Labrador v. Poe

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 1

GORSUCH, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 23A763
_________________

RAUL LABRADOR, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF IDAHO
v. PAM POE, BY AND THROUGH HER PARENTS AND NEXT
FRIENDS, PENNY AND PETER POE, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
[April 15, 2024]

The application for stay presented to JUSTICE KAGAN and
by her referred to the Court is granted. The December 26,
2023 order of the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Idaho, case No. 1:23-cv-269, is stayed, except as to
the provision to the plaintiffs of the treatments they sought
below, pending the disposition of the appeal in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and disposi-
tion of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such a writ is
timely sought. Should certiorari be denied, this stay shall
terminate automatically. In the event certiorari is granted,
the stay shall terminate upon the sending down of the judg-
ment of this Court.
JUSTICE KAGAN would deny the application for stay.
JUSTICE GORSUCH, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS and
JUSTICE ALITO join, concurring in the grant of stay.
Early in the litigation below, the district court issued a
preliminary injunction. Ordinarily, injunctions like these
may go no further than necessary to provide interim relief
to the parties. In this case, however, the district court went
much further, prohibiting a State from enforcing any aspect
of its duly enacted law against anyone. Today, the Court
stays the district court’s injunction to the extent it applies
to nonparties, which is to say to the extent it provides “uni-
versal” relief. That is a welcome development.
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GORSUCH, J., concurring

I
To appreciate the significance of the Court’s ruling, some
background helps. In 2023, Idaho adopted the Vulnerable
Child Protection Act. The law sought to regulate a number
of “ ‘practices upon a child for the purpose of attempting to
alter the . . . child’s sex.’ ” ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, ___ (Idaho
2023), App. A to Application for Stay 5. Those practices
range from “surgeries that sterilize or mutilate” a child’s
genitals to the supply of “[p]uberty-blocking medication.”
Ibid. Idaho claimed that its law aimed to protect children
from treatments that can cause “lasting harm and irreversi-
ble damage.” Id., at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The law’s provisions were scheduled to take effect January
1, 2024.
Before that could happen, two children and their parents
sued Idaho’s attorney general and a local prosecutor in fed-
eral district court. The children and their parents alleged
that, without access to puberty blockers and estrogen, the
two minor plaintiffs would likely suffer serious mental
health problems. Decl. of P. Poe in No. 1:23–cv–269 (D
Idaho), ECF Doc. 32–2, ¶¶14, 19, 22; Decl. of J. Doe, ECF
Doc. 32–4, ¶¶14, 16, 23–24. Shortly after filing suit, the
plaintiffs asked the district court to issue a preliminary in-
junction.
The district court agreed to do so. But instead of enjoin-
ing state officials from enforcing the law with respect to the
plaintiffs and the drug treatments they sought, the district
court entered a universal injunction. App. A to Application
for Stay 52–54. That is, the court prohibited the defendants
from enforcing “any provision” of the law under any circum-
stances during the life of the parties’ litigation. Id., at 54.
Among other things, this meant Idaho could not enforce its
prohibition against surgeries to remove or alter children’s
genitals, even though no party before the court had sought
access to those surgeries or demonstrated that Idaho’s pro-
hibition of them offended federal law. The court’s order
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GORSUCH, J., concurring

promised to suspend Idaho’s law indefinitely, too, as this
litigation (like many today) may take years to reach final
judgment.
Idaho responded by appealing the district court’s prelim-
inary injunction decision to the Ninth Circuit. The State
also asked the Ninth Circuit to stay the preliminary injunc-
tion during the pendency of the appeal. At the least, the
State argued, the court of appeals should stay the universal
aspect of the district court’s injunction so that at least some
portions of its duly enacted law might finally take effect.
After the Ninth Circuit denied Idaho’s stay request in a
brief unreasoned order, the State proceeded here. Before
us, the State does not challenge the preliminary injunction
to the extent it ensures the two minor plaintiffs in this case
continued access to their drug treatments. That aspect of
the district court’s order will remain in place pending ap-
peal. The State asks us to stay the preliminary injunction
only to the extent it bars Idaho from enforcing any aspect
of its law against any person anywhere in the State.
II
Stay motions and other requests for interlocutory relief
are nothing new or particularly remarkable. In truth, they
are perhaps “as old as the judicial system of the [N]ation.”
Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U. S. 4, 17 (1942).
Every federal court in this country has within its “tradi-
tional” toolkit the power to pause temporarily its own order
or one of a lower court or issue other forms of interim relief.
Id., at 9; see 28 U. S. C. §1651(a); this Court’s Rule 23.1;
Fed. Rule App. Proc. 8(a). Often, judges at all levels of the
federal judiciary resolve motions for interlocutory relief in
brief orders like the one the Court issues today and the
Ninth Circuit did below. Judges have proceeded this way
throughout the Nation’s history. Indeed, many courts could
not efficiently manage their dockets otherwise. Cf. Wilson
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GORSUCH, J., concurring

