People v. Underwood CA1/2

Filed 1/26/24 P. v. Underwood CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A165026
v.
TYLER UNDERWOOD, (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. 18-CR-018052)
Defendant and Appellant.

Tyler Underwood appeals from convictions of murder and multiple
other offenses after he lost control of the car he was driving while under the
influence of alcohol and, in the resulting collision, one passenger was killed
and others injured. Underwood believes he was guilty of at most gross
vehicular manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter and challenges several
rulings preventing him from presenting the jury with these alternative
offenses. Additionally, he contends certain sentence enhancements were not
authorized by statute and must be stricken. We agree with the latter
argument and otherwise affirm the judgment.

1
 BACKGROUND
I.
Factual Background
A. The Collision
On the evening of October 9, 2018, Underwood was with Wint Kyaw,
Chris Stubbs, Darren Walker, Ron Mauck and Sean Johnson, talking and
drinking in the parking lot of the Fanwood Terrace apartment complex in
Fremont. Underwood’s four-year-old daughter, Jane Doe, was with him;
Underwood had recently won full custody of her. After an hour or two,
Underwood, Doe and Kyaw drove to McDonald’s, bought more beer and
returned to the apartments. A short time later, they went to the house where
Underwood was living, a few minutes drive away. Outside the house,
Underwood, Kyaw, Walker and others including Daniel Cameron and Blake
Blevins, continued drinking and talking.
Johnson testified that he left the group at the apartments after getting
into an argument with Underwood when Johnson said Underwood should not
be drinking and driving with his daughter in the car. Johnson could tell
when Underwood was impaired and he was not showing signs of being
intoxicated, but Johnson thought it was wrong to be drinking and driving
with your child in the car. He believed Underwood had a high tolerance for
alcohol and did not think beer “really affects” him. Johnson testified that
Underwood had “at least two” beers but acknowledged having told the
defense investigator that Underwood had “one to two” tall cans.
Kyaw testified that she drank three tall (24 ounce) cans of Mickey’s
beer and saw Underwood drinking Mickey’s tall cans. Before they left the
apartments to go to Underwood’s house, Stubbs asked Underwood if he was
“okay to drive” and said he should not drive with his daughter. Underwood

2
said he was fine and “[i]t’s just beer. It’s just water.” At Underwood’s house,
Kyaw saw Underwood drink “[m]aybe . . . two” Mickey’s cans and a shot of
Fireball whiskey, then acknowledged on cross examination that she did not
actually remember whether he drank any Fireball. Cameron testified that
Underwood drank at least two tall cans of beer, but he did not remember
exactly how much.
The group decided to get food from a restaurant in Milpitas. Blevins
drove one car, with Cameron as a passenger, and Underwood drove the other,
with Kyaw, Walker and Underwood’s daughter as passengers. Kyaw testified
that she knew Underwood was intoxicated because he had had “too many
beers,” he was stumbling and his face was red. She offered to drive but he
said he was okay, and she believed him. Blevins testified that Underwood
did not show any signs of being impaired by alcohol. Cameron testified that
he was intoxicated and believed Underwood was too, and that from his
experience drinking with Underwood, Underwood drank “to actually get
drunk.”
Kyaw sat in the front seat of Underwood’s BMW, with Doe behind her
and Walker behind Underwood. They stopped at a gas station a few minutes
from Underwood’s house. After watching a clip from the surveillance video
showing Underwood filling the tank and walking around, Kyaw testified that
he appeared to be intoxicated because he was stumbling.
After getting gas, Underwood got on the freeway, driving about 80
miles per hour. Blevins’s car was behind them, and then passed them going
at what Kyaw believed was around 100 miles per hour. Underwood caught
up with Blevins and the two cars raced. Kyaw did not feel safe because
Underwood was “driving and drinking.” She felt like he was driving faster
and faster and when she looked at the speedometer, it said 140 miles per

3
hour. The car started to swerve, Kyaw thought she heard a tire pop, and she
could feel the bumps of the lane dividers as the car moved to the right. She
and Walker had both told Underwood to slow down and he did, but the car
was already out of control.
The car flipped over a “cliff” and rolled three or four times. Kyaw hit
her head and briefly lost consciousness, then came to and heard Doe crying.
Kyaw’s head and ankle were bleeding. She wanted to get Doe out of the car,
which was smoking, and she climbed out the window because the car door
would not open. Cameron and Blevins helped get Doe out. Kyaw testified
that as she walked up the hill with Underwood, he told everyone that he was
not driving, Cameron was, and asked Kyaw, Cameron and Blevins to lie to
the police about who was driving. Everyone agreed; Kyaw testified that she
did so because she was in shock. She told California Highway Patrol (CHP)
officers that Cameron had been driving, which was not true. Kyaw had an
immunity agreement providing that her testimony could not be used against
her.
Blevins testified that as he was driving on the freeway at about 75
miles per hour with Underwood behind him, Underwood passed him on the
left, going about 100 miles per hour, and they jokingly threw hand signals at
each other. Underwood had told him his car could go 140 miles per hour. As
the gap between the cars grew, Blevins commented to Cameron that
Underwood needed to slow down because it was reckless to drive as fast as he
was driving. Blevins then suddenly saw Underwood’s taillights “starting to
go sideways” and realized Underwood had lost control of the car, which
veered across the freeway to the right. Cameron estimated that Underwood
was driving at least 90 miles per hour when he passed their car. He did not
feel like the cars were “interacting or racing.” He testified that Underwood

4
“hit a bump or something” and the car veered right and went down the
embankment.
Blevins pulled over and both he and Cameron ran down the
embankment. Underwood’s car was behind or against a tree and Doe and
Kyaw were screaming. Underwood was standing outside the car, by the
driver’s door according to Cameron and near the right-side passenger door
according to Blevins. Blevins and Cameron helped Doe out of her car seat.
Underwood asked Cameron to “take the fall” for him, saying he could not “get
another DUI” (Driving Under the Influence) and he would owe Cameron his
life. Cameron did not immediately reply.
Once they were back at the top of the hill, Cameron saw the police
coming and realized he had to answer Underwood. Cameron asked
Underwood, Kyaw and Blevins, “ ‘who was driving?’ ”; when Kyaw said
Underwood, Cameron said, “no, I was.” Cameron testified that he was
thinking he would “get a DUI” and “maybe sit in the jail for a day” but “just
get out . . . pretty soon.” Asked why he was willing to be arrested for
Underwood, Cameron testified that he thought about Underwood having just
gotten custody of Doe and that he was always trying to help people.
Blevins testified that Underwood told him Cameron was going to “take
the fall” for the accident and at first Blevins said he “wasn’t okay with that,”
then he agreed when Cameron told him it was alright. When the police
arrived, both Cameron and Blevins told them Cameron was driving.
B. Emergency Responders’ Observations
When CHP Officer Logan Dysert arrived at the scene, Cameron and
Kyaw each separately told him Cameron was the driver. Both had red,

5
watery eyes and Kyaw had the odor of alcohol on her breath.1 Underwood
said the car was his, but Cameron was the driver. Underwood, too, had red,
watery eyes, as well as a strong odor of alcohol on his breath and slurred
speech. Underwood answered Dysert’s questions very quickly, “like he
wanted to get out of there,” but he was cooperative, coherent and followed
Dysert’s directions. Dysert believed Underwood, Cameron and Kyaw were all
under the influence of alcohol. He conducted field sobriety tests with
Cameron, who did poorly, and placed him under arrest.
Several of the first responders at the scene testified, based on their
training and experience, that Underwood appeared to be intoxicated.
Paramedic David Eastin testified that Underwood was “very loud, very
belligerent” and did not appear to be cooperating appropriately with
emergency responders given the severity of the accident. At one point
Underwood appeared to lose his balance and “sidestepp[ed] into the freeway”
and someone grabbed him. Eastin testified that it was “apparent that there
was some substance on board.” Firefighter and paramedic Frank Carlucci
testified that Underwood was “very aggressive,” “belligerent” and “all over
the place,” “mak[ing] the scene very difficult to control”; “his hands were on
everybody,” he was not listening to what the paramedics were trying to tell
him and he did not appear to comprehend what Carlucci said to him.
Carlucci smelled alcohol on Underwood from a foot away. Fremont Fire
Department Captain and emergency medical technician Ronald Martin
described Underwood’s behavior as “erratic to the point where it was making
things very hard to assess our patients” and the responders “were worried

1 Dysert acknowledged that red, watery eyes can result from an airbag

deploying in a person’s face.

