United States v. Sergio Antonio Hood

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-13903
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SERGIO ANTONIO HOOD,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:20-cr-00383-CEH-AEP-1
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13903

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Before WILSON, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Sergio Hood appeals his convictions and total 262-month
sentence for possession of ammunition by a felon, obstruction of
justice, and tampering with a witness. He argues that the district
court’s determinations related to his prior convictions were error
and, ultimately, that his conviction and sentence are unconstitu-
tional. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A federal grand jury returned a three-count indictment
against Hood, charging him with: possession of ammunition by a
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) (Count
One); obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503 and 2
(Count Two); and tampering with a witness, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1512(b)(2) and 2 (Count Three). As support for Count
One, the indictment listed Hood’s prior federal convictions for pos-
session of firearms as a felon and distribution of controlled sub-
stances, and his prior Florida state conviction for lewd or lascivious
battery.
Prior to trial, the government filed a motion in limine to ad-
mit evidence related to Hood’s prior federal gun convictions to
support the felon in possession charge. Specifically, the govern-
ment sought to admit, among other things, certified records of
Hood’s prior conviction for two counts of possession of a firearm
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21-13903 Opinion of the Court 3

by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), to prove his felon sta-
tus, and a copy of the same records, signed by Hood, to prove that
he knew of his status. The government argued that, even if Hood
stipulated to his prohibited-person status, the evidence was still ad-
missible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). It noted that,
while the Supreme Court in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172
(1997), held that a defendant must be permitted to stipulate to the
prior offense without identifying the nature of the underlying of-
fense when the sole purpose of the evidence is to prove the element
of prior conviction, Rule 404(b) guarantees the opportunity to seek
admission of prior conviction evidence with multiple utility. The
government asserted that the prior conviction evidence was admis-
sible because it was relevant to an issue other than Hood’s charac-
ter, the records could prove that he committed the acts, and the
significant probative value was not outweighed by undue preju-
dice.
Hood opposed the admission of this evidence. He argued
that the probative value of the evidence was substantially out-
weighed by its unfair prejudice and that the admission would have
a substantial and injurious effect on the jury verdict, such that this
evidence needed to be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence
403.
The district court held a hearing on the motion. The court
determined that the evidence was admissible for the purpose ar-
gued by the government and that Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct.
2191 (2019), “add[ed] the distinct requirement . . . of establishing
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-13903

