Jarvis v. Pompos

[Cite as Jarvis v. Pompos, 2024-Ohio-1102.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MAHONING COUNTY

KIMBERLY JARVIS ET AL.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

CHRIS POMPOS,

Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Case No. 23 MA 0084

Civil Appeal from the
Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio
Case No. 2022 CV 1147

BEFORE:
Mark A. Hanni, Cheryl L. Waite, Judges,
William A. Klatt, Retired Judge of the Tenth District Court of Appeals,
Sitting by Assignment.

JUDGMENT:
Affirmed.

Atty. Rebecca L. Skeeles and Atty. Thomas D. White, Eques, Inc., for Plaintiffs-Appellees
and

Atty. Matthew W. Onest and Atty. Kyle W. Rea, Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty
Co., L.P.A., for Defendant-Appellant.

Dated: March 22, 2024
 –2–

HANNI, J.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Chris Pompos, appeals from a Mahoning County
Common Pleas Court judgment denying his motion for relief from judgment entered in
favor of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Kimberly Jarvis and C. Jarvis Insurance Agency, Inc., on
Appellees’ claim for money due on a loan. Appellant claims the trial court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over this case and lacked personal jurisdiction over him and his
businesses. Because the trial court had both subject matter jurisdiction and personal
jurisdiction in this case, the court’s judgment is affirmed.
{¶2} On July 1, 2022, Appellees filed a complaint for money due against
Appellant. The complaint alleged that Kimberly Jarvis loaned Appellant $50,000 on
March 15, 2021, to purchase a travel trailer. Appellees attached a copy of the check and
the accompanying promissory note. The terms of the promissory note were that Appellant
would pay the $50,000 back with interest at 10% annum no later than March 15, 2023.
Appellant agreed to make 24 equal monthly payments, due by the 15th of each month
and beginning April 15, 2021. The complaint stated that Appellant made the required
monthly payments in April, May, June, July, September, and November 2021. It alleged
Appellant failed to make any payments in August, October, and December 2021. It stated
that Appellant then made payments of $2,020.36 on January 12, 2022 and again on
January 14, 2022. The complaint alleged that Appellant had since failed to make any
payments or to communicate with Kimberly regarding the outstanding balance on the
loan. It stated that Appellant still owed $32,181.45. The promissory note contains an
acceleration clause stating that upon non-payment, the entire balance shall be due.
Appellant was served on August 1, 2022.
{¶3} On August 31, 2022, Appellees filed a motion for default judgment asserting
Appellant had failed to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint. The trial court
granted the motion and entered a default judgment against Appellant in the amount of
$32,181.45, plus interest, that same day.
{¶4} On September 7, 2022, Appellees filed an Affidavit and Notice of
Garnishment listing vehicles subject to garnishment including a Chevrolet Silverado and

Case No. 23 MA 0084
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a Cat Skidsteer. The trial court subsequently set the matter for a garnishment hearing.
On October 5, 2022, a Court Order and Notice of Garnishment was sent by certified mail
to Appellant’s address. It appears to be signed for by Appellant on October 6, 2022. The
court held the garnishment hearing on October 20, 2022. Appellees’ counsel appeared
but Appellant failed to appear. On October 21, 2022, Appellees filed a Praecipe for Writ
of Execution ordering the sheriff to issue a writ of execution as to the listed vehicles,
including the Chevrolet Silverado and the Cat Skidsteer. The writ of execution was issued
on October 26, 2022.
{¶5} On November 25, 2022, Appellant’s counsel filed a notice of appearance
on Appellant’s behalf and filed a motion for an emergency hearing in response to the
Notice to Judgment Debtor served on him on November 22, 2022. Appellant alleged the
vehicles removed by Appellees pursuant to the court order were actually owned by other
entities and not by Appellant individually. Appellees filed a motion in opposition. The trial
court set the matter for an emergency evidentiary hearing on the garnishment to be held
January 3, 2023. But on December 29, 2022, Appellant withdrew his request for the
hearing. Instead, the parties met by way of a telephone conference with the magistrate.
Appellant challenged the garnishment based on factual statements set forth in his motion
for emergency hearing. Since Appellant withdrew his request for an emergency hearing
and because statements by counsel are not evidence, the magistrate found Appellant
presented no basis to stop the garnishment proceedings.
{¶6} On January 19, 2023, the trial court entered a judgment adopting the
magistrate’s decision and finding that Appellant failed to present any evidence to
challenge the garnishment. It found that the garnishment proceedings would continue.
{¶7} On January 24, 2023, the court issued a notice to the Ohio Bureau of Motor
Vehicles (BMV) to transfer the title of the Chevrolet Silverado from CMP Agricultural to
the Eques Law Group (Appellees’ counsel) pursuant to the Court Order and Notice of
Garnishment filed October 5, 2022. The notice stated that the Silverado was owned by
Appellant through a sole proprietorship.
{¶8} On May 12, 2023, Appellant’s new counsel entered an appearance and filed
a motion for relief from judgment. Appellant sought to have the court vacate three
judgment entries: (1) the August 31, 2022 judgment granting default judgment to

