” State v. Castellon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112522, 2023-Ohio-4215,

¶ 21, citing State v. Waver, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108820, 2020-Ohio-2724, ¶ 32,

and State v. Mack, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101261, 2018-Ohio-301, ¶ 15 (“The

doctrine of res judicata prevents repeated attacks on a final judgment for issues that

were or could have been previously litigated.”). See also State v. Levy, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 111779, 2023-Ohio-818, ¶ 12 (“[A] successive petition for

postconviction relief is typically subject to the doctrine of res judicata.”).

Ordinarily, an appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision granting

or denying a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Gondor,

112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 77, at ¶ 58. However, whether the

trial court possessed subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain a petition for

postconviction relief is a question of law subject to de novo review. State v.

Apanovitch, 155 Ohio St.3d 358, 2018-Ohio-4744, 121 N.E.3d 351, ¶ 24. In a de novo

review, we review the merits of the case independently, without any deference to the

trial court. Sosic v. Stephen Hovancsek & Assocs., Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

109993, 2021-Ohio-2592, ¶ 21.

With these standards in mind, we address the constitutional claims set

forth in Kennedy’s untimely and successive petition.

1. Brady Violation

In this case, Kennedy alleged in his successive petition for

postconviction relief that the state violated his constitutional right to due process by

withholding exculpatory police reports that were favorable to the defense and could

have been used to impeach the identification testimony of several key state

witnesses. The police reports, marked Defense Exhibits D-J, contain statements

from several witnesses in the days and weeks following the shooting. Kennedy

asserted that these reports were not provided to defense counsel during the
discovery process and were only obtained in 2021 following a public-records

request.

In relevant part, the police reports contain (1) Raiketta’s May 4, 2003

statement that “she saw a male who might have been her ex-boyfriend Harold

Kennedy but she could not be sure if it was him” (Exhibit D); (2) Raiketta’s May 5,

2003 statement that “she observed [Kennedy] point a handgun in the air and fire

the weapon, the weapon was then pointed in her direction” (Exhibit E); (3) Finnie’s

May 18, 2003 statement that she observed Kennedy standing at the rear of a white

or silver vehicle (Exhibit F); (4) Romanica Gilham’s (“Gilham”) May 29, 2003

statement that she observed a yellow Monte Carlo parked in the field next to her

home (Exhibit G); (5) Kelynn Hardnick’s (“Hardnick”) May 4, 2003 statement that

she observed a male standing next to a yellow vehicle wearing a blue hat fire a gun

(Exhibit H); (6) Hardnick’s May 5, 2003 statement identifying Kennedy as the

shooter (Exhibit I); and (7) Karmesha Wilson’s (“Wilson”) June 15, 2003 statement

that although the yellow car seen at the scene did not have anything to do with the

shooting, she was familiar with the male in the yellow vehicle and identified him as

“Jermaine.” (Exhibit J).

In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215

(1963), the Supreme Court of the United States recognized that the prosecution has

an affirmative duty to disclose evidence that is favorable to the accused and material

to the accused’s guilt or punishment. See also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432,

115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). That “duty encompasses impeachment
evidence as well as exculpatory evidence.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280,

119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). The Brady rule applies regardless of

whether evidence is suppressed by the state willfully or inadvertently. Id. at 282.

The Supreme Court has explained that evidence is favorable to the

accused when it is exculpatory or impeaching. Id. at 281-282. And “favorable

evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by the

government, ‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been

disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’”

Kyles at 433, quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87

L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). A different result is reasonably probable “when the

government’s evidentiary suppression ‘undermines confidence in the outcome of

the trial.’” Id. at 434, quoting Bagley at 678.

For the trial court to have jurisdiction to entertain the Brady claim

alleged in the successive postconviction petition, Kennedy first had to establish that

he was “unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts” on which he relies. R.C.

