[Cite as State v. Pitts, 2024-Ohio-603.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Appellee : C.A. No. 29649
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2022 CR 00546
:
RONALD W. PITTS : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
: Court)
Appellant :
:
...........
OPINION
Rendered on February 16, 2024
...........
THERESA G. HAIRE, Attorney for Appellant
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by NATHAN B. VANDERHORST, Attorney for Appellee
.............
EPLEY, P.J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Ronald Pitts appeals from his conviction in the
Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas after he pleaded guilty to aggravated arson
and was sentenced to community control. Additionally, pursuant to R.C. 2909.15(D)(2),
Pitts was ordered to register as an arson offender for the rest of his life. For the reasons
that follow, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
-2-
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} In February 2022, Pitts set fire to the house at 919 Wellmeier Avenue in
Dayton. This action not only damaged the property but violated a protection order against
him. In early March 2022, Pitts was indicted on one count of aggravated arson and one
count of violation of a protection order.
{¶ 3} In June 2022, Pitts entered into a plea agreement with the State. He agreed
to plead guilty to the single count of aggravated arson and, in exchange, the State
dismissed the violation of a protection order charge. Prior to the sentencing, Pitts filed a
motion to have the court find R.C.2909.15(D)(2)(b) – a portion of the arson offender
registry statute – unconstitutional. At the disposition, Pitts was sentenced to up to five
years of community control. The trial court acknowledged his motion but informed Pitts
that unless the Supreme Court were to find that section unconstitutional, he would be
required to register as an arson offender for the rest of his life.
{¶ 4} Pitts has filed a timely appeal with a single assignment of error.
II. Arson Registry
{¶ 5} In his initial brief, Pitts argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion
to declare R.C. 2909.15 – which requires a person convicted of arson to register with the
sheriff of the county in which he or she resides – an unconstitutional violation of the
separation of powers doctrine. Pitts alleged that R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) infringes upon the
judicial power to sentence because it requires a recommendation from executive branch
officials to potentially shorten the registration period. That section states: “The judge may
-3-
limit an arson offender’s duty to reregister at an arson offender’s sentencing hearing to
not less than ten years if the judge receives a request from the prosecutor and the
investigating law enforcement agency to consider limiting the arson offender’s registration
period.”
{¶ 6} Although this was an undecided question of law when Pitts submitted his
appellate brief, shortly thereafter, the Ohio Supreme released its opinion in State v.
Daniel, Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-4035, __ N.E.3d __, which held that the
separation of powers doctrine is not unconstitutionally implicated by the statute.
{¶ 7} The Daniel court noted that “the decision whether to recommend a reduced
registration period is not judicial in nature. The judiciary exercises the power of
adjudication and imposition of sentence when it enters final judgment of conviction, but
not before. The prosecution exercises its prosecution power before entry of final
judgment, but not after. In this respect, a prosecutor’s decision whether an offender
should be considered for a reduced registration period fits comfortably within the scope
of discretionary decisions that prosecutors are authorized to make in every criminal case.”
(Internal citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 44.
{¶ 8} It further opined that the fact an executive-branch decision is not subject to
appellate review does not create a separation of powers issue. Id. at ¶ 45. “As the United
States Supreme Court has explained, such decisions are ‘particularly ill-suited to judicial
review’ and ‘generally rest[ ] entirely in [the officer’s] discretion,’ subject of course to
statutory and constitutional constraints.” Id., quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S.
598, 607, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985) and Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S.
-4-
357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978).
{¶ 9} Recognizing the impact of the Daniel decision on his case, Pitts has filed a
brief conceding that his assignment of error must be resolved in the State’s favor. We
agree. Daniel makes clear that the reduced-registration provision of the statute does not
violate the separation of powers doctrine. Therefore, Pitts’ assignment of error is
overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 10} The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
.............
TUCKER, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.