Mike Morath, Commissioner of Education for the State of Texas Bellpas, Inc. And Copperas Cove Independent School District v. Lampasas Independent School District

Supreme Court of Texas
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No. 22-0169
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Mike Morath, Commissioner of Education for the State of Texas;
Bellpas, Inc.; and Copperas Cove Independent School District,
Petitioners,

v.

Lampasas Independent School District,
Respondent

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued October 3, 2023

JUSTICE DEVINE delivered the opinion of the Court.

When a party presents a petition to detach real property from one
school district and annex it to another, the Texas Education Code places
a duty on both school boards to hold a hearing, make findings, and adopt
a resolution approving or disapproving the petition.1 Each board is free
to give an up or down vote after considering various factors, and if they

1 TEX. EDUC. CODE § 13.051(g)–(h).
agree on the disposition, the decision is final.2 But if the boards
disagree, the Commissioner of Education can settle the matter in a
de novo administrative appeal.3
In this case, one school board held a hearing and approved the
petition in short order. But in a classic case of stonewalling,4 the other
school board has spent more than seven years fighting its statutory duty
to answer one way or the other. The issue we must decide today is
whether the requisite disagreement between the school boards is
lacking, depriving the Commissioner of jurisdiction over the petitioner’s
administrative appeal. While the court of appeals held that persistent,
long-term, and unexplained inaction is not equivalent to “disapprov[al]”
under the Commissioner’s enabling statute,5 we disagree.
We hold that the Commissioner had jurisdiction because, under a
plain reading of the Education Code, a board “disapproves” a petition by
not approving it within a reasonable time after a hearing. We further
hold that the Commissioner did not lose jurisdiction by failing to issue a
ruling within 180 days. While the statute imposes such a deadline on
the Commissioner, it is not jurisdictional.6 The statute is directed to
providing a final resolution on the merits, not thwarting one. To hold
that a ruling on the petition may be stalled indefinitely or otherwise

2 Id. § 13.051(h)–(j).

3 Id. § 13.051(j).

4 Stonewall, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010) (“delay

or block (a request, process, or person) by refusing to answer questions or by
giving evasive replies, esp. in politics”).
5 644 S.W.3d 866, 867, 871 (Tex. App.—Austin 2022).

6 TEX. EDUC. CODE §§ 7.057(b), 13.051(j). But see infra note 70.

2
prevented by the inaction or unwarranted delay of either governmental
actor would be repugnant to the statutory scheme. Finding no
jurisdictional infirmity, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and
remand the case to that court to resolve the appeal on the merits.
I. Background
Bellpas, Inc., a land development company, intends to develop
property for a residential community at the east end of Lampasas
Independent School District (LISD). Because LISD’s middle and high
schools are located almost twenty miles away, homebuilders have
expressed disinterest in the property. In contrast, the schools of the
bordering Copperas Cove Independent School District (CCISD) are
within six miles, which is more commercially desirable. To satisfy the
homebuilders’ concerns, Bellpas seeks to detach the property from LISD
and annex it to CCISD under Section 13.051 of the Education Code.
Otherwise, Bellpas asserts, the property will remain undeveloped for
the foreseeable future.
A. School Board Proceedings
To detach and annex property, a party must first present a
petition to the board of trustees of each affected school district.7 The
petition requirements are minimal: it must simply “give the metes and
bounds” of the affected territory and be signed by a majority of the
registered voters residing in the territory or, if there are no residents,
the surface owners.8

7 See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 13.051(a).

8 Id. § 13.051(b).

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 In December 2015, Bellpas, the property’s sole surface owner,
presented petitions to the LISD and CCISD boards. The nearly identical
petitions described the property, its taxable value, and the social,
economic, and educational effects of the proposed detachment and
annexation.9 Of special note for this case, the first paragraph of the
petitions stated that the “Affected Territory” “consists of 348.55 acres of
land more particularly shown and described by metes and bounds in
Exhibit A.” A map and three pages of field notes, attached as Exhibit A,
identified the total acreage as “348.55” and described the territory
through landmarks, courses, points, angles, distances, and references to
recorded deeds and plats.
The next month, Bellpas decided to carve out 12.72 acres for
immediate development, which necessitated the presentment of an
amended petition to each school board. To that end, Bellpas revised the
map and field notes to reflect that change in the territory’s description
and to identify the new total acreage as “335.83.” Bellpas also revised
the first paragraph of each amended petition to direct the respective
school boards to the new map and field notes, now attached as “Appendix
A,” by describing the “Affected Territory” as “more particularly shown
and described by metes and bounds in Appendix A.” There was,
however, one difference that LISD contends is pivotal to its entire case:
while the first paragraph in the amended petition to CCISD correctly
stated that the new total acreage shown and described in Appendix A

9 Although the original LISD petition is included in the record, the
original CCISD petition is not. The Commissioner, however, found that the
original petitions “are identical” except for the address line, and LISD does not
dispute this characterization.

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“consists of 335.83 acres,” Bellpas failed to make a conforming change to
the first paragraph in the amended petition to LISD. That petition
continued to list “348.55” as the total acreage, despite the modifications
to the affected territory’s description in Appendix A.10 Bellpas’s
president later testified that this was an “overlooked” typographical
error, which Bellpas did not discover—and LISD did not identify—
before the administrative appeal to the Commissioner.
On February 1, 2016, LISD held a hearing on the amended
petition. CCISD’s hearing occurred a few months later. “After the
conclusion of the hearing,” each board “shall make findings” as to the
students’ educational interests and the “social, economic, and
educational effects of the proposed boundary change” and “adopt a
resolution approving or disapproving the petition.”11 The CCISD board
promptly approved Bellpas’s petition after its hearing, but the LISD
board took the petition “under advisement.” This placed Bellpas in an
apparent limbo: although Section 13.051(j) authorizes a de novo appeal
to the Commissioner “under Section 7.057” if only one board
“disapproves the petition,”12 it does not explicitly address what happens
when one board approves the petition and the other takes no action.
Despite Bellpas’s repeated requests to secure a decision, the LISD
board continued to refrain from an up or down vote on the petition. In
May, Bellpas sent LISD the CCISD resolution and requested a ruling

10 The two amended petitions, which were both included in the record,

also varied in their address lines and were signed by different notaries.
11 Id. § 13.051(h).