Case No. 23 MA 0084
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Appellees; (2) the January 24, 2023 judgment ordering the BMV to transfer title from CMP
Agricultural to the Eques Law Group pursuant to a Court Order and Notice of Garnishment
filed October 5, 2022; and (3) the writ of execution issued by the Mahoning County Clerk
of Courts on October 26, 2022, to the sheriff for the Chevrolet Silverado and a Cat
Skidsteer.
{¶9} Appellant asserted that the trial court’s decision was based on the incorrect
conclusion that CMP Agricultural, which later merged into CMP Equine, LLC (CMP) and
Candywood Trace, LLC (Candywood), in whose names the title to the pickup truck and
Cat Skidsteer were in, were sole proprietorships. He argued that the judgment against
him individually did not give the court authority to seize the vehicles. He further asserted
the court’s decision was based on an incorrect conclusion of law. Appellant claimed that
under R.C. 2333.01, which authorizes a judgment creditor to go after a judgment debtor’s
ownership interest in a separate entity in order to collect on a debt, certain steps are
required that were not followed in this case.
{¶10} Appellant argued that he presented a viable claim for relief because
Appellees misspelled his name in the complaint. He asserted his name is “Christ”
Pompos but Appellees named him in the complaint as “Chris” Pompos. Therefore,
Appellant contended the default judgment against him was void. He argued he presented
another viable claim for relief because the vehicles were owned by CMP and Candywood
and not by him personally. And although he is the sole member of both entities, Appellant
argued the debt was in his name personally. He went on to argue that Appellees were
required to but failed to follow the procedure under R.C. 2333.01 for a creditor’s bill in
order to secure the vehicles.
{¶11} Appellees filed a memorandum in opposition to Appellant’s motion. They
argued Appellant did not have a meritorious defense to assert. They also argued
Appellant appeared in court, so the trial court has personal jurisdiction over him.
Appellees next asserted that the proceedings in the trial court conformed with R.C.
2333.01’s requirements. And Appellees claimed Appellant was not entitled to relief under
any of the grounds in Civ.R. 60(B).
{¶12} The trial court entered judgment on June 28, 2023, overruling Appellant’s
motion for relief from judgment.

Case No. 23 MA 0084
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{¶13} First, the court found no merit with Appellant’s argument that because his
name is actually “Christ” Pompos, and not “Chris” Pompos as stated on the complaint,
the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over him. The court found that the parties
had no reason to know that Appellant’s name was misspelled. It pointed out that the
promissory note is in the name of “Chris” Pompos and the signature line also bears that
name. Additionally, the actual signature appears to be “Chris” Pompos. The check was
made out to “Chris” Pompos. And there is nothing in the record to suggest that Appellant
made any effort to notify Appellees that they were not using his correct name. Moreover,
the court found that on August 1, 2022, “Chris” Pompos was personally served with the
summons and complaint at Appellant’s address as set forth in the complaint.
{¶14} Next, the court went on to discuss the history of this case, pointing out
numerous opportunities for Appellant to appear and challenge the judgment and the
garnishment of his vehicles and noting that Appellant failed to do so.
{¶15} Finally, the court found that Appellant did not offer any suggestion that he
has a meritorious defense to present.
{¶16} In addition to overruling Appellant’s motion for relief from judgment, the trial
court also granted Appellees’ request for leave to amend the complaint to change “Chris”
to “Christ.”
{¶17} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on July 27, 2023. He now raises
two assignments of error for our review.
{¶18} Appellant’s first assignment of error states:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO
VACATE THE JUDGMENT ALLOWING APPELLEES’ SEIZURE OF
ASSETS BELONGING TO CMP AGRICULTURAL, LLC, CMP EQUINE,
LLC, AND CANDYWOOD TRACE, LLC BECAUSE IT LACKED BOTH
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION
OVER ALL THREE ENTITIES.

