Ramsey v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC

Filed 12/29/23; Certified for Publication 1/29/24 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

CHARLES RAMSEY, H049949
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 21CV384867)

v.

COMCAST CABLE
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,

Defendant and Appellant.

Charles Ramsey subscribes to Comcast Cable Communications, LLC’s (Comcast)
Xfinity services. Ramsey sued Comcast for violations of California’s consumer
protection statutes, alleging that Comcast engaged in unfair, unlawful, and deceptive
business practices under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) and the unfair
competition law (UCL). Ramsey’s complaint sought injunctive relief. Comcast filed a
petition to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration provision in the parties’
subscriber agreement. The trial court denied the petition based on the Supreme Court’s
decision in McGill v. Citibank, N.A. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 945 (McGill), which held that a
predispute arbitration provision that waives a plaintiff’s right to seek public injunctive
relief in any forum is “contrary to California public policy and is thus unenforceable
under California law.” (Id. at p. 951.) Because the arbitration provision in Comcast’s
subscriber agreement required the parties to arbitrate all disputes and permitted the
arbitrator to grant only individual relief, the trial court held that the provision waived
Ramsey’s right to seek public injunctive relief in any forum. Further concluding that
Ramsey’s complaint sought public injunctive relief, the court held the arbitration
provision to be unenforceable.
On appeal, Comcast argues that the trial court erred in concluding that Ramsey
was seeking public injunctive relief. Comcast contends that the requested injunction was
private because it would benefit only a subset of Comcast subscribers. Comcast further
argues that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts McGill. Concluding that
Ramsey’s complaint seeks public injunctive relief, and that McGill is not preempted, we
affirm the trial court’s order.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1
Comcast designs, operates, markets, and sells its Xfinity cable television, internet,
home telephone, and related subscription services to millions of consumers in California
and nationwide. Ramsey has been a subscriber to Comcast’s services since 2009. When
Ramsey initially signed up for services, Comcast offered him a “limited time promotional
rate” and represented that it would last for approximately one year from the date the
subscription began, after which, the price of the subscription would increase.
When Ramsey’s promotional rate for Comcast’s services was nearing its initial
expiration, he determined that he was not willing to pay the additional price increase to
maintain his subscription, and contacted Comcast to discuss cancelling his service. Upon
speaking to a customer service representative regarding the cancellation, Ramsey was
“instead offered additional channels, faster internet speed, and additional services at a
premium cost.” Ramsey expressed his lack of interest in the upgraded packages and
indicated he was only willing to continue purchasing Comcast’s most basic subscription
package. After some discussion, the customer service representative eventually offered
Ramsey a “new” limited-time promotion, consisting of “similar, if not identical services

Our statement of facts is based on the allegations from Ramsey’s underlying
1

complaint.

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to what [Ramsey] had been receiving, at a cost comparable to the current promotional
rate he was being charged.” The customer service representative again informed Ramsey
that this promotional rate would expire in approximately one year.
Each year since then, Ramsey has contacted Comcast near the conclusion of his
promotional period to discuss pricing options. Each year, Comcast’s customer service
representative has “miraculously come up with a ‘new’ comparable promotional
package” to offer Ramsey. Comcast does not contact Ramsey to inform him that his
promotional period is about to expire, nor offer him any new and comparable promotions
“unless and until he contacts [Comcast].” Each time, the new promotional rate Ramsey is
offered has “arbitrarily varied,” but is always less than the non-promotional rate he would
otherwise pay if he did not reach out to Comcast.
A. Ramsey’s Complaint for Violations of the CLRA and UCL
In 2021, Ramsey filed a complaint against Comcast in superior court, alleging
violations of the CLRA and UCL. Ramsey’s complaint sets forth four causes of action.
The first cause of action alleges a violation of the CLRA, which prohibits “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result or
that results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer.” (Civ. Code, §
1770, subd. (a).) In connection with this cause of action, Ramsey alleges that by “failing
to disclose to [Ramsey] and concealing the existence of, and true and actual reasons for,
Xfinity subscription service pricing, Defendants violated [the CLRA], as they
misrepresented the reasons for, existence of, or amounts of, price reductions with respect
to their services.” For this cause of action, Ramsey seeks “public injunctive relief
enjoining Defendants’ unfair or deceptive acts or practices and correcting all false and
misleading statements and material omissions concerning pricing models, reasons for
changes in pricing, and the availability of discounts, to prevent future injury to the
general public.”