2953.23(A)(1)(a). To meet this standard, courts in Ohio have held that a defendant

ordinarily must show that he was unaware of the evidence he is relying on and that

he could not have discovered the evidence by exercising reasonable diligence. See

State v. Harrison, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105909, 2018-Ohio-1396, ¶ 6.

In State v. Bethel, 167 Ohio St.3d 362, 2022-Ohio-783, 192 N.E.3d

470, however, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized that unlike other evidence

supporting a petition for postconviction relief, “criminal defendants have no duty to
‘scavenge for hints of undisclosed Brady material.’” Id. at ¶ 24. Accordingly, the

Ohio Supreme Court explained that in the context of an alleged Brady violation, the

defendant “is not required to show that he could not have discovered suppressed

evidence by exercising reasonable diligence.” Id. at ¶ 25, citing Strickler, 527 U.S. at

282-285, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286. Rather, a defendant satisfies the

“unavoidably prevented” requirement contained in R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a) by

establishing that the prosecution suppressed the evidence on which the defendant

relies. Id.

Within his petition for postconviction relief, Kennedy broadly

asserted that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence

supporting his Brady claim, “as none of the evidence was available to him during

the prescribed time limitation.” Kennedy maintained that the newly discovered

police reports only became available to him following a public-records request made

by his postconviction attorney in 2021.

After careful consideration of the record and materials attached to

Kennedy’s successive petition for postconviction relief, we find no evidentiary basis

to conclude that the police reports underlying the Brady claim were willfully or

inadvertently suppressed by the prosecution in this case. Although the evidence

attached to the petition establishes that the police reports were acquired by Attorney

Kendall Corral following a public-records request in 2021, there is no evidence to

suggest that the police reports were not disclosed by the state during the discovery
process utilized in 2003.1 Attorney Goins did not aver, for example, that the defense

did not know about the police reports before Kennedy’s trial in 2003 or that, if

disclosed, the reports would have been incorporated into his defense at trial. See

Bethel at ¶ 27; State v. Hale, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112163, 2023-Ohio-3894, ¶ 38-

39; State v. Larkins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82325, 2003-Ohio-5928. In fact, the

record reflects that defense counsel raised an objection at trial regarding his

perception of inconsistencies between Raiketta’s trial testimony and his pretrial

notes that reflected the statements “read to [him] by the prosecutor.” (Tr. 456-457.)

Although trial counsel’s notes are not part of the record, his objection only serves to

demonstrate that he was, in fact, notified during the discovery process used in 2003

that Raiketta may have provided inconsistent statements to the police during the

initial investigation

Based on the foregoing, we find the documentary and inferential

evidence incorporated into Kennedy’s successive petition for postconviction relief

does not establish that the disputed evidence was suppressed. Thus, pursuant to the

directives set forth by the Ohio Supreme Court in Bethel, 167 Ohio St.3d 362, 2022-

Ohio-783, 192 N.E.3d 470, Kennedy failed to demonstrate that he was unavoidably

prevented from discovering the facts upon which his Brady claim relies.

1 In 2010, Ohio instituted a system of open discovery in criminal cases. See Staff
Notes to Crim.R. 16. Crim.R. 16(A) states the purpose for the adoption of this system:
“This rule is to provide all parties in a criminal case with the information necessary for a
full and fair adjudication of the facts, to protect the integrity of the justice system and the
rights of defendants, and to protect the well-being of witnesses, victims, and society at
large.”
 Notwithstanding our conclusions under R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a), we

note that Kennedy’s postconviction petition faces an additional jurisdictional

hurdle: under R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b), he must show by clear and convincing

evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty but for

constitutional error at trial. This question goes to the heart of Brady’s third prong,

which requires Kennedy to show that “‘there is a reasonable probability that, had the

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.’” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490, quoting Bagley,

473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481.