v. Sellers, 584 U. S. 122, 139 (2018) (GORSUCH, J., dissent-
ing) (“[A] busy appellate court may sometimes not see the
profit in devoting its limited resources to explaining the er-
ror [or] alternative basis for affirming . . . so it issues a sum-
mary affirmance instead”).
Just as familiar are the rules that govern stay applica-
tions. This Court, like every other federal court, is “guided”
by the same “sound . . . principles.” Nken v. Holder, 556
U. S. 418, 434 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, 582
U. S. 571, 580 (2017) (per curiam); id., at 584 (THOMAS, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). We ask (1)
whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that
it is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) whether it will suffer
irreparable injury without a stay, (3) whether the stay will
substantially injure other parties interested in the proceed-
ings, and (4) where the public interest lies. Nken, 556 U. S.,
at 434. A court’s “ ‘ “discretion” ’ ” to enter a stay is thus not
left up to its mere “ ‘ “inclination, but to its judgment” ’ ” re-
garding each of these time-tested considerations. Ibid.
(quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U. S. 132,
139 (2005), in turn quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas.
30, 35 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807) (Marshall, C. J.)).
Applying that traditional stay test here yields a ready an-
swer. Start with the first question: whether Idaho has
shown it is likely to succeed on the merits. This Court has
long held that a federal court’s authority to fashion equita-
ble relief is ordinarily constrained by the rules of equity
known “ ‘at the time of the separation of ’ ” this country from
Great Britain. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A. v. Alli-
ance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U. S. 308, 318 (1999); see Guar-
anty Trust Co. v. New York, 326 U. S. 99, 105 (1945); Boyle
v. Zacharie & Turner, 6 Pet. 648, 658 (1832). Under those
rules, this Court has said, a federal court may not issue an
equitable remedy “more burdensome to the defendant than
necessary to [redress]” the plaintiff ’s injuries. Califano v.
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 5

GORSUCH, J., concurring

Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 702 (1979); see Gill v. Whitford,
585 U. S. 48, 68 (2018) (“[A] ‘remedy must . . . be limited to
the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the
plaintiff has established’ ”); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,
12 Pet. 657, 718 (1838); Department of Homeland Security
v. New York, 589 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (DHS) (GORSUCH, J.,
concurring in grant of stay) (slip op., at 3); United States v.
Texas, 599 U. S. 670, 693 (2023) (GORSUCH, J., concurring
in judgment); S. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the
National Injunction, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 425–428 (2017).
The district court’s universal injunction defied these
foundational principles. It did not just vindicate the plain-
tiffs’ access to the drug treatments they sought. It pur-
ported to bar the enforcement of “any provision” of the law
against anyone. App. A to Application for Stay 54. The dis-
trict court issued this sweeping relief even though, by its
own admission, the plaintiffs had failed to “engage” with
other provisions of Idaho’s law that don’t presently affect
them—including the law’s provisions prohibiting the surgi-
cal removal of children’s genitals. Id., at 52. In choosing
such an extraordinary remedy, the district court clearly
strayed from equity’s traditional bounds.
The remaining stay factors—the relative harms to the
parties and the public interest—point to the same conclu-
sion. Members of this Court have long held that, “ ‘[a]ny
time a State is enjoined by a court from effectuating stat-
utes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a
form of irreparable injury.’ ” Maryland v. King, 567 U. S.
1301, 1303 (2012) (ROBERTS, C. J., in chambers) (quoting
New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U. S.
1345, 1351 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers)). Likewise,
this Court has held that “[t]here is always a public interest
in prompt execution” of the law, absent a showing of its un-
constitutionality. Nken, 556 U. S., at 436.
Both considerations favor Idaho. The district court pur-
ported to bar the State from bringing into effect portions of
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GORSUCH, J., concurring

