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2024 PA Super 38
STEVEN M. SITLER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
ALEXAS JONES :
:
Appellee : No. 1402 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered September 11, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County
Civil Division at No(s): 2023-MV-22-MV
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., KING, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
OPINION BY KING, J.: FILED: MARCH 5, 2024
Appellant, Steven M. Sitler, appeals from the order entered in the
Columbia County Court of Common Pleas, denying his petition against
Appellee, Alexas Jones, to establish paternity and for genetic testing of
Appellee’s child, R.G.J. (born in May 2023) (“Child”).1 We affirm.
In its opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant facts of this case as
follows:
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1 We use the parties’ names in the caption “as they appeared on the record of
the trial court at the time the appeal was taken.” Pa.R.A.P. 904(b)(1).
Notably, “upon application of a party and for cause shown, an appellate court
may exercise its discretion to use the initials of the parties in the caption based
upon the sensitive nature of the facts included in the case record and the best
interest of the child.” Pa.R.A.P. 904(b)(2); see also Pa.R.A.P. 907(a).
Neither party has applied to this Court for the use of initials in the caption.
Nevertheless, we will refer to the minor child as “Child” to protect Child’s
identity.
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[Appellee] had sexual relations with [B.J. (“Appellee’s
husband”)] and [Appellant] near the time of conception of
Child. No one has performed DNA testing upon Child and
[Appellee’s h]usband (or [Appellant] for that matter) to
determine biological paternity. [Appellant filed a complaint
to establish paternity and for genetic testing on July 5,
2023.] A hearing on the Complaint was held on August 21,
2023.
[Appellee] married [her husband] on March 25, 2022.
[Appellee] and [Appellee’s h]usband have an elder child,
L.J., born [in] January…2021. Both [Appellee] and
[Appellee’s h]usband testified that their marriage is intact.
They have never separated and continue to live together
with Child and L.J. as a family unit. [Appellee’s h]usband is
designated on Child’s birth certificate as Child’s father.
Emotional bonding has occurred between [Appellee’s
h]usband and Child. [Appellee’s h]usband works first shift
and cares for Child during [Appellee’s] work during third
shift, doing all that is necessary such as feeding, changing
and bathing. [Appellee] and [Appellee’s h]usband hold
[Appellee’s h]usband out to “everybody” as the father of
Child, including family, co-workers and friends. [Appellee’s
h]usband testified that he will love and care for Child as his
own regardless of the identity of the biological father of
Child.
[Appellant] has never seen Child and has no relationship
with Child. In October of 2022, after [Appellant] was
advised by [Appellee] that she was pregnant and that the
then unborn child might be his, [Appellant] told [Appellee]
that [Appellant] “wanted nothing to do” with the then
unborn child. One week later, [Appellant] inquired again
and said he did want to have a relationship with the then
unborn child. [Appellant] filed a custody action on May 17,
2023, …[shortly] after Child was born.
For a time, [Appellee] talked as if [Appellant] was the
biological father of Child, verbally and in text messages.
Despite this, [the court] found as fact that [Appellee] had
sexual relations with both [Appellee’s h]usband and
[Appellant] near the time of conception and that no test
result has been obtained which determines inclusion or
exclusion of either [Appellee’s h]usband or [Appellant] as
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the biological father of Child. Therefore, [Appellee’s] talk in
this regard was based only on supposition.
(Trial Court Opinion, filed 9/11/23, at 1-2; R.R. at 5a-6a).
Following a hearing, the court denied Appellant relief on September 11,
2023. The court decided that the presumption of paternity applied in this case
because Appellee’s marriage to her husband was intact. (See id. at 4; R.R.
at 8a). Moreover, the court held that paternity by estoppel applied to bar
Appellant relief. (Id. at 4-5; R.R. at 8a-9a).2 Appellant timely filed a notice
of appeal on October 9, 2023, along with a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).
Appellant raises three issues for our review:
Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when it
dismissed [Appellant’s] complaint to establish paternity and
for genetic testing based on the legal theory of presumption
of paternity?
Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when it
dismissed [Appellant’s] complaint to establish paternity and
for genetic testing based on the legal theory of paternity by
estoppel?
Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when it
dismissed [Appellant’s] complaint to establish paternity and
for genetic testing because public policy behind the
Commonwealth’s interest in protecting the family unit no
longer outweighs the child’s right to know his or her
biological father?