12 Id. § 13.051(j).

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but received no response. Bellpas renewed its request in August, stating
that it would take “legal steps” to compel compliance with Section 13.051
if “the board has not acted after the regular meeting in September.”
LISD’s counsel replied that he believed the board would “take it up at
the September meeting.” Although the petition was listed as an item on
that meeting’s posted agenda, the LISD board took no action on it.
When the matter was again bypassed the following month,
Bellpas attempted to secure declaratory and mandamus relief from the
courts in a suit against LISD’s trustees in their official capacities.
Instead of adopting a resolution at one of their scheduled board
meetings, which would have mooted the lawsuit, the trustees pursued a
dilatory tactic of challenging the court’s jurisdiction on the basis that
Bellpas failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by filing a local
grievance with the school district. Bellpas reports that after a hearing,
the trial judge stated his reluctance to compel the trustees to adopt a
resolution before exhaustion. On Bellpas’s motion, the trial court abated
the case in April 2017 pending the conclusion of the grievance process.
But when Bellpas promptly filed a grievance, LISD’s superintendent
dismissed it as untimely, and the LISD board affirmed the dismissal.
The superintendent explained that because Bellpas’s grievance
complained of “the same subject matter” as the abated lawsuit, Bellpas
had not filed its grievance within fifteen days from when it first “knew
or should have known of the decision giving rise to the action,” as
required by LISD’s grievance policy.
By then, it was June 2017 and more than sixteen months had
passed since the LISD hearing on Bellpas’s amended petition. In the
interim, the board had conducted multiple meetings with the petition

6
listed as an agenda item without taking any action on it, despite
Bellpas’s concerted effort to get a resolution through direct requests, a
legal action, and a grievance proceeding. All the while, LISD provided
no explanation to Bellpas for the school board’s protracted inaction.
B. Administrative Appeal
On June 6, 2017—the day after the LISD board affirmed the
dismissal of the grievance—Bellpas appealed to the Commissioner of
Education and requested a de novo hearing. Bellpas alleged that the
Commissioner had jurisdiction under Section 13.051(j) of the Education
Code because of “LISD’s constructive denial” of its petition. The
Commissioner appointed an administrative law judge (ALJ) to hear the
case, and CCISD later intervened.
The proceedings were “hotly contested” with frequent
jurisdictional and discovery disputes. In a plea to the jurisdiction and
motion to dismiss, LISD again asserted that Bellpas had not exhausted
its administrative remedies. This time, however, LISD argued that
Bellpas had no recourse to the Commissioner because the local grievance
had been untimely. The ALJ rejected this argument because Bellpas
was appealing from the board’s denial of its detachment-and-annexation
petition, which did not require a local grievance. And in an order
denying the plea and motion, the ALJ determined that the LISD board
had constructively disapproved Bellpas’s petition by failing to adopt a
resolution within a reasonable time after the hearing.
LISD moved for reconsideration on two grounds. One, the statute
does not impose a deadline to adopt a resolution; rather, a decision
merely must be “‘after the conclusion of the hearing,’ meaning not
before.” And two, the ALJ determined that a reasonable time had passed

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“with no actual evidence before him.” The ALJ withdrew the order in
September 2017 for the limited purpose of allowing LISD to present
evidence as to the reasonableness of its inaction at a hearing. The next
day, Bellpas and LISD jointly moved to amend the scheduling order to
set a January 2018 hearing and to extend the final-decision deadline to
April 6, 2018, because “additional time is needed to conduct discovery,
depose witnesses, and otherwise prepare for hearing.”
When January 2018 rolled around, however, LISD raised two new
“additional grounds for dismissal.” First, LISD argued that the
Commissioner’s jurisdiction had already expired the previous month
because, under Sections 7.057(b) and 13.051(j) of the Education Code,
he “shall” hold a hearing and issue a decision “not later than the 180th
day” after the filing of the administrative appeal.13 Second, LISD
claimed that the CCISD and LISD boards did not consider the same
petition because of the total-acreage discrepancy in the amended
petitions’ first paragraphs. In other words, there was no “split decision”
on the same petition as necessary to provide the Commissioner with
jurisdiction under Section 13.051(j).14
That same month, Bellpas moved for sanctions against LISD for
failure to comply with an earlier discovery order. The ALJ again ordered
discovery and rescheduled the merits hearing for a later date. After
LISD again failed to produce the requisite discovery, Bellpas renewed
its motion, and the ALJ concluded that LISD had now “flagrantly and

13 Id. §§ 7.057(b), 13.051(j). But see infra note 70.
14 See Marble Falls Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Scott, 275 S.W.3d 558, 563 (Tex.

App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied) (describing a Section 13.051(j) appeal as from
a “split decision”).

8
obstinately failed to comply with discovery orders,” “significantly
harm[ing]” Bellpas’s ability to present its case. As a sanction, the ALJ
deemed the social and educational factors (but not the economic factor)
as “strongly favor[ing] the boundary change” and noted that a hearing
would be held as to the remaining jurisdictional and merits issues.
That hearing occurred in September 2018, more than a year after
Bellpas filed its administrative appeal. As a preliminary matter, LISD
objected to the hearing being conducted after the 180-day statutory
deadline. But the ALJ overruled that objection after Bellpas asserted
that the “deadline is directory and not mandatory.” The ALJ also
confirmed that the remaining issues were limited to the economic
impact of the detachment and annexation and any evidence LISD “ha[d]
to offer about the reasonableness of the school district having delayed
action on this local petition for what is now coming on three years.” But
when the ALJ asked why LISD had never acted on the amended
petition, LISD did not present any evidence on the matter. Instead,
counsel demurred: “I don’t want to go outside the record, your Honor. I
mean, that’s the intent of the board.” In April 2019, the ALJ issued his
proposal for decision, recommending that the detachment and
annexation be approved.
In June 2019, two years after Bellpas filed its administrative
appeal, the Commissioner issued his final decision, approving the
detachment and annexation. As relevant to the jurisdictional issues
here, the Commissioner found and concluded:
 “When a statute requires an action to be done, but does not set
a timeline, a reasonable timeline is presumed.”

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  What is a reasonable time depends “on the particular case,”
but “in many cases,” it “will be the next regularly scheduled
meeting or at least the second regularly scheduled meeting,
barring extraordinary situations.”

 A school district that “obstinately refuses” to adopt findings
and issue a resolution has shown that providing an
opportunity to do so would “be futile.”

 The amended petitions to LISD and CCISD are “functionally
identical” and “essentially the same,” notwithstanding one
typographical error misstating the total acreage.

 The LISD board “will be deemed to [have] disapprove[d] the
petition” because it did not adopt a resolution within a
reasonable time after the hearing, has provided no credible
explanation as to why not, and has acted “in order to thwart
the proposed detachment and annexation.”

C. Judicial Review
In a suit for judicial review,15 LISD contested the Commissioner’s
jurisdiction and challenged the decision’s validity on procedural and
merits grounds. The trial court affirmed, but the court of appeals
vacated the judgment and dismissed the cause. The court of appeals
first noted that Section 7.057(a)(2) of the Education Code authorizes an
appeal “when a person is aggrieved by ‘actions or decisions’ of a school
district board of trustees that violate Texas school laws” and construed
the “actions or decisions” requirement to apply to an appeal under
Section 13.051(j).16 The court then held that there was no predicate “act
or decision” by the LISD board for the Commissioner to exercise his

15 See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 7.057(d) (providing for judicial review).

16 644 S.W.3d 866, 867, 870-71 (Tex. App.—Austin 2022).

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jurisdiction and the argument that “‘inaction is the action’ triggering the
Commissioner’s jurisdiction under section 7.057 is unsupported by the
plain and unambiguous language of the statutory text.”17
Bellpas, CCISD, and the Commissioner petitioned this Court for
review, arguing that the court of appeals conflated the general
requirements for an appeal under Section 7.057(a) with the more specific
requirements for an appeal under Section 13.051(j). As to
Section 13.051(j), the petitioners contest LISD’s statutory construction
that would allow one board to effectively hold a veto and “block the
detachment/annexation process by inaction.” Bellpas and CCISD invoke
the absurdity doctrine while the Commissioner claims that LISD’s
construction is inconsistent with Section 13.051(j)’s language, which
requires only disapproval, not disapproval by resolution. The
Commissioner also asserts that the amended petitions for detachment
and annexation are functionally identical because the
metes-and-bounds description attached as Appendix A controls over the
misstated total acreage in the first paragraph.
LISD agrees that Section 13.051(j) provides the “gateway” to a
detachment-and-annexation appeal and that any “broader holding
about the meanings of the words ‘actions or decisions’” under
Section 7.057(a) “was both unnecessary and irrelevant to the [court of
appeals’] decision.” But LISD argues that (1) a board of trustees must
affirmatively act to disapprove a petition for detachment and
annexation, which its board did not do; (2) the Legislature did not
impose a deadline to adopt a resolution and the Commissioner does not

17 Id. at 871.

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have the authority to create a “reasonable time” deadline; and
(3) because the amended petitions state different total acreages, there
was no “split decision.” Alternatively, LISD asserts that the
Commissioner lost jurisdiction by failing to issue a decision within
Section 7.057(b)’s 180-day deadline. Finally, LISD claims that if the
dismissal is not affirmed, the Commissioner’s decision must be reversed
on various procedural and merits grounds not reached by the court of
appeals.
We granted the petitions to consider the jurisdictional issues the
parties have raised.
II. Discussion
The parties’ jurisdictional dispute presents issues of statutory
interpretation, which we consider de novo.18 In construing statutory
text, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the
Legislature’s intent.19 In doing so, we look to the plain meaning of the
statutory terms, informed by context, as the most reliable guide to the
Legislature’s intent.20
A. Sections 7.057(a) and 13.051(j)
We begin by considering whether an appeal under
Section 13.051(j) must also satisfy Section 7.057(a)’s requirements.
Both sections authorize appeals to the Commissioner. Section 7.057(a)
provides that aggrieved persons “may appeal” to the Commissioner on

18 Davis v. Morath, 624 S.W.3d 215, 221 (Tex. 2021).

19 Broadway Nat’l Bank v. Yates Energy Corp., 631 S.W.3d 16, 23 (Tex.

2021).
20 Miles v. Tex. Cent. R.R. & Infrastructure, Inc., 647 S.W.3d 613, 619

(Tex. 2022).

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broad grounds, including when a board’s “actions or decisions” violate
the “school laws of this state.”21 When the appeal is “against a school
district,” the Commissioner’s decision is “based on a review of the record
developed at the district level under a substantial evidence standard of
review.”22 Section 13.051(j), in contrast, authorizes a “de novo” appeal
in the following specified circumstance: “If the board of trustees of only
one affected district disapproves the petition, an aggrieved party to the
proceedings in either district may appeal the board’s decision to the
commissioner under Section 7.057.”23
Sections 7.057(a) and 13.051(j) each provide independent grounds
for an appeal against a school district with different standards of review.
Although Bellpas conceivably could have appealed the LISD board’s
inaction to the Commissioner as an alleged violation of school laws
under a substantial-evidence standard of review,24 it instead sought a
de novo appeal under Section 13.051(j).25 To the extent the court of
appeals imported Section 7.057(a)’s requirements for an appeal under
Section 13.051(j), it erred. Thus, the crux of the parties’ dispute is not
whether “‘inaction is the action’ triggering the Commissioner’s

21 TEX. EDUC. CODE § 7.057(a)(2)(A).

22 Id. § 7.057(c).

23 Id. § 13.051(j) (emphasis added).

24 See id. §§ 7.057(a)(2)(A), (c), 13.051(h).
But see Davis v. Morath, 624
S.W.3d 215, 223 n.7 (Tex. 2021) (noting the hypothetical argument that parties
could not “appeal” under Section 7.057(a) for “actions or decisions” in violation
of school laws “without having obtained a decision from the school district at
all”).
25See Davis, 624 S.W.3d at 225 (noting that administrative
complainants “are entitled to frame their own grievance”).

13
jurisdiction under section 7.057,”26 as the court of appeals framed it, but
whether the LISD board “disapprove[d]” Bellpas’s petition as required
for the Commissioner’s jurisdiction over an appeal under
Section 13.051(j).
B. The Plain Meaning of “Disapproves”
To ascertain the meaning of an undefined term like “disapproves,”
we generally consult dictionaries for the term’s commonly understood
meaning.27 Dictionaries define “disapprove” as “to pass unfavorable
judgment upon” or “to refuse approval to.”28 Along these lines, LISD
argues that a board “must act” to disapprove a petition. But the term
need not be so limited; it is also defined as “to withhold approval from,”
which does not require action.29 Even “to refuse approval to”
contemplates disapproval that can be shown.30 And disapproval can be
shown through inaction when action otherwise would be called for.31

26 644 S.W.3d 866, 871 (Tex. App.—Austin 2022).

27 Tex. State Bd. of Exam’rs of Marriage & Fam. Therapists v. Tex. Med.

Ass’n, 511 S.W.3d 28, 35 (Tex. 2017).
28 Disapprove, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
(2002); see Disapprove, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2016) (“To have an unfavorable opinion of; condemn”; “To
refuse to approve; reject”).
29 Disapprove, THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1987).

30 See Refuse, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
(2002) (“to show . . . unwillingness to do or comply with”); Belin v. Reynolds,
989 N.W.2d 166, 174 (Iowa 2023) (“[D]ictionaries confirm that a ‘refusal’ can
either be stated or shown.”).
31 See Belin, 989 N.W.2d at 174 (collecting examples and noting that

“refusal can also be implied” and that “[t]he idea of a ‘silent refusal’ is not
foreign to English speakers”); cf. Silent Treatment, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002) (“an act of completely ignoring a person or

14
Everyday life confirms this: disapproval may be expressed, for example,
by leaving no tip at a restaurant after being served or by sitting silently
while everyone else is applauding at the end of a concert.
Courts, however, must be cautious in relying on acontextual
definitions.32 Although text should not be stretched “beyond its
permissible meaning,”33 its scope should not be restricted without
reason to less than the plain language can bear.34 Context delineates
the contours of a term’s scope.35 Here, Section 13.051(j) omits any
reference to “resolution” and does not require disapproval by resolution
for the Commissioner to exercise his jurisdiction over an appeal.36 And
because an appeal is de novo, the lack of findings and a resolution is no
hindrance to the Commissioner’s consideration. Although in practice,
disapproval usually would occur by resolution, subsection (j)’s text does

thing by resort to silence esp. as a means of expressing contempt or
disapproval”).
32 McLane Champions, LLC v. Hous. Baseball Partners LLC, 671
S.W.3d 907, 920 (Tex. 2023) (“Words in a vacuum mean nothing. Only in the
context . . . can the true meaning of a single provision be made clear.”).
33 BankDirect Cap. Fin., LLC v. Plasma Fab, LLC, 519 S.W.3d 76, 85

(Tex. 2017).
34 Janvey v. Golf Channel, Inc., 487 S.W.3d 560, 572 (Tex. 2016) (“Our

primary objective . . . is to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature’s intent
without unduly restricting or expanding the statute’s scope.”).
35 Brown v. City of Houston, 660 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex. 2023) (“‘Context,’

after all, ‘is a primary determinant of meaning.’” (quoting Antonin Scalia &
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, at 167
(2012))).
36 See In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d 504, 514 (Tex. 2020) (“[W]e assume the

Legislature chose statutory language with care, included each chosen word for
a purpose, and purposefully omitted all other words.”).

15
not contextually constrain “disapproves” to narrowly refer only to
disapproval by formal resolution. In other words, consistent with the
plain meaning of “disapproves,” a board disapproves a petition by
inaction if action approving the petition would otherwise be called for.
C. An Implicit Reasonable Time Standard
Section 13.051(h) provides:
After the conclusion of the hearing, each board of trustees
shall make findings as to the educational interests of the
current students residing or future students expected to
reside in the affected territory and in the affected districts
and as to the social, economic, and educational effects of
the proposed boundary change and shall, on the basis of
those findings, adopt a resolution approving or
disapproving the petition.37

According to the Commissioner, action to approve a petition by
resolution is called for within a reasonable time after a hearing. LISD
responds that the statute is silent as to a required time for performance
and only the Legislature can impose such a deadline. In the
administrative proceedings, LISD’s counsel even asserted that it would
not violate the law to wait a hundred years after a hearing before
making findings and adopting a resolution.
We agree with the Commissioner and conclude that the
Legislature intended the board’s duty to be performed within a
reasonable time. Our holding does not mean that the Legislature
intended courts to enforce consequences for noncompliance with this

37 TEX. EDUC. CODE § 13.051(h) (emphases added).

16
implicit time standard, which would require a distinct analysis.38 But
here, we are interpreting a statute to determine the meaning of
“disapproves,” not crafting a judicially enforceable consequence for
noncompliance with an implied deadline.
To our knowledge, we have never considered whether a statute
that imposes no express deadline implies a reasonable time to perform
a statutory duty. But we have concluded that parties must execute
statutory rights or contractual obligations within a reasonable time
when the text is otherwise silent.39 And high courts of our sister states
have applied a well-recognized rule requiring performance within a
reasonable time when a statute imposes a duty but is silent as to when
it must be carried out,40 especially when the statute charges a public

38 See In re Stetson Renewables Holdings, LLC, 658 S.W.3d 292, 295-97

(Tex. 2022).
39 See, e.g., Westheimer Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Brockette, 567 S.W.2d 780,

789 (Tex. 1978) (statutory right to appeal); Hall v. Hall, 308 S.W.2d 12, 16
(Tex. 1957) (contractual obligation); cf. Fischer v. CTMI, L.L.C., 479 S.W.3d
231, 239 (Tex. 2016) (noting that courts may imply terms “that can reasonably
be implied” in agreements to avoid forfeitures); Austin Co. v. Vaughn Bldg.
Corp., 643 S.W.2d 113, 115 (Tex. 1982) (holding that the law implies a
reasonable time limit for an owner to give written notice of defects when an
express warranty does not specify a deadline); Countz v. Mitchell, 38 S.W.2d
770, 774 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1931) (“It also appears that the Legislature has
failed to fix the length of time for giving notice of such an election. In the
absence of such provision, we think the law implies there must be a reasonable
time.”).
40 See Belin v. Reynolds, 989 N.W.2d 166, 174 (Iowa 2023) (“If a statute

imposes a duty but is silent as to when it is to be performed, a reasonable time
is implied.” (quoting 2B SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 55:3 (7th
ed. 2012))); accord In re Adoption of B.B., 417 P.3d 1, 25 (Utah 2017); Trivectra
v. Ushijima, 144 P.3d 1, 19 (Haw. 2006); The Jewish Home for the Elderly of
Fairfield Cnty., Inc. v. Cantore, 778 A.2d 93, 99 (Conn. 2001); In re Edwards,
130 So. 615, 617 (Fla. 1930); Leigh v. Green, 86 N.W. 1093, 1095 (Neb. 1901).

17
officer with a public duty.41 Although we do not adopt this rule as a
general presumption of legislative intent today, we conclude that this
statutory scheme’s text and context—including its evident purpose—
fairly implies a reasonable time standard.42
Specifically, this standard is objectively implicit in the statutory
requirements that a board “shall” both adopt a resolution “[a]fter” the
hearing and “carry out” its “duties as provided by the code.”43 To
construe “shall . . . adopt a resolution” as imposing a duty that could be
indefinitely delayed after a hearing would effectively neuter the
obligation, impose no duty to “carry [it] out” at all, and frustrate the
statute’s purpose.44 The statute permits local boards to decide the issue

41 See McDeid v. Johnston, 984 N.W.2d 864, 877 (Minn. 2023) (“It is a

well recognized rule that when a public officer is called upon to perform a
public duty by statute and no time is specified for the performance of the act,
it is required that the act be performed within a reasonable time.” (quoting
State ex rel. Laurisch v. Pohl, 8 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Minn. 1943))); accord State
Bd. of Tax Comm’rs v. L.H. Carbide Corp., 702 N.E.2d 706, 707 (Ind. 1998);
Bd. of Supervisors of King & Queen Cnty. v. King Land Corp., 380 S.E.2d 895,
898 (Va. 1989); Dearborn v. Town of Milford, 411 A.2d 1132, 1134 (N.H. 1980);
E. Iowa Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Iowa City, 272 N.W.2d 413, 417 (Iowa 1978);
Brink v. Curless, 209 N.W.2d 758, 769 (N.D. 1973); 67 C.J.S. Officers § 346
(2023); 63C AM. JUR. 2d Public Officers and Employees § 228 (2024).
42 See Scalia & Garner, supra note 35, at 16 (“Textualism, in its purest

form, begins and ends with what the text says and fairly implies.”), 33 (a text’s
purpose, as “gathered” from the text itself, “is a vital part of its context”), and
167 (“Context is a primary determinant of meaning.”).
43 TEX. EDUC. CODE §§ 11.1511(b)(15), 13.051(h); see Carry Out,
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002) (“to put into
execution”; “to bring to a successful issue”; “to continue to an end or stopping
point”).
44 See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.021(2)–(4) (stating presumptions that in

enacting a statute, the Legislature intended a just and reasonable result, a
result feasible of execution, and the entire statute to be effective); S. Taylor
Cnty. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Winters Indep. Sch. Dist., 249 S.W.2d 1010, 1012

18
without the Commissioner substituting his judgment for theirs when
they lawfully concur, but it also provides for disagreement between
boards to be resolved through an administrative appeal procedure with
the Commissioner.45 LISD’s construction would create an atextual
option that gives one board a unilateral veto (through extended delay)
over a proposed detachment and annexation without review, contrary to
the statute’s structure and design.46 In context, the mandatory directive
“shall” with the temporal indicator “[a]fter” fairly implies that a board
must act on the petition within a certain time that would promote
orderly conduct towards resolving the proceedings.47
In our view, construing the statute’s implicit time period for
action to permit unreasonable or indefinite delay after the hearing is

(Tex. 1952) (annexation law should “not be given a construction that would
thwart [its] purposes”); cf. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Woody, 865 F.3d 303, 320
(5th Cir. 2017) (inferring a reasonable time standard for districts to refer
disabled children for evaluations because otherwise they would be
“perverse[ly] incentiv[ized]” not to comply to “stall accrual” of obligations);
Hotze v. Turner, 672 S.W.3d 380, 388 (Tex. 2023) (relying on Section 311.021’s
presumptions to reject an interpretation that would “permit a municipality to
indefinitely delay giving effect to an amendment”).
45 See TEX. EDUC. CODE §§ 11.151(b), 13.051(i), (j).

46 Cf. Minella v. City of San Antonio, 437 F.3d 438, 441 (5th Cir. 2005)

(rejecting an interpretation of Section 9.005(b) of the Texas Local Government
Code that would provide the city council with discretion to determine an
amendment’s effective date because it “would allow a city council to effectively
‘veto’ a voter adopted amendment by delaying its implementation”).
47 Cf. State ex rel. Berger v. McCarthy, 548 P.2d 1158, 1160 (Ariz. 1976)

(“The Legislature’s use of the word ‘shall’ necessarily included a directive that
it be performed within a time period which would promote prompt and orderly
conduct of the proceedings.” (citing Chisholm v. Bewley Mills, 287 S.W.2d 943,
945 (Tex. 1956))).

19
patently unreasonable.48 “Context also includes common sense,”49 and
the “notion that some things ‘go without saying’ applies to legislation
just as it does to everyday life.”50 Consider a mother who tells her child,
“After dinner, you shall clean your room,” and the father says, “Make
sure to carry out what she told you to do.” Although waiting a week, a
year, or even a hundred years after dinner to clean the room would
comply with a hyperliteral interpretation of “after,” it would defy a
reasonable understanding of the parental commands’ fair meaning.51
Objectively implicit is the requirement that the job will be done in a
reasonable time. Perhaps not immediately or at a precise time “after”
dinner: homework or a tv show might occur first or an emergency may

48 See Worsdale v. City of Killeen, 578 S.W.3d 57, 73-74 (Tex. 2019)
(“[A]ffording the statute an unreasonable meaning runs counter to bedrock
statutory construction principles and is inconsistent with ‘a realistic
assessment of what the legislature ought to have meant.’” (quoting Scalia &
Garner, supra note 35, at 252)).
49Biden v. Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. 2355, 2379 (2023) (Barrett, J.,
concurring).
50 Id. (quoting Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 857 (2014)); see

Scalia & Garner, supra note 35, at 96 (“The omitted-case canon . . . must
sometimes be reconciled with the principle that a text does include not only
what is express but also what is implicit.”).
51 See Scalia & Garner, supra note 35, at 356 (“Adhering to the fair

meaning of the text . . . does not limit one to the hyperliteral meaning of each
word in the text.”); see also Worsdale, 578 S.W.3d at 74 n.111 (“Judges must
navigate a narrow course between a sterile literalism which loses sight of the
forest for the trees, and a proper scruple against imputing meanings for which
the words give no warrant.” (quoting Jaster v. Comet II Constr., Inc., 438
S.W.3d 556, 572 (Tex. 2014) (Willett, J., concurring))).

20
require further delay. But what “goes without saying” is that any delay
would not be unreasonable.52 So too here.
The Commissioner concluded that a reasonable time depends “on
the particular case,” but “in many cases” it “will be the next regularly
scheduled meeting or at least the second regularly scheduled meeting,
barring extraordinary situations.” We need not determine whether the
Commissioner properly characterized what generally constitutes a
“reasonable time” because the LISD board far exceeded that boundary
line.53 Sixteen months of unexplained inaction—during which multiple
board meetings occurred with Bellpas’s petition as a scheduled item—is
indisputably unreasonable.54

52 Cf. Hall v. Hall, 308 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Tex. 1957) (noting that it is “in

accord with human experience” to assume parties intended a reasonable time
when they “omit an express stipulation as to time”).
53 Although we do not specify the precise contours of a “reasonable time”

in this case, best practices for a party contemplating an appeal to the
Commissioner based on a board’s inaction would include notifying the board so
that it can either provide a reason for its delay or promptly adopt a resolution.
Here, Bellpas twice requested the board to rule after the hearing on its petition
and provided notice that it would take legal action if the board did not act.
54 By interpreting the statute to permit an appeal to the Commissioner

when one board “disapproves” a petition through unreasonable inaction, we do
not diminish the importance of local decision-making. See Gilder v. Meno, 926
S.W.2d 357, 360 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, writ denied) (acknowledging “the
practical problems of preserving local decision-making while still providing for
an appeal to a state administrative body”). If a board that has not expressly
acted on a petition wants to concur with the other board’s action, we see no
reason why it could not, in good faith, request an abatement of the
administrative appeal to allow that board to make findings and adopt a
concurring resolution, thereby mooting the administrative appeal. But
abatement is unwarranted if the board merely desires to make its
disagreement with the other board’s action express after it has already
“disapprove[d]” of the petition through inaction. If the school districts are at a
stalemate as to the disposition of a petition, the statute affords no deference to

21
 No doubt, a reasonable-time-to-perform standard cannot provide
the predictability of a clear, bright-line rule.55 Our jurisprudence favors
bright-line jurisdictional rules to help ensure that “judges and litigants
will not waste their resources” determining jurisdiction.56 But the
inability to provide a bright-line rule does not give rise to a jurisdictional
impediment here.57 In construing a statute, our objective is always—
and only—to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intent, as both

the findings and resolutions of either school board, so abating the
administrative appeal would serve no purpose besides further delay. And
there is no prejudice to the school districts because each has an opportunity to
present its position and evidence for the Commissioner’s de novo consideration.
55 See In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d 225, 228-29 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001,

orig. proceeding) (“[N]o bright-line demarcates the boundaries of a reasonable
time period.”); Scalia & Garner, supra note 35, at 32-33 (noting that terms like
“reasonable time” are often used “to cover a multitude of situations that cannot
practicably be spelled out in detail or even foreseen”).
56 Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S.

527, 549 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); see United Rentals N. Am., Inc. v.
Evans, 668 S.W.3d 627, 637 (Tex. 2023) (“We should strive throughout the law
for easily administrable bright-line rules, which can be followed by parties with
confidence and applied by judges with predictability.”).
57 A reasonable time standard is not foreign to jurisdictional contexts.

See, e.g., Tex. S. Univ. v. Young, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2023 WL 6772144, at *3 (Tex.
Oct. 13, 2023) (Young, J., concurring in denial) (noting the jurisdictional-fact
issue of whether a complaint was provided to a law enforcement officer within
a reasonable time (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE § 614.023(a), (b))); City of Grapevine
v. Sipes, 195 S.W.3d 689, 690 (Tex. 2006) (noting that whether a governmental
unit corrected the absence of a traffic signal “within a reasonable time” after
notice determines if immunity, which implicates subject-matter jurisdiction, is
waived (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.060(a)(2))); Westheimer
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Brockette, 567 S.W.2d 780, 789-90 (Tex. 1978) (requiring a
court to determine whether an appeal was “taken within a reasonable time”
before exercising its appellate jurisdiction). Courts also determine whether a
plaintiff acted within a “reasonable time” to cure any defects before reinstating
a case after abating it for lack of capacity. Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato,
171 S.W.3d 845, 853 n.7 (Tex. 2005).

22
expressed and implicit in the enacted language. In any event, though
bright-line rules are coveted, “we cannot offer them at the expense of
fulfilling legislative intent.”58
Applying the plain meaning of “disapproves” in subsection (j) and
the objectively implicit reasonable-time-to-perform standard in
subsection (h), we hold that the LISD board disapproved Bellpas’s
amended petition59 by not adopting a resolution approving it within a
reasonable time after the February 2016 hearing.60
D. A Split Decision
LISD also argues that, even if its board had “disapprove[d]”
Bellpas’s petition through inaction, there was no “split decision” to

58 Worsdale v. City of Killeen, 578 S.W.3d 57, 76 (Tex. 2019).

59 LISD asserts that because its school board received the amended
petition only nine days before the February 2016 hearing, its board “couldn’t
even consider that petition at the hearing because it would constitute a
violation of the notice requirement” and “those who could possibly be affected
have a right to know and to speak on the matter.” See TEX. EDUC. CODE
§§ 13.003(e), .051(g) (requiring notice no later than ten days before the
hearing). But Bellpas presented uncontroverted evidence that the LISD board
did, in fact, consider the amended petition: Bellpas’s president testified that he
personally attended the hearing and it was on the “amended petition.” LISD
also admits that when its board received Bellpas’s original petition, notice was
timely provided for the scheduled LISD hearing. Given that the amended
petition merely decreased the size of the affected territory, it defies logic that
there were others with potentially affected rights who would not have been on
notice. The greater already included the lesser.
60 As we already noted, LISD did not introduce any evidence in the

administrative proceedings on the reasonableness of its delay to adopt a
resolution on Bellpas’s amended petition, which continues to this day. LISD
disputes whether it received a proper petition to trigger the statutory
requirement to adopt a resolution and if the statute imposes any time
constraint to do so. But it has not substantively challenged the Commissioner’s
finding and conclusion that a reasonable time had passed after the hearing
without the LISD board adopting a resolution.

23
provide the Commissioner with jurisdiction under Section 13.051(j) over
the appeal. According to LISD, “Bellpas made a split decision an
impossibility” because the amended petition Bellpas submitted to the
LISD board identified the total acreage as “348.55” while the amended
petition Bellpas submitted to the CCISD board listed “335.83” as the
total acreage. We disagree with LISD’s premise.
As an initial observation, a stated total acreage of the affected
territory is not only insufficient under our case law to satisfy the
statutory scheme but also unnecessary.61 Section 13.051 requires the
petition to “give the metes and bounds of the territory to be detached
and annexed,” not the total acreage.62
The misstated total acreage was also a manifest error. The
amended petition submitted to LISD expressly pointed the board to
Appendix A, noting that the affected territory “consists of 348.55 acres
of land more particularly shown and described by metes and bounds in

61 Mesquite Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gross, 67 S.W.2d 242, 243-44, 246 (Tex.

[Comm’n Op.] 1934) (concluding that a petition describing the tracts by “the
abstract number, certificate number, number of acres, and name of survey”
failed to satisfy the statutory requirement to “[f]ully describ[e] by metes and
bounds the territory proposed to be annexed”); see Grand Lodge of the Order of
the Sons of Hermann in Tex. v. Curry, 108 S.W.2d 574, 575-76 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1937, writ ref’d) (holding that a petition to annex territory to a water
district failed to describe the metes and bounds when it listed only the total
acreage “of 324 acres” and the specific farm numbers).
62 TEX. EDUC. CODE § 13.051(b)(2). Our precedent has noted that the
“generally accepted meaning” of “metes and bounds” in the annexation statutes
is “the boundary lines and corners of the land sought to be annexed.” Curry,
108 S.W.2d at 575-76 (describing annexation statutes for school and water
districts); see Metes and Bounds, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)
(“The territorial limits of real property as measured by distances and angles
from designated landmarks and in relation to adjoining properties.”).

24
Appendix A.”63 The map and field notes attached as Appendix A were
the same in both amended petitions, describing the territorial limits of
the area with the 12.72 acres carved out and clearly identifying the total
acreage as “335.83” acres. By their express terms, both amended
petitions requested the detachment and annexation of the same
territory. The misstated total acreage in one was not only superfluous
but also in conflict with the descriptions in Appendix A—what the
statute and the petitions themselves identify as controlling.64
Of course, diligence should always be exercised to avoid
typographical errors, even of the immaterial variety. Although we do
not excuse any lack of care by Bellpas,65 to err is human, and the
appropriate response is charitable understanding, not procedural
gamesmanship—especially from government officials as “the servant

63 Emphasis added.

64 General principles of interpretation also analogously lead to the same

conclusion that the more specific metes-and-bounds description controls over
the misstated total acreage. In the deed context, a metes-and-bounds
description “is more specific and therefore better indicates the parties’ intent”
over a conflicting “call for acreage,” “‘the least reliable of all calls.’” Stribling
v. Millican DPC Partners, LP, 458 S.W.3d 17, 21 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Tex. Pac.
Coal & Oil Co. v. Masterson, 334 S.W.2d 436, 439 (Tex. 1960)); see Cullers v.
Platt, 16 S.W. 1003, 1005 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1891) (“[T]he rule is that, where
there is a repugnance between a general and a particular description in a deed,
the latter will control . . . . Where a grantor conveys specifically by metes and
bounds, so there can be no controversy about what land is included and really
conveyed, a general description . . . cannot control[.]”).
65 Bellpas’s president testified that the error was an “overlooked”
typographical error stemming from the total acreage listed in the earlier
original petition. And LISD did not present any evidence, nor does the record
indicate, that Bellpas’s typographical error was intentional or in bad faith.

25
and not the master of the people.”66 This is not just an ivory-tower
admonishment; courts must frequently walk the walk, as even the best
of us are not immune from making such mistakes.67 Indeed, we
reaffirmed just last term that “‘[t]his Court has never wavered from the
principle’ that ‘the right of appeal should not be lost due to procedural
technicalities.’”68
Consistent with this general principle, we hold that when
materially identical petitions both include the same controlling
description of the territory to be detached and annexed, an obvious (and
obviously immaterial) typographical error misstating the total acreage
does not bar a Section 13.051(j) appeal. As the Commissioner correctly
recognized, the amended petitions were “functionally identical” and

66 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.001(a); see TEX. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“All
political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded
on their authority, and instituted for their benefit.”).
67 See, e.g., Maxim Crane Works, L.P. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 642 S.W.3d

551, 553 n.1 (Tex. 2022) (identifying “a typographical error in the certified
question” from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit); City
of Amarillo v. Martin, 971 S.W.2d 426, 428 n.1 (Tex. 1998) (inserting the word
“not” into a statute when otherwise the “literal reading of the statute is
patently absurd” and “the obvious legislative intent” was that the Legislature
meant to include the “not”); Villareal v. Steve’s & Sons Doors, Inc., 139 S.W.3d
352, 354 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.) (concluding that the listed
effective date of a statute “contained in the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in
Reyes is a typographical error” (citing Storage & Processors, Inc. v. Reyes, 134
S.W.3d 190, 192 (Tex. 2004))).
68 Chen v. Razberi Techs., Inc., 645 S.W.3d 773, 782 (Tex. 2022) (quoting

Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Tex. 1997)); see In re A.B., 676 S.W.3d
112, 116 (Tex. 2023) (“[W]e have repeatedly stressed that procedural rules
should be construed and applied so that the right of appeal is not unnecessarily
lost to technicalities.” (quoting Guest v. Dixon, 195 S.W.3d 687, 688 (Tex.
2006))).

26
“essentially the same.” The Commissioner therefore acquired
jurisdiction over Bellpas’s appeal from a split decision.
We also feel compelled to disapprove of LISD’s actions, not
through mere silence or inaction, but expressly. LISD strung Bellpas
along for months without explaining its inaction or pointing out the
typographical error LISD latched onto as a post hoc justification for its
obvious stonewalling.69 Had it done so, Bellpas could easily have
corrected the error. Instead, LISD chose to play a game of procedural
“gotcha” for no apparent purpose other than to obstruct a statutory right
and prevent any review on the merits. These types of actions undermine
the people’s trust in government and waste limited governmental
resources, including taxpayer dollars and the judiciary’s time.
E. Section 7.057(b)’s Deadline
As an alternative ground to affirm the court of appeals’ dismissal,
LISD raises Section 7.057(b)’s requirement that the Commissioner
“shall, not later than the 180th day after the date an appeal under
[s]ubsection (a) is filed, hold a hearing and issue a decision without cost
to the parties involved.”70 We conclude that this deadline is not

69 In oral argument before the court of appeals, LISD’s counsel
represented that the record is silent as to whether LISD told Bellpas before the
administrative appeal of the discrepancy between the amended petitions but
argued that “there isn’t an obligation to do that under the statute.” Bellpas’s
counsel responded by affirming that Bellpas was unaware of the typographical
error until the administrative appeal was pending before the Commissioner.
70 In the administrative proceedings, the parties disputed whether
subsection (b)’s 180-day deadline or subsection (c)’s 240-day deadline applied.
See TEX. EDUC. CODE §§ 7.057(b) (providing for a hearing before the
Commissioner and imposing a 180-day deadline to issue a decision from “the
date an appeal under [s]ubsection (a) is filed”), (c) (imposing a 240-day deadline
in “an appeal against a school district” to “issue a decision based on a review

27
jurisdictional and that the Legislature did not intend dismissal as a
judicially enforceable, nonjurisdictional consequence for noncompliance
with that deadline. We leave open the possibility, however, that other
judicially enforceable consequences may exist to compel the
Commissioner to comply with his statutory duty to hold a hearing and
issue a decision if he refuses to do so within the prescribed time.
Statutory requirements are presumed to be nonjurisdictional
absent clear legislative intent to the contrary.71 To discern legislative
intent, we look to the statute’s plain meaning, any specific consequences
for noncompliance, the statute’s purpose, and each construction’s
resulting consequences.72 Section 7.057(b) imposes no specific
consequences for noncompliance with the 180-day deadline. Agencies,
however, may only exercise expressly granted and necessarily implied
powers.73 Relying primarily on the plain meaning of “shall” and the
Code Construction Act’s requirement that “shall” generally “imposes a
duty,”74 LISD argues that the Commissioner lost the specific power to
issue a decision when the deadline passed.

of the record developed at the district level under a substantial evidence
standard of review”), 13.051(j) (providing that a Section 13.051(j) appeal
“under Section 7.057” is “de novo”). But in this Court the parties do not dispute
subsection (b)’s application. Because our analysis applies to either deadline,
we assume subsection (b) imposes the applicable deadline.
71 See In re J.S., 670 S.W.3d 591, 603 (Tex. 2023).

72 Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chicas, 593 S.W.3d 284, 287, 290 (Tex. 2019).

73 Tex. Student Hous. Auth. v. Brazos Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 460 S.W.3d

137, 143 (Tex. 2015).
74 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.016(2); see AC Ints., L.P. v. Tex. Comm’n on

Env’t Quality, 543 S.W.3d 703, 709 (Tex. 2018) (“The words ‘shall’ and ‘must’

28
 To infer from the use of a mandatory “shall” that the Legislature
necessarily intended a specified deadline to be a jurisdictional limit
precluding later agency action presumes too much. “[E]ven when there
is no judicially enforceable consequence of a broken deadline, a
mandatory deadline can still be both mandatory and far from
pointless.”75 The Legislature may have intended to signal its
expectations for the agency in the form of commands: directives
“designed to promote the proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of
business”76 and “a spur to prompt action, not as a bar to tardy
completion of the business.”77 And even if the Legislature intended
there to be judicially enforceable consequences for noncompliance with
a mandatory duty, “this does not mean that compliance is necessarily
jurisdictional.”78
Other considerations also point to the deadline being
nonjurisdictional. The statute exists to provide for prompt review and
resolution by the Commissioner to definitively settle a stalemate
between school districts. But a jurisdictional construction could

in a statute are generally understood as mandatory terms that create a duty
or condition.”).
75 In re Stetson Renewables Holdings, LLC, 658 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Tex.

2022); see Chicas, 593 S.W.3d at 288 (“[S]trict compliance does not equate to a
jurisdictional requirement.”); Igal v. Brightstar Info. Tech. Grp., 250 S.W.3d
78, 84 (Tex. 2008) (noting that a mandatory statutory requirement in the
administrative context is not necessarily jurisdictional).
76 Suburban Util. Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 652 S.W.2d 358,

362 (Tex. 1983).
77 Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 172 (2003).

78 Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 494 (Tex. 2001).

29
(1) harm aggrieved appealing parties for delay that may be outside their
control, (2) promote gamesmanship to intentionally delay proceedings,
and (3) leave untimely administrative decisions subject to future
attack,79 with students potentially seesawed between school districts. A
nonjurisdictional construction, on the other hand, would likely cause
minimal disruption by merely perpetuating the status quo during any
delay.80 Generally, a late decision on the merits is better than never,81
and unlawful bureaucratic delay should not rob an appealing party and
the public—including students—of both administrative and judicial
review when boards disagree on detachment and annexation.

79 Chicas, 593 S.W.3d at 289; see City of DeSoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d

389, 394 (Tex. 2009) (rejecting the argument that the possibility of a future
attack on a judgment for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is not present in
the administrative context).
80 In Garza v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission, we concluded that

because a statute created an “absolute deadline for rendition of judgment” in
an appeal of a liquor-license denial, “district courts have no power to render
judgment or entertain post-judgment motions after expiration of the ten-day
period.” 89 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2002). But Garza’s statutory construction relied
heavily on the potential detriment to the public welfare of a nonjurisdictional
construction. Id. at 5 (noting that if the deadline was not an “absolute
deadline,” “a business could continue operating more than ten days after the
appeal is filed even when (as here) a county court has concluded that the
business imperils the general welfare, health, peace, morals, and safety of the
people”). Here, in contrast, the resulting consequences weigh in favor of a
nonjurisdictional construction.
81 See United States v. Dolan, 571 F.3d 1022, 1027 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Call

this the better-late-than-never principle. Congress imposes deadlines on other
branches of government to prod them into ensuring the timely completion of
their statutory obligations to the public, not to allow those branches the chance
to avoid their obligations just by dragging their feet. It would be a strange
thing indeed if a bureaucracy or court could avoid a congressional mandate by
unlawful delay.”), aff’d, 560 U.S. 605 (2010).

30
 For similar reasons, we also conclude that the Legislature did not
intend dismissal as a judicially enforceable, nonjurisdictional
consequence. Although the parties frame the issue as whether the use
of “shall” indicates that the 180-day deadline is “mandatory” or merely
“directory,” “[t]hese labels are somewhat misleading.”82 “More precisely,
the issue is not whether ‘shall’ is mandatory, but what consequences
follow a failure to comply.”83
When the Legislature intends dismissal as a consequence, it
generally says so.84 Here, it did not. And dismissal is not a “logically
necessary” consequence for the Commissioner’s noncompliance with this
provision.85 Dismissal as a consequence not only lacks textual support
but also would eviscerate the statute’s purpose, depriving the aggrieved
appealing party of any—let alone prompt—review and resolution by the
Commissioner.86

82 State v. $435,000.00, 842 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. 1992).

83 Id.; see AC Ints., L.P. v. Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality, 543 S.W.3d

703, 709-10 (Tex. 2018) (“It is too quick to say that ‘must’ is mandatory
language, therefore failure to comply results in dismissal.”).
84 Hogan v. Zoanni, 627 S.W.3d 163, 170 (Tex. 2021) (plurality op.); see

State, 842 S.W.2d at 644 (“If the Legislature had intended dismissal to be the
consequence of a failure to hear a forfeiture case within the prescribed period,
it could easily have said so[.]”).
85 AC Ints., 543 S.W.3d at 711 (noting that generally when a statute

does not state a consequence for a nonjurisdictional requirement, “no
consequence is logically necessary”).
86 See id. at 713 (“[W]hen the statute is otherwise silent on the subject,

we look to its purpose for guidance in divining the consequence for
noncompliance. . . . [I]f a particular consequence is logically necessary to
accomplish the statute’s purpose, the courts will apply that consequence.”);
State, 842 S.W.2d at 644 (“It does not follow, however, that if a trial court is

31
 “[N]o government official should ever feel free to disregard a
statutory deadline or any other statutory command.”87 When the law
commands, the commands are law, whether they are categorized as
jurisdictional, mandatory, or merely directory.88 Although we have
concluded that this statutory scheme does not provide for dismissal as a
judicially enforceable consequence for the Commissioner’s
noncompliance with the deadline, other consequences—if consistent
with the constitutional separation of powers89—may exist to compel the
Commissioner to hold a hearing and issue a decision.90
But the availability of any possible consequences for continued
noncompliance is for another day. The Commissioner eventually
complied with his duty to issue a decision on the merits, even if
untimely. LISD did not. Nor did LISD seek a remedy in the
administrative proceedings to compel the Commissioner to promptly

required by statute to hear a forfeiture case within 30 days of the filing of the
answer and does not do so, it cannot hear the case at all and must dismiss it.”).
87 In re Stetson Renewables Holdings, LLC, 658 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Tex.

2022).
88 Id. at 295 (“[C]ommands [to act within a stated time] are part of the

law; whether they prescribe a consequence, and whether they are
characterized as ‘mandatory’ or ‘directory,’ they are not mere suggestions to be
disregarded.”).
89 See id. at 297 (“[D]evising ways to judicially ‘enforce’ a duty can risk

supplanting the legislature because it is primarily for the legislature to
determine how far it is worth pressing to achieve compliance with its own
statutory directives.”).
90 Cf. State, 842 S.W.2d at 644 (“The mandatory provision affords the

parties the right to compel the trial court to hear the case promptly. If a trial
court refuses, the statute provides a basis for relief by mandamus, but not for
dismissal.”).

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conduct the hearing and issue a resolution.91 On this issue, LISD merely
sought—as it does now—to avoid any decision on the merits by
requesting dismissal. To conclude that Bellpas is not entitled to a
decision on the merits of its detachment-and-annexation petition due to
delay in the administrative-appeal process would be just as
incompatible with the statutory scheme as allowing LISD’s school board
to evade its duty to provide a decision by simply refusing to do so.
III. Conclusion
We reverse the court of appeals’ judgment. Our disposition on
these jurisdictional issues now requires the merits of the
Commissioner’s decision to be reviewed. Consistent with our usual
practice and as a reviewing court of last resort—not of first view—we
decline to consider these nonjurisdictional questions in the first
instance.92 We remand the case to the court of appeals for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

John P. Devine
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: February 16, 2024

91 To the contrary, LISD jointly requested a deadline extension and then

promptly argued the extension divested the Commissioner of jurisdiction.
92 See Rattray v. City of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860, 870 (Tex. 2023)

(“[T]he law is typically better served when the lower courts review a legal issue
before this Court does. ‘Ours is a court of final review and not first view.’”
(quoting Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 201 (2012))).

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