a statute that no party has shown, and no court has held,
likely offensive to federal law. The district court’s order
promised to run for the life of this lawsuit, thus preventing
Idaho from executing any aspect of its law for years. Mean-
while, the plaintiffs face no harm from the partial stay the
State requests. Even with it, the district court’s prelimi-
nary injunction will operate to prevent state authorities
from taking any action to interfere with their ability to ac-
cess the particular drug treatments they seek.
III
The dissent disputes none of this. It does not question
that Idaho is entitled to relief under this Court’s traditional
stay test. Instead, it laments the number of requests for
interim relief this Court has recently faced in “high-profile”
cases. Post, at 1 (JACKSON, J., dissenting from the grant of
stay). To deter future applications of that sort, the dissent
proposes adding to our traditional stay test new factors al-
ien to our precedents and historic equitable practice. Re-
spectfully, however, the dissent’s proposals miss the mark.
First, the dissent suggests that we should refuse to inter-
vene when both a district court and a court of appeals have
refused a party’s request for interim relief. Post, at 2. But
the dissent does not explain how this system of upside-down
precedent works, where the Supreme Court is somehow
bound to follow lower court decisions. Of course, no one
questions that the Court should (as it does) afford due re-
spect to the work of our lower court colleagues. See, e.g.,
Little v. Reclaim Idaho, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (ROBERTS,
C. J., concurring in grant of stay) (slip op., at 5). But the
dissent does not explain why due respect should be replaced
with abject deference, or how the rule it proposes would al-
low us to discharge faithfully our own obligation to assess
fairly and independently the cases that come to us. Nor, for
that matter, does the dissent attempt to reconcile its pro-
posed new rule with the fact that, over the last 12 months,
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GORSUCH, J., concurring

this Court has (repeatedly) granted interim relief to the fed-
eral government in the face of contrary lower court rulings.1
Perhaps sensing these problems and convinced of the cor-
rectness of this Court’s recent interventions, the dissent ul-
timately fashions itself an escape hatch. Tucked away in a
footnote, the dissent adds that it does not mean to suggest
that the “burden” of overcoming adverse lower court deci-
sions “can never be carried.” Post, at 3, n. 1. But if that’s
true, when does the dissent believe we should intervene,
and when not? And why was it appropriate for this Court
to override lower court decisions in so many other recent
cases but it is inappropriate to do the same here? The dis-
sent never says. So much for the added clarity and “re-
straint” it hopes to bring to our law. Post, at 7.
Second, the dissent suggests that, before granting relief,
we should ask whether a case is “certworthy.” Post, at 4.
But it isn’t clear how that would help matters either. In the
past, various individual Justices faced with requests for in-
terlocutory relief in chambers, sometimes while the Court
stood in recess, considered whether four Justices would
likely agree to take up the dispute. That practice may be
understandable. But when hearing many stay requests,
this one included, we sit as a full Court. And here, a major-
ity has decided that this case is worthy of the Court’s atten-
tion.
It has done so, too, for good reason. This case poses a
question about the propriety of universal injunctive relief—
a question of great significance that has been in need of the

——————
1 See, e.g., Murthy v. Missouri, 601 U. S. ___ (2023) (overriding a lower

court order prohibiting the government from coercing or encouraging so-
cial media companies to censor private speech); Garland v. Blackhawk
Mfg. Group, Inc., 601 U. S. ___ (2023) (setting aside a lower court order
prohibiting the government from enforcing its regulation restricting the
sale of ghost guns); FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 598 U. S.
___ (2023) (countermanding a lower court order staying the Food and
Drug Administration’s approval of mifepristone, an abortion drug).
8 LABRADOR v. POE

GORSUCH, J., concurring

Court’s attention for some time. DHS, 589 U. S., at ___
(opinion of GORSUCH, J.) (slip op., at 3); Griffin v. HM Flor-
ida-ORL, LLC, 601 U. S. ___, ___ (2023) (statement of
KAVANAUGH, J.) (slip op., at 3). This case also implicates an
apparent circuit split, as courts of appeals have disagreed
about whether district courts may issue the sort of sweep-
ing relief the district court issued here when faced with
laws very much like Idaho’s. See, e.g., Brandt v. Rutledge,
47 F. 4th 661, 672 (CA8 2022); L. W. v. Skrmetti, 83 F. 4th
460, 489–490 (CA6 2023). Even applying the dissent’s pro-
posed standard for relief, then, this case would seem to sat-
isfy it.2
Third, the dissent suggests that the Court should exer-
cise more “caution” and “restraint” in cases like this one,
where a party does not challenge the entry of a preliminary
injunction but asks us to address only the scope of the rem-
edy it provides. Post, at 2, 4–5. But if “caution” and “re-
straint” are our watchwords, why would a party’s request
——————
2 The dissent seeks to downplay the “certworthiness” of this case by