[Hood’s] knowledge.” Noting that this Circuit had affirmed the
admission of prior gun‑related convictions to prove the knowledge
element, the district court determined that the evidence was ad-
missible at trial with specific redactions and a limiting jury instruc-
tion.
Hood proceeded to trial. During jury selection, the court
determined that the nature of Hood’s prior felony conviction for
lewd and lascivious battery was inadmissible but followed its pre-
trial ruling regarding his prior gun-related convictions. The court
read Count One to the prospective jurors, stating that Hood
“knowing that he had previously been convicted in a court of a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year
including possession of firearms as a convicted felon and distribu-
tion of controlled substances . . . did knowingly possess . . . ammu-
nition.” During voir dire, the government asked jurors if they could
follow the court’s limiting instructions as to the prior convictions
evidence and consider the evidence only for its proper purpose.
One prospective juror stated that it might affect their judgment but
agreed that they would probably be able to overcome the prejudice
during deliberations. Multiple other prospective jurors stated that
the knowledge that Hood was previously convicted of a crime in-
volving firearms would make them more likely to believe that he
would commit another firearm crime.
The government stated its intention to introduce Hood’s
prior firearm possession and drug distribution convictions as im-
peachment evidence against Hood, should he testify. Hood then
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testified on his own behalf. Factually, he denied possessing a gun
and stated that he was at his brother’s house watching sports when
the alleged shooting occurred. However, cell phone records
showed that Hood left his brother’s home before the shooting oc-
curred. As to his felon status, Hood testified that he had been con-
victed of two gun charges and three drug charges. He stated, “I
have nothing illegal, no guns, no drugs, no nothing. I’m already
on probation for that so I know I’m prohibited of having those
things.” Testimony from Hood’s U.S. Probation Officer and certi-
fied records of Hood’s convictions admitted into evidence con-
firmed that, at the time of the shooting, Hood was on supervised
release for two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon.
Tampa Police Department Detective Daniel Romonosky
testified that, following the incident, Hood was arrested and held
in state custody for about a year, until he was transferred to federal
custody for his supervised release revocation hearing. He testified
that, while in custody, Hood called his brother multiple times, us-
ing different inmates’ pin numbers, to discuss his alibi that they had
been together at the time of the shooting. Before jury delibera-
tions, the district court instructed the jury:
During the trial, you heard evidence of acts al-
legedly done by the Defendant on other occasions
that may be similar to acts with which the Defendant
is currently charged. You must not consider any of
this evidence to decide whether the Defendant en-
gaged in the activity alleged in the indictment. This
evidence is admitted and may be considered by you
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in determining whether the Defendant had the state
of mind or intent necessary to commit the crime
charged in the indictment and whether the Defendant
had a motive or the opportunity to commit the acts
charged in the indictment.
At the end of the six-day trial, the jury found Hood guilty on
all three counts. The U.S. Probation Office generated Hood’s
presentence investigation report (“PSI”). The PSI grouped Counts
Two and Three in accordance with U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(a), then
grouped Counts Two and Three with Count One in accordance
with § 3D1.2(c). The PSI calculated an offense level of 20 in accord-
ance with U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), based on the determination
that Hood was previously convicted of three counts of distribution
of methylenedioxymethamphetamine (“MDMA”), a controlled
substance offense. Probation then applied: (1) a four-level enhance-
ment, under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), because Hood possessed ammuni-
tion in connection with another felony offense1; and (2) a two-level
adjustment, under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, for obstruction of justice. The
resulting adjusted offense level was 26.

1 Hood was charged in Hillsborough County Circuit Court with aggravated

assault with a deadly weapon (Count 1) and shooting at or within a vehicle
(Count 2) for the offense conduct in this case. But Count 1 was dismissed, and
Count 2 was pleaded down to a lesser included offense of trespass in an occu-
pied structure. References throughout the PSI to the offense conduct being in
connection with “another felony offense” or “crime of violence” refer to these
charges.
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Additionally, the PSI determined that Hood qualified as an
armed career criminal under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4 because he had at
least three prior convictions for a violent felony or serious drug of-
fense, committed on occasions different from one another. This
classification was based on Hood’s convictions for: (1) distribution
of MDMA on March 1, 2011, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
and (b)(1)(C); (2) distribution of MDMA on March 2, 2011, in vio-
lation of § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C); and (3) distribution of MDMA on
June 21, 2011, in violation of §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) and 2. The PSI
determined that the application of the armed career criminal en-
hancement resulted in a total offense level of 34 because Hood pos-
sessed ammunition in connection with aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon, a crime of violence.
The PSI then detailed Hood’s criminal history. It listed
Hood’s prior convictions, which included petit theft, lewd and las-
civious battery, distribution of MDMA, possession of a firearm by
a felon, and trespass. Based on his convictions, the PSI calculated
an initial criminal history score of six but added two points, see
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d), because Hood committed the instant offense
while on supervised release. A total criminal history score of eight
yielded a criminal history category of IV. However, the PSI as-
signed a criminal history category of VI under § 4B1.4(c)(2) because
of Hood’s armed career criminal status and because he possessed
the ammunition in connection with a crime of violence. Hood’s
total offense level of 34 and a criminal history category VI yielded
a guideline range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment.
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In his objections to the PSI, Hood objected, in relevant part,
to the application of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18
U.S.C. § 924(e). Specifically, he argued that the imposition violated
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments because the requirements were
not charged in the indictment nor proven to a jury beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. He also objected to the PSI’s reliance on non-Shep-
ard 2 approved documents. Hood also objected to the classification
of his prior convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 2 as ACCA predicate “se-
rious drug offense[s]” because § 2 offenses are not included in the
statutory definition. He objected to the classification of his predi-
cate conviction, which consisted of three separate counts, as being
three predicate offenses “committed on occasions different from
one another,” arguing that the determination erroneously relied on
non-elemental facts. Finally, he challenged the ACCA’s “occasions
clause” as void for vagueness.
The government filed a sentencing memorandum in re-
sponse to Hood’s objections and in support of its sentencing rec-
ommendation. In relevant part, the government contended that
the ACCA need not be set forth in the indictment nor proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt because it is a sentencing enhancement
provision, not a distinct offense. Next, it argued that Hood’s prior
convictions were supported by the Shepard-permissible indictment,

