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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12659
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JAQUAN ERIC MELIK DOUGLAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 0:21-cr-60327-CMA-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12659
Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jaquan Eric Melik Douglas appeals his conviction and 163-
month sentence for carjacking and brandishing a firearm during a
crime of violence. First, Douglas argues that after Borden v. United
States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021), federal carjacking does not qualify as a
crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Second, he contends
that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district
court did not consider his personal history, and that his carjacking
offense was not a typical carjacking. Third and finally, he asserts
that the district court procedurally erred because it failed to address
specific arguments that he presented in support of his request for a
downward variance.
I
We review de novo whether an offense is a crime of violence
under § 924(c). United States v. Bates, 960 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir.
2020). When a defendant does not raise a relevant objection at the
time of sentencing, however, we review only for plain error. United
States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014). To pre-
serve an objection, it must be clear enough to inform the district
court of its legal basis. United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814, 819
(11th Cir. 2006). To preserve an objection to his sentence for ap-
peal, a defendant must raise the point in such clear and simple lan-
guage that the district court cannot misunderstand it. Id. When
the statement does not clearly inform the district court of the legal
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22-12659 Opinion of the Court 3
basis for the objection, the objection is not properly preserved and
is reviewed for plain error. Id.
The plain error standard requires the defendant to show that
the district court committed a plain error that affects substantial
rights and that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public rep-
utation of the proceedings. Id. at 818. For an error to be plain, it
must be one that is obvious and clear under current law. United
States v. Madden, 733 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 2013).
Our prior-panel-precedent rule mandates that “a prior
panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until
it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Su-
preme Court or [our] [C]ourt sitting en banc.” United States v.
Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008). “It does not matter
whether a prior case was wrongly decided . . . whether it failed to
consider certain critical issues or arguments; or whether it lacked
adequate legal analysis to support its conclusions.” United States v.
Lee, 886 F.3d 1161, 1163 n.3 (11th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted)).
The federal carjacking statute makes it a crime to, “with the
intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, take[] a motor vehicle
that has been transported, shipped or received in interstate or for-
eign commerce from the person or presence of another by force
and violence or by intimidation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2119. The intent ele-
ment of the statute is satisfied if “at the moment the defendant de-
manded or took control over the driver’s automobile the defendant
possessed the intent to seriously harm or kill the driver if necessary
to steal the car . . . .” Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 12 (1999).
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12659
To qualify as a crime of violence, an offense must meet the
definition of § 924(c)(3)(A)’s “elements clause,” which defines a
“crime of violence” as a felony offense that “has as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). The def-
inition is nearly identical to the definition of “violent felony” in the
Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which defines a “violent fel-
ony” as any crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceed-
ing one year that “has an element the use, attempted use, or threat-
ened use of physical force against the person of another.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i). The Supreme Court has held that the term “use”
means the “active employment” of physical force. Leocal v. Ashcroft,
543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004). Further, the Supreme Court has defined “phys-
ical force” as “violent force—that is, force capable of causing phys-
ical pain or injury to another person.” Johnson v. United States, 559
U.S. 133, 140 (2010).
We have held that carjacking under § 2119 satisfies
§ 924(c)(3)(A) because it has an element requiring that one take or
attempt to take by force and violence or by intimidation. In re
Smith, 829 F.3d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir. 2016). Further, we have held
that carjacking is a crime of violence because “§ 2119’s proscribed
conduct where the defendant must take the car from a person by
intimidation… and do so with the intent to kill or cause serious
bodily injury necessarily entails at least threatened or attempted
force and qualifies under § 924(c)(3)(A).” Ovalles v. United States, 905
F.3d 1300, 1304 (11th Cir. 2018).
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22-12659 Opinion of the Court 5
In Borden, the Supreme Court held that a criminal offense
that requires only a mens rea of recklessness cannot qualify as a
crime of violence under the ACCA. Borden, 593 U.S. at 423–24. At
the outset, the Court noted that it had concluded that only a statute
confined to purposeful or knowing conduct can count as a violent
felony under the ACCA. Id. at 425 n.2 (citations omitted). The
Court then held that, although offenses with a mens rea of reck-
lessness may involve the use of physical force, they do not require
the force to be directed against another, and that the “against an-
other” phrase in the ACCA sets out a mens rea requirement of pur-
poseful or knowing conduct. Id. at 428–30. The Court held that
offenses with a mens rea of recklessness do not require, as the
ACCA does, the active employment of force against another per-
son. Id. at 437–442, 444. We have agreed. See United States v. Carter,
7 F.4th 1039, 1045 (11th Cir. 2021).
Here, Douglas’s claim is foreclosed by this Court’s prece-
dent. Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352. His claim must be reviewed for
plain error because he did not object at sentencing that federal car-
jacking is not a crime of violence. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d at 1307. It
fails for two reasons. First, Borden did not abrogate this Court’s
case law. Both before and since Borden, this Court has held that an
offense with a mens rea of recklessness cannot qualify as a crime of
violence. Borden, 593 U.S. at 425 n.2; Carter, 7 F.4th at 1045. Even
so, this Court has also held that federal carjacking is a crime of vio-
lence under § 924(c)(3)(A), and that precedent remains binding.
Smith, 829 F.3d at 1280; Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352. Further, even if
Douglas’s claim was not foreclosed by the prior-panel-precedent
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12659
rule, the mens rea for federal carjacking is not recklessness, as it
requires intent to kill or cause serious bodily injury, and, thus, Bor-
den would still not support his claim. Holloway, 526 U.S. at 12;
Ovalles, 905 F.3d at 1304. Thus, the district court did not plainly err
when Douglas was convicted and sentenced for carjacking and
brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence.