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 Ramsey’s second cause of action alleges a violation of the UCL’s prohibition
against unfair business practices. According to the complaint, “[Ramsey] purchased
Defendants’ services at costs he reasonably believed to be the accurate, true, and the
actual price of those services, when in fact, Defendants have and continue to offer secret
and unearned discounts on their services to select consumers, and concealing the
existence and amount of these discounts to the general public.” This practice of “issuing
secret rebates constitutes an unfair business practice in violation of California Business
and Professions Code section 17200, et seq.” 2 For this cause of action, Ramsey seeks a
“permanent injunction requiring Defendants to halt their practice of issuing secret
discounts.”
Ramsey’s third cause of action alleges a violation of section 17045, which falls
under the UCL’s prohibition against unlawful business practices. Section 17045 provides
that the “secret payment or allowances of rebates, refunds, commissions, or unearned
discounts . . . to the injury of a competitor and where such payment or allowance tends to
destroy competition, is unlawful.” (§ 17045.) In this cause of action, Ramsey seeks
“public injunctive relief and declaratory relief enjoining Defendants’ unfair or deceptive
acts or practices to prevent injury to the general public.”
Ramsey’s fourth cause of action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief for the
aforementioned law violations. In connection with this cause of action, Ramsey requests
that the court adjudicate and declare that, (1) Ramsey has a right to view and rely upon
truthful advertising, (2) that Comcast has an obligation to “ensure all of their
advertisements and related statements and representations are truthful, complete, and not
misleading,” (3) that Comcast not issue “secret and earned [sic] discounts to select
consumers,” and (4) that Comcast has an obligation to “train their personnel not to
misrepresent Defendants’ services and pricing and to present consumers with truthful,

2
All statutory references are to the Business & Professions Code, unless otherwise
stated.

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complete and accurate information.” Ramsey also seeks “related injunctive relief that
requires Defendants to comply with their legal obligations and utilize only truthful and
complete advertisements, statements, and representations, and ensure consumers are
aware of any and all price reductions and rebates Defendants seek to grant to consumers.”
In his prayer for relief, Ramsey seeks a “declaration requiring Defendants to
comply with the various provisions of the CLRA and UCL alleged herein,” and an order
“enjoining Defendants from continuing their unlawful and unfair business practices.”
Though Ramsey alleges that he had suffered “an ascertainable loss of money,
including . . . out of pocket costs incurred in paying nonpromotional rates when he did
not immediately contact [Comcast] to obtain new promotional pricing,” he does not seek
monetary damages but only declaratory and injunctive relief, and an award of costs and
attorney’s fees.
B. Comcast’s Petition to Compel Arbitration
Comcast sought to compel arbitration. In the petition, Comcast argued that
Ramsey has continuously accepted the terms of Comcast’s subscriber agreements, which
has contained an arbitration provision since 2011. Comcast asserted that the trial court
should compel arbitration based on the subscriber agreement included in Ramsey’s May
2021 bill (the 2021 subscriber agreement), which provided that any “Dispute” between
the parties “shall be resolved through individual arbitration.” The 2021 subscriber
agreement also included a waiver of all class, collective, and representative claims,
providing that “[t]he arbitrator may award injunctive relief only in favor of the individual
party seeking relief and only to the extent necessary to provide relief warranted by that
individual party’s claim, and the arbitrator may not award relief for or against or on
behalf of anyone who is not a party.”
In the petition, Comcast acknowledged the McGill decision, but argued that
because Ramsey’s complaint sought private, not public injunctive relief, McGill was not