2 Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005) (referring to “the terms of the

charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy
between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was con-
firmed by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of this infor-
mation”).
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21-13903 Opinion of the Court 9

plea colloquy, and undisputed facts from the PSI from his prior fed-
eral case. Third, the government argued that Hood’s § 2 argument
was a misunderstanding of his prior convictions, as § 2 does not
define a crime and Hood was principally liable for all three counts.
Fourth, responding to Hood’s “occasions clause” argument, the
government contended that Hood’s prior convictions were all tem-
porally distinct, i.e., successive rather than simultaneous, and thus
committed on different occasions. Finally, the government argued
that the application of the ACCA in Hood’s case did not violate the
Fifth or Sixth Amendments. To support its contentions, the gov-
ernment submitted alongside its memorandum: (1) the certified
judgment; (2) the transcript of the guilty plea hearing; (3) the tran-
script of the sentencing hearing; and (4) the indictment from
Hood’s prior convictions for three counts of distribution of
MDMA.
Hood then filed a sentencing memorandum, in which he
briefly reasserted his arguments that he should not be classified as
an armed career criminal, and that his sentence should be limited
accordingly.
The district court addressed Hood’s objections at sentenc-
ing. The district court overruled Hood’s objection arguing that the
government needed to allege the ACCA violations in the indict-
ment, finding that this Court’s precedent did not require such.
The court then determined that Hood’s prior convictions were
supported by Shepard-approved documents, and relying on these
documents, determined that Hood’s prior convictions were three
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10 Opinion of the Court 21-13903

separate, temporally distinct offenses that qualified Hood as an
armed career criminal under the ACCA. The court next overruled
Hood’s § 2 objection to the ACCA, determining that, although
Hood pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting in addition to his drug
distribution charges, this did not disqualify the convictions as
ACCA predicates. The court then overruled Hood’s Fifth and Sixth
Amendment objections because this Court’s caselaw foreclosed the
arguments.
The district court imposed a total sentence of 262 months’
imprisonment, consisting of 262 months on Count 1, 120 months
on Count 2, and 240 months on Count 3, to run concurrently, and
a five‑year term of supervised release. This appeal ensued.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Hood argues that: (1) the district court erred in
admitting evidence of his prior felon-in-possession convictions at
trial; (2) 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the Commerce Clause, both
facially and as applied; (3) his sentence should be vacated and re-
manded in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Wooden v.
United States, 595 U.S. 360 (2022), and because the ACCA sentenc-
ing enhancement violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments since
the “occasions different” requirement was neither charged in the
indictment, nor found by the jury; and (4) the district court erred
in determining that Hood’s convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 2 quali-
fied as “serious drug offenses” because it is not among the statutes
listed in the ACCA’s definition. We address these arguments in
turn.
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A. The Admission of Hood’s Prior Convictions
We review the admission of evidence under Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b) for abuse of discretion. United States v. Culver, 598
F.3d 740, 747 (11th Cir. 2010). “If a reviewing court finds that a
district court has abused its discretion in admitting evidence in vi-
olation of Rule 404(b), then its decision to uphold the conviction is
properly reviewed under a harmless error standard.” United States
v. Hubert, 138 F.3d 912, 914 (11th Cir. 1998). Under that standard,
“[r]eversal is warranted ‘only if [the error] resulted in actual preju-
dice because it had substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury’s verdict.’” United States v. Phaknikone, 605
F.3d 1099, 1109 (11th Cir. 2010) (second alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Guzman, 167 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir.
1999)). “Overwhelming evidence of guilt is one factor that may be
considered in finding harmless error.” Id. (quoting Guzman, 167
F.3d at 1353).
Rule 404(b) prohibits the introduction of evidence of “a
crime, wrong, or other act” to “prove a person’s character in order
to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accord-
ance with the character.” It does, however, allow such evidence
for other purposes, “such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack
of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). “Rule 404(b) is a rule of in-
clusion, and accordingly 404(b) evidence, like other relevant evi-
dence, should not be lightly excluded when it is central to the pros-
ecution’s case.” United States v. Kapordelis, 569 F.3d 1291, 1313 (11th
Cir. 2009) (alteration adopted) (quoting United States v. Jernigan, 341
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12 Opinion of the Court 21-13903