{¶19} Appellant argues here that the judgment against him did not give the trial
court authority to order the seizure of the vehicles owned by his businesses absent a
separately filed creditor’s bill action. Because Appellees never filed a separate creditor’s

Case No. 23 MA 0084
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bill action under R.C. 2333.01, Appellant claims the trial court lacked both personal and
subject matter jurisdiction over his businesses and the judgment ordering and upholding
the seizure of the vehicles was void.
{¶20} Appellant first asserts that because the judgment was void for lack of
subject matter or personal jurisdiction, he was not required to meet the elements for relief
from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B) and set out in GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. Arc
Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976).
{¶21} Appellant goes on to argue that the vehicles belonged to his businesses,
not to him personally. He notes that there is no dispute that the businesses were the
listed title owners of the vehicles. Thus, at the time of the writ, the Cat Skidsteer was the
property of Candywood and the Silverado was the property of CMP. Because he did not
personally own the vehicles, Appellant argues the judgment against him cannot reach his
businesses absent a separate creditor’s bill case filed pursuant to R.C. 2333.01. He
argues that a creditor cannot obtain a lien on assets under R.C. 2333.01 until it files and
serves a complaint alleging a right to the lien. It follows then, Appellant claims, that the
trial court does not acquire subject matter jurisdiction to order the seizure of a third-party’s
assets using an equitable lien until a creditor’s bill complaint is filed and served. Because
Appellees never named CMP and Candywood as defendants and served them with a
creditor’s bill, a lien could not attach against their property (the vehicles) and the trial court
never acquired subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, Appellant argues the trial court
erred in upholding the seizure of the vehicles and we should order the return of the
vehicles to the businesses.
{¶22} Appellant also argues the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over
the businesses because the businesses were never named or served in this matter.
{¶23} The Ohio Supreme Court set out the controlling test for Civ.R 60(B) motions
in GTE, 47 Ohio St.2d at paragraph two of the syllabus:

“To prevail on a motion brought under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must
demonstrate that: (1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present
if relief is granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds
stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a
reasonable time, and, where the grounds of relief are Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2) or

Case No. 23 MA 0084
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(3), not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was
entered or taken.”

