UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
Criminal Action No. 23-73-23 (CKK)
RAUL PACHECO RAMIREZ,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(January 29, 2024)
Defendant Raul Pacheco Ramirez is charged by indictment with conspiring to distribute,
with others, thousands of counterfeit pills of fentanyl. On November 20, 2023, Magistrate Judge
Maria Audero for the United States District Court for the Central District of California ordered
Defendant detained pending trial. Before the Court is Defendant’s [224] Motion for Bond Review
(“Motion” or “Mot.”). Defendant requests that the Court review the magistrate judge’s detention
order and release him on pretrial conditions. Mot. at 1, 8. Upon consideration of the pleadings, 1
the relevant legal authority, and the record before the Court, the Court shall DENY Defendant’s
[224] Motion for Bond Review.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
On March 9, 2023, the Government filed an indictment against Defendants Hector David
Valdez, Craig Eastman, and Charles Jeffrey Taylor. ECF No. 1 (sealed). Additional defendants
were indicted on April 26 and May 18, 2023. ECF No. 25; ECF No. 48 (sealed). On November 6,
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The Court’s consideration has focused on:
• Defendant’s Motion for Bond Review, ECF No. 224; and
• The Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Review of Detention (“Gov’t’s Opp’n”),
ECF No. 249, and exhibits therein.
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2023, a grand jury returned a third superseding indictment, adding, among others, Defendant
Ramirez. ECF No. 134 (sealed). On November 17, 2023, a grand jury returned a fourth superseding
indictment in this matter. ECF No. 174. Following the third superseding indictment, Magistrate
Judge Robin M. Meriweather of this jurisdiction issued an arrest warrant for Defendant, which was
executed on November 16, 2023 in Los Angeles, California. ECF No. 246. That same day,
Defendant appeared before Magistrate Judge Audero, who ordered Defendant to be temporarily
detained. See ECF No. 5, Case No. 23-mj-05939 (sealed). On November 20, 2023, Defendant
appeared for a detention hearing before Magistrate Judge Audero, who ordered Defendant to be
detained pending trial. See ECF No. 10, Case No. 23-mj-05939 (sealed).
Defendant subsequently filed the pending motion on January 5, 2024, requesting this Court
to review the magistrate judge’s detention order and set conditions of release. ECF No. 224. The
Government opposes Defendant’s motion, filing its opposition on January 19, 2024. ECF No. 249.
B. Factual Allegations
In its opposition, the Government details the allegations against Defendant, including
messages exchanged between Defendant and two co-defendants in this case, photographs that
purportedly depict hundreds (if not thousands) of “blue ‘M-30’ pills” and various “apparent
firearms,” and numerous messages from various individuals on social media indicating that
Defendant was distributing illicit pills. Broadly, the Government alleges that Defendant was “a
wholesale distributor of pills, who obtained and resold thousands upon thousands of pills at a
time.” Gov’t’s Opp’n at 25.
To support its claim, the Government recounts purported social media messages between
Defendant and co-Defendant Valdez. Id. at 14–15. For instance, on January 19, 2023, Defendant
messaged Valdez, via social media, stating, “This [expletive] told me you charging him 500 a
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boat,” and “Ima need a couple in a few days but I’ll lyk if the tickets good.” Id. at 15. Valdez
responded, “How many,” to which Defendant stated, “8” and “But they gotta be good.” Id. The
Government proffers that the above exchange indicates that Defendant messaged Valdez when “he
heard that [] Valdez was charging $500 for 1,000 pills [(i.e., a boat)] and that he may need a couple
thousand pills.” Id. Defendant then informed Valdez that he would purchase “8,000, if the pills
were of good quality.” Id. According to the Government, these communications between
Defendant and Valdez “continued to the subsequent week” when Defendant informed Valdez on
January 25, 2023 that “Ima be ready for the 8 [boat symbol]” that week. Id.