F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003), abrogated in part on other grounds by
Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019)).
We recognize a three-part test to determine whether evi-
dence is admissible under Rule 404(b): (1) the evidence must be rel-
evant to an issue other than the defendant’s character; (2) there
must be sufficient proof that a jury could find by a preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant committed the act; and (3) the
probative value of the evidence must not be substantially out-
weighed by undue prejudice, as established in Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 403. United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1344 (11th Cir.
2007).
The first prong of the Rule 404(b) test can be satisfied “where
the state of mind required for the charged and extrinsic offenses is
the same.” Id. at 1345. “[B]y pleading not guilty, [a defendant]
place[s] th[e] [knowledge] element of the § 922(g) offense in issue.”
Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1281 n.7. This Court has held that a prior con-
viction in which the defendant possessed a gun provides a “logical
connection between a convicted felon’s knowing possession of a
firearm at one time and his knowledge that a firearm is present at
a subsequent time (or, put differently, that his possession at the
subsequent time is not mistaken or accidental).” Id. at 1281 (stating
that a defendant’s prior offenses involving the knowing possession
of a firearm “plainly bore” on the defendant’s knowledge that the
gun was present in the charged instance).
The third prong of the Rule 404(b) test consists of balancing,
under Rule 403, the probative value of the evidence against its
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prejudicial effect and requires the court to conduct the Rule 403 in-
quiry based “upon the circumstances of the extrinsic offense.”
Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1345 (quoting United States v. Dorsey, 819 F.2d
1055, 1059 (11th Cir. 1987)). Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy
that courts should employ “only sparingly since it permits the trial
court to exclude concededly probative evidence.” United States v.
Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1295 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v.
Norton, 867 F.2d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 1989)). Accordingly, we view
the disputed evidence “in a light most favorable to its admission,
maximizing its probative value and minimizing its undue prejudi-
cial impact.” Id. (quoting United States v. Elkins, 885 F.2d 775, 784
(11th Cir. 1989)).
The risk of undue prejudice can be reduced by an appropri-
ate limiting instruction. United States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344,
1354 (11th Cir. 2005); see, e.g., United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981
F.2d 1216, 1225 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting that, where the district
court issued a limiting instruction both at the presentation of the
evidence and in its final charge to the jury, “any unfair prejudice
possibly caused by its introduction was mitigated”). Indeed, a dis-
trict court’s reticence and careful efforts “to preclude the admission
of certain especially prejudicial aspects of” a prior conviction
through limiting instructions are significant. See Jernigan, 341 F.3d
at 1282.
Section 922(g) governs offenses for unlawful possession of a
firearm and ammunition and “entails three distinct elements: (1)
that the defendant was a convicted felon; (2) that the defendant was
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14 Opinion of the Court 21-13903