5
implicated. Ramsey opposed Comcast’s petition, arguing that his complaint sought
public injunctive relief within the meaning of McGill.
C. Trial Court’s Order Denying Comcast’s Petition to Compel Arbitration
The trial court denied Comcast’s petition, finding unpersuasive Comcast’s
argument that McGill did not apply because Ramsey was seeking private, not public
injunctive relief. The court held that the subject arbitration provision violated McGill
because it “explicitly barred the arbitrator from determining ‘the rights, obligations, or
interests of anyone other than a named party,’ or from ‘making an award for the benefits
of anyone . . . other than a named party.’ ”
Relying on Mejia v. DACM Inc. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 691(Mejia) and
Maldonado v. Fast Auto Loans, Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 713 (Maldonado), the trial
court further held that McGill applies when a plaintiff seeks to “enjoin future violations
of California’s consumer protection statutes.” The court held that the requested relief in
Ramsey’s complaint is “indistinguishable” from that sought in Mejia and Maldonado,
and “describe[s] public injunctive relief.” The trial court thus concluded that the
arbitration provision was unenforceable.
Comcast timely appealed the trial court’s order.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Comcast argues that the trial court erred in holding the arbitration
provision in its 2021 subscriber agreement to be unenforceable under McGill. Comcast
does not dispute that the arbitration provision, by its terms, waives Ramsey’s right to seek
public injunctive relief in any forum. Rather, Comcast contends that McGill is not
implicated because Ramsey does not seek a public injunction, but a private one.
Alternatively, Comcast argues that McGill itself is invalid because it is preempted by the
FAA.
We conclude that the requested relief set forth in Ramsey’s complaint falls within
McGill’s definition of public injunctive relief. We decline to hold that the FAA preempts

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McGill. We affirm the trial court’s order denying Comcast’s petition to compel
arbitration.
A. Standard of Review
An order denying a petition to compel arbitration is appealable. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1294, subd. (a).) When, as here, a trial court’s order denying a petition to compel
arbitration is based on a question of law, we review the denial de novo. (Clifford v. Quest
Software Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 745, 749.)
B. The Complaint Seeks Public Injunctive Relief
1. The Relief Sought Falls Within McGill’s Definition of Public Injunctive Relief
To determine whether Ramsey’s complaint seeks public or private injunctive
relief, we look first to McGill itself. In McGill, the Supreme Court, relying on its earlier
decisions in Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1066 (Broughton) and
Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 303 (Cruz), distinguished
between the two types of injunctive relief: Private injunctive relief is “relief that
primarily ‘resolve[s] a private dispute’ between the parties . . . and ‘rectif[ies] individual
wrongs’ . . . and that benefits the public, if at all, only incidentally.” (McGill, supra,
2 Cal.5th at p. 955, quoting Broughton, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 1079-1080.) Public
injunctive relief is “relief that ‘by and large’ benefits the general public . . . and that
benefits the plaintiff, ‘if at all,’ only ‘incidental[ly]’ and/or as ‘a member of the general
public.’ ” (McGill, supra, at p. 955, alterations in original.) “To summarize, public
injunctive relief under the UCL, the CLRA, and the false advertising law is relief that has
‘the primary purpose and effect’ of prohibiting unlawful acts that threaten future injury to
the public. (Broughton, supra, at p. 1077.)” (McGill, supra, at p. 955.) “Relief that has
the primary purpose or effect of redressing or preventing injury to an individual plaintiff–
or to a group of individuals similarly situated to the plaintiff–does not constitute public
injunctive relief.” (Ibid.)

