In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-23-00375-CV
___________________________
ELISHA HOLLOWAY, Appellant
V.
REVELSTOKE VENTURE, LLC, Appellee
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2023-005682-1
Before Wallach, J.; Sudderth, C.J.; and Walker, J.
Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellee Revelstoke Venture, LLC prevailed on its forcible detainer action
against Appellant Elisha Holloway in the justice court. The judgment awarded
Revelstoke possession of the premises, $4,958 in back rent, and costs. The judgment
further ordered Holloway to pay $2,670 in rent into the court’s registry each month
during the pendency of any appeal.
Holloway appealed to the county court. The justice court sent her a notice
acknowledging receipt of the notice of appeal and reminding her that she needed to
deposit the monthly rental amount into the court’s registry within five days and that
her failure to make that payment “MAY RESULT IN THE COURT ISSUING A
WRIT OF POSSESSION WITHOUT HEARING.”
The next month, Revelstoke filed a motion requesting issuance of a writ of
possession on the basis that Holloway had failed to make the monthly rent payments
into the court’s registry. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.9(c)(5)(B)(iv). A month later, the
county court signed an “Order Authorizing Immediate Issuance of Writ of
Possession.” In the order, the county court found that Holloway had not paid rent
into the court’s registry, that Revelstoke had given Holloway proper notice of the
failure, and that Revelstoke was entitled to issuance of a writ of possession. The order
did not mention Revelstoke’s claim for back rent. Nevertheless, the order stated that
it was a final judgment disposing of all clams of all parties. The next day, the county
clerk issued the writ.
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Holloway appealed to this court. Because the clerk’s record shows that the writ
of possession had been executed, this court became concerned that the appeal was
moot. Consequently, we notified Holloway that we would dismiss the appeal unless
she or another party wishing to continue the appeal filed with this court a response
showing grounds for the appeal’s continuance.
Holloway filed a response, but it does not show grounds on which we may
continue the appeal. First, she cites Texas Property Code Section 92.0561 and asserts
that “[w]e assert our right under this code to address necessary repairs when the
landlord neglects maintenance requests.” See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 92.0561. Next,
she asserts that her appeal “defends the fundamental right of tenants to reside in
habitable dwellings, demanding swift resolution of maintenance issues.” She then
claims that Revelstoke’s “continuous disregard for maintenance requests potentially
breaches the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment” and that her “meticulously
documented email communication serves as indispensable evidence, exposing [her]
sincere attempts and the landlord’s failure to address valid concerns.” Finally, she
asserts that her appeal “is fueled by the violation of civil rights, including but not
limited to discrimination and harassment,” and she “insist[s] that our counterclaim1 be
duly considered in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations governing such
claims.”
1
The clerk’s record does not show that Holloway filed any counterclaims.
3
Regardless of whether Holloway would have had recourse against Revelstoke
for failing to perform its obligations under the lease, and regardless of whether
Holloway may have any other claims against Revelstoke, her response has not raised
any meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the property. As the
Supreme Court of Texas has explained, “[j]udgment of possession in a forcible
detainer action is not intended to be a final determination of whether the eviction is
wrongful; rather, it is a determination of the right to immediate possession.” Marshall
v. Hous. Auth. of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006). “The only issue in
a forcible detainer action is the right to actual possession of the premises.” Id. at
785 (emphasis added). Thus, a forcible detainer action may resolve only a claim for
possession and related claims for unpaid rent and attorney’s fees. See Tex. Prop. Code
Ann. §§ 24.0051, .006; Brigandi v. Am. Mortgage Inv. Partners Fund I Tr., No. 02-16-
00444-CV, 2017 WL 1428726, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 20, 2017, pet.
dism’d) (mem. op.).
Here, the county court’s judgment awards possession but does not award
damages or attorney’s fees, and so the only issue on appeal is possession. But
Holloway no longer has possession of the premises, her response did not raise any
meritorious claim of right to possession, and nothing in the record before us shows
that she has a potentially meritorious claim to possession. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at
787; Ratliff v. Homes by Ashley, Inc., No. 02-20-00014-CV, 2020 WL 1057320, at
*1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 5, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that a forcible-
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detainer appeal becomes moot upon an appellant’s eviction from the property unless
the appellant holds and asserts a meritorious claim of right to current, actual
possession of the property or unless damages or attorney’s fees remain at issue).
Accordingly, regardless of whether Holloway has other claims that she could
bring in a separate suit, she has not shown grounds for continuing this appeal.
Because she no longer has possession of the property, her appeal is moot, and we
have no jurisdiction over her appeal. We therefore vacate the county court’s judgment
and dismiss the appeal. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 790.
Per Curiam
Delivered: January 18, 2024
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