6
about his safety.” Underwood was moving a lot and yelling, and there was
concern that he was going to walk into traffic. Martin thought Underwood
was intoxicated based on his “loud, slurred speech” and “belligerence,” and
thought he smelled alcohol on Underwood. Underwood was very concerned
about his daughter, but in Martin’s experience his behavior “felt excessive
and extreme.”
Paramedic Glenn Rogers, who was with Underwood when he was
transported to the hospital, smelled alcohol on Underwood’s breath after
getting him into the ambulance. He asked if Underwood had had any alcohol
and Underwood said he had had several beers. Rogers did not recall
observing signs of intoxication other than the smell of alcohol. He gave
Underwood two doses of fentanyl, a total of 100 micrograms, which he
described as a “moderate” dose; he did not give a “significant” dose due to
concern about increased sedative effects caused by alcohol in his system.
Underwood was complaining of severe pain associated with bruising on his
chest and the fentanyl did not appear to relieve any of his pain. Underwood
was alert, oriented, cooperative and answered questions appropriately.
Rogers did not note any impairments such as slurred speech or lack of
coordination in his report and would have done so if he had observed them.
He did not recall or note in his report any changes in Underwood’s
orientation or ability to converse after he was given fentanyl.
Hospital records showed that the doctor who first assessed Underwood
noted “alcohol before driving,” “intoxication” and “ETOH [alcohol] on breath,”
all of which reflected only that alcohol was consumed, not how much or the
person’s level of intoxication. Underwood was alert and answered questions
appropriately. Dr. James Alva, who treated Underwood in the emergency
department, testified that a note saying “[p]atient appears intoxicated”

7
indicated he saw behavior or clinical signs of intoxication, as he would not
write this unless he believed there was sufficient evidence it was true.2
C. Discovery of Walker’s Body
No one told the officers and other first responders at the scene that
Walker had also been in the car. Walker’s body was found the day after the
crash, about 60 feet from where the car came to rest. The location was not
visible from the crash site even in daylight, and it would have been extremely
difficult to find Walker’s body at night. He died from multiple blunt
traumatic injuries to his head that were consistent with being ejected from a
vehicle moving at a very high rate of speed. It appeared he had not been
wearing a seat belt. In the opinion of the forensic pathologist who performed
the autopsy, it was very unlikely there was a period of time in which Walker
could have been resuscitated; he “had no chance.”
Kyaw learned that Walker had died from Mauck and decided she had
to tell the truth about who was driving, so she called CHP and said
Underwood was the driver. Cameron also told the police he was not the
driver when he learned that Walker had died; he testified that he never
would have said he was driving if he had known.
Johnson learned of Walker’s death on October 10, 2018, and was with
Underwood that evening at a mutual friend’s house. Underwood’s friends
were “grilling” him about whether he was driving, telling him he was
“screwed” if he was and should “kill himself or run.” In a recorded statement

2 Underwood was placed in a cervical collar that had to be replaced

multiple times because he removed it. The repeated removal without medical
approval indicated to Dr. Alva “an illogical thought process,” in this case most
likely due to either behavioral issues or intoxication. Dr. Alva was not aware
that Underwood had been given fentanyl. Underwood later testified that he
took off the neck collar because he was extremely uncomfortable and did not
think he had a neck injury.

8
to the police the next day, Johnson said there was an argument about who
was driving, the story changing from Cameron to Blevins and back, then
Underwood said he “screwed up” and “shouldn’t have been driving.” When
Johnson asked, “what did you say,” Underwood said Cameron was driving.
On October 18, 2018, Underwood called his cousin, Lani Jackson, who
worked as a technician with the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office; told her he
had been in a car accident and there was a warrant for his arrest; and asked
for her and her father to take him to turn himself in. Underwood said he had
been drinking and “racing a car full of friends,” that a friend was going to
“take the DUI for him” but “that changed” when they learned someone had
died, and that the police were looking for him and “had him on camera
getting into the driver’s seat at a gas station.” He was “[h]ysterical,” said he
was “going to go away forever because he had so many DUIs,” he was “drunk
and driving,” he had “killed his best friend” and his “daughter was in the
car.” As soon as they hung up, Jackson called the CHP and told the lead
officer on the case what Underwood had said. An hour or two later, in a
second phone call, Underwood told Jackson that he had not been driving and
there was no warrant, but he wanted to hide at her father’s house because
the victim’s family was looking for him. When she tried to convince him to
turn himself in, pointing out that her work calls were randomly recorded and
he had already said he was driving and on video, he said, “Why would I do
that when I wasn’t even the one driving.”
D. Underwood’s Blood Alcohol Level
Underwood’s blood was drawn by a trauma nurse at 12:33 a.m. on
October 10 and tested at the hospital’s clinical laboratory. As described by

9
the expert witness, Dr. Philip Sobolesky,3 the lab uses an enzymatic method
for testing ethanol levels, a fast method that measures levels of the molecule
NADH (nicotinamide adenine dinucleotide), which forms from ethanol.
NADH can be produced by a number of naturally occurring reactions in the
body and the enzymatic testing method does not identify the source. The
hospital lab tests plasma rather than whole blood.4 Ethanol concentrations
in plasma samples are about 1.14 times higher than in whole blood samples.
Underwood’s test results indicated a level of 0.181, which would convert to a
level of 0.158 in whole blood.5
Underwood’s blood samples were subsequently released for testing by a
forensic laboratory, Central Valley Toxicology Crime Lab (CVT).6 CVT tests

3 Dr. Sobolesky, a clinical biochemist at the Santa Clara Valley Medical

Center (SCVMC), testified as the People’s expert on operation of the machine
used by the lab to test for ethanol in blood.

4 Whole blood is the blood in a living person’s system.
Plasma is the
“aqueous phase on top” that results from centrifuging a whole blood sample
to which an anticoagulant has been added.

5 Asked on cross examination whether he was familiar with a

statement that individuals’ serum whole blood ratio varies from 1.09 to 1.35,
Sobolesky said he was not. The prosecutor subsequently asked Sobolesky to
convert Underwood’s 0.181 level by the lowest and highest conversion rates
in that range, which resulted in levels of 0.166 for the lowest conversion rate
and 0.134 for the highest.

6 Clinical labs process samples for purpose of medical treatment;

forensic labs, which test samples for use in criminal trials, must follow some
requirements beyond those applicable to clinical labs. Title 17 of the
California Code of Regulations establishes requirements for forensic labs.
(See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 17, § 1216 et seq.)
CVT is a state-approved forensic laboratory. It is not accredited.
California does not require forensic labs to be accredited.

10
for alcohol using a gas chromatograph with dual detector, a machine that
most hospital labs do not have. In accordance with regulations governing
forensic laboratories, CVT must test samples of whole blood with both
preservative and anticoagulant. CVT tested the gray tube top vial of
Underwood’s blood, the only vial that appeared to have both the preservative
and the anticoagulant required by title 17.7 The blood alcohol level in a
whole blood analysis was 0.147. Expert witness Bill Posey8 testified this
result was accurate within a range from 0.139 to 0.156 and was consistent
with the 0.158 whole blood conversion result from the hospital lab plasma
test.
Given a hypothetical of a six-foot four-inch, 290-pound man who
stopped drinking at about 10:55 p.m., crashed his vehicle at about 11:10 p.m.,
and was found to have 0.14 percent blood alcohol content in blood drawn at
about 12:33 a.m., Posey estimated the blood alcohol level at the time of the
crash would have been 0.15 to 0.16. If the test showed a level of 0.15, the
estimated level at the time of the crash would be 0.16 to 0.17. Studies on the
effects of alcohol and driving indicate that one hundred percent of the
population will show “marked impairment” at a 0.15 level. For a man of this
size, it would take ten to eleven 12-ounce cans of beer to reach a 0.14 level if

7 Underwood’s blood had been tested previously by a person who had

since left CVT and moved out of state. The People requested that the sample
be retested by a current employee who would be able to testify at trial.

8 Posey, a forensic toxicologist and licensed medical technologist who

founded CVT and at the time of trial had recently retired as its director,
testified as the People’s expert on analysis and determination of blood alcohol
and controlled substances content and the effects of alcohol on the human
body.