recasting the universal aspect of the district court’s order as an “inci-
denta[l]” feature designed to protect the plaintiffs’ anonymity. See post,
at 3, n. 2, 4, and n. 3. But labeling universal relief incidental does not
make it so. The district court faced two plaintiffs seeking access to cer-
tain specific treatments, yet it issued an order applicable to all potential
nonparties and all regulated treatments. There was nothing incidental
about it. Tellingly, too, the district court nowhere paused to address the
adequacy of less intrusive (and truly incidental) measures to protect the
plaintiffs’ anonymity—for example, a sealed order, shared with pertinent
state authorities and the plaintiffs’ physicians, guaranteeing them ac-
cess to the particular treatments they seek. Today, the Court supplies a
much-needed reminder that courts cannot so easily sidestep the tradi-
tional equitable rule that the relief a federal court may issue “must . . .
be limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the
plaintiff has established.” Gill v. Whitford, 585 U. S. 48, 68 (2018) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). In doing so, the Court does not, as the
dissent suggests, “ignor[e]” the district court’s reason for granting uni-
versal relief. Post, at 4, n. 3. Rather, the Court recognizes that “aspect
of the District Court’s decision” for what it is—an unpersuasive depar-
ture from our precedents. Ibid.
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GORSUCH, J., concurring

for narrower rather than broader relief “counsel against our
intervention”? Post, at 2. Do we really want to incentivize
parties to seek more sweeping relief in order to enhance
their chances of success in this Court? And how does it
serve “caution” and “restraint” for this Court to allow lower
courts to transgress foundational remedial principles more
readily than foundational liability principles? Especially
when pursuing that course would mean (as it does here)
that a single federal judge may erroneously suspend the op-
eration of a law adopted by the people’s elected representa-
tives for years on end? Once more, the dissent offers no an-
swers.
Fourth, the dissent contends that we should exercise spe-
cial “caution” when considering whether to intervene in
“high-profile cases.” Post, at 1. But by any measure, a great
deal of caution is already baked into the Nken analysis. To
warrant this Court’s intervention, an applicant seeking a
stay must make a “ ‘strong showing’ ” on the merits, demon-
strate an “ ‘irreparable’ ” harm, and persuade the Court that
the public interest warrants intervention. Nken, 556 U. S.,
at 434. The dissent does not explain why these traditional
cautionary notes are insufficient.
Nor does it explain why we should reserve an added new
measure of caution for “high profile” matters alone. I would
have thought that, as judges, we should neither deliber-
ately seek out nor evade “high-profile” disputes, but afford
all litigants who come before us their lawful due. Even tak-
ing the dissent’s test on its own terms, too, my colleagues
fail to explain why this case qualifies for special caution as
“high profile” but so many others in the last 12 months did
not. Does anyone really think that this Court’s recent in-
terventions—in cases involving ghost guns, allegations of
government censorship, and abortion access—were war-
10 LABRADOR v. POE

GORSUCH, J., concurring

ranted because the laws at issue there were less “high-pro-
file” than Idaho’s? See n. 1, supra.3
IV
None of this is to suggest the dissent is without a point.
Perhaps the Court has seen a rise in the number of applica-
tions for interim relief. But if so, it seems to me that this
trend is not the result of (nor does it justify tinkering with)
this Court’s precedents and traditional equitable stand-
ards. Instead, at least part of the problem may be attribut-
able to a departure from those precedents and standards in
the lower courts. In recent years, certain district courts
across the country have not contented themselves with is-
suing equitable orders that redress the injuries of the plain-
tiffs before them, but have sought instead to govern an en-
tire State or even the whole Nation from their courtrooms.
Today, Idaho is on the receiving end of one of these univer-
sal injunctions, but lately it has often been the federal gov-
ernment.4
——————
3 The dissent chides me for neglecting to mention that the State

stamped the word “EMERGENCY” on the front cover of its stay applica-
tion. Post, at 5. But it is not obvious what point the dissent is trying to
make. Post, at 6, n. 4. In its recent stay applications, the federal gov-
ernment hasn’t always affixed a similar stamp on its papers. See, e.g.,
Application in No. 23A302, Garland v. Blackhawk Mfg. Group, Inc. (Oct.
5, 2023); Application in No. 23A243, Murthy v. Missouri (Sept. 14, 2023);
Application in No. 22A902, FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine
(Apr. 14, 2023). Should we have denied those applications on that basis?
In truth, every applicant for interim relief believes its case qualifies as
an “emergency.” Our traditional stay test helps us evaluate those asser-
tions by focusing our attention on factors such as irreparable harm, the
balance of equities, and the public interest. The dissent does not explain
what additional value an “emergency” test would provide or what neutral
principle would guide our analysis. Nor, for that matter, does the dissent
square its proposed new “emergency” test with its other proposals. Take
the dissent’s preference for avoiding high-profile cases. See post, at 1, 5.
Does the dissent mean to suggest that we should grant relief only in
“emergencies,” but only so long as they also keep a low profile?
4 Many of this Court’s recent orders granting interim relief were the
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GORSUCH, J., concurring