The Brady standard does not require Kennedy to show that disclosure

of the police reports would have resulted in his acquittal. See Kyles at 434. Nor does

it require him to show that “after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the

undisclosed evidence, there would not have been [sufficient evidence] left to

convict.” Id. at 434-435. Rather, Kennedy was required to demonstrate that “in the

context of the entire record,” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 112, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49

L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), suppression of the police reports “‘undermines confidence in

the outcome of the trial.’” Kyles at 434, quoting Bagley at 678. Thus, the question

is whether we can have confidence in the jury’s verdict even assuming that the

prosecution suppressed the police reports cited in Kennedy’s successive petition.

See Bethel at ¶ 34, citing Kyles at 434.

Viewing the record and the evidence supporting the convictions,

Kennedy has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that disclosure of
the allegedly suppressed evidence would have undermined our confidence in the

jury’s verdict. Contrary to Kennedy’s position on appeal, the police reports were not

exculpatory. Rather, they were corroborative of the state’s theory of the case. While

the police reports reflect minor inconsistencies between Raiketta, Gilham,

Hardnick, and Wilson’s recollection of the incident, the witnesses each conclusively

stated that they observed Kennedy fire a handgun in the direction of Raiketta and

Ebony in the midst of the altercation. The police reports further indicate that the

individual believed to be inside the yellow vehicle present at the scene was not

involved in the shooting. To the extent Hardnick’s first statement implicated the

yellow vehicle, her second statement demonstrates that her initial statement was

motivated by fear “of what might happen if she was to tell on somebody.” Under

these circumstances, we find the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Brady

claim raised in Kennedy’s successive postconviction petition.

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Kennedy’s successive petition for postconviction relief further alleged

that trial counsel’s deficient performance throughout the trial rendered his

judgment of conviction void or voidable under R.C. 2953.21. As previously

mentioned, Kennedy claimed that counsel prejudicially (1) failed to impeach the

identification testimony of state witnesses, (2) failed to secure the presence of

Thomas at trial, and (3) engaged in unlawful and unethical conduct by compelling

Pitts to “lie on the stand.”
 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a

defendant the effective assistance of counsel at “‘“critical stages of a criminal

proceeding,” including when he enters a guilty plea.’” State v. Romero, 156 Ohio

St.3d 468, 2019-Ohio-1839, 129 N.E.3d 404, ¶ 14, quoting Lee v. United States, 582

U.S. 357, 137 S.Ct. 1958, 1964, 198 L.Ed.2d 476 (2017), quoting Lafler v. Cooper,

566 U.S. 156, 165, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.

52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985).

In a petition for postconviction relief based on a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, the petitioner bears the initial burden to submit evidentiary

documents containing sufficient operative facts to demonstrate (1) deficient

performance by counsel, i.e., performance falling below an objective standard of

reasonable representation, and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced

him, i.e., a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. State v. Moore, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2014-CA-

66, 2015-Ohio-550, ¶ 13, citing State v. Kapper, 5 Ohio St.3d 36, 38, 448 N.E.2d 823

(1983); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694, 104 S.Ct.

2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373

(1989), paragraphs two and three of the syllabus.

After careful consideration, we find Kennedy’s ineffective assistance

of counsel claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Preliminarily, we note

that the ineffective assistance of counsel claims relating to counsel’s dealings with

Thomas and Pitts were previously raised, and rejected, in Kennedy’s original
petition for postconviction relief in 2004. Kennedy is not entitled to a second

opportunity to litigate his ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a successive

petition merely because Kennedy failed to support his original petition with

documentary evidence. The facts supporting these claims were known to Kennedy

at the time his original petition was filed; he simply failed to supplement the petition

to include the evidentiary materials supporting his claims. State v. Brown, 12th

Dist. Preble No. CA2019-04-006, 2020-Ohio-971, ¶ 50 (Res judicata bars a

petitioner from “re-packaging” evidence or issues that either were or could have

been raised.). Furthermore, to the extent Kennedy challenges counsel’s alleged

failure to adequately cross-examine certain state witnesses regarding perceived

inconsistencies in their testimony, such challenges rely on the trial record and could

have been raised in Kennedy’s direct appeal.