11
all were consumed in a short period of time, more if the drinks were
consumed over a period of hours.
E. Prior Incidents Involving Drinking and Driving
Underwood had five prior convictions related to driving under the
influence of alcohol. At the time of each conviction, he was advised in writing
and by his attorney and the court that being under the influence of alcohol
impairs his ability to safely operate a motor vehicle, driving while under the
influence of alcohol is extremely dangerous to human life, and if he continued
to drive under the influence of alcohol and someone was killed as a result, he
could be charged with murder. Each time, Underwood acknowledged his
understanding of these advisements. Underwood received the same
advisements, and acknowledged his understanding of them, when he applied
for a new driver’s license shortly after the 2008 conviction. Underwood was
also told, upon each of the five convictions, that his driver’s license would be
suspended and that he was required to install an ignition interlock device on
any car he drove.
Underwood’s first arrest for driving under the influence was in 2007,
when he was 20 years old; in October 2008 pleaded no contest to a “wet and
reckless,” a lesser included offense of DUI. He was required to complete a 30-
hour, first offender DUI program, during which there was repeated
discussion of the dangers of drinking and driving and the possibility of being
charged with murder if someone died as a result of his drinking and driving.
While that case was pending, in February 2008, Underwood was again
arrested for driving under the influence. He pleaded guilty to driving with a
blood alcohol content over 0.08 percent and was required to attend a six-
month course on the dangers of drunk driving. He was next arrested for
driving under the influence in February 2012, pleaded guilty a few months

12
later and was required to complete an 18-month DUI course but did not do so.
While on probation, he was again arrested for driving under the influence
and pleaded guilty to driving with a blood alcohol level above 0.08 in October
2013. Finally, Underwood was arrested for drinking and driving on March
11, 2018, and pleaded guilty in August 2018. He was advised that he had to
complete another 18-month DUI course but never enrolled in one.
A few months before the October 9, 2018, collision, Underwood drove
76-year-old Ronald Mauck to pick up Kyaw in San Jose. On the way back to
Fremont, Underwood stopped at a liquor store and bought a tall can of
Mickey’s, which he kept between his legs and drank as he drove to Fremont.
Mauck became concerned when Underwood started driving 100 miles per
hour on the 880 freeway, changing lanes and dodging in and out of traffic.
Mauck told Underwood to slow down, saying “if he gets in a wreck and hurts
me, he better kill me because if he don’t, I’m gonna take him apart.”
F. Defense Case
1. Expert Testimony on Blood Alcohol Testing
Janine Arvizu testified as an expert in laboratory quality assurance,
standards, proficiency and testing programs, operations, method validation
and quality control of chemical tests, including testing for ethanol content in
serum plasma or whole blood samples. She concluded that the results of the
blood testing by the SCVMC lab were not reliable because the enzymatic
testing method is considered a screening tool and is suitable for use in clinical
settings9 but not for forensic purposes; the lab tested plasma rather than
whole blood (as title 17 requires); and the testing procedures and chain of

9 Arvizu did not evaluate the reliability of the blood alcohol test results

for use in a clinical setting and noted that the CVMC testing appeared to
have complied with the lab’s internal clinical requirements.

13
custody were lacking. The blood sample CVT tested was not suitable for a
forensic alcohol test because it did not have sufficient preservative and there
was no record showing that a critical piece of the testing equipment was
properly calibrated, and the CVT results could not be used to confirm the
SCVMC results because the two labs tested different blood samples.
Arvizu explained that to prevent microbes from changing the
composition of blood samples, they must be refrigerated and must have
sufficient preservative. Bacteria in blood can cause elevated levels of ethanol
and yeast can cause bacteria to form through fermentation; sufficient
preservative in a blood sample prevents bacteria from growing but does not
stop yeast from growing. Arvizu testified that there is no way to tell from
looking at or smelling a sample that fermentation has occurred. In the
present case, the blood samples were not refrigerated when transported from
SCMVC to CVT and the manner in which they were transported raised
questions about the reliability of subsequent ethanol testing. 10
Arvizu expressed concerns about CVT’s quality management systems
and the lab not being accredited, as accreditation bodies impose higher

10 The blood samples were transported from SCVM to CVT by

motorcycle and were not refrigerated during the two-hour trip; the vials were
in a paper evidence envelope on top of the CHP officer’s jacket in the
saddlebag of his motorcycle, the bottom of which is a few inches from the
motorcycle’s exhaust pipe, which gets hot.
The People’s expert witnesses agreed that increased temperature can
cause fermentation, which would result in an artificially high alcohol level,
but neither considered this a problem in this case. Sobolesky testified that
“[g]enerally bacteria aren’t in a patient’s bloodstream to the degree that
would interfere” and, since the tubes are vacuum sealed, they are not subject
to contamination from outside sources if unopened. Posey did not think
fermentation was an issue with Underwood’s sample because no visible signs
or odor of fermentation were noted.

14
standards than California does. She acknowledged that the regulations in
title 17 do not require use of any specific type of test tube or amount of
preservative for a reliable ethanol test. Nor do the regulations refer to
refrigeration or chain of custody requirements. The regulations do prohibit
using alcohol to clean the skin where a specimen will be collected (as was
done when Underwood’s blood was drawn), which Arvizu testified is
important because even if the alcohol used is isopropanol, the indirect testing
method can misidentify isopropanol as ethanol.11
2. Underwood’s Testimony
Underwood testified that he was raised by his grandparents from age
12 on. They drank frequently, and Underwood learned to cope with stress
and problems with alcohol. He started drinking when he was 16. Despite his
DUIs, he did not think he had an alcohol problem. He knew he was not

11 Underwood’s skin was cleaned with isopropyl alcohol before the blood

draw. The procedure followed is to first clean the area with isopropyl alcohol
or ChloraPreps (chlorhexidine and isopropyl alcohol), then let it dry before
inserting the needle so as to avoid accidentally injecting any live bacteria
that might remain on the skin.
The People’s experts did not consider this a problem. Sobolesky
testified that there are studies showing alcohol used to clean the skin before a
blood draw can affect the accuracy of the results, but the impact can be
avoided by waiting a certain time after wiping the area before drawing the
sample. Although the manufacturer’s package insert for the hospital’s
testing equipment says not to use alcohol at the draw site, Sobolesky testified
this was not an issue for a clinical lab because the contribution of an alcohol
wipe “is quite negligible” and “not really a factor in terms of patient care”; he
acknowledged the contribution could be significant for legal purposes.
Posey testified that use of an isopropyl alcohol wipe would not affect
the results of testing for ethanol because the results would show the other
type of alcohol if it was present. Even if the machine could not distinguish
the two types of alcohol, the only potential significance would be for the first
vial drawn and the vial CVT tested was not the first one drawn.

15
allowed to drive with alcohol in his system and could not explain why he
continued to do so. He had not had a valid driver’s license since his first
conviction in 2008 and had never tried to regain his license. He had never
installed an ignition interlock device despite knowing he was required to do
so and driving without one was a violation of his probation.
Underwood considered himself to have a high tolerance for beer
because he is a big man and had been drinking for a long time. He thought it
was dangerous to drive if he was feeling the effects of alcohol, but not if he
was not feeling its effects.
In October 2018, Underwood was working but was looking for a job that
would fit the schedule of his daughter’s daycare. He had an interview
scheduled for October 10. On the evening of October 9, the group got together
because Walker was getting ready to leave for a few months for a job;
Underwood had texted Blevins that Walker was leaving “and let’s get him
fucked up.” Underwood was not planning to drink as much as he might have,
since his daughter was there and he had the interview the next day. He
testified that he drank two tall cans of Mickey’s and part of a third over the
course of the evening. He did not drink any Fireball.
Underwood was on probation and knew that one of the conditions was
that he does not drive with alcohol in his system, even if he was not feeling
its effects. He testified that when the group wanted to go for food, he drove
because he had not had as much to drink as everyone else, was not feeling
any effects from the alcohol he had consumed and believed he could drive
safely; he would not have driven otherwise.
Underwood testified that when he sped up to pass Blevins on the
freeway, he was going between 90 and 100 miles per hour for four to five
seconds; when he hit 100 miles per hour, Kyaw told him to slow down and he

16
let off the gas. He did not believe driving fast was necessarily dangerous or
that someone was likely to die if he drove fast, and he did not feel he was
putting anyone in danger with his driving.
After he took his foot off the accelerator, Underwood heard a noise, his
car pitched to the right and he lost control of it. He did not remember the car
rolling down the embankment or crashing; when came to, he did not have his
glasses on, he heard Doe crying and, when he could not open the car door, he
climbed out the sunroof. He was “super freaked out” and “discombobulated,”
scared and worried about Doe and Kyaw. He thought Walker was okay and
had walked off; it never occurred to him that Walker could have been ejected
from the car.
Underwood testified that he was “a little bit” worried that he could get
another DUI even though he was not feeling the effects of alcohol. He asked
Cameron to say he was driving because he had just worked so hard to get
custody of Doe and was “finally starting” to get his life in order. He felt
“pretty desperate” because he was scared of having his daughter taken away
and “possible repercussions of what had happened.” He acknowledged lying
about who was driving to the first responders, at the hospital and to Walker’s
mother. When he was interacting with the first responders, Underwood was
worried about Doe and trying to relay to them that she had epilepsy; she had
recently been diagnosed and he did not know if the epilepsy might be
triggered by the collision. He did not remember stepping into the roadway
but testified he might have done so when he was trying to step around the
paramedic to get to the back of the ambulance, because he could not see
without his glasses. He did not tell the first responders that anyone else had
been in the vehicle because Walker “didn’t particularly like law enforcement”
and Underwood thought Walker might have walked away to avoid having an