As best I can tell, universal injunctions are a relatively
new phenomenon. By some accounts, universal injunctions
against the federal government during President Franklin
D. Roosevelt’s tenure—those 12 eventful years covering the
Great Depression, the New Deal, and most of World War
II—were virtually unknown. See Bray, 131 Harv. L. Rev.,
at 434–435. Others have pointed to a single example of a
“nation-wide” decree during that period, but there the
Court reversed the lower court’s “sweeping” ruling for lack
of standing. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113, 117,
120–121 (1940). Even as late as President Barack Obama’s
administration, some estimate that lower courts issued
only about 19 universal injunctions against the federal gov-
ernment over the course of eight years. See Dept. of Justice,
J. Rosen, Opening Remarks at Forum on Nationwide In-
junctions and Federal Regulatory Programs (Feb. 12, 2020).
Since then, however, universal injunctions have prolifer-
ated. By one count, lower courts issued 55 universal injunc-
tions during the first three years of President Donald
Trump’s administration. Ibid. And if the last 12 months
are any indication, it seems that trend has continued apace
during the administration of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
See, e.g., n. 1, supra (citing examples).
A rising number of universal injunctions virtually guar-
antees that a rising number of “high-profile” cases will find
their way to this Court. Just consider this case. Idaho does
not challenge the district court’s injunction to the extent it
addresses the plaintiffs’ asserted injuries. The State seeks
relief here only because and to the extent the district court
prevented it from enforcing any aspect of its duly enacted
——————
product of a different and unrelated problem: the profound “intrusions
on civil liberties” governments attempted in response to COVID–19. Ar-
izona v. Mayorkas, 598 U. S. ___, ___ (2023) (statement of GORSUCH, J.)
(slip op., at 4). And, “[n]ot surprisingly,” the number of requests for in-
terim relief in this Court “has shrunk in the years since COVID–19.”
Post, at 11, n. 5 (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in the grant of stay).
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GORSUCH, J., concurring

law against anyone—all without any showing that other
provisions in the statute violate federal law or the rights of
any current party. As in so many other recent cases, the
district court’s universal injunction effectively transformed
a limited dispute between a small number of parties focused
on one feature of a law into a far more consequential refer-
endum on the law’s every provision as applied to anyone.
What’s worse, universal injunction practice is almost by
design a fast and furious business. Normally, parties spend
“their time methodically developing arguments and evi-
dence” before proceeding to a trial and final judgment lim-
ited to the persons and claims at hand. DHS, 589 U. S., at
___ (opinion of GORSUCH, J.) (slip op., at 3). If they seek
relief for a larger group of persons, they must join those in-
dividuals to the suit or win class certification. In universal-
injunction practice, none of that is necessary. Just do a lit-
tle forum shopping for a willing judge and, at the outset of
the case, you can win a decree barring the enforcement of a
duly enacted law against anyone. Once that happens, the
affected government (state or federal) will often under-
standably feel bound to seek immediate relief from one
court and then the next, with the finish line in this Court.
After all, if the government does not act promptly, it can
expect a law that the people’s elected representatives have
adopted as necessary and appropriate to their present cir-
cumstances will remain ineffectual for years on end. In all
these ways, universal injunctions circumvent normal judi-
cial processes and “tend to force judges into making rushed,
high-stakes, low-information decisions” at all levels. Id., at
___ (opinion of GORSUCH, J.) (slip op., at 4).
Today, the Court takes a significant step toward address-
ing the problem. It does so not by reworking our precedents
and traditional equitable practices, but by enforcing them.
It focuses directly on a root cause of the recent proliferation
of interlocutory litigation in “high profile” matters, sets
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GORSUCH, J., concurring

aside a district court’s universal injunction, and in the pro-
cess reminds lower courts of the foundational rule that any
equitable remedy they issue must not be “more burdensome
to the defendant than necessary to [redress]” the plaintiff ’s
injuries. Califano, 442 U. S., at 702.
Lower courts would be wise to take heed. Retiring the
universal injunction may not be the answer to everything
that ails us. But it will lead federal courts to become a little
truer to the historic limits of their office; promote more
carefully reasoned judicial decisions attuned to the facts,
parties, and claims at hand; allow for the gradual accretion
of thoughtful precedent at the circuit level; and reduce the
pressure on governments to seek interlocutory relief in this
Court. A return to a more piecemeal and deliberative judi-
cial process may strike some as inefficient. It may promise
less power for the judge and less drama and excitement for
the parties and public. But if any of that makes today’s de-
cision wrong, it makes it wrong in the best possible ways,
for “good judicial decisions are usually tempered by older
virtues.” DHS, 589 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4).
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KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 23A763
_________________

