140 Nev., Advance Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
LINA MARIE WILLSON, No. 84353-COA
Petitioner,
vs.
THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
MED
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FEB 08 2024
CARSON CITY; AND THE
ELI
HONORABLE JAMES TODD RUSSELL, CLERK RT
By
DISTRICT JUDGE, EF DEPUTY CLERK
Respondents,
and
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Real Party in Interest.
Original petition for a writ of certiorari challenging an order of
the district court denying an appeal from a judgment of conviction, entered
pursuant to a bench trial, of obstructing a public officer.
Petition granted.
Charles H. Odgers, Public Defender, Carson City,
for Petitioner.
Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Jason Woodbury, District
Attorney, and Peter W. Smith and Sarah E. White, Deputy District
Attorneys, Carson City,
for Real Party in Interest.
BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, GIBBONS, C.J., and BULLA and
WESTBROOK, JJ.
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
In this opinion, we consider constitutional challenges to NRS
197.190, which provides that a person may not "willfully hinder, delay or
obstruct any public officer in the discharge of official powers or duties."
Petitioner Lina Marie Willson was charged and convicted under NRS
197.190 after yelling from her front yard at several police officers, who were
attending to a separate, potentially life-threatening matter involving a
juvenile on the street near Willson's house. After the district court affirmed
her misdemeanor conviction, Willson petitioned for a writ of certiorari,
arguing that NRS 197.190 is unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. We
conclude that (1) NRS 197.190 applies only to physical conduct or fighting
words that are specifically intended to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public
officer and, therefore, (2) NRS 197.190, as construed by this court, is not
unconstitutionally overbroad or vague, either on its face or as applied to
Willson.
Although we hold that Willson's as-applied claims fail, we
recognize that Willson's claims implicate the sufficiency of the evidence in
light of our interpretation of NRS 197.190. Since the district court did not
have the benefit of our interpretation of NRS 197.190 as applying only to
physical conduct and fighting words, it did not consider whether there was
sufficient evidence to support Willson's conviction. Accordingly, we grant
the petition and direct the clerk of this court to issue a writ of certiorari
upholding NRS 197.190's constitutionality and instructing the district court
to reconsider Willson's direct appeal for the sole purpose of addressing
whether, under this court's interpretation of NRS 197.190, sufficient
evidence supported Willson's conviction.
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 25, 2021, the Carson City Sheriff s Office responded
to a call indicating a juvenile was contemplating suicide. Sergeant Mike
Cullen was the first officer to arrive and saw the juvenile walking down a
residential road with a knife in his hands. Sergeant Cullen followed the
juvenile in his car and attempted to communicate with him. At some point,
the juvenile stopped in the street, and Sergeant Cullen got out of his car
and continued to communicate with the juvenile from a distance. The
juvenile pressed the knife into his body a couple of tirnes and stated he
wanted to kill himself. In accord with his training, Sergeant Cullen
attempted to build rapport with the juvenile to prevent the juvenile from
committing suicide.
Shortly thereafter, more officers arrived on the scene. One
officer, Deputy Nicholas Simpson, maintained a position with a beanbag
shotgun while the other officers attempted to deescalate and control the
scene. Deputy Simpson was to use the beanbag shotgun if the public or the
officers became at risk. Approximately 15 minutes after the officers arrived
on scene, the juvenile dropped the knife. Sergeant Cullen believed the
situation was unstable up until that moment.
At some point during these 15 minutes, while the officers were
interacting with the juvenile, Willson, who lived next door to where the
incident was taking place, started yelling at the officers and the juvenile
from the middle of her front lawn. Willson continued to yell at the officers
even though two deputies had asked her to stop yelling several times.' The
officers generally could not recall what Willson was yelling, although
1Deputy Simpson testified that he asked Willson to stop yelling
between three and five times.
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Sergeant Cullen heard Willson yell at some point that "she was a witness of
some sort."