____________________________________________
2 The court reiterated these conclusions in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. (See Rule
1925(a) Opinion, filed 10/10/23, at 1-2; R.R. at 24a-25a).
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(Appellant’s Brief at 4).3
In reviewing cases involving a question of paternity, we will not disturb
a trial court order absent an abuse of discretion. Vargo v. Schwartz, 940
A.2d 459, 462 (Pa.Super. 2007).
An abuse of discretion exists if the trial court has overridden
or misapplied the law, or if there is insufficient evidence to
sustain the order. Moreover, resolution of factual issues is
for the trial court, and a reviewing court will not disturb the
trial court’s findings if they are supported by competent
evidence. It is not enough for reversal that we, if sitting as
a trial court, may have made a different finding.
Id. (quoting Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d 1279, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2003)).
Further:
“The finder of fact is entitled to weigh the evidence
presented and assess its credibility.” Smith v. Smith, 904
A.2d 15, 20 (Pa.Super. 2006). In so doing, the finder of
fact “is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and
we as an appellate court will not disturb the credibility
determinations of the court below.” Id. (citation omitted).
Vargo, supra.
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court improperly applied
the presumption of paternity here, where Appellee’s extramarital affair with
Appellant “undermines…the policy upon which the presumption of paternity in
this case is built.” (Appellant’s Brief at 15). Appellant asserts that the
presumption of paternity applies only where the presumption would advance
the policy upon which it was built—namely, the preservation of marriage.
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3 Appellee has not filed a responsive brief.
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Appellant contends that the extramarital affair in this case, along with
Appellee’s subsequent admissions that Appellant was Child’s biological father,
eliminates the policy for which the presumption was created. Appellant
maintains that Appellee’s husband gave no indication that the marriage would
be terminated if Appellant was declared the biological father of Child.
Appellant submits that permitting genetic testing “would have no more
deleterious effect on the marriage than the extramarital affair.” (Id. at 16).
Appellant posits that permitting the presumption of paternity to apply in this
case is patently unjust to not only Appellant, but to Child.
Appellant concedes that there is no evidence that Appellee’s husband
was either sterile, impotent, or without access to Appellee at the time of
conception. Nevertheless, Appellant emphasizes Appellee’s admission to
Appellant that he is Child’s biological father. Appellant also acknowledges
Appellee’s testimony that she had sexual intercourse with both Appellant and
her husband during the week of conception. Appellant suggests, however,
that the court “failed to give appropriate weight to the fact that no expecting
mother would inform the man with whom she was having an affair…that the
child belonged to him, instead of her husband, when there was a possibility
the child was husband’s.” (Id. at 16-17). Appellant insists that Appellee’s
admission that Appellant is Child’s biological father is a compelling rebuttal to
the presumption of paternity. Appellant concludes the court erred in applying
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the presumption of paternity in this case, and this Court must grant relief. We
disagree.
Our Supreme Court has recently revisited the presumption of paternity
in B.C. v. C.P., ___ Pa. ___, ___ A.3d ___, 2024 WL 314097 (Pa. filed Jan.
29, 2024).4 The Court explained:
The presumption that a child born to a married woman is
the child of the woman’s husband has been a part of our
common law for centuries, and has been characterized as
one of the strongest presumptions known to the law. This
legal doctrine was originally referred to as the “presumption
of legitimacy” because it was intended to shield a child from
the stigma attached in the past to illegitimacy, which
subjected the child to significant legal and social
discrimination. After the General Assembly eliminated this
concern by enacting legislation in 1971 which abolished the
legal distinction between “legitimate” and “illegitimate”
children, the Court referred to the presumption as the
“presumption of paternity.”
The presumption of paternity has a second policy
justification, which remains today and is at issue in this
appeal, relating to the preservation of the marriage and the
family unit. …
Traditionally, the presumption of paternity could only be
overcome by clear and convincing evidence establishing that
the husband did not have access to his wife during the
period of possible conception, or that the husband was
impotent or sterile. Indeed, the presumption has been held
to be otherwise irrebuttable when a third party seeks to
assert his own paternity as against the husband in an intact
marriage. However, under certain circumstances, the
distinct doctrine of paternity by estoppel may apply, and
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4 At the outset, the Court made clear that it would “not address whether the
presumption of paternity…as a general doctrine…should be reconsidered”
where the parties did not expressly challenge the continued viability of the
presumption. Id. at *1.