In addition to speaking with Valdez, Defendant maintained a close relationship with co-
Defendant Hodges. See id. at 20. Specifically, the Government claims that Defendant “sold []
Hodges pills by the thousands.” Id. For instance, on January 7, 2021, in an Instagram conversation
purportedly between Defendant and Hodges, Defendant told Hodges: “Okay bet bro lmk what he
say I can get the boats for you for 3,500$.” Id. The Government states that the above interaction
indicates that Defendant “can get thousands of pills for [] Hodges for $3500 [sic].” Id. In addition,
in July 2022, Defendant sent Hodges “a photo of a USPS receipt reflecting a shipment to Suitland,
MD.” Id. at 20–21. Hodges then asked for a picture of “beans.” Id. at 21. The Government states
that Defendant responded with a “video of what appears to be unidentified pills of various shapes,
sizes, and colors (thus suggesting ‘beans’ means ‘pills’).” Id. The Government appends the
following images to support its allegations.
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See id. at 21–22. The Government claims that the pills in the video sent by Ramirez “may have
contained fentanyl,” based on a comparison of what “rainbow fentanyl pills” appear as according
to a news story. Id. at 22–23.
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See id. at 23. Then, on July 10, 2022, Hodges asked Defendant to “Send me those lol,” and then
stated “Lol them joints cool bro.” Id. at 23. On July 13, 2022, Hodges told Ramirez, “I got myself
a lane now in VA as of today for these.” Id. The Government claims that the above interaction
demonstrates that Hodges “had a way to redistribute pills sent to him by Defendant Ramirez.” Id.
at 23.
The Government also claims that Defendant’s social media account “contained numerous
messages about distributing pills.” Id. at 19. For instance, on April 2, 2022, a social media account
asked Defendant if he could “do a boat for 1k,” to which Defendant purportedly responded, “Yea
you wanna pull up.” Id. Defendant then instructed that account user to meet him in Long Beach,
California. Id. On May 4, 2022, Defendant messaged another social media account, stating, “My
boy I got a boy,” “Boat of the blues,” “I’m tryna get rid of asap,” and “Shoot me 850.” Id. The
Government proffers that this conversation indicates that Defendant had “1,000 blue ‘M-30’
fentanyl pills that he would sell for $850.” Id. at 19–20. On August 16, 2023, Defendant messaged
another social media account, stating, “You tryna make that play.” Id. at 20. Defendant then
messaged “4 boats,” which, according to the Government, means that Defendant was trying to
engage in a “drug transaction for 4,000 pills.” Id. On December 23, 2022, Defendant messaged
another social media account, stating “Ima come grab 15 boats every 2 weeks.” Id. The
Government proffers that Defendant “told the other Instagram account that he is going to buy
15,000 pills every two weeks.” Id. Additional communications via social media further indicate
that Defendant knew he was distributing fentanyl pills. On March 3, 2022, one social media
account asked Defendant: “Dis bitches fentanyl ?,” to which Defendant responded, “They the
ones,” “They burn n all,” and “Perfect ones.” Id.
Finally, the Government claims that Defendant was in possession of the illicit pills and
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“apparent firearms,” as evinced by his social media account. See id. at 15. The Government
appends the following images, extracted from Defendant’s social media account, to support its
claims.
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See id. at 16–19.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A defendant ordered detained by a magistrate judge may file “a motion for revocation or
amendment of the order” with “the court having original jurisdiction over the offense.”
18 U.S.C. § 3145(b). The Court applies de novo review to the question and is “free to use in its
analysis any evidence or reasons relied on by the magistrate judge, but it may also hear additional
evidence and rely on its own reasons.” United States v. Sheffield, 799 F. Supp. 2d 18, 20 (D.D.C.
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2011) (BAH) (quoting United States v. Hanson, 613 F. Supp. 2d 85, 88 (D.D.C. 2009) (PLF)).
“The motion shall be determined promptly.” 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b).
In our society, “liberty is the norm” and “detention prior to trial or without trial is the
carefully limited exception.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). The Bail Reform
Act permits pretrial detention in only “carefully defined circumstances.” United States v.