17
interaction with them. Underwood learned of Walker’s death when Blevins
called him on the evening of October 10, 2018. Underwood denied driving
100 miles per hour with a beer between his legs when he was driving with
Mauck.
II.
Legal Proceedings
The first amended information filed on July 29, 2021, charged
Underwood with second degree murder (Pen. Code,12 § 187, subd. (a))
(count 1); child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a)) (count 2); driving under the influence
of alcohol (DUI) causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)) with prior
convictions (Veh. Code, §§ 23560, 23566) (count 3); with special allegations
that he was driving at least 30 miles per hour over the maximum speed limit
(Veh. Code, § 23103), proximately caused bodily injury and death to more
than one victim (Veh. Code, § 23558) and had a passenger under the age of
14; driving with over 0.08 percent blood alcohol level causing injury (Veh.
Code, § 23153, subd. (b)) with prior convictions (Veh. Code, §§ 23560, 23566),
with the same special allegations as in count 3 (count 4); misdemeanor
driving with a suspended license for a prior DUI (Veh. Code, § 14601.2,
subd. (a)) (count 5); misdemeanor unlawful operation of a vehicle without a
functioning ignition interlock device (Veh. Code, § 23247, subd. (e)) (count 6);
and two infractions, driving at a speed exceeding 100 miles per hour (Veh.
Code, § 22348, subd. (b)) (count 7) and driving with a blood alcohol

12 Further undesignated statutory references will be to the Penal Code

except as otherwise specified.

18
concentration of 0.01 percent or greater while on probation for a DUI (Veh.
Code, § 23154, subd. (a)) (count 8).
The initial information, filed on February 14, 2020, had included a
count of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, with a prior
(§ 191.5, subd. (a)).
On November 23, 2021, a jury found Underwood guilty on all counts
and found the special allegations true. On March 4, 2022, the trial court
denied Underwood’s motion for a new trial and imposed sentence. The court
sentenced Underwood to a prison term of 15 years to life on count 1; a
consecutive middle term of four years on count 2; a concurrent one-third
middle term of one year on count 3, with concurrent one-year terms for each
of the three victims for the Vehicle Code section 23558 enhancements, stayed
pursuant to section 654, and concurrent jail terms of 60 days and 30 days,
respectively, for the Vehicle Code section 23582 and 23572 enhancements;
the same sentence on count 4 as on count 3, stayed pursuant to section 654;
stayed six-month sentences on counts 5 and 6; and fines of $500 each on
counts 7 and 8.
Underwood filed a timely notice of appeal on March 7, 2022.
DISCUSSION
I.
Refusal to Instruct on Vehicular Manslaughter
In an argument raised primarily to preserve the issue for further
review, Underwood maintains his rights to due process and a fair trial were

19
violated by the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on gross vehicular
manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder.
A. Background
The People moved in limine to prohibit the defense from arguing to the
jury that Underwood was only guilty of vehicular manslaughter, arguing that
vehicular manslaughter may be related to but is not a lesser included offense
of the charged murder. In opposition, the defense pointed out that the People
had elected to dismiss the originally charged count of gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated (§ 191.5, subd. (a)), presumably “to take
away Mr. Underwood’s right to have instructions on the lesser-included
offenses to that charge,” and argued that Underwood had a right to argue he
was guilty only of a lesser related, uncharged, offense even if he was not
entitled to jury instructions on the offense.13
The trial court held that because gross vehicular manslaughter is not a
lesser included offense within the charged murder and it could not instruct
on a lesser related offense without the People’s agreement, it would not
“(1) instruct on gross vehicular manslaughter, (2) allow the Defense to
discuss that instruction or statute, or (3) allow the Defense to say that
Mr. Underwood may have committed gross vehicular manslaughter.” The
court stated that the defense was “free, of course, to fully argue that the
People have not proven implied malice or any other element of murder. The
Defense may argue that Mr. Underwood drove under the influence of alcohol,

13 Underwood relied on People v. Valentine (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th

1383, 1388, which held that a defendant charged with robbery was not
entitled to jury instructions on receiving stolen property because he was not
charged with that offense but noted, “[w]e do not suggest, however, that
Valentine could not argue to the jury that his culpability was as one who was
in possession of stolen property but not one who committed a robbery.” (Id.
at pp. 1385, 1388.)

20
did something that could cause death, acted with gross negligence, and killed
Mr. Walker due to that negligence. The Defense may even argue that these
facts may add up to a ‘different offense’ but not murder.” (Fn. omitted.)
B. Governing Legal Principles
Underwood was charged with murder in violation of section 187,
subdivision (a), which defines murder as “the unlawful killing of a human
being . . . with malice aforethought.” People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290
(Watson) held that a person who kills another while driving under the
influence of alcohol may be charged with second degree murder if the
circumstances support a finding of implied malice. (Id. at pp. 294, 298–299.)
This is “informally known as a Watson murder.” (People v. Wolfe (2018)
20 Cal.App.5th 673, 677 (Wolfe).)
“Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the unlawful killing
of a human being without malice aforethought, in the driving of a vehicle,
where the driving was in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 of the
Vehicle Code, and the killing was either the proximate result of the
commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, and with gross
negligence, or the proximate result of the commission of a lawful act that
might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence.”
(§ 191.5, subd. (a).)
“When the prosecution charges a defendant with a Watson murder, a
vehicular manslaughter charge may be related to, but it is not necessarily
included within, the murder charge. (People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th
983, 990 (Sanchez), overruled on another point in People v. Reed (2006)
38 Cal.4th 1224, 1228–1229.)” (Wolfe, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 685.)
Sanchez held that gross vehicular manslaughter is not a lesser included
offense of murder because “the statutory elements of murder do not include

21
all the elements of the lesser offense. Gross vehicular manslaughter while
intoxicated requires proof of elements that need not be proved when the
charge is murder, namely, use of a vehicle and intoxication. Specifically,
section 191.5 requires proof that the homicide was committed ‘in the driving
of a vehicle’ and that the driving was in violation of specified Vehicle Code
provisions prohibiting driving while intoxicated.” (Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal.4th
at p. 989.) Gross vehicular manslaughter is not a lesser included offense
under the statutory elements test because “[a]lthough as a factual matter, a
murder may be carried out by means of a vehicle and by an intoxicated
driver, in the abstract it obviously is possible to commit a murder without
committing gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated.” (Id., at p. 988.)
“A trial court must instruct on all lesser included offenses supported by
substantial evidence.” (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 561.)
Instructions on lesser related offenses, however, are permitted only if both
parties agree. (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 668; People v. Birks
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 108,136–137.) “A defendant has no right to instructions on
lesser related offenses, even if he or she requests the instruction and it would
have been supported by substantial evidence, because California law does not
permit a court to instruct concerning an uncharged lesser related crime
unless agreed to by both parties.” (People v. Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th at
p. 668.)
“To determine if an offense is lesser and necessarily included in another
offense for this purpose, [courts] apply either the elements test or the
accusatory pleading test. ‘Under the elements test, if the statutory elements
of the greater offense include all of the statutory elements of the lesser
offense, the latter is necessarily included in the former. Under the
accusatory pleading test, if the facts actually alleged in the accusatory

22
pleading include all of the elements of the lesser offense, the latter is
necessarily included in the former.’ (People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224,
1227–1228.)” (People v. Shockley (2013) 58 Cal.4th 400, 404.)
C. Analysis
1. Under Sanchez, Gross Vehicular Manslaughter Is Not a Lesser
Included Offense of Murder
Underwood takes issue with Sanchez, pointing out that the court took a
different approach with respect to theft offenses in People v. Ortega (1998)
19 Cal.4th 686 (Ortega). The issue in Ortega was whether the defendant
could be convicted of both robbery and theft under the rule prohibiting
multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses. (Id. at p. 694.)
In holding he could not be convicted of both offenses, Ortega explained that
although some forms of theft require proof of facts not required for robbery
(e.g., grand theft of an automobile), “[f]ocusing upon whether a particular
form of theft necessarily is included within the offense of robbery misses the
point, recognized in our early case law, that the crime of theft, in one form or
another, always is included within robbery.” (Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal.4th at
pp. 695–697.) As described in Sanchez, Ortega “emphasized a particular
historical tradition—the long-standing recognition of the law that theft is a
lesser included offense of robbery” and robbery is “ ‘ “ ‘simply an aggravated
form of theft with the additional element of force or fear.’ ” ’ ” (Sanchez, at
p. 992, quoting Ortega, at p. 695.)
In distinguishing Ortega, Sanchez explained, “Although it generally is
true that manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder, because
generally manslaughter simply involves an unlawful killing of a human being
without malice, gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated—like assault
with a deadly weapon—requires proof of additional elements that are not

