UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 97-4804
DALLAS RAY DILLON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston.
Charles H. Haden II, Chief District Judge.
(CR-91-205)
Submitted: May 5, 1998
Decided: June 22, 1998
Before WIDENER, WILKINS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
Hunt L. Charach, Federal Public Defender, Edward H. Weis, First
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellant. Rebecca A. Betts, United States Attorney, Steven I. Loew,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellee.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Dallas Dillon pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm with an
obliterated serial number in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 922(k),
924(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1998). Dillon was sentenced to forty-six
months' imprisonment and three years of supervised release. After
serving his sentence, Dillon violated conditions of his supervised
release. Dillon now appeals the court's revocation of the supervised
release and imposition of a seven month sentence. Dillon's attorney
has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967), addressing whether the court erred in revoking the super-
vised release and imposing the seven month sentence. Counsel asserts
that there are no meritorious issues for appeal.* Dillon was notified
of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he has failed to do
so. We affirm.
Dillon was released from custody and began serving his term of
supervised release on October 26, 1994. After Dillon's probation offi-
cer reported that Dillon violated two conditions of his supervised
release, the district court modified the terms of Dillon's supervised
release on June 10, 1997, directing Dillon to serve the remainder of
his supervised release term in community confinement. On August
26, 1997, the probation officer again reported two more violations of
his supervised release. Dillon violated the rules and regulations of the
facility where he was in community confinement and also traveled to
Chicago without obtaining prior permission from his probation offi-
cer. Given Dillon's repeated failure to obey the terms of his supervi-
sion and Dillon's admission to the violations, the court revoked
Dillon's supervised release and imposed a sentence of seven months,
a sentence within the Guidelines range. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3)
(West Supp. 1998).
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*We previously granted Appellant's motion to submit the case on the
briefs.
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Dillon's attorney noted no objection to the sentence. Consequently,
we review only for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); see also
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993). We should
grant relief only if the error is plain, affects substantial rights, and
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. Id. at 732-37. In sentencing a defendant after revoking
a term of supervised release, the district court must consider certain
factors set out in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (1985 & West Supp. 1998),
one of which is the applicable Chapter 7 policy statements governing
the revocation of supervised release terms. See 18 U.S.C.A.
§§ 3553(a)(4)(B), 3583(e).
Dillon primarily maintains that the district court did not fulfill its
statutory obligation to impose a sentence that is sufficient, "but not
greater than necessary" to comply with the purposes of sentencing, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Dillon's argument is without merit.
From the transcripts of the sentencing and in its order, it is clear that
the court gave due consideration to Dillon's personal circumstances
and the fact that Dillon has made improvements in his life. Given the
court's past leniency with respect to Dillon's supervised release and
Dillon's repeated violations of the conditions of his supervised
release, the court's imposition of a seven month sentence, a sentence
within the guideline range, cannot be considered plain error.
In accordance with Anders, we have examined the entire record in
this case and find no reversible error. We therefore affirm the district
court order revoking Dillon's supervised release and imposing a
seven month sentence. This court requires that counsel inform his cli-
ent in writing of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United
States for further review. If the client requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from represen-
tation. Counsel's motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
the client. We dispense with oral argument in accord with the court's
prior order granting Dillon's motion to submit his case on the briefs.
AFFIRMED
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