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 McGill opened a credit card account with Citibank and purchased a credit
protection plan, which permitted her to defer payments on the credit card in a qualifying
event, such as long-term disability or unemployment. (McGill, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
p. 952.) While McGill’s initial accountholder agreement did not contain an arbitration
provision, such a provision was later added and there was no dispute that it was in effect
during the relevant time period. (See id. at pp. 952-953.)
McGill filed a class action lawsuit against Citibank based on Citibank’s marketing
of the credit protection plan and its handling of a claim she had made under it after she
lost her job. (McGill, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 953.) The complaint alleged various
violations of California’s consumer protection laws, including the CLRA, UCL, and the
false advertising laws, and sought “an injunction prohibiting Citibank from continuing to
engage in its illegal and deceptive practices,” in addition to other relief. (Ibid.) Citibank
moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision set forth in the
accountholder agreement. (Id. at pp. 952-953.) The trial court granted the petition in
connection with McGill’s monetary claims but denied it in connection with the requests
for injunction under the CLRA, UCL, and false advertising laws. The Court of Appeal
reversed, concluding that all of McGill’s claims were subject to arbitration. (Id. at
p. 953.)
The Supreme Court in turn reversed the appellate court, holding that an arbitration
provision that waives a plaintiff’s right to seek public injunctive relief in any forum is
invalid and unenforceable. (McGill, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 951-952.) The court then
examined McGill’s complaint to determine whether it sought public or private injunctive
relief. (Id. at p. 956.) The court provided two examples of what it believed constituted
public injunctive relief. “[A]n injunction under the CLRA against a defendant’s
deceptive methods, acts, and practices ‘generally benefit[s]’ the public ‘directly’ by the
elimination of deceptive practices and ‘will . . . not benefit’ the plaintiff ‘directly,’
because the plaintiff has ‘already been injured, allegedly, by such practices and [is] aware

8
of them.’ [Broughton, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1080, fn. 5]).” (McGill, at p. 955.)
Likewise, “an injunction under the UCL or the false advertising law against deceptive
advertising practices ‘is clearly for the benefit of . . . the general public’; ‘it is designed to
prevent further harm to the public at large rather than to redress or prevent injury to a
plaintiff.’ (Cruz, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 315-316.)” (McGill, at p. 955.)
The court concluded that McGill’s requested relief “does, in fact, appear to seek
the type of public injunctive relief that Broughton and Cruz identified.” (McGill, supra,
2 Cal.5th at p. 956.) The complaint was brought under the consumer protection statutes
and alleged “unfair, deceptive, untrue, and misleading” advertising and marketing, and
“false, deceptive, and/or misleading” representations and omissions. (Id. at pp. 956-957.)
The complaint sought an injunction “to ensure compliance” with these laws, and to enjoin
Citibank from “continuing to falsely advertise or conceal material information and
conduct business via the unlawful and unfair business acts and practice complained
herein.” (Id. at p. 957.) “In light of these allegations and requests for relief . . . we
disagree with Citibank that McGill has failed adequately . . . ‘to explain how the public at
large would benefit from’ that relief.” (Ibid.)
As in McGill, Ramsey alleges violations of California’s consumer protection
statutes–specifically, the CLRA and UCL. The complaint similarly seeks injunctive
relief that “has the primary purpose and effect of prohibiting unlawful acts that threaten
future injury to the general public.” (McGill, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 955.) For example, as
in McGill, where the plaintiff sought to enjoin unfair and deceptive marketing practices
and ensure Citibank’s future compliance with consumer protection laws, Ramsey’s
complaint seeks to (1) enjoin Comcast from engaging in “unfair or deceptive acts or
practices and correcting all false and misleading statements and material omissions . . . to
prevent future injury to the general public”; (2) require Comcast to “halt their practice of
issuing secret discounts”; (3) require Comcast to “comply with their legal obligations and

9
utilize only truthful and complete advertisements, statements, and representations”; and
(4) enjoin Comcast from “continuing their unlawful and unfair business practices.”
An injunction that seeks to prohibit a business from engaging in unfair or
deceptive practices and marketing, requires it to provide enhanced pricing transparency,
and requires it to comply with our consumer protection laws, does have the primary
purpose and effect of protecting the public, and thus falls within McGill’s definition of
public injunctive relief.
2. An Injunction That Primarily Benefits Both Subscribers and Potential
Subscribers Is a Public Injunction
Comcast contends that Ramsey’s complaint does not seek public injunctive relief
because “any injunction flowing from Ramsey’s claims would, primarily–if not
exclusively, benefit a limited group of existing Comcast subscribers whose promotional
terms are coming to an end.” Specifically, Comcast argues that any injunctive relief
granted under the complaint would benefit only the following subset of individuals:
“(1) existing Comcast subscribers, (2) who currently receive services on a promotional
rate term agreement, (3) who are far enough into that term to make a decision about their
next contact, and (4) who would make a commitment to another fixed term subscription.”
But we conclude that the scope of the requested injunction is not so constricted.
As Ramsey’s complaint sets forth, “[r]easonable consumers . . . rely on the
representations made by service providers in determining whether to purchase their
services and consider that information important to their purchase decision.” Ramsey
argues that any consumer would want a “complete and accurate representation of what
happens after promotional pricing ends, what other pricing is available, further discounts,
etc., without misrepresentations and concealment, when deciding whether to purchase
such subscription services.” Thus, an injunction that prohibits Comcast from engaging in
“deceptive acts and practices,” requires Comcast to utilize “only truthful and complete
advertisements,” and requires Comcast to make consumers “aware of any and all price