Simpkins, 826 F.2d 94, 95–96 (D.C. Cir. 1987). A detention hearing must be held only if a case
involves any of an enumerated set of offenses, including an offense “for which a maximum term
of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in[, inter alia,] the Controlled Substances Act,”
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(C), or if the defendant poses a serious risk of flight or of trying to obstruct
justice or threaten, injure, or intimidate a witness or juror, id. § 3142(f)(2)(A)–(B).
The question for the Court is whether any “condition or combination of conditions will
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and
the community.” Id. § 3142(e)(1). “In common parlance, the relevant inquiry is whether the
defendant is a ‘flight risk’ or a ‘danger to the community.’” United States v. Vasquez-Benitez,
919 F.3d 546, 550 (D.C. Cir. 2019). In determining whether a defendant should be detained
pending trial, the Court must consider “the available information” concerning four enumerated
factors: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence
against the defendant; (3) the history and characteristics of the defendant; and (4) the nature and
seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the defendant’s
release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
“To justify detention on the basis of dangerousness, the government must prove by ‘clear
and convincing evidence’ that ‘no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure
the safety of any other person and the community.’” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273,
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1279–80 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)). That standard requires the Government
to establish that the defendant “poses a concrete, prospective threat to public safety” that cannot
be sufficiently mitigated by release conditions. Id. at 1280; see also Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751
(requiring the Government to “prove[ ] by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents
an identified and articulable threat to an individual or the community”). “Detention cannot be
based on a finding that defendant is unlikely to comply with conditions of release absent the
requisite finding of dangerousness or risk of flight; otherwise[,] the scope of detention would
extend beyond the limits set by Congress.” Munchel, 991 F.3d at 1283.
III. DISCUSSION
The Court concludes that the evidence presented by the Government in its briefing requires
Defendant Ramirez’s detention pending trial.
A. Legal Principles
As a threshold matter, the Court shall address the proper standard to apply at this stage of
proceedings. As explained above, Defendant has appealed his detention order pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3145(b). Such an appeal is subject to de novo review, in which the Court must engage
in a searching, “factbound inquiry” to determine danger to the community and/or risk of flight.
United States v. Sabol, 534 F. Supp. 3d 58, 69 (D.D.C. 2021) (EGS) (citing Munchel, 991 F.3d at
1283) (cleaned up).
In determining whether Defendant is a danger to the community or a flight risk, the Court
considers the Section 3142(g) factors including: (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged”; (2) “the weight of the evidence”; (3) “the history and characteristics” of the defendant;
and (4) “the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be
posed by the [defendant’s] release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
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The Court shall consider these factors based upon the present record without holding an
additional hearing. See Sheffield, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 20 (permitting district court to use in its
analysis the evidence relied on by the magistrate judge); see also United States v. Anderson, 384 F.
Supp. 2d 32, 33–34 (D.D.C. 2005) (PLF) (taking into consideration the indictment, “the briefs and
other papers submitted by the parties, the proceedings before [the magistrate judge], the
[magistrate’s] findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the evidence and proffers before [the
court]”). Based on the current record, the Court concludes that clear and convincing evidence
supports a finding that no condition or combination of conditions will “reasonably assure” the
“safety of any other person and the community” or Defendant’s appearance at trial. Accordingly,
the Court orders that Defendant shall remain detained pending trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1).
B. Nature and Circumstances of the Offense Charged
Turning to the Section 3142(g) factors, the Court first considers the “nature and
circumstances of the offense charged” including whether the offense involves “a controlled
substance.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1). In this case, a rebuttable presumption of detention applies
because Defendant has been charged by indictment with serious violations of the Controlled
Substances Act. See id. § 3142(e)(3)(A); United States v. Brown, 538 F. Supp. 3d 154, 165
(D.D.C. 2021) (RCL). Even the possession with intent to distribute “9.11 grams of fentanyl and
.89 grams of powdered cocaine” triggers such a presumption. Brown, 538 F. Supp. 3d at 165–66.
