NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 1 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NOEL JACKSON, No. 22-55937
Petitioner-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:97-cv-03531-MWF
v.
MEMORANDUM*
RONALD BROOMFIELD, Warden of
California State Prison at San Quentin,
Respondent-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 7, 2024
Pasadena, California
Before: H.A. THOMAS and DESAI, Circuit Judges, and MÁRQUEZ,** District
Judge.
Appellant Ron Broomfield, Warden of San Quentin Rehabilitation Center,
appeals the district court’s grant of habeas relief to Appellee, Noel Jackson, who is
serving a sentence of life in prison without parole. Broomfield contends that the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Rosemary Márquez, United States District Judge for
the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
district court erred in finding that the prosecutor at Jackson’s trial impermissibly
struck all Black potential jurors in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986).1 Specifically, Broomfield argues that the district court erred when, after
conducting a comparative juror analysis, it held that the state trial court
unreasonably accepted the prosecutor’s race-neutral justifications for striking these
jurors.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. We review de novo
a district court’s decision to grant or deny a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. See
Avena v. Chappell, 932 F.3d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir. 2019). Pursuant to the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), we defer to
the last reasoned state-court decision on the merits of any claim unless the state
court’s ruling was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly
established Federal Law,” or “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented at the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1)–(2); see also Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 924–25 (9th Cir.
2008).2 In evaluating a Batson claim, we must look to the “totality of the relevant
facts,” Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, being mindful that “the Constitution forbids striking
1
Because the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, we do not discuss them
in detail.
2
Here, the last reasoned state-court decision was the decision of the California
Supreme Court. People v. Jackson, 920 P.2d 1254, 1268–70 (1996).
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even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose.” United States v.
Vasquez- Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 902 (9th Cir. 1994). Applying these standards, we
affirm.
Broomfield argues that, contrary to the district court’s conclusion, none of
the race-neutral justifications provided by the prosecutor for striking the three
Black potential jurors were pretextual. We disagree. While some of the reasons
provided by the prosecutor for striking the three potential jurors may have been
legitimate, others were not. The prosecutor struck one Black potential juror
allegedly because that potential juror was “too fair minded.” But this justification
is contradicted by the record, given the number of seated jurors who described
themselves similarly. For example, one non-Black seated juror stated they “would
be very fair.” Another non-Black seated juror stated they would be “fair and
impartial.” And a third non-Black seated juror stated that they have “never been
one to jump to conclusions or make initial judgment” and that they give “people
the benefit of the doubt.”
The prosecutor justified his strike of another Black potential juror by
pointing to that juror’s statement that “[i]f a psychiatrist or psychologist ha[s]
interviewed the person, they would know quite a bit about that person.” According
to the prosecutor, that statement suggested that the Black potential juror “may give
too great a weight to psychiatric testimony.” But again, when compared to the
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responses provided by seated jurors, the prosecutor’s proffered justification is not
supported. For example, two seated jurors indicated that psychiatric/psychological
evaluations may “always” be considered to understand human behavior, whereas
the Black potential juror indicated that such evaluations may only “sometimes” be
considered. Another non-Black seated juror, a longtime registered nurse, indicated
they had a favorable experience with psychiatric professionals and expressed no
reservations about considering expert psychiatric or psychological evaluations.
The prosecutor’s strike of another Black potential juror on the basis that the
potential juror “enjoy[ed] soap operas” bore no explained relation to that
individual’s ability to serve as a juror. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 239
(2005) (“[T]he prosecutor must give a clear and reasonably specific explanation of
his legitimate reasons for exercising the challeng[e].” (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at
98 n.20) (some alterations in original)). And the prosecutor often failed to question
and follow up with Black potential jurors regarding his purported subjects of
concern, which casts further doubt on the legitimacy of his justifications.
Other evidence bolsters our conclusion that at least some of the prosecutor’s
race-neutral justifications were motivated by a discriminatory purpose. One
hundred percent of Black potential jurors were struck from the venire as opposed
to approximately a third of non-black jurors. Ervin v. Davis, 12 F.4th 1102, 1107
(9th Cir. 2021) (finding that statistical anomalies were “too disparate to be
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explained away or categorized as mere happenstance” (quoting Flowers v.
Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2248 (2019))); And the prosecutor eliminated all
Black potential jurors using the first seven of his eighteen peremptory strikes. The
sequence of the prosecutor’s strikes here is suspect, and “give[s] rise to an
inference of discrimination.” Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2246 (quoting Batson, 476
U.S. at 97).
Given the “totality of the relevant facts,” we conclude, as did the district
court, that race was at least a “substantial motivating factor” in the prosecutor’s
exercise of at least one strike. Currie v. McDowell, 825 F.3d 603, 605, 614 (9th
Cir. 2016) (first quoting Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005); and then
quoting Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 2010)). We therefore agree
with the district court’s conclusion that the state court’s decision to the contrary
was unreasonable on the record before it.
AFFIRMED.
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