The officers testified that Willson did not leave her yard, did not
threaten them with violence, and did not throw anything at them.
Nevertheless, the officers testified that Willson's yelling was loud and
disruptive and delayed their attempts to get the juvenile to drop the knife
because it interfered with their ability to build rapport and interact with
the juvenile. Deputy Simpson also testified that he had to put down the
beanbag shotgun to address Willson because of her yelling, which put the
officers at risk. Eventually, Willson's behavior "stopped enough" to where
the officers were able to get the juvenile over to the curb, and the juvenile
dropped the knife.
Thereafter, the State charged Willson with obstructing a public
officer in violation of NRS 197.190, and Willson was convicted after a bench
trial in Carson City Justice Court. Willson appealed her conviction to the
district court, arguing that NRS 197.190 was unconstitutionally overbroad
and vague both on its face and as applied to her. The district court denied
the appeal, holding NRS 197.190 was not unconstitutionally overbroad or
vague because the statute required both due notice and the specific intent
to obstruct a public officer. Wilson then filed this petition for a writ of
certiorari.
ANALYSIS
In this petition, Willson challenges the constitutionality of NRS
197.190. This court is authorized to review a petition for a writ of certiorari
in cases where a district court has passed upon the constitutionality of a
statute on appeal from justice court. See Nev. Const. art. 6, § 4(1); NRS
34.020(3). "The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that we
review de novo." Siluar v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 289, 292, 129 P.3d
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682, 684 (2006). "Statutes are presumed to be valid, and the challenger
bears the burden of showing that a statute is unconstitutional." Id.
Willson argues NRS 197.190 is unconstitutionally overbroad
and vague, both on its face and as applied to her. "The overbreadth doctrine
permits the facial invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise of First
Amendment rights if the impermissible applications of the law are
substantial when 'judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep.' Ford v. State, 127 Nev. 608, 612, 262 P.3d 1123, 1125 (2011)
(quoting Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999)). The First Amendment
of the United States Constitution prohibits the government from abridging
an individual's freedom of speech.2 U.S. Const. amend. I; Busefink v. State,
128 Nev. 525, 529, 286 P.3d 599, 602 (2012). "The vagueness doctrine holds
that `[a] conviction fails to comport with due process if the statute under
which it is obtained fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or
encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement." Ford, 127 Nev. at 612,
262 P.3d at 1125 (alteration in original) (quoting United State,s v. Williams,
553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)).
To determine whether NRS 197.190 is overbroad or vague, we
must first interpret NRS 197.190 to determine what the statute prohibits.
See id. at 612, 262 P.3d at 1126 ("The first step in both overbreadth and
vagueness analysis is to construe the challenged statute."); see also United
States v. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762, 770 (2023) ("To judge whether a statute is
overbroad, we must first determine what it covers."). After interpreting
2 The First Amendment is applicable to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
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NRS 197.190, we determine whether NRS 197.190, as construed by this
court, is overbroad or vague, either on its face or as applied to Willson.
NRS 197.190 prohibits physical conduct or fighting words that are
specifically intended to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer in the
discharge of official powers or duties
NRS 197.190 was enacted as part of the Crimes and
Punishments Act of 1911, reprinted in Nev. Rev. Laws § 6805, at 1928
(1912), and has not been amended by the Legislature or interpreted in a
published decision by the Nevada appellate courts since its enactment. The
statute reads as follows:
Every person who, after due notice, shall refuse or
neglect to make or furnish any statement, report or
information lawfully required of the person by any
public officer, or who, in such statement, report or
information shall make any willfully untrue,
misleading or exaggerated staternent, or who shall
willfully hinder, delay or obstruct any public officer
in the discharge of official powers or duties, shall,
where no other provision of law applies, be guilty of
a misdemeanor.
NRS 197.190.