Here, a grand jury has found probable cause that Defendant was engaged in a conspiracy to
distribute more than 400 grams of fentanyl that ran from August 2020 until the present day, and
the Government has presented evidence that Defendant has trafficked thousands of grams of
fentanyl. See Gov’t’s Opp’n at 16–17, 19–20. The Court must therefore presume that no condition
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or combination of conditions will reasonably assure Defendant’s appearance as required or the
safety of the community.
To rebut this presumption, Defendant must “offer some credible evidence” that he will not
endanger the community or flee if released. United States v. Cherry, 221 F. Supp. 3d 26, 32
(D.D.C. 2016) (GMH). The Court finds that Defendant has failed to do so here. He argues that
the allegations against him suggest that he “played a very minor role in a multi-year period in
which the distribution conspiracy is alleged to have taken place.” Mot. at 5. However, Defendant
offers no evidence—let alone credible evidence—that he is not a danger to the community or a
flight risk if released. Notably, while Defendant states that he is charged “with a non-violent drug
offense,” Mot. at 5, Defendant fails to acknowledge that the Government is still alleging that he
possessed and trafficked thousands of grams of fentanyl, see Gov’t’s Opp’n at 15–17, 19–22. And,
according to the Government, Defendant was selling the fentanyl pills, at least to an extent,
“disguised and passed off as legitimate oxycodone.” Gov’t’s Opp’n at 25.
The Court concludes that the nature and circumstances of the offense weigh in favor of
detention. Defendant is charged with conspiring to distribute and possessing with intent to
distribute 400 grams or more of a substance containing fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), 846. This charge carries a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence, with a maximum
of life. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vi). As the Government puts it, “it is common knowledge that
fentanyl kills,” Gov’t’s Opp’n at 24; this investigation began with the overdose death of a D.C.
resident who appears to have obtained her drugs through the member(s) of this conspiracy, id. at
3–4. “Moreover, this is not the case of an individual seller working alone.” Brown, 538 F. Supp.
3d at 167. The Government alleges not just a conspiracy among the defendants in this action, but
vast distribution across the United States. Therefore, Defendant’s “alleged participation in the
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conspiracy charged thus strongly suggests that, if released, he would have the means to purchase
and distribute narcotics and thereby endanger [not just] the D.C. community,” but also
communities throughout the United States. Id.
Furthermore, the additional defendants in the third superseding indictment have been
ordered detained pending trial as well. See, e.g., ECF No. 167; ECF No. 182 (sealed); ECF No.
184; No. 191; ECF No. 231. In each of these cases, there was sufficient evidence of fentanyl drug
trafficking to warrant and support their detention. Releasing this particular defendant, who is a
large-scale fentanyl trafficker in California, would be contrary to the other detention orders in
effect. Therefore, the first factor weighs in favor of detention.
C. Weight of the Evidence
The weight of the evidence against Defendant also favors continued pretrial detention. The
Government presents communications between Defendant and other co-defendants in this case,
including Defendants Valdez and Hodges, substantiating its claim that Defendant did in fact deal
with large quantities of illicit drugs. See Gov’t’s Opp’n at 14–15, 20–24. The Government also
presents communications between Defendant and various social media account, all of which
suggest that Defendant did distribute thousands of pills. See id. at 19–20. Finally, Defendant’s
own social media account evinces Defendant’s proclivity for possessing the drugs, as well as
apparent proclivity for firearms. See id. at 16–19.
In all, the Court finds that the weight of this evidence is strong. See Brown, 538 F. Supp.
3d at 168–69. Given the evidence to date, this factor weighs in favor of detention. See United
States v. Brockhoff, 590 F. Supp. 3d 295, 304 (D.D.C. 2022) (CKK).
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D. History and Characteristics of the Defendant
Under the third Section 3142(g) factor, the Court must consider a defendant’s “history and
characteristics,” including his “character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment,
financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, history
related to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court
proceedings.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3).