23
included in the offense of murder or in other forms of nonvehicular
manslaughter. . . . Although we recognize that historically manslaughter in
general has been considered a necessarily included offense within murder,
that long and settled tradition has not extended to the more recently enacted
forms of vehicular manslaughter that require proof of additional elements.”
(Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 992.)
Underwood relies heavily on Justice Kennard’s dissent in Sanchez,
which challenged the majority’s “departure from its analysis in Ortega” and
argued that, as with theft and robbery, “it is irrelevant that gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated has elements that distinguish it from other
forms of manslaughter, because manslaughter, in whatever form it happens
to occur, is a necessarily included offense of murder” (Sanchez, supra,
24 Cal.4th 983 at p. 1001, (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) Justice Kennard’s
position, of course, was considered and rejected by the Sanchez majority—
which, as Underwood recognizes, we are bound to follow. (Auto Equity Sales,
Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
2. The Expanded Accusatory Pleadings Test Is Inconsistent with
Precedent
Sanchez, as noted, determined that gross vehicular manslaughter is not
a lesser included offense of murder under the statutory elements test.
Underwood argues the result would be different under the “expanded
accusatory pleading test” applied in People v. Ortega (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th
956, which held that “[t]he evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing must
be considered in applying the accusatory pleading test when the specific
conduct supporting a holding order establishes that the charged offense
necessarily encompasses a lesser offense.” (Id. at p. 967.) Underwood argues
that although the first amended information tracked the language of the

24
statute, the jury instructions required proof of driving under the influence, so
that the prosecutor was required to prove the elements of gross vehicular
manslaughter in order to prove murder.14
As Underwood recognizes, People v. Ortega, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th 956
has been criticized as contrary to California Supreme Court precedent.
(People v. Macias (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 957, 963; People v. Alvarez (2019)
32 Cal.App.5th 781, 789; People v. Munoz (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 143, 156
(Munoz).) “The Supreme Court has indicated repeatedly . . . that when
applying the accusatory pleading test to determine whether one offense is
necessarily included in another, courts do not look to evidence beyond the
actual pleading and its allegations regarding the purported greater offense.
(See, e.g., People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1160 . . . [‘When applying
the accusatory pleading test, “[t]he trial court need only examine the
accusatory pleading” ’], overruled in part in People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th
363, 391; accord, People v. Smith (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232, 244; see also People
v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1036 . . . [‘Consistent with the primary
function of the accusatory pleading test—to determine whether a defendant
is entitled to instruction on a lesser uncharged offense—we consider only the
pleading for the greater offense’].) ¶ Indeed, in cases such as this one in
which ‘the accusatory pleading incorporates the statutory definition of the

14 Underwood’s opening brief specifically states that his argument
concerning the accusatory pleading test, like his argument that Sanchez
reached the wrong conclusion, is raised to preserve the issue for further
review. In his reply brief, however, he “clarifies” that his other arguments
are raised for consideration on the merits because the California Supreme
Court “has not yet addressed application of the expanded pleadings test in
these circumstances.”

25
charged offense without referring to the particular facts, a reviewing court
must rely on the statutory elements to determine if there is a lesser included
offense.’ (People v. Robinson (2016) 63 Cal.4th 200, 207, italics added; see
also [People v. Shockley, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 404] [‘because the information
. . . simply tracked [the statutory] language without providing additional
factual allegations, we focus on the elements test’].)” (Munoz, supra,
31 Cal.App.5th at p. 156.)
Not surprisingly, the Courts of Appeal have rejected the expanded
accusatory pleading test in cases directly on point, upholding trial courts’
refusal to instruct on gross vehicular manslaughter as a lesser included
offense of a charged Watson murder. (People v. Alvarez, supra,
32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 787–788; Munoz, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at pp. 155–
158.) We agree. Underwood was not entitled to jury instructions on gross
vehicular manslaughter.
II.
Section 192, Subdivision (b), Excludes Involuntary Manslaughter as a
Lesser Included Offense of Murder
“Generally, involuntary manslaughter is a lesser offense included
within the offense of murder.” (People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083,
1145.) Involuntary manslaughter is defined as “the unlawful killing of a
human being without malice ¶ . . . ¶ in the commission of an unlawful act,
not amounting to a felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might
produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and
circumspection.” (§ 192, subd. (b).) The statutory definition, however,

26
further provides: “This subdivision shall not apply to acts committed in the
driving of a vehicle.” (§ 192, subd. (b).)
Despite this statutory exclusion, Underwood contends section 192,
subdivision (b) should not be read to exclude vehicle-based involuntary
manslaughter as a lesser included offense to murder because, in his view, the
history of the provision shows the Legislature did not intend the exclusion to
allow a prosecutor’s decision to charge only murder to leave the jury with an
all or nothing choice between murder and no liability. Underwood argues
that excluding vehicle-based manslaughter from section 192, subdivision (b)
violates his constitutional right to equal protection because defendants
charged with murder based on an act of driving a vehicle are denied the
benefit of lesser included offense instructions on involuntary manslaughter to
which those charged with murder committed by other means are entitled.
A. Section 192, Subdivision (b) Means What it Says
Underwood argues that the Legislature’s intent, when it adopted the
language of what is now the section 192, subdivision (b) exclusion, was
simply to prevent dual liability for the same act under both the Penal Code
and the Vehicle Code. The language was initially adopted as part of a 1941
amendment to former Vehicle Code section 500 (Stats. 1941, ch. 279, § 1,
p. 1414), which then defined vehicular manslaughter. (Watson, supra,
30 Cal.3d at p. 297.) The amendment “elevate[ed] the standard of culpable
conduct” from negligence to “reckless disregard of, or wilful indifference to,
the safety of others.” (Ibid.) It included a provision stating, “ ‘Hereafter, the
provisions of the Penal Code, defining involuntary manslaughter, shall not
apply to homicide caused by the driving of any vehicle.’ ” (People v. Mitchell
(1946) 27 Cal.2d 678, 684. (Mitchell)) As Underwood points out, Mitchell
observed that “[t]he sentence last quoted prevented dual liability under

27
section 500 of the Vehicle Code and section 192 of the Penal Code for the
same conduct.” (Ibid.)
Although the Legislature has since reorganized the relevant statutes,15
it has maintained the separation between involuntary manslaughter (§ 192,
subd. (b)) and vehicular manslaughter (§§ 192, subd. (c), 191.5, subd. (a)),
including the exclusionary language in section 192, subdivision (b), and
eventually further separated vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated
(§ 191.5, subd. (a)) from other forms of vehicular manslaughter (§ 192,
subd. (c)). Consistent with its exclusionary language, the Courts of Appeal
have applied section 192, subdivision (b) in upholding trial courts’ refusal to
instruct on involuntary manslaughter when a defendant is charged with a
Watson murder. (Munoz, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at pp. 151, 153–154; Wolfe,
supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 686.)

15 Vehicle Code section 500 was repealed in 1943 and section 193 “was

amended to provide a specific penalty for involuntary manslaughter resulting
from the operation of a vehicle.” (Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 297–298.)
Then, “[i]n 1945, subdivision 3 was added to section 192 (Stats. 1945,
ch. 1006, § 1, p. 1943) to provide a separate category for vehicular
manslaughter in addition to the voluntary and involuntary categories.”
(Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 298.) “In 1983, [the Legislature] further
defined vehicular manslaughter as being with or without gross negligence
and with or without some form of intoxication. (Former § 192, subd. 3, as
amended by Stats. 1983, ch. 937, § 1, pp. 3387–3388.)” (People v. Bennett
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 1032, 1035.)
In 1986, the Legislature enacted section 191.5, defining the offense of
gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated and replacing what had
previously been subdivision (c)(3) of [section] 192 (vehicular manslaughter).
(People v. Bennett, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1035–1036 and fn. 2.) At the same
time, the Legislature expressly stated in section 192, subdivision (c)(1), that
the subdivision defines vehicular manslaughter “[e]xcept as provided in
Section 191.5.” (Stats. 1986, ch. 1106, § 3, p. 3881.)