10
reductions and rebates,” would benefit both existing Comcast subscribers and any
member of the public who considers signing up with Comcast (i.e., potential subscribers).
This benefit would come in the form of more accurate and transparent pricing options,
not only for the one-year promotional term, but for the duration of the consumer’s
subscription. Such enhanced transparency, in turn, would enable subscribers and
potential subscribers alike to make informed decisions from the outset about whether to
subscribe to Comcast, for how long, and to compare Comcast prices against those of its
competitors.
The issue, then, is whether an injunction that benefits both existing and potential
Comcast subscribers qualifies as a public injunction under McGill. On this question,
Ramsey urges us to follow Mejia and Maldonado. Comcast argues that we should reject
Mejia and Maldonado in favor of Hodges v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC (9th
Cir. 2021) 21 F.4th 535 (Hodges). We conclude that Mejia and Maldonado are both
persuasive and consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in McGill. We thus decline
to follow Hodges.
(a) Mejia and Maldonado
Mejia bought a used motorcycle from Del Amo (a dealership) and financed the
purchase using a credit card he obtained through the dealership. (Mejia, supra, 54
Cal.App.5th at p. 694.) He subsequently filed a class action complaint, alleging that Del
Amo violated the Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance Act, the CLRA, and the UCL
by “failing to provide its consumers with a single document setting forth all the financing
terms for motor vehicle purchases made with a conditional sale contract.” (Id. at p. 695.)
Among other relief, the complaint sought an injunction prohibiting Del Amo from selling
motor vehicles “without first providing the consumer with a single document containing
all of the agreements of Del Amo and the consumer with respect to the total cost and the
terms of payment.” (Ibid.) Del Amo moved to compel arbitration based on the parties’

11
prior agreement, but the trial court denied the petition, holding that the arbitration
provision was unenforceable under McGill. (Id. at pp. 693, 696-697.)
On appeal, Del Amo disputed that Mejia sought public injunctive relief, arguing
that the requested injunction was private because it would benefit “only a narrow group
of Del Amo customers–the class of similarly situated individuals who, like Mejia, would
buy a motorcycle from Del Amo with a conditional sales contract.” (Mejia, supra,
54 Cal.App.5th at p. 702.) The court rejected this argument as “mak[ing] little sense,”
reasoning that the requested injunction would force Del Amo to stop selling motorcycles
in California without first providing consumers with statutorily mandated disclosures in a
single document. (Id. at p. 702.) This request is “plainly one for a public injunction
given that [plaintiff] ‘seeks to enjoin future violations of California’s consumer
protection statutes, relief oriented to and for the benefit of the general public.’ (Blair v.
Rent-A-Center, Inc. (9th Cir. 2019) 928 F.3d 819, 831.)” (Mejia, supra, at p. 703.) In
addition, the requested injunction did not “limit itself to relief only for class members or
some other small group of individuals; it encompassed ‘consumers’ generally.” (Ibid.)
For these reasons, the court in Mejia concluded that the requested injunction “fits the
Supreme Court’s definition of ‘public injunctive relief’ in McGill: ‘injunctive relief that
has the primary purpose and effect of prohibiting unlawful acts that threaten future injury
to the general public.’ (McGill, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 951.)” (Mejia, supra, at pp. 703-
704.)
Similarly, in Maldonado, Fast Auto Loans (Lender) offered loans to California
consumers in immediate need of cash who had limited credit opportunities. (Maldonado,
supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 713.) The plaintiffs brought a putative class action against
Lender under the CLRA and UCL, alleging that Lender charged “unconscionable interest
rates” in violation of state law. (Ibid.) The complaint sought an injunction requiring
Lender to “cease charging an unlawful interest rate on its loans exceeding $2500” and to
“institute corrective advertising and provide written notice to the public of the unlawfully

