NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-733
RUTH ADJARTEY
vs.
SANTANDER BANK, N.A.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, Ruth Adjartey, appeals from the sua sponte
order dismissing a petition filed with the Superior Court that
sought to set aside a decision of the Housing Court and
permanently enjoin that judgment under equity principles. She
also appeals from the order denying her motion to reconsider the
dismissal. The plaintiff raises a variety of issues, all of
which amount to a collateral attack on the judgment of the
Housing Court. We affirm.
Discussion. Adjartey styled her "petition" to vacate the
Housing Court judgment as a motion pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P.
60 (b) (4), 365 Mass. 828 (1974), and we will treat it as such.
"It is well established as a general matter that denial of a
motion under rule 60 (b) will be set aside only on a clear
showing of an abuse of discretion." Wang v. Niakaros, 67 Mass.
App. Ct. 166, 169 (2006). We also review a decision on a motion
for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Kauders v. Uber
Techs., Inc., 486 Mass. 557, 568 (2021). "[A] judge's
discretionary decision constitutes an abuse of discretion where
we conclude the judge made a clear error of judgment in weighing
the factors relevant to the decision such that the decision
falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives" (citation
and quotation omitted). L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169,
185 n.27 (2014).
In 2019, the Housing Court granted summary judgment to
Santander Bank, N.A. (Santander) on its postforeclosure summary
process action, and judgment ultimately entered against
Adjartey. In an unpublished decision, Santander Bank, N.A. v.
Doku, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 1117 (2021), this court affirmed the
Housing Court judgment on direct appeal. Further appellate
review was denied. Santander Bank, N.A. v. Doku, 489 Mass. 1105
(2022).
Still determined to fight her eviction, Adjartey filed a
petition in the Superior Court, in which she asked for relief
from the Housing Court judgment on the ground that it is void
and asked the court to permanently enjoin the judgment against
her.1 In so filing, Adjartey relied on certain language in a
1 The record does not indicate that Santander was ever served
with the Superior Court petition. Santander has not filed a
2
footnote in the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion in Adjartey v.
Central Div. of the Hous. Court Dep't, 481 Mass. 830 (2019),
which affirmed an order of the single justice that denied
Adjartey and others' request for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.2
In relevant part, the footnote states:
"with regard to any potential claims under art. 114 of the
Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, the
Massachusetts Equal Rights Act (MERA), or the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), the petitioners could have
initiated a separate action in a court of competent
jurisdiction or argued on direct appeal that they were
prejudiced by a judge's erroneous denial of a request for
reasonable accommodations."
Id. at 833 n.6. Adjartey claims that this language demonstrates
that the Superior Court is a "court of competent jurisdiction"
to vacate the Housing Court judgment and adjudicate the matters
already decided by the Housing Court. However, the issues that
were raised in the G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition that is the
subject of Adjartey, supra, are entirely separate from the
issues raised in the Superior Court petition that is before us.
In this petition, Adjartey has not raised any potential claims
she may have under art. 114 of the Amendments to the
brief in this appeal, and it is unclear whether it is even aware
of these proceedings.
2 The G. L. c. 211, § 3 petition raised numerous concerns
regarding summary process practices and procedures. See
Adjartey, 481 Mass. at 832. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed
the order of the single justice "[b]ecause the petitioners had
adequate alternative avenues to seek review of their claims."
Id. at 833.
3
Massachusetts Constitution, the MERA, or the ADA in the Superior
Court.
Rather, Adjartey's petition requests that the Superior
Court vacate the judgment of the Housing Court and permanently
enjoin enforcement of such a judgment against her. She raises
the same arguments that were already litigated in the Housing
Court against the same party, Santander, and in the direct
appeal that followed. These arguments include that the judgment
is void because the Housing Court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction due to Santander's lack of standing. The short
answer is, as the judge properly held, the Superior Court does
not have jurisdiction to vacate judgments of the Housing Court.
Even if the Superior Court could have addressed the claims,
Adjartey would fare no better.
"[T]he principle of res judicata requires that a valid and
final personal judgment rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter serve
as a bar to any further proceedings between the same
parties on the same claim. Furthermore, a party cannot
avoid this rule by seeking an alternative remedy or by
raising the claim from a different posture or in a
different procedural form."
Wright Mach. Corp. v. Seaman-Andwall Corp., 364 Mass. 686, 688
(1974).
As stated in this court's decision on her direct appeal,
"Adjartey is not helped by trying to recast her various
substantive arguments with respect to the underlying merits as
4
ones claiming that Santander lacks 'standing.'" Doku, 100 Mass.
App. Ct. 1117 n.6. Additionally, under the doctrine of claim
preclusion, the summary process judgment barred Adjartey from
asserting that the foreclosure was invalid in Superior Court.
"[A]lthough 'subject matter jurisdictional issues are
nonwaivable and can be raised at any time, . . . that does not
mean that subject matter jurisdictional issues can always be
raised in every context and in every forum.'" Bigelow v. Reem
Property, LLC, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 590, 595-596 (2023), quoting
Brown v. Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 481 Mass. 1036, 1037 (2019).
"The place to seek relief from a judgment as void for want of
subject matter jurisdiction . . . is the issuing court."
Bigelow, supra at 596. The issuing court was the Housing
Court -- not the Superior Court.3
In any event, the concept of a "void judgment," that is, a
"total want of jurisdiction[,] must be distinguished from an
error in the exercise of jurisdiction. A court has the power to
3 While Adjartey asserts she has been denied the opportunity to
be fully heard on her claims to date, the record reflects that
multiple relevant motions and oppositions filed by Adjartey were
decided after a hearing was held. This court also fully
considered her direct appeal from the Housing Court judgment in
Doku, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 1117. We also reject Adjartey's claim
that the Superior Court was obligated to conduct an evidentiary
review of the record, as her title and standing claims were
fully adjudicated by the Housing Court's denial of her motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and granting of
summary judgment.
5
determine its own jurisdiction, and an error in that
determination will not render the judgment void. Only in the
rare instance of a clear usurpation of power will a judgment be
rendered void." Harris v. Sannella, 400 Mass. 392, 395 (1987),
quoting Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys., 453 F.2d 645, 649 (1st
Cir. 1972). From our review of the limited record, this is not
a rare instance of a clear usurpation of power that would render
a judgment void. Title challenges in a summary process
action -- including those based on alleged predatory lending and
discrimination -- and "housing problems" that may give rise to
an equal rights violation, fall squarely within the jurisdiction
of the Housing Court. G. L. c. 185C, § 3. See G. L. c. 151B,
§ 9; G. L. c. 183C, § 18 (a)-(b). See also Bank of Am., N.A. v.
Rosa, 466 Mass. 613, 623-626 (2013) (Housing Court has
jurisdiction in summary process proceeding to consider all
equitable challenges to title, including those that previously
had to be raised by independent Superior Court action).
Santander had asserted in the Housing Court that it had title to
the property by virtue of a foreclosure on Adjartey's mortgage.
"The action thus appeared to be a typical postforeclosure
summary process action of the sort regularly adjudicated by the
Housing Court." Bigelow, 102 Mass. App. Ct. at 596.
Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion in the Superior
6
Court's dismissal of the petition (rule 60 (b) motion) and
denial of the motion for reconsideration.
Order denying rule 60 (b)
motion affirmed.
Order denying motion for
reconsideration affirmed.
By the Court (Meade, Blake &
Desmond, JJ.4),
Assistant Clerk
Entered: March 7, 2024.
4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
7