28
 Munoz explained: “Involuntary manslaughter is a lesser included
offense of murder; thus, a trial court must instruct the jury on involuntary
manslaughter ‘[i]f the evidence presents a material issue of whether a killing
was committed without malice, and if there is substantial evidence the
defendant committed involuntary manslaughter.’ (People v. Cook (2006)
39 Cal.4th 566, 596.) [¶] If a defendant is charged with murder caused by
driving a vehicle while intoxicated, however, a trial court cannot give an
involuntary manslaughter instruction, because the alleged killing was an
‘act[ ] committed in the driving of a vehicle’ exempt from the involuntary
manslaughter statute. (§ 192, subd. (b); see Wolfe, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 685–686.) Thus, section 192, subdivision (b) effectively eliminates
involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder when
‘committed in the driving of a vehicle.’ (§ 192, subd. (b).)” (Munoz, supra,
31 Cal.App.5th at pp. 153–154.)
Underwood argues that these cases, which he describes as applying
“the plain meaning of the proviso” in section 192, subdivision (b), result in
harsher treatment for homicides resulting from acts of driving than for
homicides resulting from other acts, since the jury is forced into an all or
nothing choice between murder and acquittal. The “plain reading,” he
maintains, leads to “absurd results, contrary to the Legislative intent,”
because the proviso was intended only to prevent dual liability and there is
no indication the legislature intended to treat vehicular homicides more
harshly than other homicides. Underwood argues that the Legislature
excluded vehicular homicide from the involuntary manslaughter statute at
the same time it added vehicular manslaughter to section 192 with a less
severe punishment than that for involuntary manslaughter, thus “indicating

29
an intent to exclude vehicular based homicide from involuntary
manslaughter to ensure lesser punishment.”16
Underwood is correct that the punishment originally attached to
vehicular manslaughter was less severe than the punishment for involuntary
manslaughter. For example, in 1943, when the punishment for vehicular
involuntary manslaughter was set at not more than one year in county jail or
a state prison term of not more than five years, the punishment for
involuntary manslaughter was imprisonment for not more than 10 years.
(Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 297.) But Underwood’s suggestion that the
exclusion of vehicular manslaughter from the involuntary manslaughter
statute reflects legislative intent to ensure lesser punishment for the former
is unpersuasive in light of subsequent changes to the punishments for these
offenses, throughout which the Legislature has retained the section 192
proviso. Currently, involuntary manslaughter is punishable by
imprisonment for two, three or four years. (§ 193, subd. (b).) Vehicular
manslaughter under section 192, subdivision (c), is subject to punishment
ranging from a jail term of not more than a year to a term of four, six or ten
years, depending on how it is committed.17 Gross vehicular manslaughter

16 Underwood’s chronology appears to be slightly off:The exclusionary
provision was first adopted in 1941; a separate penalty was attached to
vehicle-based involuntary manslaughter in 1943; and vehicular
manslaughter was added to section 192 in 1945. (Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at
pp. 297–298.)

17 Vehicular manslaughter under section 192, subdivision (c)(1) (gross

negligence) is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for not more
than a year or in state prison for two, four or six years; vehicular
manslaughter under section 192, subdivision (c)(3) (knowingly causing
accident for financial gain in connection with presenting a false or fraudulent

30
while intoxicated under section 191.5 is punishable by imprisonment for four,
six or ten years (§ 191.5, subd. (c)(1)) and, for a person such as Underwood,
who has one or more prior convictions under enumerated statutes pertaining
to multiple convictions for DUI offenses, is punishable by a prison term of 15
years to life (§ 191.5, subd. (d).) Clearly, the Legislature no longer views
vehicular manslaughter—and particularly vehicular manslaughter while
intoxicated—as subject to lesser punishment than involuntary manslaughter,
and the exclusion of vehicular manslaughter from section 192, subdivision (b)
cannot be seen as ensuring lesser punishment.
The absurdity that Underwood sees in what he concedes is the plain
meaning of the exclusion in section 192, subdivision (b) was pointed out by
Justice Kennard in her Sanchez dissent with respect to vehicular
manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder: “When an intoxicated
driver becomes involved in a fatal accident, a prosecutor may elect to charge
the driver only with murder, without also charging any form of vehicular
manslaughter. Because, under the majority's holding, trial courts may not
instruct on vehicular manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder,
juries in these instances will face the difficult and troubling all-or-nothing
choice between a murder conviction and an acquittal. Thus, the majority's
decision will deny juries ‘the opportunity to consider the full range of criminal
offenses established by the evidence.’ (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th
186, 197; see also People v. Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 127.)” (Sanchez,
supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1001, (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) This argument did

claim) is punishable by a prison term of four, six or 10 years. (§ 193,
subd. (c).)

31
not convince the majority that vehicular manslaughter under section 191.5
should be considered a lesser included offense of murder.
While Sanchez did not address section 192, subdivision (b),18 Justice
Kennard’s argument applies equally to the statutory exclusion of vehicle-
based manslaughter from the definition of involuntary manslaughter, which
also removes the possibility of a lesser offense to murder and therefore leaves
the jury with a “difficult and troubling all-or-nothing choice” when the
prosecutor charges only murder and not gross vehicular manslaughter. The
Sanchez majority’s implicit acceptance of this consequence of its decision
makes it difficult to see the same consequence as “absurd” in the context of
section 192, subdivision (b). Moreover, the Legislature has retained the
section 192, subdivision (b) exclusion despite the consequence pointed out by
the Sanchez dissent more than 20 years ago.
“To justify departing from a literal reading of a clearly worded statute,
the result must be so unreasonable that the Legislature could not have
intended it.” (Lopez v. Sony Electronics, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 627, 638.) In
light of Sanchez, we cannot find the effect of the section 192, subdivision (b)
exclusion on cases charging murder based on driving a vehicle so absurd as to
justify departing from the unambiguous language of statute. “ ‘ “[T]he power
to define crimes and fix penalties is vested exclusively in the legislative
branch.” (Keeler v. Superior Court [(1970)] 2 Cal.3d 619, 631 . . . ;
[citations].)’ (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 516.)”

18 The issue in that case was not, as here, what lesser included offense

instructions should be offered to the jury but rather whether the defendant
could be convicted of both second degree murder and gross vehicular
manslaughter based on the same act—which he could not if one offense was a
lesser necessarily included offense of the other. (Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal.4th
at p. 988.)

32
(People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1183.) If the Legislature does not
intend the plain language of section 192, subdivision (b) to apply when a
defendant is charged with a Watson murder, it is for the Legislature to refine
the statute.
B. The Statutory Exclusion Does Not Violate Underwood’s Equal
Protection Rights19
“ ‘Equal protection of the laws means that similarly situated persons
shall be treated similarly unless there is a sufficiently good reason to treat
them differently.’ (People v. Castel (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1321, 1326.) In
evaluating an equal protection challenge, we first determine ‘whether there
are two groups of individuals who are “ ‘ “similarly situated with respect to
the legitimate purpose of the law” ’ ” but are being treated differently.’ (Ibid.)
‘[I]f these threshold requirements are met, a court must next ascertain
whether the Legislature has a constitutionally sufficient reason to treat the
groups differently.’ (Ibid.) As a general matter, laws ‘will be upheld as long
as there is any “ ‘ “rational relationship between the disparity of treatment
and some legitimate governmental purpose,” ’ ” even if the rational basis for
that law was never articulated by—or even relied on by—the Legislature.’
(Id. at p. 1327.) However, if the law ‘affects a fundamental right,’ or the
groups the law treats differently are ‘members of a “suspect class” (such as
race, national origin, gender, or illegitimacy, to name a few),’ courts will

19 Underwood did not request jury instructions on involuntary

manslaughter and asks us to exercise our discretion to reach the equal
protection issue despite any forfeiture. We do so because the issue is one of
law, subject to de novo review, and might otherwise return to us as a petition
for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. (In re
Spencer S. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1323.) The People do not suggest we
should find the issue forfeited.