{¶24} The standard of review used to evaluate the trial court's decision to grant or
deny a Civ.R. 60(B) motion is abuse of discretion. Preferred Capital, Inc. v. Rock N Horse,
Inc., 9th Dist. No. 21703, 2004-Ohio-2122, at ¶ 9.
{¶25} But in this assignment of error, Appellant first alleges the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction. An appellate court reviews the determination of subject-matter
jurisdiction de novo. Burns v. Daily, 114 Ohio App.3d 693, 701, 683 N.E.2d 1164 (1996).
{¶26} A judgment is only void when the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction;
lack of jurisdiction over the specific case merely makes the judgment voidable. Pratts v.
Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 12. A void judgment is a
nullity and open to collateral attack at any time. Lingo v. State, 138 Ohio St.3d 427, 2014-
Ohio-1052, 7 N.E.3d 1188, ¶ 46.
{¶27} Subject matter jurisdiction of a court connotes the power and authority to
hear and decide particular types of cases upon their merits. Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio
St.2d 86, 87, 290 N.E.2d 841 (1972). It relates to the proper forum for an entire class of
cases, not the particular facts of an individual case. Fifth Third Bank, N.A. v. Maple Leaf
Expansion, Inc., 188 Ohio App.3d 27, 2010-Ohio-1537, 934 N.E.2d 366, ¶ 15 (7th Dist.),
citing In re Ohio Bur. of Support, 7th Dist. No. 00AP0742.
{¶28} Pursuant to the Ohio Supreme Court, “[w]hen a court has the constitutional
or statutory power to adjudicate a particular class or type of case, that court has subject-
matter jurisdiction.” Ostanek v. Ostanek, 166 Ohio St.3d 1, 2021-Ohio-2319, 181 N.E.3d
1162, ¶ 36, citing Corder v. Ohio Edison Co., 162 Ohio St.3d 639, 2020-Ohio-5220, 166
N.E.3d 1180, ¶ 14. The Court recognizes that “there is a distinction between a court that
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a case and a court that improperly exercises that
subject-matter jurisdiction once conferred upon it.” Pratts, 2004-Ohio-1980, at ¶ 10. “If a
court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction, any error in the invocation or exercise of
jurisdiction over a particular case causes a judgment to be voidable rather than void.
Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 19,
citing Pratts, at ¶ 12.
{¶29} The Ohio Supreme Court has explained:

Case No. 23 MA 0084
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Ohio’s common pleas courts are endowed with “original jurisdiction over all
justiciable matters * * * as may be provided by law.” Article IV, Section 4(B),
Ohio Constitution. Jurisdiction has been “provided by law” in R.C. 2305.01,
which states that courts of common pleas have “original jurisdiction in all
civil cases in which the sum or matter in dispute exceeds the exclusive
original jurisdiction of county courts.” This court has long held that the court
of common pleas is a court of general jurisdiction, with subject-matter
jurisdiction that extends to “all matters at law and in equity that are not
denied to it.” Saxton v. Seiberling, 48 Ohio St. 554, 558–559, 29 N.E. 179
(1891).

Kuchta, at ¶ 20.
{¶30} A common pleas court has subject matter jurisdiction over a claim for money
owed and over a creditor’s bill action. Saadi v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 7th Dist. Mahoning
No. 20 MA 0083, 2021-Ohio-2360, ¶ 31, 35. Therefore, the trial court had subject matter
jurisdiction over this case. Thus, its judgment was not void as Appellant alleges.
{¶31} As to personal jurisdiction, we review a trial court’s decision to exercise
personal jurisdiction under a de novo standard. State ex rel. Cordray v. Makedonija
Tabak 2000, 189 Ohio App.3d 73, 2010-Ohio-2903, 937 N.E.2d 595, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.).
{¶32} Appellant claims the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over CMP and
Candywood because Appellees never filed for a creditor’s bill.
{¶33} As explained by the Eleventh District, a creditor’s bill and a garnishment
action are two separate things:

A creditor’s bill action allows a judgment creditor to secure a lien on
an equitable interest of the judgment debtor that cannot be reached by
regular execution of the judgment. Am. Transfer Corp., supra, at ¶ 8, citing
Union Properties, Inc. v. Patterson, 143 Ohio St. 192, 54 N.E.2d 668 (1944).
An action in the nature of a creditor’s suit under R.C. 2333.01 is wholly
equitable in nature and, as such, permits the judgment creditor to reach
equitable assets which, by reason of uncertainties respecting title or
valuation, cannot be effectively subjected under the ordinary legal process

Case No. 23 MA 0084
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of execution by way of judgment liens, attachment, or garnishment. Am.
Transfer Corp., supra, Hoover v. Professional & Executive Mtge. Corp., 21
Ohio App.3d 223, 225, 486 N.E.2d 1285 (9th Dist.1985). See also Berg v.
Sigcom Group, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86180, 2005-Ohio-6495, 2005
WL 3320873, ¶ 13.