RAUL LABRADOR, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF IDAHO
v. PAM POE, BY AND THROUGH HER PARENTS AND NEXT
FRIENDS, PENNY AND PETER POE, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
[April 15, 2024]

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, with whom JUSTICE BARRETT
joins, concurring in the grant of stay.
A Federal District Court in Idaho preliminarily enjoined
Idaho from enforcing its new Vulnerable Child Protection
Act. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
declined to stay the injunction. Idaho then filed an
emergency application in this Court for a partial stay of the
injunction. The Court today grants Idaho’s emergency
application. I agree with the Court’s decision.
I add this concurring opinion to explain how this Court
typically resolves emergency applications in cases like
this—namely, in cases where a party has sought to enjoin
enforcement of a new state or federal law in the often years-
long period until a final decision on the merits.
Traditionally, one important factor when this Court
decides an emergency application involving a new law is
likelihood of success on the merits. The likelihood of
success on the merits factor can pose difficulty, however,
because it can require the Court to assess the merits of
important cases earlier and more quickly than is ordinarily
preferable, and to do so without the benefit of full merits
briefing and oral argument. But when resolving emergency
applications involving significant new laws, this Court
often cannot avoid that difficulty. It is not ideal, but it is
reality. Given that reality, the Court must then determine
2 LABRADOR v. POE

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

the best processes for analyzing likelihood of success on the
merits in emergency cases.
I
Here is how the issue typically arises. After a new federal
statute, federal regulation, or state law has been enacted,
an adversely affected party who contends that the new law
violates the Constitution or federal law may seek a pre-
enforcement preliminary injunction in federal district
court. A preliminary injunction prevents the government
from enforcing its new law pending the eventual decision
on the merits. If the district court grants a preliminary
injunction, the government may promptly seek a stay in the
court of appeals. Or if the district court denies a
preliminary injunction, the plaintiff may promptly seek an
injunction in the court of appeals.
The party that loses in the court of appeals may then seek
emergency relief in this Court. The losing party may argue,
for example, that a consequential new law has been
mistakenly enjoined or mistakenly green-lighted by the
lower courts, and ask this Court to grant relief.
When an emergency application comes to this Court, we
must decide it—grant or deny. The Court has no authority
to reject or turn away emergency filings without deciding
them.
It is critical to appreciate the significance of the decision
that this Court is being asked to make in emergency cases
involving new laws. Keep in mind how much time it takes
for the litigation process to run its course and reach a final
merits ruling in the district court, court of appeals, and
potentially this Court—often one to three years or even
longer. The final merits decision, when it occurs, will of
course be important. But the interim status of the law—
that is, whether the law is enforceable during the several
years while the parties wait for a final merits ruling—itself
raises a separate question of extraordinary significance to
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 3

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

the parties and the American people. And that is the
question this Court often must address when deciding
emergency applications involving new laws.1
Consider a few examples. Suppose that a State enacts a
new online defamation law. Do communications and media
companies have to alter their editorial policies and posting
practices to comply with that new speech law during the
several years while its constitutionality under the First
Amendment is being litigated on the merits? Or suppose
that EPA issues major new environmental regulations. Do
businesses have to restructure their operations or build
new facilities to comply with the new regulations during the
multiyear period while the legality of the regulations is
being challenged in court? Cf. West Virginia v. EPA, 577
U. S. 1126 (2016) (enjoining Clean Power Plan pending
review by the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court).
In those emergency cases, the plaintiffs—including
individuals and businesses—often will suffer irreparable
harm if the relevant government officials are not enjoined
from enforcing the law during that multiyear period. But
on the flip side, other parties—including the Federal
Government, the States, or other individuals and
businesses—often will suffer irreparable harm if the
relevant government officials are enjoined from enforcing
the law during that multiyear period.
If the moving party has not demonstrated irreparable
harm, then this Court can avoid delving into the merits.
But not infrequently—especially with important new
laws—the harms and equities are very weighty on both
sides. In those cases, this Court has little choice but to
——————
1 The Court also receives emergency applications in other contexts,

such as capital cases, election-law cases, and a smorgasbord of other
matters. But a distinct difficulty arises when we consider emergency
applications involving the enforcement of new federal or state laws. This
opinion uses “laws” as shorthand to include regulations and executive
policies as well.
4 LABRADOR v. POE