33
subject it to heightened scrutiny. (Id. at p. 1327.)” (Munoz, supra,
31 Cal.App.5th at p. 162.)
As Underwood recognizes, the exclusion of vehicular homicides from
the involuntary manslaughter statute has been upheld against equal
protection challenges. (Munoz, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 162; Wolfe, supra,
20 Cal.App.5th at p. 690.) Wolfe held that defendants charged with a Watson
murder are not subjected to disparate treatment with regard to instructions
on involuntary murder as a lesser included offense because not all defendants
charged with non-vehicular implied malice murder are entitled to such
instructions: Since defendants are entitled to lesser included offense
instructions only when there is substantial evidence to support the lesser
charge, juries in some non-vehicular implied murder cases are also presented
with an all-or-nothing choice between murder and acquittal. (Wolfe, at
pp. 687–688.)20 The court went on to determine that even overlooking this
threshold failure to establish disparate treatment of similarly situated
persons, there was no fundamental right at issue and there was “a rational
basis for allowing prosecutors to charge DUI drivers who commit homicides
solely with implied malice murder, rather than manslaughter.” (Id. at
p. 690.) Wolfe held that “the Legislature's charging scheme is rationally
related to a legitimate governmental purpose: to appropriately punish—and

20 Underwood criticizes Wolfe for defining the two groups of defendants

it compared in a manner that allowed the court to find no disparate
treatment. He argues the relevant comparison is within the group of all
defendants charged with murder, where there is evidence the defendant
acted without malice, between the defendants charged with murder based on
an act involving driving a vehicle and those charged with murder by other
means. For purposes of this discussion, we will assume the comparison
groups to be as Underwood describes them.

34
also perhaps to discourage—people from engaging in the highly dangerous
conduct of driving under the influence. (See People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th
1078, 1086 [‘ “a drunk driver is not at all unlike a ‘bomb,’ and a mobile one at
that” ’].)” (Ibid.)
Munoz “assume[d] for the sake of argument that the defendants
charged with Watson murder are similarly situated to the defendants
charged with other forms of implied malice murder, and that the law treats
them differently” and, like Wolfe, concluded there was no basis for applying
strict scrutiny. (Munoz, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at pp. 159–160, 162.) Munoz
held the statutes related to vehicular homicide were reasonably related to the
legitimate legislative purpose of “providing a wider and more nuanced range
of penalties given the ubiquity of automobiles and the resulting deaths
caused by motorists.” (Id. at p. 162.)
Munoz explained that “the Legislature reasonably could distinguish
unintentional homicides committed in the driving of a vehicle from other
unintentional homicides. Motor vehicles are a ‘leading cause of accidental
deaths’ in this country. (Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn v. State Farm Mut. (1983)
463 U.S. 29, 33.) Our Supreme Court expressly has identified deterrence of
driving under the influence of alcohol as ‘a highly important governmental
interest.’ (Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1338.) [¶] Given the
prevalence of deaths caused by motor vehicle accidents, the Legislature
reasonably could conclude that the general involuntary manslaughter statute
did not account sufficiently for the varying circumstances and levels of
culpability (e.g., gross negligence, intoxication) arising in this all-too-common
occurrence. The Legislature thus reasonably could define separate vehicular
manslaughter offenses, with a wider range of penalties than would be
available under the general involuntary manslaughter statute. (Cf. §§ 191.5,

35
subd. (c)(1), (2), 193, subds. (b), (c)(1), (2).) The Legislature reasonably could
add additional elements to the vehicular manslaughter statutes, such as
‘driving a vehicle,’ to distinguish them from involuntary manslaughter.
Having created a specific statutory scheme directed at unintentional
vehicular homicides, the Legislature also reasonably could exclude vehicular
homicides from the general involuntary manslaughter statute.” (Munoz,
supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at pp. 160–161.)
Contrary to Munoz and Wolfe, Underwood argues there is no rational
basis for treating homicide involving driving more harshly than homicide by
any other means.21 His argument focuses on the premise, discussed above,
that the legislative intent behind the section 192, subdivision (b) exclusion of
acts involving driving a vehicle was solely to avoid dual liability for the same
act under both vehicular manslaughter statutes and the involuntary
manslaughter statute, and not to punish vehicular homicides more harshly
than other homicides. The argument is no more persuasive as the basis for
an equal protection challenge than as a reason to depart from the express
language of section 192, subdivision (b).
The rational review standard “ ‘does not depend upon whether
lawmakers ever actually articulated the purpose they sought to achieve. Nor
must the underlying rationale be empirically substantiated. [(Heller [v. Doe
(1993) 509 U.S. 312,] 320.)] While the realities of the subject matter cannot
be completely ignored (id. at p. 321), a court may engage in “ ‘rational
speculation’ ” as to the justifications for the legislative choice (id. at p. 320).
It is immaterial for rational basis review “whether or not” any such
speculation has “a foundation in the record.” ’ ([People v.] Turnage[ (2012)

21 Underwood makes no real effort to argue for application of strict

scrutiny.

36
55 Cal.4th 62,] 74–75.) To mount a successful rational basis challenge, a
party must ‘ “negative every conceivable basis” ’ that might support the
disputed statutory disparity. (Heller, at p. 320; see Turnage, at p. 75.) If a
plausible basis exists for the disparity, courts may not second-guess its
‘ “wisdom, fairness, or logic.” ’ (Heller, at p. 319; see Turnage at p. 74.)”
(Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881.)
As we have discussed, whatever the Legislature’s purpose in its initial
adoption of the language that is now the section 192, subdivision (b)
exclusion, the Legislature has maintained that exclusion throughout the
development of a statutory scheme that treats vehicular manslaughter
distinctly from involuntary manslaughter committed by other means. The
Legislature’s choice to distinguish vehicular manslaughter from other forms
of involuntary manslaughter and vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated
from other forms of vehicular manslaughter, reflects its increasing concern
with vehicular homicide in general and vehicular homicide while intoxicated
in particular. For example, “[w]hen the Legislature enacted section 191.5, it
stated: ‘The Legislature finds and declares that traffic accidents are the
greatest cause of violent death in the United States and that over one-half of
the ensuing fatalities are alcohol related. . . . In view of the severe threat to
public safety which is posed by the intoxicated driver, there is a compelling
need for more effective methods to identify and penalize those who
voluntarily consume alcoholic beverages to the point of legal intoxication and
thereafter operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired
physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of exerting great force
and speed and causing severe damage and death.’ (Stats. 1986, ch. 1106, § 1,
pp. 3880–3881.)” (People v. Bennett, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 1038–1039.)

37
 The Legislature “is afforded considerable latitude in defining and
setting the consequences of criminal offenses.” (Johnson v. Department of
Justice, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 887.) The section 192, subdivision (b)
exclusion of acts involving driving a vehicle from the offense of involuntary
manslaughter is an integral part of the statutory scheme chosen by the
Legislature. The fact that the statutory scheme results in an all-or-nothing
choice for the jury when a prosecutor charges a defendant with a Watson
murder and does not also charge vehicular manslaughter does not invalidate
the Legislature’s definition of the offenses. We join Wolfe and Munoz in
concluding the Legislature’s exclusion of acts involving driving a vehicle from
section 192, subdivision (b) is rationally related to a legitimate legislative
purpose.
III.
Underwood Was Not Denied His Right to Present a Defense
“A criminal defendant has a well-established constitutional right to
have counsel present closing argument to the trier of fact. (People v.
Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 854.) ‘[The] right is not unbounded,
however; the trial court retains discretion to impose reasonable time limits
and to ensure that argument does not stray unduly from the mark.’ (Ibid.)”
(People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 110.) “We review a trial court's
decision to limit defense counsel closing argument for abuse of discretion.”
(People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 147.)
A. Background
Underwood contends he was denied his constitutional right to present a
defense by the trial court’s ruling that counsel could not argue Underwood
was guilty of gross vehicular manslaughter. As earlier described, in response
to the People’s in limine motion to prohibit the defense from arguing to the

38
jury that Underwood was only guilty of vehicular manslaughter, the trial
court ruled that it would not “(1) instruct on gross vehicular manslaughter,
(2) allow the Defense to discuss that instruction or statute, or (3) allow the
Defense to say that Mr. Underwood may have committed gross vehicular
manslaughter.” The court explained that the defense was free to “fully argue
that the People have not proven implied malice or any other element of
murder,” that Underwood “drove under the influence of alcohol, did
something that could cause death, acted with gross negligence, and killed Mr.
Walker due to that negligence,” that “these facts may add up to a ‘different
offense’ but not murder” and that Underwood’s conduct “was reckless in a
way that created a high risk of death or great bodily injury—in other words,
that his conduct was grossly negligent—but there was no implied malice.”
Defense could not, however, argue “that this means [Underwood] is ‘guilty
only of gross vehicular manslaughter’ or discuss that law or related
instruction.”
Later, the court reminded the parties of this ruling, noting that it felt
the order had been violated during opening statements. When defense
counsel sought to clarify that the court was precluding the defense from “even
mention[ing]” the word “manslaughter” or “gross vehicular manslaughter,”
the court responded, “I can't imagine how you would say the word and . . . not
violate the order. There might be some way, I am not envisioning it. . . . You
can say this conduct was grossly negligent, you can say all that. But you
can't say that he was—should have been·charged with gross vehicle
manslaughter or he committed gross vehicle manslaughter.”
B. Analysis
Underwood argues the trial court’s ruling prevented him from
conveying his primary defense—that he was guilty of a lesser manslaughter