12
charged interest rate on prior loans.” (Id. at p. 715.) The trial court denied Lender’s
petition to compel arbitration based on McGill. (Id. at p. 716.) On appeal, Lender argued
that McGill did not apply because the relief sought was private in that it would benefit
only a narrow group of “similarly situated individuals who would borrow money from
Lender and agree to a similar arbitration provision.” (Id. at p. 720.)
The court rejected this contention, concluding that the complaint “does not limit
the requested remedies for only some class members, but rather encompasses all
consumers and members of the public.” (Maldonado, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 721.)
Moreover, “an injunction under the CLRA against Lender’s unlawful practices will not
directly benefit [the plaintiffs] because they have already been harmed and are aware of
the misconduct.” (Ibid.) The court further rejected Lender’s argument that the lawsuit
challenged only the interest rates charged in the putative class members’ loans. “To
accept this argument, we would have to ignore the complaint’s unequivocal request to
enjoin Lender from harming other consumers in future contracts for outrageous interest
rates.” (Ibid.) Ultimately, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that “although ‘not all
members of the public will become customers of [Lender],’ this does not negate the fact
that public injunctive relief will nevertheless offer benefits to the general public . . . . The
requested injunction cannot be deemed private simply because Lender could not possibly
advertise to, or enter into agreements with, every person in California.” (Id. at pp. 722-
723.) “Such a holding would allow Lender to continue violating the UCL and CLRA
because consumers harmed by the unlawful practices would be unable to act as a private
attorney general and seek redress on behalf of the public.” (Ibid.)
As in Mejia and Maldonado, the requested injunction here “seeks to enjoin future
violations of California’s consumer protection statutes.” (Mejia, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at
p. 703.) The complaint does not limit the requested remedies to Ramsey himself or those
similarly situated, but “encompasses all consumers and members of the public.”
(Maldonado, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 721.) For example, in connection with his

13
CLRA claim, Ramsey seeks “public injunctive relief enjoining Defendants’ unfair or
deceptive acts or practices . . . to prevent future injury to the general public.” In
connection with the two UCL claims, Ramsey seeks “a permanent injunction requiring
Defendants to halt their practice of issuing secret discounts” and “related injunctive relief
that . . . ensure consumers are aware of any and all price reductions and rebates.” In the
prayer for relief, Ramsey seeks to enjoin Comcast “from continuing their unlawful and
unfair business practices.”
The injunctive relief Ramsey seeks here is forward-looking and “oriented to and
for the benefit of the general public.” (Mejia, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 703.) The
requested relief also does not directly benefit Ramsey, as he has “already been harmed
and [is] aware of the misconduct.” (Maldonado, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 721.)
Ramsey and those similarly situated to him are already aware of Comcast’s practice of
offering “new” promotional rates only to those who reach out to Comcast toward the end
of their subscription cycle, and the relief he seeks–i.e., cessation of Comcast’s unfair or
deceptive practices–will not compensate him for the “ascertainable loss of money” he had
previously incurred from “paying nonpromotional rates when he did not immediately
contact [Comcast] to obtain new promotional pricing.” Rather, the requested injunction
would primarily benefit existing and potential Comcast subscribers by providing them
with more truthful and transparent pricing options. To the extent Ramsey benefits from
this relief, it would be incidentally, as a member of the public. (See McGill, supra, 2
Cal.5th at p. 955.)
(b) Hodges
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Hodges deviated sharply from Mejia and
Maldonado, holding that unless a plaintiff’s requested injunctive relief benefits the entire
public “as a diffuse whole,” it does not fall within McGill’s definition of public injunctive
relief. (See Hodges, supra, 21 F.4th at p. 549.) Hodges also examined the holdings of
Mejia and Maldonado and concluded that they represent a “patent misreading of