When interpreting a statute, this court's "primary goal . . . is to
give effect to the Legislature's intent in enacting it." Rarnos v. State, 137
Nev. 721, 722, 499 P.3c1 1178, 1180 (2021). "[W]e first look to the statute's
plain language to determine its meaning, and we will enforce it as written
if the language is clear and unambiguous." Id. In determining the plain
meaning of a statute, we consider both "the particular statutory language
at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole."
Reggio v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 4, 525 P.3d 350, 353
(2023) (quoting K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988)). "We
will look beyond the statute's language only if that language is ambiguous
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or its plain meaning was clearly not intended or would lead to an absurd or
unreasonable result." Rarnos, 137 Nev. at 722, 499 P.3d at 1180. "An
ambiguity arises where the statutory language lends itself to two or more
reasonable interpretations." State v. Catanio, 120 Nev. 1030, 1033, 102
P.3d 588, 590 (2004).
As an initial matter, we recognize that NRS 197.190 provides
three alternative means by which a person may be guilty of obstructing a
public officer, and each alternative is laid out in a clause that begins with
"who." Willson only challenges the constitutionality of the final clause,
which she was charged with violating: "[e]very person... who shall
willfully hinder, delay or obstruct any public officer in the discharge of
official powers or duties."3 NRS 197.190.
Willson contends that NRS 197.190's scope is broad, prohibiting
not only physical conduct but also protected speech. The State contends
that NRS 197.190 is limited in its scope by due notice and specific intent
requirements. As such, the parties raise three issues for this court's
consideration: (1) whether NRS 197.190 requires that a person receive "due
notice" that their behavior is hindering, delaying, or obstructing a public
officer; (2) whether NRS 197.190 requires that a person have the specific
intent to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer; and (3) whether NRS
197.190 prohibits speech that hinders, delays, or obstructs a public officer.
We consider these issues in turn.
As such, all references to obstruction in this opinion refer to an
3
obstruction charge under this last clause, unless stated otherwise. We
express no opinion regarding the constitutionality of the other provisions of
NRS 197.190.
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NRS 197.190 does not require that a person receive "due notice" that
they are hindering, delaying, or obstructing a public officer
The State argues, and the district court held, that a person
cannot be guilty of obstructing a public officer unless the person received
due notice that their behavior was hindering, delaying, or obstructing a
public officer. However, such an interpretation is at odds with the structure
of the statute.
The phrase "after due notice" succeeds only the first "who"
clause, which introduces the first alternative means of committing the
offense. The phrase's placement within only the first clause indicates its
application is limited to the category of persons described in that clause,
i.e., those who "refuse or neglect to make or furnish any statement, report
or information lawfully required of the person by any public officer."
Indeed, interpreting NRS 197.190 as requiring due notice for each means of
committing obstruction would lead to an absurd result, as it would require
that a person convicted of obstruction under the second clause have received
due notice that they were making a "willfully untrue, misleading or
exaggerated statement."
Were we to follow the logic of the State and district court, to be
consistent, we would also have to hold that the phrase following the second
"who" clause—"in such statement, report or information"—would also have
to apply to the other two clauses. However, this would lead to a nonsensical
construction, prohibiting every person who, "in such statement, report or
information" from "willfully hinder[ing], delay[ing] or obstruct[ing] any
public officer in the discharge of official powers or duties." An absurd
construction such as this should always be avoided. Sheriff, Clark Cnty. v.
Burcharn, 124 Nev. 1247, 1253, 198 P.3d 326, 329 (2008). Therefore, we
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conclude that NRS 197.190 does not require that a person receive due notice
that their behavior is hindering, delaying, or obstructing a public officer.
NRS 197.190 requires that a person have the specific intent to hinder,
delay, or obstruct a public officer
The State also argues, and the district court held, that a person
cannot be guilty of obstructing a public officer unless the person has the
specific intent to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer.