in knowing possession of a firearm; and (3) that the firearm was in
or affecting interstate commerce.” Id. at 1279; § 922(g)(1). The
Supreme Court has held that, in a prosecution under §§ 922(g) and
924(a)(2), the government “must prove both that the defendant
knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the
relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Re-
haif, 139 S. Ct. at 2200.
In the § 922(g) context, the Supreme Court has held that “ev-
idence of the name or nature of the prior offense generally carries
a risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.” Old Chief v. United
States, 519 U.S. 172, 174–77, 185, 191 (1997). However, when prof-
fered evidence “has the dual nature of legitimate evidence of an
element and illegitimate evidence of character,” the court must de-
termine “whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the
probative value of the evidence in view of the availability of other
means of proof.” Id. at 184.
Hood argues that the district court committed fundamental
and harmful error when, at trial, it granted the government’s mo-
tion to admit evidence of his prior convictions under a Rule 404(b)
exception to show that Hood had “knowledge” of his prohibited
person status. He argues that the district court incorrectly deter-
mined that Rehaif established a requirement for the court to allow
evidence that the defendant knew of his prohibited person status
or that he was prohibited from possessing the firearms, even when
the defendant stipulated to that issue. Hood contends that, because
he did not dispute knowledge of his status, the element was not at
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21-13903 Opinion of the Court 15

issue in his case, and thus his prior crimes were unnecessary and
only showed propensity. He also asserts that the court failed to
follow Old Chief and should have allowed him to stipulate to his
prohibited status in exchange for prohibiting the admission of the
evidence. He contends that the district court’s limiting instruction
to the jury could not cure undue prejudice. And he asserts that any
probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by
unfair prejudice.
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allow-
ing Hood’s prior convictions into evidence because they were rel-
evant to show his knowledge about Count One. By pleading not
guilty to the charges, Hood made knowledge of possession of am-
munition an issue in the case, regardless of his alibi defense and
testimony that he was not present at the shooting. See Jernigan, 341
F.3d at 1281 & n.7. As for Hood’s reliance on Old Chief, the Su-
preme Court held that the district court abused its discretion by
admitting a prior conviction record for the sole purpose of estab-
lishing that the defendant was a convicted felon in order to satisfy
the prior conviction element of § 922(g)(1), despite the defendant’s
stipulation as to the conviction. See 519 U.S. at 174. Here, how-
ever, Hood’s prior convictions were admitted for a separate evi-
dentiary purpose, and Old Chief thus does not preclude their admis-
sion. Id. Similarly, because the government’s burden to prove that
Hood knew that he belonged to a category of persons prohibited
from possessing a firearm is separate from its burden to prove that
he knowingly possessed a firearm, his stipulation to the former
does not bar the government’s introduction of evidence intended
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16 Opinion of the Court 21-13903

to satisfy the latter requirement. See Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2200; Jer-
nigan, 341 F.3d at 1279.
The prior convictions’ probative value was also not “sub-
stantially outweighed” by their prejudicial effect. Any risk of unfair
prejudice to Hood was minimal due to the district court’s careful
efforts to redact the conviction records, and any undue prejudice
that resulted from the district court’s allowance of the prior con-
victions was mitigated by the three limiting instructions that it gave
to the jury. Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.
B. The Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
For the first time on appeal, Hood argues that his conviction
must be vacated because § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional, both fa-
cially and as applied, for exceeding congressional authority under
the Commerce Clause. He contends that Congress is not permit-
ted to criminalize the intrastate possession of ammunition simply
because the ammunition crossed state lines at some time. Hood,
however, acknowledges that his arguments here are foreclosed by
this Court’s precedent, although he criticizes that precedent as be-
ing based on a statutory interpretation decision that used a stand-
ard well below the contemporary substantial effects test in United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
Generally, we review the constitutionality of a statute de
novo, as it is a question of law. United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708,
715 (11th Cir. 2010). But if the issue is raised for the first time on
appeal, we review for plain error only. Id. Plain error occurs only
if (1) there was error, (2) it was plain, (3) it affected the defendant’s
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21-13903 Opinion of the Court 17