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involves a legal determination that, because of a person’s
conduct, such as holding a child out as his own, the person,
regardless of his biological relationship with a child, will not
be permitted to deny parentage, nor will a child’s mother be
permitted to sue a third party for support, claiming that the
third party is the biological father.
* * *
Questioning the wisdom of the presumption’s application
due to dramatic societal changes that had arisen since the
presumption was created, concerning not only the nature of
the relationship between men and women, but also the
commonality of separation, divorce, and children born out
of wedlock, [in Brinkley v. King, 549 Pa. 241, 701 A.2d
176 (1997) (plurality), the Opinion Announcing the
Judgment of the Court (“OAJC”)] broke with precedent and
limited the use of the presumption to cases where the policy
underlying the presumption is furthered, rendering the
presumption otherwise inapplicable. The OAJC expressly
defined the public policy supporting the presumption of
paternity as “the concern that marriages which function as
family units should not be destroyed by disputes over the
parentage of children conceived or born during the
marriage.”
… In [Strauser v. Stahr, 556 Pa. 83, 726 A.2d 1052
(1999)], Timothy Strauser filed a custody complaint,
asserting that he was the father of the youngest of the three
children born to April and Steven Stahr, as demonstrated by
blood tests voluntarily submitted by April, the child, and
Strauser. April and Steven invoked the presumption of
paternity to defeat Strauser’s claim. The trial court found
that: April and Strauser had sex on at least one occasion
during the time of the child’s conception; April was also
having sex with Steven during that time; April and Steven
were married when the child was conceived and born, and
remained married without ever separating; April had held
the child out to the community as Strauser’s child, and
promoted his relationship with the child; and Steven
exhibited an attitude of indifference toward April and the
child.
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The trial court held that April, having held out her child to
be Strauser’s and having voluntarily submitted to blood
testing, was equitably estopped from contesting the child’s
paternity. The court also admitted the blood tests into
evidence, and concluded that the presumption of paternity
was overcome. The Superior Court reversed, holding that
the presumption of paternity applied and was irrebuttable
because the family had remained intact. This Court
affirmed.
Acknowledging that the presumption of paternity had been
criticized in Brinkley, the Court found the facts in Strauser
to be distinct, as “the marriage into which [the child] was
born continues.” The Court emphasized that, “despite the
marital difficulties that they have encountered, [April and
Steven] have never separated,” and, “[i]nstead, they have
chosen to preserve their marriage and to raise as a family
the three children born to them,” including the child at issue.
Accordingly, we held that the case fell within the limited
circumstances under which, according to the Brinkley
plurality, the presumption of paternity continued to apply,
and was, in fact, irrebuttable.
Notably, in rejecting Strauser’s claims that April and Steven
Stahr did not enjoy a traditional marriage and family unit
because, inter alia, the couple had experienced conflict
caused by adultery, and April represented to others that
Strauser was the child’s father, the Court found that such
assertions were “not unique,” as they indicated that the
Stahrs’ marriage, like many, “encountered serious
difficulties.” The Court declared that it “is in precisely this
situation, … that the presumption of paternity serves its
purpose by allowing husband and wife, despite past
mistakes, to strengthen and protect their family.” Thus,
finding that the presumption was applicable and
irrebuttable, the Court deemed unavailing any reliance upon
an estoppel theory.
B.C., supra at *6-*9 (some internal citations, quotation marks, and footnotes
omitted). The Court acknowledged that our courts have narrowed the
application of the presumption of paternity over the years “to reflect more
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accurately the societal realities of the time. This Court’s decisions, however,
have held steadfast that there is a single circumstance under which the
presumption of paternity continues to apply, and, indeed, is irrebuttable—
where there is an intact marriage to preserve.” Id. at *11.
Under the facts of B.C., the trial court found that the biological mother
and her husband were living together with the child as a family, and their
marriage was strong, notwithstanding multiple contentious periods of
separation that the couple had endured. Id. Our High Court confirmed that
the record supported the trial court’s finding of an intact marriage. Thus, the
Court held that the presumption of paternity applied precisely in this situation,
“where the evidence establishes that a marriage and resulting family unit have
overcome the seemingly insurmountable odds and remained together after
marital infidelity.” Id. The Court opined:
Logic dictates that the presumption offers little protection
against the heart-wrenching revelations and resulting
personal devastation, many times public in nature, that may
arise prior to and during the litigation of a paternity dispute,
as some, if not all, of these damning events may have
already occurred by the time the court is examining whether
the presumption applies. The presumption, however,
additionally protects against the potential insertion of a third
party into the functioning family unit upon resolution of the
paternity action. This protection is warranted
whenever the court finds, and the record supports the
finding, that an intact marriage exists.