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

decide the emergency application by assessing likelihood of
success on the merits. Courts historically have relied on
likelihood of success as a factor because, if the harms and
equities are sufficiently weighty on both sides, the best and
fairest way to decide whether to temporarily enjoin a law
pending the final decision is to evaluate which party is most
likely to prevail in the end.2
The merits issues raised in emergency applications
involving new laws can be consequential and difficult. And
those applications can require this Court to assess the
merits on a tight timeline—without the benefit of many
reasoned lower-court opinions, full merits briefing, and oral
argument. It is worth noting that this difficulty is not
unique to this Court—lower courts must also deal with
applications for interim relief that can require them to
assess the merits on a tight timeline.
That scenario is not always optimal for orderly judicial
decisionmaking. So various suggestions have been made to
eliminate or reduce the need for this Court to address
likelihood of success on the merits when resolving
emergency applications involving new laws. Some
suggestions have force; others are questionable. As I see it,
none completely eliminates the need for this Court to make
those calls.
First, some suggest that this Court, when receiving an
emergency application involving a new law, should adopt a
default posture of deference to the court of appeals’ ruling
on a stay or injunction, especially when the court of appeals
——————
2 This Court has used different formulations of the factors for granting

emergency relief. All formulations basically encompass (1) likelihood of
success on the merits (or a fair prospect of success); (2) certworthiness;
(3) the harms to the parties; and (4) the equities and public interest. See,
e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U. S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam). For
present purposes, I will treat likelihood of success as equivalent to a fair
prospect of success. If there is any meaningful difference among the
common formulations of the emergency-relief factors (which I tend to
doubt), those distinctions can be explored if necessary in a future case.
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 5

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

has not disturbed the district court’s ruling on whether to
grant or deny an injunction. See, e.g., post, p. 1 (JACKSON,
J., dissenting from grant of stay). Under that view, this
Court should deny most emergency applications in cases
involving new laws, regardless of whether an injunction
against enforcement of the law was ultimately upheld or
denied by the court of appeals.
I respectfully disagree with that suggestion. Again,
whether a new federal or state law can be enforced during
the several years before a final ruling on the merits can
itself be an important national question. And this Court
has a responsibility to resolve major questions of national
importance. So a default policy of off-loading to lower
courts the final word on whether to green-light or block
major new laws for the several years until a final ruling on
the merits would amount to an abdication of this Court’s
proper role. Moreover, given the possibility that different
courts of appeals might reach different conclusions on
whether to enjoin the enforcement of a new law for the
several years pending final review, a deferential approach
could lead to substantial uncertainty and disuniformity
that become untenable in cases involving nationwide
government programs or national businesses.
I would therefore not adopt a default position where the
Court always (or almost always) denies emergency
applications involving new laws. Rather, the Court needs
some way to evaluate when to grant relief. And one of the
traditional, tried-and-true factors has been likelihood of
success on the merits.
Second, one might reasonably think that this Court,
when dealing with an emergency application, should simply
try to “preserve the status quo.” Sounds attractive in
theory. But in practice, difficulties emerge when trying to
define the status quo. Is the status quo the situation on the
ground before enactment of the new law? Or is the status
quo the situation after enactment of the new law, but before
6 LABRADOR v. POE

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

any judicial injunction? Or is the status quo the situation
after any district court ruling on a preliminary injunction?
Or is the status quo the situation after a court of appeals
ruling on a stay or injunction?
There is no good blanket answer to the question of what
the status quo is. Each conception of the status quo is
defensible, but there is no sound or principled reason to pick
one over another as a rule to apply in all cases involving
new laws.
And even if we could settle on one definition of the status
quo, applying that one definition consistently across the
range of emergency applications would lead to very
troubling results. Suppose, for example, that the status quo
is defined to mean the status before enactment of the new
law. If courts applied that rule across the board, some
plainly constitutional and democratically enacted laws
would effectively be blocked for several years pending the
final decision on the merits. Or suppose instead that the
status quo is defined as the status after the new law is in
place. In that case, some plainly unconstitutional or
otherwise illegal laws would nonetheless remain in effect
and be enforced against individuals and businesses for
several years pending the final decision on the merits.
I doubt that anyone would tolerate such an inequitable
and scattershot approach. So even if we could define the
status quo in theory in a principled way across all cases, a
blanket rule of “preserving the status quo” in application
would not be suitable for this Court’s emergency docket.
That is yet another reason why the Court throughout its
history has relied on likelihood of success on the merits as
an essential factor in determining when to grant emergency
relief in individual cases.
Third, JUSTICE BARRETT has emphasized that the Court
can and should take care to focus on certworthiness when
considering emergency applications. Does 1–3 v. Mills, 595
U. S. ___ (2021) (BARRETT, J., concurring in denial of
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 7