"Specific intent" is "Nile intent to accomplish the precise
criminal act that one is later charged with." Intent, Black's Law Dictionary
(11th ed. 2019); accord Bolden v. State, 121 Nev. 908, 923, 124 P.3d 191, 201
(2005), receded from on other grounds by Cortinas v. State, 124 Nev. 1013,
1026-27, 195 P.3d 315, 324 (2008). In contrast, "general intent" is "[t]he
intent to perform an act even though the actor does not desire the
consequences that result." Intent, Black's Law Dictionary; see Bolden, 121
Nev. at 923, 124 P.3d at 201. With respect to NRS 197.190, specific intent
would require that a person intend for a public officer to be hindered,
delayed, or obstructed by the person's act, whereas general intent would
require only that a person intend to perform an act that results in the
hinderance, delay, or obstruction of a public officer, regardless of whether
the person desired such a result.
NRS 197.190 makes it unlawful to "willfully hinder, delay or
obstruct any public officer in the discharge of official powers or duties." NRS
197.190 does not define the term "willfully"; therefore, we consider the term
as it is commonly understood. See Cornella v. Just. Ct. of New River Twp.,
132 Nev. 587, 594, 377 P.3d 97, 102 (2016) ("When the Legislature does not
specifically define a term, this court 'presume[s] that the Legislature
intended to use words in their usual and natural meaning." (alteration in
original) (quoting Wyrnan v. State, 125 Nev. 592, 607, 217 P.3d 572, 583
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(2009))). Although the term is generally understood to mean "deliberately"
or "intentionaljly]," see Willful, Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary
(11th ed. 2020), the term may denote either that an act is "[v]oluntary and
intentional, but not necessarily malicious" or that an act "involves [a]
conscious wrong or evil purpose on the part of the actor," see Willful, Black's
Law Dictionary.
Because the terrn "willfully" does not necessarily require
malice, the phrase "willfully hinder, delay or obstruct any public officer"
may reasonably be interpreted as requiring only that a person intend to
perform an act that resulted in the hinderance, delay, or obstruction of a
public officer. See Robey v. State, 96 Nev. 459, 461, 611 P.2d 209, 210 (1980)
(stating the term "'willful' when used in criminal statutes with respect to
proscribed conduct relates to an act or omission which is done intentionally,
deliberately or designedly, as distinguished from an act or omission done
accidentally, inadvertently, or innocently"); see also Moore v. State, 136 Nev.
620, 624, 475 P.3d 33, 36 (2020) (recognizing "the term `wil[l]fully' has been
defined to refer to general intent" in the context of statutes aimed at the
protection of infants (alteration in original) (quoting Jenkins v. State, 110
Nev. 865, 870, 877 P.2d 1063, 1066 (1994))).
However, because the term "willfully" may also suggest an evil
or malicious purpose on the part of the actor, and the terms "hinder,"
"delay," and "obstruct" are transitive verbs that refer to a specific object,
i.e., "any public officer," the phrase "willfully hinder, delay or obstruct any
public officer" may also reasonably be interpreted as requiring that a person
intend their act to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer. See Flores-
Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 650 (2009) ("In ordinary English,
where a transitive verb has an object, listeners in most contexts assume
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that an adverb . . . that modifies the transitive verb tells the listener how
the subject performed the entire action, including the object as set forth in
the sentence."); see also Byforcl v. State, 116 Nev. 215, 234, 994 P.2d 700.
713 (2000) (holding "willful means intentional" and that "willful first-degree
murder requires that the killer actually intend to kill"). Therefore, we
conclude NRS 197.190 is ambiguous as to whether the offense is a general
or specific intent crime.
"To interpret an ambiguous statute, we look to the legislative
history and construe the statute in a manner that is consistent with reason
and public policy." State v. Lucero, 127 Nev. 92, 95, 249 P.3d 1226, 1228
(2011). We also consider "prior judicial interpretations of related or
comparable statutes by this or other courts," Castaneda v. State, 132 Nev.