II
We review the reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of dis-
cretion. United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1321–22 (11th Cir.
2008). The party challenging a sentence bears the burden of show-
ing that the sentence is unreasonable. Id. at 1322. Although we do
not automatically presume a sentence falling within the guideline
range is reasonable, we ordinarily expect it to be. United States v.
Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008).
On substantive-reasonableness review, we may vacate the
sentence only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction
that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in
weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors to arrive at an unreasona-
ble sentence based on the facts of the case. United States v. Irey, 612
F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). A district court abuses
its discretion when it (1) fails to consider relevant factors that were
due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper
or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment by
balancing the proper factors unreasonably. Id. at 1189. We con-
sider whether a sentence is substantively unreasonable under the
totality of the circumstances and in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
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22-12659 Opinion of the Court 7
factors. Williams, 526 F.3d at 1322. The district court is required to
evaluate all of the § 3553(a) factors, but the weight given to each
factor is within the sound discretion of the district court. United
States v. Ramirez-Gonzalez, 755 F.3d 1267, 1272–73 (11th Cir. 2014).
The district court does not have to give all of the factors
equal weight and is given discretion to attach great weight to one
factor over another. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249,
1254 (11th Cir. 2015). However, a district court’s unjustified reli-
ance on any one § 3553(a) factor may be indicative of an unreason-
able sentence. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir.
2008). The district court’s imposition of a sentence well below the
statutory maximum penalty is an indicator of reasonable-
ness. United States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1310 (11th Cir. 2016).
The factors the district court is to consider include the na-
ture and circumstances of the offense and the history and charac-
teristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence imposed to re-
flect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense as well as to afford
specific and general deterrence; and the need to avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who
have been found guilty of similar conduct. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). While the district court should consider and properly
calculate the advisory guidelines range, it is permitted to give
greater weight to other 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Rosales-Bruno,
789 F.3d at 1259. The district court may also “consider facts that
were taken into account when formulating the guideline range for
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-12659
the sake of a variance.” United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353,
1362 (11th Cir. 2014).
One of the purposes of the Guidelines is to provide certainty
and fairness in sentencing, and “avoiding unwarranted sentencing
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar criminal conduct.” United States v. Docampo,
573 F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). Alt-
hough we have never specified the defendant’s burden in these con-
texts, we have stated that the district court is required to avoid the
unwarranted disparities between similarly situated defendants, in-
dicating that the court should be aware of any potential for this
issue at sentencing. See id. at 1101–02.
Here, the district court did not impose a substantively un-
reasonable sentence because, based on the totality of the circum-
stances, the court properly weighed all of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors. First, it imposed a sentence within the advisory guidelines
for count one. Hunt, 526 F.3d at 746. Douglas’s sentence for count
one was 79 months—which was below the 15-year maximum
term—and his sentence for count two of 84 months was well below
the statutory maximum of life. Croteau, 819 F.3d at 1310. Second,
the court properly considered the impact that the incident had on
Douglas’ victim, S.W.—including that S.W. is now unemployed,
suffers from PTSD, and cannot see out of his left eye.
The court correctly noted that S.W. was trying to be kind by
offering Douglas a ride home and that Douglas responded by hit-
ting S.W. and stealing his car. And it also considered evidence from
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22-12659 Opinion of the Court 9
the PSI that showed that Douglas attempted to use S.W.’s credit
cards to purchase jewelry days after the crime. What’s more, the
court properly considered Douglas’s criminal history including his
unscored criminal history—as well his personal history, noting that
Douglas grew up in a broken home and that his life experience was
“pretty bad.”
There is no evidence from the sentencing transcript that
Douglas ever argued that his carjacking was not a typical carjacking
or that he was not a typical offender. Additionally, Douglas did not
point to any similarly situated defendants who received a below
guidelines sentence. Docampo, 573 F.3d at 1101. Specifically, he
didn’t point to a defendant with a similar criminal history and/or
similar facts surrounding their carjacking.
In sum, then, the court’s sentence is substantively reasona-
ble because the court properly weighed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) fac-
tors when it determined that Douglas should receive a guidelines
sentence as his victim is left permanently blind in his left eye.
III
Where a defendant challenges a sentence as procedurally er-
ror-based on the adequacy of the district court’s explanation, we
review de novo, even in the absence of a timely objection at sen-
tencing. United States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262, 1265 (11th Cir.
2023).
While a district court must consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors in determining a sentence, it is not required to state in its
explanation that it has evaluated each factor individually. United
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-12659
States v. Ortiz-Delgado, 451 F.3d 752, 758 (11th Cir. 2006). An ac-
knowledgment by the district court that it has considered the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors is sufficient. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d
1265, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007). Ultimately, the court must explain the
sentence with enough detail to satisfy the appellate court that it has
considered the arguments of the parties and has a reasoned basis
for its decision. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).
Here, the court did not commit procedural error because it
did consider Douglas’s rough childhood, his mental health and ad-
diction struggles, his criminal conduct, and his remorse for his ac-
tions. Indeed, all the court had to do to demonstrate that it consid-
ered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors was to explicitly assert that it
had done so. Turner, 474 F.3d at 1281. The court properly made
this assertion, and it correctly explained that the sentence it im-
posed was to promote respect for the law and deter Douglas from
future conduct.
Additionally, as already explained, Douglas did not argue be-
fore the court at sentencing that his case was not a typical carjack-
ing case. Therefore, the court did not err when it did not discuss it
in its explanation of Douglas’s sentence. Thus, the court’s explana-
tion is sufficiently compelling and provides enough detail that
shows that the court considered the parties’ arguments. Rita, 551
U.S. at 356.
AFFIRMED.