substantial rights, and (4) it seriously affected the “fairness, integ-
rity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting
United States v. Jones, 289 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir. 2002)). Addi-
tionally, the prior precedent rule requires us to follow a prior bind-
ing precedent unless it is overruled by this Court en banc or by the
Supreme Court. United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225, 1228 (11th
Cir. 2016). “To constitute an ‘overruling’ for the purposes of this
prior panel precedent rule, the Supreme Court decision must be
‘clearly on point.’” United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1255 (11th
Cir. 2009) (quoting Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs.,
344 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003)).
“We have clearly held that § 922(g) is constitutional under
the Commerce Clause.” United States v. Longoria, 874 F.3d 1278,
1283 (11th Cir. 2017). We have also rejected as-applied challenges
to § 922(g), holding that the government proves a “minimal nexus”
to interstate commerce where it demonstrates that the firearms
were manufactured outside of the state where the offense took
place and, thus, necessarily traveled in interstate commerce. See
Wright, 607 F.3d at 715–16. And we have specifically rejected con-
stitutional challenges to § 922(g) under Lopez, concluding that
“[n]othing in Lopez suggest[ed] that the ‘minimal nexus’ test should
be changed.” United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 390 (11th Cir.
1996).
Here, because Hood did not object on these grounds below,
we review only for plain error. The district court did not plainly
err in convicting Hood under § 922(g) because we have upheld the
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18 Opinion of the Court 21-13903

constitutionality of § 922(g) against both facial and as applied chal-
lenges under the Commerce Clause, as Hood argues here. Thus,
Hood’s challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g) is foreclosed
by the prior precedent rule, and we affirm as to this issue.
C. The Constitutionality of Hood’s Sentence
We review constitutional challenges to a sentence de novo.
Longoria, 874 F.3d at 1281. We also review de novo “whether prior
offenses meet the ACCA’s different-occasions requirement.” Id.
The ACCA states:
In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of
this title and has three previous convictions by any
court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a
violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, com-
mitted on occasions different from one another, such
person shall be fined under this title and imprisoned
not less than fifteen years.
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). This provision “kicks in only if (1) a § 922(g)
offender has previously been convicted of three [predicate felony
offenses], and (2) those three felonies were committed on ‘occa-
sions different from one another.’” Wooden, 595 U.S. at 368 (quot-
ing § 924(e)). The government “must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence, using ‘reliable and specific evidence,’ that the defend-
ant’s prior convictions each ‘arose out of a separate and distinct
criminal episode.’” United States v. McCloud, 818 F.3d 591, 595 (11th
Cir. 2016) (citation omitted) (first quoting United States v. Almenida,
686 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012); then quoting United States v.
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21-13903 Opinion of the Court 19

Sneed, 600 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2010)). Only Shepard-ap-
proved sources may be used to determine if prior offenses were
committed on different occasions for ACCA purposes. Sneed, 600
F.3d at 1333.
Under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, “[o]ther than the
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submit-
ted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). Additionally, “when a defend-
ant pleads guilty to a crime, he waives his right to a jury determi-
nation of only that offense’s elements; whatever he says, or fails to
say, about superfluous facts cannot license a later sentencing court
to impose extra punishment.” Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S.
254, 270 (2013).
The Supreme Court addressed the correct approach for de-
termining whether a state conviction qualifies as a predicate ACCA
violent felony in Descamps and Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500
(2016). The Court emphasized the “elements-only” categorical ap-
proach in making such a determination, noting that the considera-
tion of non-elemental facts would require impermissible judicial
fact-finding. Mathis, 579 U.S. at 510–12. And the Court specifically
stated that an elements-centric approach was necessary to avoid
Sixth Amendment concerns that would arise from sentencing
courts’ making findings of fact that properly belong to juries—i.e.,
whether the elements of the predicate convictions were proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 267.
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20 Opinion of the Court 21-13903