434, 439, 373 P.3d 108, 111 (2016), as well as definitions of the offense at
common law, see Adler v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 92 Nev. 641, 643, 556 P.2d
549, 550 (1976); see also NRS 193.050(3). Finally, "every reasonable
construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from
unconstitutionality." State v. Castaneda, 126 Nev. 478, 481, 245 P.3d 550,
552 (2010) (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)); see also
United States v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909) ("[W]here a
statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and
doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such
questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.").
Unfortunately, there is neither legislative history to assist in
discerning legislative intent, nor any Nevada caselaw discussing the
reasons for NRS 197.190's passage more than a century ago. See City of
Milwaukee v. Wroten, 466 N.W.2d 861, 869, 871 (Wis. 1991) (declining to
guess the original intent of the drafters in passing a 135-year-old ordinance
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statute.° Rather, the issue that remains is whether her actions and words
in fact constitute protected speech: if they do constitute protected speech,
then they are not punishable under the statute as construed by this court;
but if they do not constitute protected speech, then they may be punishable
under the statute. For this reason, Willson's as-applied claims are more
properly viewed as claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to
support her conviction. See Ex parte Carter, 514 S.W.3d 776, 780 (Tex. App.
2017) (recognizing the appellant's as-applied claim was actually a "veiled
sufficiency challenge"); see also In re Mental Commitment of KE.K., 954
N.W.2d 366, 380 (Wis. 2021) (stating the petitioner's "dispute is with the
sufficiency of the evidence, not with the constitutionality of' the statute).
The district court did not have the benefit of our interpretation
of NRS 197.190 as being limited to physical conduct and fighting words, and
it therefore did not consider whether there was sufficient evidence that
Willson engaged in physical conduct or uttered fighting words so as to
support her conviction of violating NRS 197.190. Because Willson's as-
applied constitutional challenges are more properly viewed as challenges to
the sufficiency of the evidence, and because Willson raised these claims in
the district court, we grant the petition and instruct the district court to
reconsider Willson's direct appeal for the sole purpose of addressing
whether sufficient evidence supported Willson's conviction under this
6 For this reason, Willson's "as-applied" claims necessarily fail. See,
e,g., In re Mental Commitment of K.E.K., 954 N.W.2d 366, 379 (Wis. 2021)
(rejecting a petitioner's claim that a statute was unconstitutional as applied
to them because "[t]he statute ha [d] no application, constitutional or
otherwise, against those" in the petitioner's position).
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court's interpretation of NRS 197.190.7 See Cornella v. Just. Ct. of New
River Twp., 132 Nev. 587, 600, 377 P.3d 97, 106 (2016) (upholding the
constitutionality of the challenged statute but granting the petition with
instructions for the district court to reconsider the petitioner's direct
appeal).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that NRS 197.190
only applies to physical conduct and fighting words that are specifically
intended to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer and, thus, the statute
is not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague, either on its face or as applied
to Willson. However, in light of our interpretation of NRS 197.190, Willson's
as-applied constitutional challenges are more properly viewed as challenges
to the sufficiency of the evidence. Because the district court did not consider
whether there was sufficient evidence to support Willson's conviction, we
grant the petition and direct the clerk of this court to issue a writ of
certiorari upholding NRS 197.190's constitutionality and instructing the
district court to reconsider Willson's direct appeal for the sole purpose of
7 Because a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim is outside the scope of a
petition for a writ of certiorari filed pursuant to NRS 34.020(3), see NRS
34.020(3) (stating "the writ shall be granted . . . for the purpose of reviewing
the constitutionality or validity of [a] statute or ordinance"), we do not
address whether there is sufficient evidence to support Willson's conviction,
see Cornella v. Just. Ct. of New River Twp., 132 Nev. 587, 600 n.14, 377 P.3d
97, 106 n.14 (2016).
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addressing whether, under this court's interpretation of the statute,
sufficient evidence supported Willson's conviction.
, C.J.
Buila
Westbrook
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