Under the foregoing circumstances, we find the trial court did not err

in finding that Kennedy’s claims “regarding ineffective assistance of counsel and

trial testimony” are barred by principles of res judicata.

3. Judicial Bias

Finally, Kennedy’s petition for postconviction relief alleged that the

trial judge presiding over his criminal trial violated his constitutional rights to due

process by failing “to uphold and promote the impartiality of the judiciary.”

Specifically, Kennedy maintained that “a new trial [was] necessary” because the trial

judge did not disclose that she “had, at the time of trial, a close relationship with one

of the witnesses who testified against him.”
 “It is well settled that a criminal trial before a biased judge is

fundamentally unfair and denies a defendant due process of law.” State v. LaMar,

95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 34.

[T]he term “biased or prejudiced,” when used in reference to a judge
before whom a cause is pending, implies a hostile feeling or spirit of ill
will or undue friendship or favoritism toward one of the litigants or his
attorney, with the formation of a fixed anticipatory judgment on the
part of the judge, as contradistinguished from an open state of mind
which will be governed by the law and the facts.

State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt, 164 Ohio St. 463, 469, 132 N.E.2d 191 (1956).

The Ohio Supreme Court has reiterated the importance of an

unbiased judge, explaining:

[I]t is imperative to remove any hint or question of an appearance of
bias and to ensure to the parties and the public the unquestioned
neutrality of an impartial judge. This court long ago noted that ‘“[n]ext
in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of
doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness or
integrity of the judge.’” State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt, 164 Ohio St.
463, 471, 132 N.E.2d 191 (1956), quoting Haslam v. Morrison, 113 Utah
14, 20, 190 P.2d 520 (1948).

State v. Weaver (In re Cottrill), 171 Ohio St.3d 1201, 2022-Ohio-4800, 215 N.E.3d

569, ¶ 16.

However, “‘“bias or prejudice on the part of a judge will not be

presumed. In fact, the law presumes that a judge is unbiased and unprejudiced in

the matters over which he presides, and bias or prejudice must be strong enough to

overcome the presumption of his integrity.”’” State v. Browning, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga Nos. 111856, 111857, 111858, and 111859, 2023-Ohio-1887, ¶ 37, quoting

State v. Baker, 25 Ohio Misc.2d 11, 12, 495 N.E.2d 976 (C.P.1984), quoting 48A
Corpus Juris Secundum, Judges, Section 108, at 731 (1981). The Ohio Supreme

Court has held that the “appearance of bias or prejudice must be compelling to

overcome” this presumption against bias. In re Disqualification of Olivito, 74 Ohio

St.3d 1261, 1263, 657 N.E.2d 1361 (1994). Furthermore, “dissatisfaction or

disagreement with a judge’s rulings of law are legal issues subject to appeal. A

judge’s opinions of law, even if later found to be erroneous, are not by themselves

evidence of bias or prejudice and thus are not grounds for disqualification.” In re

Disqualification of Corts, 47 Ohio St.3d 601, 602, 546 N.E.2d 928 (1988).

In this case, Kennedy’s judicial bias claim relies on a statement made

by the trial judge during a subsequent and unrelated criminal proceeding held in

2016. During that proceeding, the trial judge spoke on behalf of the victim in that

matter, and in the course of her statement, disclosed that she was the godmother of

Rosalyn — a witness who testified on behalf of the state during Kennedy’s trial in

2003. The trial judge has since clarified that her personal relationship with Rosalyn

did not begin until after Kennedy’s criminal trial was concluded. Thus, the trial

judge “vehemently” disagreed with Kennedy’s representations and maintained that

she “had no relationship with any witness prior to or during Mr. Kennedy’s trial,

personal or otherwise.”