On the one hand, Defendant’s lack of a serious criminal record weighs against pretrial
detention. According to his Pretrial Services Report, Defendant has three arrests and one prior
conviction. See Pretrial Services Report (“PSR”), ECF No. 252. His prior conviction occurred in
December 2013 and involved three counts of receiving stolen property. Id. at 3. Although the
Government claims that Defendant’s criminal history suggests that Defendant is a danger, Gov’t’s
Opp’n at 26, the Court is not persuaded by his criminal history alone. Defendant also explains that
he has a history of employment, and strong ties to the Los Angeles community, including family—
a fiancé, children, mother, and sister. Mot. at 6–7.
On the other hand, the Government states that Defendant appears to have been in
possession, or at least has access to, various handguns and rifles, as depicted on his social media
account. Gov’t’s Opp’n at 26. This does raise concerns for the Court, and Defendant does not
address his purported possession of firearms in his Motion. See generally Mot. The Government
further argues that Defendant’s ties to Mexico also weigh in favor of detention. Gov’t’s Opp’n at
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26. Specifically, Defendant is a citizen of Mexico, though he is in the United States legally
pursuant to the DREAM Act. See id.
In all, given Defendant’s proclivity for possessing controlled substances and alleged
possession of numerous firearms, the Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of detention.
E. The Nature and Seriousness of the Danger Posed by Defendant’s Release
The final factor that the Court must consider is “the nature and seriousness of the danger
to any person or the community that would be posed by the person’s release.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(g)(4). Conspiring to distribute fentanyl presumptively renders a defendant a serious danger
to the community. See Brown, 538 F. Supp. 3d at 170; cf. also United States v. Bethea, 763 F.
Supp. 2d 50, 54 (D.D.C. 2011) (RCL) (narcotics trafficking generally). Particularly so given the
vast amount of drugs at issue here. More generally, “the lethality of fentanyl and scourge of . . .
opioids on this community [and communities around the country] further demonstrate the serious
danger Defendant’s release could pose.” United States v. Bolivar, 455 F. Supp. 3d 1165, 1171
(D.N.M. 2020). And, the significant statutory penalties Defendant faces provide him with a strong
incentive to flee.
Defendant maintains that he is not a danger to the community or a flight risk. See Mot. at
3–4. As such, Defendant proposes that he be released on the condition that he reside in a duplex
in Los Angeles with his mother, fiancé, and children. Id. at 7. Defendant further consents to drug
testing and will refrain from communicating with any of the co-defendants in this case, except in
the presence of counsel. Id. at 4. Defendant notes that his Pretrial Services Report suggests there
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are conditions of release that can be set to adequately supervise him. Id. at 3; see PSR, ECF No.
252, at 1; see also Ex. 1, ECF No. 224-1.
However, the Government has provided strong evidence indicating that Defendant
knowingly and intentionally trafficked counterfeit pills in the thousands. See generally Gov’t’s
Opp’n. Again, “it is common knowledge that fentanyl kills.” Id. at 24. Overall, the Court’s
concern regarding the safety of the community or Defendant’s appearance at trial is not alleviated.
Therefore, this factor also weighs in favor of detention.
* * *
All in all, even if Defendant could rebut the presumption of detention, the Court finds that
no set of conditions can address the threat of danger he poses to the community or mitigate his risk
of flight. The Government has shown that Defendant has a strong incentive to flee given the
seriousness of the charges, the apparent weight of the evidence, the substantial statutory penalties
he is facing, and Defendant’s ties to Mexico. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Section 3142
factors require pretrial detention.
IV. CONCLUSION
The record as a whole establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that no condition or
combination of conditions can be imposed that would reasonably assure the safety of the
community or Defendant’s presence at trial if he was released pending trial. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(e)(1). As such, the Court DENIES Defendant’s [224] Motion for Bond Review. An
appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Dated: January 29, 2024
/s/
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
United States District Judge
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