14
California law.” (Id. at p. 544.) Comcast urges that we follow Hodges, but we
respectfully disagree with both its holding and the Ninth Circuit’s characterization of
Mejia and Maldonado.
In Hodges, a former Comcast subscriber brought a putative class action lawsuit
against Comcast, alleging that Comcast violated class members’ statutory privacy rights
by collecting various personal data without first obtaining subscriber consent. (Hodges,
supra, 21 F.4th at pp. 537-538.) The complaint alleged various federal and state law
violations, including a violation of the UCL. (Id. at p. 538.) Among other things, the
complaint sought “statewide public injunctive relief” to require Comcast to “clearly and
conspicuously notify cable subscribers in writing, at the requisite times, of the period
during which it maintains their [personally identifiable information (“PII”)], including
video activity data and demographic data.” (Id. at pp. 538, 548-549.)
Comcast moved to compel arbitration under the subscriber agreement. (Hodges,
supra, 21 F.4th at pp. 538-539.) The district court denied the petition based on McGill
and Comcast appealed. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that McGill was not
implicated because the complaint did not seek public injunctive relief. (Id. at p. 540.)
While recognizing that some of the relief sought was “forward-looking prohibitions
against future violations of law,” the Hodges majority nevertheless concluded that alone
was “not enough to classify the remedy as public within the meaning of the McGill rule.”
(Id. at p. 549.) Instead, to meet McGill’s definition of public injunctive relief, the
plaintiff must seek relief that “could be said to primarily benefit the general public as a
more diffuse whole.” (Ibid.) Under that definition, the plaintiff in Hodges was not
seeking public injunctive relief because the requested relief would benefit only Comcast
cable subscribers. (Ibid.) The Hodges majority further posited that the plaintiff in Mejia
was not seeking public injunctive relief because the requested injunction there would
only “benefit the class of persons who actually purchased motorcycles, and not the
general public as a whole.” (Id. at pp. 544-545.) Hodges also disagreed with

15
Maldonado, noting that the plaintiff there was not seeking public injunctive relief
because his requested injunction would only benefit “those who actually sign lending
agreements.” (Id. at p. 545.)
(c) Mejia and Maldonado Are More Consistent with McGill
The definition of public injunctive relief the courts set forth in Mejia and
Maldonado is consistent with McGill, in which our Supreme Court expressly recognized
injunctions issued under the CLRA and UCL as injunctions that benefit the public. (See
McGill, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 955.) Injunctive relief under the CLRA and UCL is
precisely what plaintiffs sought in Mejia and Maldonado, and what Ramsey seeks here.
In our view, Mejia and Maldonado’s definition of public injunctive relief also better
reflects the overarching purpose of the consumer protection statutes. While the requested
injunction in those cases and here may not benefit the entire public as a “diffuse whole,”
we agree with the court in Maldonado that “a requested injunction cannot be deemed
private simply because [a business] could not possibly advertise to, or enter into
agreements with, every person in California . . . . Such a holding would allow [that
business] to continue violating the UCL and CLRA because consumers harmed by the
unlawful practices would be unable to act as a private attorney general and seek redress
on behalf of the public.” (Maldonado, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at pp. 722-723.) McGill
did not require that public injunctive relief have such a universal reach.
Finally, we disagree with the majority in Hodges that the requested injunctions in
Mejia and Maldonado stood to benefit only those who purchased motorcycles or signed
lending agreements. (See Hodges, supra, 21 F.4th at pp. 544-545.) We find compelling
the reasoning of the dissent, which observed that an injunction requiring a dealership to
provide consumers with statutorily mandated disclosures in a single document, though
not benefiting every member of the public, would benefit “potential and actual
purchasers of motorcycles . . . when they are considering whether to enter into a
transaction.” (Id. at pp. 551-552.) Similarly, an injunction prohibiting a lender from

16
charging “unconscionable interest rates” would benefit not only those who took out
loans, but any member of the public with limited credit options who find themselves in
need of cash. (Ibid.)
The injunctive relief Ramsey seeks in this case would require Comcast to cease its
“unfair or deceptive practices” and provide increased pricing transparency. Such relief
would benefit not only those who subscribe to Comcast (such as Ramsey), but any
member of the public considering such a subscription, by “preventing [Comcast] from
contracting or proposing to contract with any member of the public–not just current
customers–on unfair terms.” (Hodges, supra, 21 F.4th at p. 551.) This is the essence of
what the consumer protection statutes are designed to do. (McGill, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
p. 954 [purpose of CLRA is to “protect consumers against unfair and deceptive business
practices,” and purpose of UCL is to “prevent “protect both consumers and competitors
by promoting fair competition”].) 3
Because the relief Ramsey requests both “seeks to enjoin future violations of
California’s consumer protection statutes,” and is “oriented to and for the benefit of the

3
To the extent we look to federal authority to guide our analysis on the issue of
whether Ramsey’s requested injunctive relief is public or private, Blair v. Rent-A-Center,
Inc. (9th Cir. 2019) 928 F.3d 819 (Blair) is more consistent with McGill. In Blair,
plaintiffs entered into “rent-to-own agreements” with Rent-A-Center, which operates
stores that rent household items to consumers for set installment payments. (Blair, supra,
928 F.3d at p. 822.) They subsequently brought a putative class action lawsuit against the
company, alleging that it structured its rent-to-own pricing in violation of California law,
including the Karnette Rental-Purchase Act, the CLRA, and the UCL. (Ibid.) Among
other forms of relief, plaintiffs’ complaint sought an injunction against the company to
“enjoin future violations of these laws.” (Id. at p. 823.) The Ninth Circuit held that
plaintiffs’ requested relief constituted public injunctive relief under McGill–even though
the requested injunction would not benefit every member of the public, but only those
who enter or contemplate entering into an agreement with Rent-a-Center. (See id. at
p. 831, fn. 3; see also Hodges, supra, 21 F.4th at p. 550.) Under Blair, benefitting every
member of the public as a “diffuse whole” was neither necessary nor required. It was
sufficient that plaintiffs sought “to enjoin future violations of California consumer
protection statutes, relief oriented to and for the benefit of the general public.” (Blair,
supra, at p. 831, fn. 3.)

17
general public,” it falls within McGill’s definition of public injunctive relief. (See Mejia,
supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 703.)
C. The FAA Does Not Preempt McGill
Lastly, Comcast argues that the FAA preempts McGill. The Supreme Court held
in McGill itself that there is no preemption. (McGill, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 963;
Maldonado, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 724 [rejecting Lender’s argument that the FAA
preempts McGill].) As Comcast acknowledges, we are bound to follow Supreme Court
precedent. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) We do
so here, concluding that the FAA does not preempt McGill.
III. DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition to compel arbitration is affirmed.

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 _______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_______________________________
Grover, J.

_______________________________
Lie, J.

H049949
Ramsey v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC
Filed 1/29/24

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

CHARLES RAMSEY, H049949
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 21CV384867)

v.

COMCAST CABLE
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,

Defendant and Appellant.

BY THE COURT:

The written opinion, which was filed on December 29, 2023, has now been
certified for publication pursuant to rule 8.1105(b) of the California Rules of
Court, and it is therefore ordered that the opinion be published in the official
reports.

(Greenwood, P. J., Grover, J. and Lie, J. participated in this decision.)

Date:_________________________ _____________________________ P.J.

20
Trial Court: Santa Clara County Superior Court
Superior Court No.: 21CV384867

Trial Judge: The Honorable Patricia M. Lucas

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent,
Charles Ramsey: Daniel S. Jonathan
Freeman, Freeman & Smiley

Bevin Elaine Pike
Trisha Kathleen Monesi
Ryan Hung-Hsi Wu
Liana Carol Carter
Capstone Law APC

Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant,
Comcast Cable Communications, LLC: Aileen Marie McGrath
Michael Weisbuch
Marshall Lee Baker
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP

H049949
Ramsey v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC

21