UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 97-4354
WINSTON MICHAEL EVANS, a/k/a
Mike Evans,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Florence.
Cameron McGowan Currie, District Judge.
(CR-96-374)
Submitted: February 26, 1998
Decided: March 18, 1998
Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and HAMILTON,
Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
Daniel M. McEachin, Jr., Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant.
William Earl Day, II, Assistant United States Attorney, Florence,
South Carolina, for Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Winston Michael Evans pled guilty to conspiracy to possess mari-
juana, cocaine, and crack cocaine with intent to distribute in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994). He appeals his conviction and 97-month
sentence. Evans' attorney has filed a brief in accordance with Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), raising three issues but stating that
in his view there are no meritorious issues for appeal. Evans was noti-
fied of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but has not done
so. We find the claims raised by counsel to be without merit and, after
a review of the record, we affirm the conviction and sentence.
First, Evans contests the extent of the substantial assistance depar-
ture he received. See USSG § 5K1.1, p.s.* We lack jurisdiction to
review the extent of a downward departure absent a showing that the
sentence imposed was in violation of law or resulted from an incor-
rect application of the sentencing guidelines. See United States v. Hill,
70 F.3d 321, 324-25 (4th Cir. 1995). Evans has not made the required
showing.
Second, Evans challenges the district court's failure to give him a
mitigating role adjustment. See USSG § 3B1.2. Evans did not contest
his role in the offense at sentencing, but requested a minimal role
adjustment in a post-sentencing motion. The district court was with-
out authority to reconsider the application of the guidelines after sen-
tence had been pronounced. See United States v. Layman, 116 F.3d
105, 108 (4th Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3308
(U.S. Oct. 20, 1997) (No. 97-698). We find that the district court did
not plainly err in failing to award Evans a minimal or minor role
adjustment. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993)
(to obtain relief on unpreserved issue, appellant must show that error
_________________________________________________________________
*U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (1994).
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occurred, that it was plain, was prejudicial to him, and seriously
affected the fairness, integrity and public reputation of the court).
Evans was primarily a drug user, but on one occasion he drove
another conspirator, Wayne McKenzie from South Carolina to Florida
and back to facilitate the purchase of a kilogram of crack and shield
conspirator Lafayette Bradford, who wished to keep his distance from
the transaction. Evans was paid by Bradford for making the trip. On
his return to South Carolina, Evans delivered the kilogram of cocaine
to Rex Matthews, the real purchaser. On these facts, we cannot say
that Evans was plainly due a mitigating role adjustment.
Finally, Evans challenges the penalties for crack offenses on equal
protection grounds. We have consistently rejected such arguments.
See United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 876-77 (4th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 65 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1997
(No. 96-6868).
In accordance with Anders, we have examined the entire record in
this case and find no reversible error. We therefore affirm the convic-
tion and sentence. This court requires that counsel inform his client,
in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United
States for further review. If the client requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from represen-
tation. Counsel's motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
the client. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the record and briefs, and oral
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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