United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 23-1871
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Timothy Tirrell Brown
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa
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Submitted: November 13, 2023
Filed: February 6, 2024
[Unpublished]
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Before KELLY, ERICKSON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Timothy Brown pled guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. The
district court1 sentenced Brown to 57 months of imprisonment. Brown appeals,
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The Honorable C.J. Williams, United States District Judge for the Northern
District of Iowa.
arguing the district court procedurally erred in calculating Brown’s offense level and
imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. We affirm.
I. Background
In July 2021, police officers pulled over Brown’s vehicle when he failed to
obey a stop sign. While conversing with Brown, an officer saw evidence of
marijuana use in Brown’s vehicle. The officer asked Brown if he had any weapons
or contraband. Brown relayed the question to his girlfriend, who was on a video call
with him during the stop. Brown’s girlfriend informed the officer of a firearm in the
trunk. The officer searched the car and found an AR pistol with a 30-round magazine
behind the passenger seat.
Brown was charged and pled guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a
felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Brown was released on
a personal recognizance bond that required pretrial supervision, the terms of which
Brown violated multiple times.
Eventually, Brown appeared for a sentencing hearing. When calculating the
advisory sentencing range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (Guidelines
or U.S.S.G.), the district court determined a higher base offense level applied
because Brown had previously been convicted of cocaine trafficking in Mississippi.
See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3). The district court sentenced Brown to 57 months of
imprisonment, the bottom of his calculated Guidelines range.
II. Analysis
Brown argues the district court procedurally erred when calculating the
Guidelines range. “We review de novo whether a prior conviction is a sentencing
enhancement predicate.” United States v. Henderson, 11 F.4th 713, 716 (8th Cir.
2021). We determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a predicate offense
using a categorical approach that “looks to the statutory definition of the prior
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offense.” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting United States v. Boleyn, 929 F.3d 932, 936 (8th
Cir. 2019)).
Brown argues his conviction for selling cocaine in Mississippi was based on
a statute that is categorically too broad to be considered a controlled substance
offense and, because of this, his offense level was overinflated. According to Brown,
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1’s definition of “controlled substance offense” includes only
offenses involving controlled substances as listed in the federal schedule of
controlled substances, see 21 U.S.C. § 812. Brown then argues Mississippi’s
definition of cocaine is broader than the federal definition and is thus categorically
overbroad. See Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-115(a)(4).
Brown’s argument is foreclosed by precedent. We previously held in
Henderson that a state offense related to controlled or counterfeit substances may
qualify as a controlled substance offense under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) even if the
substance underlying the offense is not controlled by federal law. 11 F.4th at 717–
19. Thus, the district court did not procedurally err by considering Brown’s
Mississippi cocaine conviction a controlled substance offense for purposes of the
Guidelines.
Brown also challenges his 57-month sentence as substantively unreasonable.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence “under a ‘deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.’” United States v. Ellison, 71 F.4th 1111, 1115 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51–52 (2007)).
Brown argues the district court failed to properly weigh his mitigating factors,
including his lack of violent or drug trafficking offenses in the past decade, criminal
history points based on charges involving minimal amounts of cocaine, the nature of
Brown’s offense, and Brown’s status as a working parent. “[B]ut ‘district courts are
allowed wide latitude to weigh the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors in each case and
assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate
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sentence.’” United States v. Mays, 967 F.3d 748, 754 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting
United States v. Calloway, 762 F.3d 754, 760 (8th Cir. 2014)).
Here, the district court gave Brown a more lenient sentence based on his
aforementioned history and characteristics but voiced concerns with Brown’s
repeated violations of the terms of his pretrial release. The district court saw the
latter as an indication that Brown might reoffend. Based on these circumstances, the
district court sentenced Brown to 57 months of incarceration, the bottom of his
calculated Guidelines range. This was not an abuse of discretion.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
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