Based on the evidence incorporated into the state’s brief in opposition

to Kennedy’s successive petition, there is no basis to conclude that the trial judge

failed to disclose an existing relationship with a state witness at the time of

Kennedy’s trial in 2003. The trial judge’s present relationship with Rosalyn does
not serve to retroactively support a claim of judicial bias. In the absence of evidence

establishing an undisclosed relationship with a material witness in the proceeding,

the judicial bias claim alleged in Kennedy’s successive petition amounts to an

attempt to litigate due-process claims that were raised, or could have been raised,

previously. For instance, Kennedy argues on appeal that the trial court

demonstrated her bias at trial by (1) permitting the state to introduce prior bad acts

in violation of Evid.R. 404(B), (2) “failing to perform the appropriate analysis under

Evid.R. 403,” and (3) displaying “contempt towards petitioner’s counsel during

trial.” Such claims rely on information contained in the trial court record and could

have been raised in Kennedy’s direct appeal. And in fact, this court overruled

analogous claims in Kennedy, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83445, 2004-Ohio-6414.

Accordingly, we find Kennedy’s judicial bias claim is barred by res judicata.

Moreover, even if this court were to accept Kennedy’s suggestion that

he has presented evidence dehors the record that “the trial court abandoned her role

as a neutral jurist” by developing “feelings” for certain state witnesses over the

course of his trial, we cannot conclude that the alleged constitutional error

undermines confidence in the jury verdict. If such internal bias existed, Kennedy

had not identified any external action by the court that would overcome the

unambiguous identification testimony of several state witnesses. Similarly, we

cannot find the court’s alleged bias or prejudice influenced the judgment denying

Kennedy’s original petition for postconviction relief in 2004 where the undisputed

facts establish that Kennedy failed to support his petition with documentary
evidence. Thus, even if the doctrine of res judicata did not apply, Kennedy failed to

satisfy the requirement of R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b), and the trial court was without

jurisdiction to consider the judicial bias arguments posed in this successive and

untimely petition.

The first, fourth, fifth, and sixth assignments of error are overruled.

B. Misstatement of Law

In the second assignment of error, Kennedy argues the trial court

erred in applying an improper standard in assessing his postconviction petition.

Specifically, Kennedy contends that the trial court’s judgment was premised, at least

in part, on the court’s erroneous belief that Kennedy was required to request leave

before filing the petition for postconviction relief. Kennedy also states that the court

inappropriately concluded that there was “No Just Cause for Delay.”

Kennedy is correct that unlike the language set forth in Crim.R. 33,

the statutory provision governing delayed petitions for postconviction relief does not

require leave of court. Rather, as discussed, the requirements for filing an untimely

or successive petition are governed by R.C. 2953.23. Nevertheless, regardless of the

trial court’s brief reference to Kennedy’s failure to seek leave in this matter, we find

no merit to Kennedy’s position based on our resolution of the first, fourth, fifth, and

sixth assignments of error. Finally, Kennedy has not directed this court to any case

law to suggest the trial court’s inclusion of the Civ.R. 54(B) language in its judgment

entry was error.

The second assignment of error is overruled.
 C. Fair and Impartial Trial Judge

In the third assignment of error, Kennedy reiterates arguments

previously addressed, claiming that the record demonstrates he was denied the

constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial judge. Kennedy contends that the

former trial judge’s response to the affidavit of disqualification demonstrates that

her personal feelings impaired her ability to remain impartial at the time of his trial.

Kennedy further claims in the seventh assignment of error that the doctrine of res

judicata should not apply where the prior rulings were made by a biased, nonneutral

trial judge.

Consistent with the foregoing discussion, we find no merit to

Kennedy’s arguments on appeal. As discussed, Kennedy’s judicial bias claim is

barred by res judicata or otherwise fails to satisfy the requirements of R.C.

2923.23(A)(1)(b).

The third and seventh assignments of error are overruled.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J., and
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR