USCA4 Appeal: 23-4428 Doc: 21 Filed: 02/29/2024 Pg: 1 of 5
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4428
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DANNY LAMORE FORD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, District Judge. (1:14-cr-00273-TDS-1)
Submitted: February 27, 2024 Decided: February 29, 2024
Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Sophia L. Harvey, LIAO HARVEY PC, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Philip A. Taylor, Special Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
In 2014, Danny Lamore Ford pled guilty to possession of a firearm in furtherance
of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The district court
sentenced Ford to 60 months’ imprisonment, followed by five years’ supervised release.
Shortly after Ford began his term of supervision, he was charged with new offenses in state
court. At the hearing on Ford’s probation officer’s petition for revocation of his supervised
release, Ford did not contest the charged violations. The district court revoked Ford’s
supervised release and sentenced Ford to 48 months’ imprisonment, to run consecutively
to any sentence for the state charges, followed by 12 months’ supervised release. Ford now
appeals.
On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether
the district court abused its discretion in revoking Ford’s supervised release and whether
the sentence is plainly unreasonable. Ford has filed a pro se supplemental brief raising
additional issues. ∗ We affirm.
The district court may revoke supervised release if it “finds by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3). We review a district court’s revocation decision for abuse of discretion and
its factual findings underlying the revocation for clear error. United States v. Padgett, 788
∗
We have considered the issues raised in Ford’s supplemental brief and conclude
they lack merit.
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F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015). We conclude that there was no error in the district court’s
decision to revoke Ford’s supervised release.
With respect to Ford’s sentence “[a] district court has broad discretion when
imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States v. Webb, 738
F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). Thus, we will “affirm a revocation sentence so long as it is
within the prescribed statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable.” United States v.
Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 296 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). When
reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first determine
“whether the sentence is unreasonable at all.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately
explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding
Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors,” id. at 297
(internal quotation marks omitted), and the explanation indicates “that the court considered
any potentially meritorious arguments raised by the parties,” United States v. Patterson,
957 F.3d 426, 436-37 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A court need
not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when
imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement of reasons for the
sentence imposed.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if, in light
of the totality of the circumstances, the court states an appropriate basis for concluding that
the defendant should receive the sentence imposed.” Coston, 964 F.3d at 297 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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We conclude that Ford’s revocation sentence is both procedurally and substantively
reasonable. When imposing its sentence, the district court correctly calculated the policy
statement range, considered the relevant statutory factors, imposed a sentence within the
statutory maximum, gave sufficiently detailed reasons for its decision, and addressed
Ford’s arguments for a lesser sentence.
In imposing a variant sentence above the policy statement range, the court explained
that Ford’s violations of his supervised release conditions were serious, and involved his
possession of drugs while on supervision and while incarcerated on the new state drug
charges. The court also cited the fact that Ford had only been on supervision for eight
months before he incurred the first set of new charges, concluding that the sentence needed
to deter Ford from committing crimes. Based on the factors identified by the district court,
the variant sentence is not plainly unreasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Ford, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States for further review. If Ford requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this
court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy
thereof was served on Ford.
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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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