In contrast, a garnishment is an action at law. Lakeshore Motor
Freight Co. v. Glenway Industries, Inc., 2 Ohio App.3d 8, 440 N.E.2d 567
(1st Dist.1981), paragraph one of the syllabus. In a garnishment, the
judgment creditor seeks satisfaction of his debt out of an obligation
presently owed to the judgment debtor by a third party. Id.

Great Lakes Crushing, Ltd. v. DeMarco, 2014-Ohio-4316, 20 N.E.3d 430, ¶ 17-18 (11th
Dist.).
{¶34} This Court has explained a garnishment action in detail:

Garnishment is a procedure whereby a creditor can obtain property
of its debtor which is in the possession of a third party. R.C. 2716.11
authorizes the commencement of garnishment by a judgment creditor when
supported by an affidavit stating:

(A) The name of the judgment debtor whose property the judgment
creditor seeks to garnish;

(B) A description of the property;

(C) The name and address of the garnishee who may have in the
garnishee's hands or control money, property, or credits, other than
personal earnings, of the judgment debtor.

It has been held that:

Property held by a third party is subject to garnishment to satisfy the
debts of a judgment debtor when, at the time of the service of the
garnishment order, the judgment debtor has a right or title to the property. *

Case No. 23 MA 0084
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* * On the other hand, where the judgment debtor himself has no present
right to obtain the money or property from the garnishee, then the judgment
creditor likewise has no right to the property. Id. Toledo Trust Co. v.
Niedzwiecki, 89 Ohio App.3d 754, 757, 627 N.E.2d 616 (6th Dist.1993).

The garnishor has the initial burden to prove that the property being
garnished is the property of the judgment debtor. Davis v. Sean M. Holley
Agency, Inc., 2d Dist. No. 23891, 2010-Ohio-5278, 2010 WL 4311683, ¶
11.

The judgment debtor may attempt to defeat the garnishment order
by establishing an exemption or other defense to garnishment. “The burden
of proof on the existence or applicability of an exemption or defense rests
with the judgment debtor.” (Emphasis sic.) Ashtabula Cty. Med. Ctr., supra,
at *2, citing Hoffman v. Weiland, 64 Ohio App. 467, 29 N.E.2d 33 (1st
Dist.1940). The judgment debtor may object to the attachment of the
property and request a hearing. R.C. 2716.13(B). “The hearing is limited to
the consideration of the amount of property of the judgment-debtor in the
hands of the garnishee that can be used to satisfy all or part of the debt
owed by the judgment-debtor to the judgment-creditor.” Marinik v. The
Cascade Group, 103 Ohio Misc.2d 18, 22, 724 N.E.2d 877 (M.C.1999).

E. Liverpool v. Buckeye Water Dist., 2012-Ohio-2821, 972 N.E.2d 1090, ¶ 36-39 (7th
Dist.).
{¶35} This case proceeded as a garnishment. Importantly, Appellant has had
many opportunities to raise this issue in the trial court and has failed to do so. On
September 7, 2022, Appellees filed an Affidavit, Order and Notice of Garnishment of
Property Other than Personal Earnings and Answer of Garnishee. This filing listed the
Silverado and Cat Skidsteer. The trial court then issued a Notice of Garnishment on
October 5, 2022, and set the matter for a hearing to take place October 20, 2022. This
notice instructed Appellant that he had a right to a hearing on the garnishment where he
could dispute the creditor’s right to garnish the property. Appellant received this notice
by certified mail and signed for it. Yet Appellant did not respond. He did not appear at