However, Descamps and Mathis focused solely on the predi-
cate felony stage of the ACCA inquiry. United States v. Dudley, 5
F.4th 1249, 1260 (11th Cir. 2021). “Unlike the predicate felony de-
termination, which focuses solely on the statutory legal elements,
the different-occasions inquiry necessarily ‘requires looking at the
facts underlying the prior convictions.’” Id. (quoting United States
v. Richardson, 230 F.3d 1297, 1299 (11th Cir. 2000)). We have “re-
peatedly rejected the argument that judicially determining
whether prior convictions were committed on different occasions
from one another for purposes of the ACCA violates a defendant’s
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.” Id. at 1260. Specifically, in
Dudley, we held that “[n]either Descamps nor Mathis is clearly on
point” to abrogate our existing precedent as to the occasions
clause, “as neither case deals with the different‑occasions inquiry.”
Id. at 1265. Accordingly, the district court may make such a deter-
mination. Id. at 1259–60. However, in doing so, the district court
“is limited to Shepard-approved sources, as only information found
in such conclusive judicial records has gone through a validation
process that comports with the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 1259.
We have rejected a defendant’s argument that the district
court could consider only elemental facts—specifically, the dates of
his prior convictions—contained in Shepard‑approved documents,
because it was foreclosed by precedent. Longoria, 874 F.3d at 1283.
In Longoria, a defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a
firearm by a felon, and the district court sentenced him pursuant to
the ACCA. Id. at 1280. The district court overruled his objections
regarding the ACCA enhancement, finding that his three predicate
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21-13903 Opinion of the Court 21

offenses occurred on “occasions different from one another” to
qualify for a sentence enhancement under the ACCA. Id. On ap-
peal, we held that the district court did not err in looking at the plea
agreement and transcript from the change-of-plea hearing to deter-
mine that those predicate convictions, charged in a single indict-
ment, were temporally distinct. Id. at 1283; see also Dudley, 5 F.4th
at 1260 (“[I]n determining whether a defendant’s prior convictions
were committed on different occasions from one another, a district
court may rely on ‘non-elemental facts’ contained in the Shepard-
approved sources.”).
In March 2022, the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Wooden, interpreting the “different occasions” requirement. First,
the Court noted that “[t]he Courts of Appeals have divided over
the meaning of ACCA’s ‘occasions’ clause.” 595 U.S. at 365. It also
identified our precedent as consistent with the Sixth Circuit’s “se-
quentially rather than simultaneously” test. Id. at 365 & n.1. The
Court concluded that treating each temporally distinct offense as
its own occasion was inconsistent with the plain meaning of the
word “occasion” and the legislative history of the ACCA. See id. at
366–76. Rather, the inquiry of whether offenses occurred on dif-
ferent occasions was more “multi-factored in nature” and required
consideration of: (1) the timing of the offenses; (2) the proximity of
location; and (3) the character and relationship of the offenses. Id.
at 368–70. The Court clarified that offenses committed close in
time, in an uninterrupted course of conduct, will often count as
part of one occasion, whereas offenses separated by substantial
gaps in time or significant events may not. See id. (stating “[t]iming
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22 Opinion of the Court 21-13903

of course matters”). It added that, “[i]n many cases, a single fac-
tor—especially of time or place—can decisively differentiate occa-
sions” and that courts have “nearly always treated offenses as oc-
curring on separate occasions if a person committed them a day or
more apart.” Id. at 369–70.
Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit’s judg-
ment and concluded that the defendant’s commission of ten bur-
glaries—on a single night at the same location, in a single uninter-
rupted course of conduct, with each offense essentially identical
and intertwined—was one criminal occasion for purposes of the
ACCA. Id. at 370–71. However, the Supreme Court did not ad-
dress whether the Sixth Amendment requires a jury, rather than a
judge, to resolve whether the prior crimes occurred on a single oc-
casion. Id. at 366 n.3.
We first applied Wooden in United States v. Penn, 63 F.4th
1305 (11th Cir. 2023). In Penn, we addressed whether the defend-
ant’s cocaine distribution offenses committed thirty days apart “oc-
curred on the same ‘occasion’ based on the ordinary meaning of
the word.” Id. at 1318. Citing to the language in Wooden that clar-
ified the significance of temporal proximity, we determined that
“the answer [was] obvious”: the offenses “did not occur on the
same occasion” because the similarities between the offenses
“[could] not overcome the substantial gap in time.” Id. Penn also
argued that under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, a jury must
find, or a defendant must admit, that two offenses occurred on sep-
arate occasions. Id. However, because Penn did not preserve this
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21-13903 Opinion of the Court 23

challenge below, we declined to resolve the issue on the merits,
holding only that the defendant could not show plain error. Id.
We decline to remand Hood’s case for resentencing. Hood’s
predicate offenses were committed a day or more apart, and the
temporal differences are sufficient to decisively differentiate the oc-
casions. Additionally, Hood’s argument that the district court
erred by relying on non-elemental facts is foreclosed by our prece-
dent. Further, as we held in Dudley, the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Mathis and Descamps did not abrogate our occasions clause prec-
edent, i.e., that district courts may judicially determine whether
prior convictions were committed on different occasions from one
another for purposes of the ACCA. Because the Supreme Court
expressly declined to reach this issue in Wooden, Dudley remains
controlling precedent, and Hood’s Sixth Amendment challenge
fails.
Further, we reject Hood’s argument the ACCA’s occasions
clause is not unconstitutionally vague. “To overcome a vagueness
challenge, statutes must ‘give the person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may
act accordingly,’ and ‘must provide explicit standards for those
who apply them.’” Leib v. Hillsborough Cnty. Pub. Transp. Comm’n,
558 F.3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rock-
ford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)). The plain language of the ACCA;s
occasions clause gives persons of ordinary intelligence fair notice
that committing qualifying offenses on different occasions will
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24 Opinion of the Court 21-13903

result in the sentencing enhancement, and it permits non‑arbitrary
enforcement. Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.
D. Hood’s Prior Convictions Under 18 U.S.C. § 2
Hood also contends that the district court erroneously de-
termined that his prior convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 2 qualify as
“serious drug offenses” to support the ACCA enhancement. We
review de novo whether a prior conviction qualifies as a serious drug
offense for ACCA purposes. White, 837 F.3d at 1228.
The ACCA defines a “serious drug offense” as, in relevant
part, “an offense under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C.
801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21
U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or chapter 705 of title 46, for which a maximum
term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.”
§ 924(e)(2)(A)(i). Section 841(a)(1) makes it unlawful to manufac-
ture, distribute, dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense a controlled substance, and § 841(b)(1)(C)
creates a maximum penalty of twenty years’ imprisonment for
such an offense.
Hood argues that § 2—the federal aiding and abetting stat-
ute—is not among those specific portions of the U.S. Code enu-
merated in the ACCA’s definition of “serious drug offense.” He
asserts that canons of statutory interpretation indicate that Con-
gress did not intend for § 2 offenses to be “serious drug offenses”
under the ACCA definition. Therefore, he argues, his prior convic-
tions under § 2 cannot properly be “serious drug offenses,” and he
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lacks the requisite number of predicate offenses to qualify for the
ACCA enhancement and should be resentenced.
Under § 2, whoever “aids, abets, counsels, commands, in-
duces or procures” the commission of an offense, or “willfully
causes” another to perform an act that would be an offense if per-
formed by him, is punishable as a principal. Aiding and abetting,
under § 2, “is not a separate federal crime, ‘but rather an alternative
charge that permits one to be found guilty as a principal for aiding
or procuring someone else to commit the offense.’” United States
v. Sosa, 777 F.3d 1279, 1292 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States
v. Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004)). In concluding
that a Georgia conviction for aiding and abetting burglary qualified
as a “violent felony” ACCA predicate offense, we have held that
“an ostensible [ACCA] predicate crime is not deprived of that status
merely because the conviction may have been based on conduct
that aided and abetted the crime.” United States v. Coats, 8 F.4th
1228, 1245 (11th Cir. 2021). We noted that, because every jurisdic-
tion has expressly abrogated the distinction between principals and
aiders and abettors, “[w]ere it otherwise, Congress would have en-
acted a sentencing enhancement statute for which no prior crimi-
nal conviction could ever serve as a predicate crime.” Id.
We thus conclude that the district court did not err in classi-
fying Hood’s § 2 convictions as “serious drug offense[s]” under the
ACCA because, for ACCA predicate purposes, there is no distinc-
tion between a person charged as a principal and a person charged
as an aider and abettor. Therefore, we affirm as to this issue.
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26 Opinion of the Court 21-13903

III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Hood’s convictions and
sentences.
AFFIRMED.