Id. at *11 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court held that while “a marital
couple’s prior temporary separation is a factor to consider in determining
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whether the marriage is intact at the time of the paternity hearing, … such
factor is not dispositive.” Id. at *12 (internal footnote omitted).
Instantly, Appellee and Appellee’s husband both confirmed that they live
together and have a marital relationship. (See N.T. Hearing, 8/21/23, at 6;
R.R. at 31a). The trial court expressly found the marriage was intact. (See
id. at 33; R.R. at 58a) (stating: “As a factual finding…, I’m going to find that
this is an intact marriage. I don’t have a choice. Everyone inside it says it’s
intact”). We see no reason to disturb the trial court’s factual finding that
Appellee’s marriage to her husband is intact. See Vargo, supra.
Under the facts of this case, where the record supports the trial court’s
determination that Appellee and her husband’s marriage is intact, the
presumption of paternity applies. See B.C., supra. Further, because
Appellee and her husband’s marriage is intact, the presumption of paternity
is irrebuttable. See id. Therefore, the trial court properly applied the
presumption of paternity in this case, and Appellant’s first issue merits no
relief.5
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5 In his second issue, Appellant complains that the trial court improperly
applied the doctrine of paternity by estoppel. Because that doctrine applies
only in circumstances where the presumption of paternity does not apply, we
agree with Appellant that paternity by estoppel is inapplicable here, and we
need not discuss further Appellant’s second issue on appeal. See Brinkley,
supra at 250, 701 A.2d at 180 (explaining that if presumption of paternity
has been rebutted or is inapplicable, then court examines whether paternity
by estoppel applies, which may operate to bar plaintiff from making claim or
bar defendant from denying paternity).
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In his third issue, Appellant argues that the public policy behind the
Commonwealth’s interest in protecting the family unit no longer outweighs a
child’s right to know his or her biological father. Appellant stresses that the
genetic testing he seeks can be performed by a simple oral swab and does not
even require a blood draw. Appellant cites to various concurring and
dissenting opinions in which Supreme Court Justices have advocated for
utilizing genetic testing to rebut the presumption of paternity.
Appellant submits that this case should serve as one to change the law,
where the Commonwealth’s interest in preserving the marital unit has been
eroded by the societal evolution of marriage. Appellant insists that a child’s
right to know the identify of his/her biological parents should supersede the
Commonwealth’s interest in preserving the family unit in this modern age.
Appellant emphasizes the health and welfare concerns at play regarding
genetics. Appellant posits that “[b]y continuing to hold that the
Commonwealth’s interest in the preservation of marriage is paramount, it is,
in effect, saying that it is more important to preserve an entity that may
dissolve by itself than to protect the health and welfare of a minor child.”
(Appellant’s Brief at 30-31). Appellant insists such a result is absurd and
cannot continue in our society. Appellant concludes that public policy and the
passage of time require a change in how courts in Pennsylvania address the
presumption of paternity, and this Court must reverse the order denying his
petition. For the following reasons, we cannot grant Appellant relief.
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In B.C., supra, our Supreme Court clarified its holding as follows:
In closing, we reiterate that this appeal does not present the
issue of whether the presumption of paternity has outlived
its usefulness in light of contemporary standards. Unless
or until this Court abrogates the presumption of
paternity in a case where that issue is preserved and
fully developed, courts in this Commonwealth shall apply
the presumption of paternity in the limited circumstances
where its purpose to preserve marriage is advanced.
Id. at *13 (emphasis added).
Instantly, Appellant invites us to do away with the presumption of
paternity. Nevertheless, our Supreme Court has instructed us to continue to
apply the presumption in cases where a marriage is intact, unless or until
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania abrogates the presumption. See id.
Although Appellant advances a compelling argument for a change in our law,
as an error-correcting court, we are simply unable to afford Appellant the relief
he seeks. See Matter of M.P., 204 A.3d 976, 986 (Pa.Super. 2019)
(explaining this Court is bound by decisional and statutory legal authority,
even when equitable considerations may compel contrary result; “We
underscore our role as an intermediate appellate court, recognizing that the
Superior Court is an error correcting court and we are obliged to apply the
decisional law as determined by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania”).
Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 03/05/2024
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