39
offense but not guilty of murder. He acknowledges that defense counsel did
argue that he was not guilty of murder, that there were “lesser forms of
homicide that would actually be applicable to this case” and that “the
Prosecution chose to charge [Underwood] with the most extreme form of
homicide, murder.” He maintains, however, that defense counsel “could not
give legitimacy to the argument by naming the lesser crime that the evidence
supported or argue the elements were a better fit.”
In essence, Underwood argues that his defense depended on being able
to show the jury that the elements of gross vehicular manslaughter fit the
facts of his offense better than the elements of murder. But since the jury did
not have the option of convicting Underwood of gross vehicular
manslaughter, referring to that offense and discussing its elements would
have risked confusing the jury unnecessarily.
The point of discussing gross vehicular manslaughter would have been
to convince the jury that the prosecutor overstepped by choosing not to charge
an offense that fit the facts better than the more serious offense actually
charged. Defense counsel was able to, and did, make this point forcefully
despite not naming the specific offense. Defense counsel argued, “Now when
you first found out what happened in this case, you were probably a bit
surprised that [Underwood] was being charged with murder and not a
different form of homicide, maybe a lesser form of homicide. [¶] And you
should trust your instincts when it comes to that because this, what
happened here is not murder. There are other forms of homicide as you
heard. There are lesser forms of homicide that would actually be applicable
to this case. But the Prosecution chose to charge [Underwood] with the most
extreme form of homicide, murder.” At another point, defense counsel argued
that “[t]his was stupid, reckless behavior plain and simple” but was stopped

40
by a sustained objection when he began to say, “vehicular recklessness that
leads to a death is a different—” Counsel then continued, “The Prosecution
could have charged Mr. Underwood with something else if they wanted to do
this fairly. Instead they chose to pursue the most extreme charge which
must be reserved for only the most extreme conduct.” Defense counsel told
the jury that “[c]onvicting [Underwood] of something so extreme when the
evidence does not support that would be a grave and irreversible injustice.
[Underwood] bears responsibility but he is not guilty of murder.”
Underwood quotes a portion of closing argument in which defense
counsel, after arguing that Walker’s death was a tragedy but did not involve
the “conscious decision-making” necessary for murder, stated that “[t]his was
stupid, reckless behavior plain and simple” but was stopped by a sustained
objection when he began to say “vehicular recklessness that leads to a death
is a different—” Underwood acknowledges that his counsel then argued he
was not guilty of murder but of “something less” but complains that counsel
could not identify the lesser offense. He then points to several questions the
jury asked during deliberations seeking clarification of instructions regarding
implied malice and suggesting it was having difficulty reaching a verdict on
one (unidentified) count.22 To the extent Underwood is arguing that the

22 The jury asked for “[c]larification on ‘A natural and probable

consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if
nothing unusual intervenes’ from pg 31 in the form of definition and
examples”; “[c]larification on pg 30 Implied Malice #3 ‘At the time he acted,
he knew his act was dangerous to human life’ in terms of interpretation of
‘knew’ ”; and “[c]larification or understanding of standard for pg 30, Implied
Malice #4 ‘He deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life.’ ”
The jury also asked the court “[w]hat happens if we can’t agree on one of the
counts? Is the one charge dismissed and the others still hold?”

41
inability to expressly refer to gross vehicular manslaughter interfered with
his ability to argue he lacked implied malice, we are again unpersuaded.
Defense counsel repeatedly stressed that Underwood acted recklessly
but without the mental state of implied malice necessary for murder. As
Underwood points out, defense counsel’s closing argument in effect focused on
Underwood’s mental state by conceding much of his culpable conduct,
including his prior DUI convictions, his decisions to drive after drinking
(although not while feeling the effects of alcohol), with a suspended license,
without a required ignition interlock, well over the speed limit, with his
daughter in the car and his attempts to avoid responsibility by lying to the
police and Walker’s family. Counsel’s fundamental point was that
Underwood did not intend or want to put anyone in danger or kill anyone:
Counsel argued that Underwood’s conduct “was poor judgment but it was not
implied malice. This was recklessness, yes, but it was not murder.” Counsel
argued that convicting Underwood of murder “when the evidence does not
support a charge that extreme is not true, proper accountability.”
Specific reference to gross vehicular manslaughter would not have
assisted defense counsel in explaining the concept of implied malice; it would
simply have allowed counsel to name an offense the People could have
charged rather than refer generally to charges not requiring implied malice.

The court responded that it could not “give further instructions with
additional definitions, examples, or explanations” but suggested that it “may
(or may not) be helpful to read the instructions for Count 1 with the ‘act’ in
mind” and provided a copy of the instructions pertaining to count 1 on which
“driving under the influence” was substituted for each instance of “act.” The
court further stated that if the jurors were unable to agree on count 1, “we
can discuss whether short, further arguments by counsel about implied
malice would be helpful.” The jury subsequently returned its verdicts
without additional argument.

42
As shown in the portions of closing argument we have quoted, defense
counsel was fully able to make the point that the evidence showed
Underwood’s poor judgment and reckless conduct but not that he knew his
act of driving under the influence was “dangerous to human life” and
“deliberately acted with conscious disregard for [human] life.” (CALCRIM
No. 520 [defining implied malice].)
Underwood “was not precluded from making his central argument” by
the trial court’s ruling. (People v. Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 147.)
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)
IV.
Several Sentence Enhancements Must Be Stricken
A. The Two Vehicle Code Section 23572 Enhancements Are Not
Statutorily Authorized
In connection with counts 3 and 4, the jury found true the allegations
that Underwood had a passenger under the age of 14. The trial court
imposed a concurrent term of 30 days in county jail for the enhancement on
count 3 and the same punishment on count 4, stayed pursuant to section 654.
Vehicle Code section 23572 specifies additional penalties to be imposed
on a person convicted of a violation of Vehicle Code section 23152 when a
minor under 14 years of age was a passenger in the vehicle at the time of the
offense. Counts 3 and 4 charged Underwood with violations of Vehicle Code
section 23153, not section 23152. Accordingly, Underwood contends these
two enhancements must be stricken. He also points out that even if Vehicle
Code section 23572 applied to convictions of violating Vehicle Code
section 23153, the enhancements would not apply to him because Vehicle
Code section 23572, subdivision (c), specifies that “[n]o punishment
enhancement shall be imposed pursuant to this section if the person is also

43
convicted of a violation of Section 273a of the Penal Code arising out of the
same facts and incident.” Underwood was convicted of child abuse in
violation of section 273a, subdivision (a), in count 2.
The People agree that these enhancements must be stricken. We
concur.
B. Two of the Vehicle Code Section 23558 Enhancements Are Not
Statutorily Authorized
On counts 3 and 4, Underwood was convicted of driving under the
influence of alcohol causing injury to Walker, Kyaw and Underwood’s
daughter (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)) and driving with over 0.08 percent
blood alcohol level causing injury to the same three victims (Veh. Code,
§ 23153, subd. (b)). In connection with both counts, the jury found true
allegations that Underwood caused bodily injury and death to the three
victims. The trial court imposed one-year terms for each of the three victims
pursuant to Vehicle Code section 23558.23
Vehicle Code section 23558 provides that a person who proximately
causes bodily injury or death “to more than one victim in any one instance of
driving in violation of Section 23153 of this code” shall receive a one-year
enhancement “for each additional injured victim.” (Italics added.)
Underwood argues the language of Vehicle Code section 23558 requires that
enhancements be imposed only for additional injured victims beyond the first.
The People agree, as do we. Underwood may be sentenced to only two
Vehicle Code section 23558 enhancements, not three.

23 On count 3, the court imposed the enhancements as to Kyaw and

Underwood’s daughter to run concurrently and stayed the enhancement as to
Walker pursuant to Penal Code section 654; the court stayed the
enhancements on count 4 pursuant to Penal Code section 654.

44
 DISPOSITION
On each of counts 3 and 4, the enhancements under Vehicle Code
section 23572 and corresponding punishment shall be stricken.
On each of counts 3 and 4, one of the Vehicle Code section 23558
enhancements and the corresponding one-year prison term for each of these
enhancements shall be stricken.
The abstract of judgment shall be corrected accordingly.
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

45
 _________________________
STEWART, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
RICHMAN, J.

_________________________
MILLER, J.

People v. Underwood (A165026)

46