Case No. 23 MA 0084
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the hearing. And he did not object to the garnishment. Over a month later, on November
25, 2022, counsel filed a notice of appearance for Appellant and an Emergency Request
for Hearing in response to the Notice to Judgment Debtor that Appellant had received.
He asserted the vehicles seized belonged to his businesses and not to him personally.
{¶36} The magistrate granted Appellant’s request and set the matter for an
emergency evidentiary hearing to be held January 3, 2023. But on December 29, 2022,
Appellant withdrew his request for the hearing. Consequently, the magistrate put on an
order finding that the garnishment proceedings were procedurally proper and that
Appellant had failed to provide any evidence whatsoever in support of his allegations.
Appellant did not object to this magistrate’s decision. Consequently, on January 19, 2023,
the trial court entered a judgment adopting the magistrate’s decision. Appellant did not
appeal from this decision. Appellant then waited four months before filing a Motion for
Relief from Judgment.
{¶37} Based on the numerous opportunities Appellant had to raise his objections
to the garnishment, and his failure to avail himself of any of these opportunities, he has
waived the issue on appeal.
{¶38} In addition to the above, Appellant cannot meet the GTE elements required
for relief from judgment. Appellant does not now, nor has he ever asserted a meritorious
defense or claim to present if relief is granted as is required by the first GTE element.
Appellant has never alleged that he does not owe Appellees for the debt on the
promissory note, that he paid the note in full, or that that he somehow otherwise satisfied
his obligation. Because Appellant cannot satisfy even the first element of the GTE test,
the trial court acted within its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for relief from
judgment.
{¶39} Accordingly, Appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit and is
overruled.
{¶40} Appellant’s second assignment of error states:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO
VACATE JUDGMENT FOR APPELLEES’ DEFAULT JUDGMENT
AGAINST POMPOS BECAUSE IT LACKED PERSONAL JURISDICTION
OVER POMPOS.

Case No. 23 MA 0084
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{¶41} Appellant contends here the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction
over him because Appellees misspelled his name in the complaint. He asserts his name
is “Christ” Pompos but Appellees named “Chris” Pompos as the defendant in this case.
{¶42} Appellant alleges Appellees never amended the complaint to correct the
spelling of his name. But in its June 28, 2023 judgment entry, the trial court granted
Appellees’ request to amend Appellant’s name on the complaint to “Christ” Pompos.
{¶43} Moreover, Appellant invited any error involving the spelling of his first name
and the court exercising personal jurisdiction over “Chris” Pompos. As one court
explained:

“The doctrine of invited error is a corollary of the principle of equitable
estoppel. Under the doctrine of invited error, an appellant, in either a civil
or a criminal case, cannot attack a judgment for errors committed by himself
or herself; for errors that the appellant induced the court to commit; or for
errors into which the appellant either intentionally or unintentionally misled
the court, and for which the appellant is actively responsible. Under this
principle, a party cannot complain of any action taken or ruling made by the
court in accordance with that party’s own suggestion or request.”

Daimler/Chrysler Truck Financial v. Kimball, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2007-CA-07, 2007-
Ohio-6678, ¶ 40, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1999, Supp.2007) 170-71, Appellate
Review, Section 448, (internal citations omitted).
{¶44} The doctrine of invited error can be applied to an alleged error concerning
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a party. See State ex rel. Downs v. Panioto,
107 Ohio St.3d 347, 2006-Ohio-8, 839 N.E.2d 911, ¶ 32.
{¶45} Throughout these proceedings, Appellant has led Appellees and the trial
court to believe that his name is “Chris” and not “Christ.” The check for the loan that
started this dispute was made out to “Chris” Pompos. Appellant cashed that check. The
accompanying promissory note was in the name of “Chris” Pompos. Appellant signed
the promissory note as “Chris” Pompos above the signature line that stated “Chris”
Pompos. (Complaint Exs. A, B). Appellant’s former counsel referred to him as “Chris”
Pompos in all court filings. (Notice of Appearance and Request for Emergency Hearing

Case No. 23 MA 0084
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filed November 25, 2022; Notice of Withdrawal of Hearing Request filed December 29,
2022). And a Court Order and Notice of Garnishment was sent by certified mail to “Chris”
Pompos and was signed for by “Chris” Pompos on October 6, 2022.
{¶46} Based on the above, Appellant cannot now claim that the trial court lacked
personal jurisdiction over him due to the alleged misspelling of his first name on the
complaint.
{¶47} Accordingly, Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit and is
overruled.
{¶48} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby affirmed.

Waite, J., concurs.

Klatt, J., concurs.

Case No. 23 MA 0084
[Cite as Jarvis v. Pompos, 2024-Ohio-1102.]

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be taxed against
the Appellant.
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in
this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a
certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.