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

application for injunctive relief ). If the underlying merits
issue would not warrant this Court’s review when the case
returned to the Court on the merits docket, then we should
deny the application and leave the question of interim relief
to the court of appeals. I fully agree with JUSTICE
BARRETT’s important insight. Emphasizing certworthiness
as a threshold consideration helps to prevent parties from
using “the emergency docket to force the Court to give a
merits preview in cases that it would be unlikely to take.”
Id., at ___ (slip op., at 1).
Of course, the certworthiness factor is, by definition, only
a partial cure for the issue here: Although emphasizing
that factor reduces the number of emergency applications
involving new laws where we have to assess the merits,
some of the most significant and difficult emergency
applications will readily clear the certworthiness bar. And
in those cases, we may still have to assess likelihood of
success on the merits.
Fourth, some suggest that the Court should prohibit so-
called nationwide and statewide injunctions—injunctions
that prevent enforcement of a law against persons other
than the plaintiffs. The theory is that eliminating
nationwide and statewide injunctions by district courts will
in turn reduce the number of emergency applications
involving new laws that make it to this Court, or at least
reduce the number of applications where this Court needs
to assess the merits.
As I see it, prohibiting nationwide or statewide
injunctions may turn out to be the right rule as a matter of
law regardless of its impact on this Court’s emergency
docket. See ante, at 4–5, 13 (GORSUCH, J., concurring in
grant of stay). More to the point for present purposes, I
agree that such a rule could somewhat reduce the number
of emergency applications that make it to this Court and
require the Court to assess the merits.
To begin with, the government party might not seek
8 LABRADOR v. POE

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

immediate appellate (or Supreme Court) review of a
preliminary injunction that is confined to one or a few
individual parties. And an emergency application to this
Court where the issue concerns only a few individual
parties may not clear the certworthiness bar.3
That said, a rule prohibiting nationwide or statewide
injunctions would not eliminate the need for this Court to
assess the merits of some emergency applications involving
new laws. For one, there is ongoing debate about whether
any such rule would apply to Administrative Procedure Act
cases involving new federal regulations, given the text of
the APA. See Griffin v. HM Florida-ORL, LLC, 601 U. S.
___, ___, n. 1 (2023) (statement of KAVANAUGH, J.,
respecting denial of application for stay) (slip op., at 3, n. 1);
5 U. S. C. §706(2). But put that caveat aside for now.
Even if a district court enjoins a new federal statute or
state law only as to the particular plaintiffs, that injunction
could still have widespread effect. For example, the
plaintiff might be a State, or the plaintiff might be an
association that has many members, or the plaintiffs might
file a class action for classwide injunctive relief under Rule
23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. So even if
district court injunctions are confined to the plaintiffs,
there still will be emergency applications with nationally
important effects that come to this Court and clear the
certworthiness bar, thereby still requiring this Court to
assess the merits.
Moreover, the effects of a rule prohibiting nationwide or
statewide injunctions on this Court’s emergency docket can
be diminished by vertical stare decisis. The general
discussion of the scope of district court injunctions often
overlooks the important role of the court of appeals. Even

——————
3 The scope of the injunction may affect evaluation not only of

certworthiness but also of the harms to the government defendant and
other affected parties.
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 9

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

when district court injunctions are limited to the plaintiffs,
the losing party in the district court’s preliminary
injunction proceeding may promptly seek an injunction or
stay in the court of appeals. And any ensuing decision by
the court of appeals to grant or deny injunctive relief could
then have precedential effect—formally, when there is a
precedential opinion, or perhaps informally, when there is
not—on other district courts in that circuit when other
parties seek similar injunctive relief. After all, with any
consequential new law, many different parties may seek
preliminary injunctions in separate proceedings in the
district courts within a circuit.
As a result, the ruling by the court of appeals on an
emergency application for a stay or injunction in a discrete
case (or cases) can often determine whether the new law
continues to be enforced across the entire circuit. And in
those circumstances, the losing party in the court of appeals
may seek relief in this Court and point out that the court of
appeals decision may have broader circuitwide impact—
and is therefore different from just a single district court
ruling involving a few plaintiffs. Put simply, when a court
of appeals ruling on an emergency stay or injunction could
affect enforcement of a significant new law throughout the
circuit, that broader impact may sometimes make the case
significant enough to clear the certworthiness bar in this
Court.
With any consequential new federal law, moreover, it is
likely that different parties will seek preliminary
injunctions in multiple circuits. And what happens if
different courts of appeals reach different results? For
example, what if a major new federal law regulating social
media companies, or immigration, or energy producers, or
healthcare, or securities markets is enforceable in one
circuit but not in another for the several years pending final
review on the merits? That disuniformity could often be
highly problematic. Again, an emergency application to
10 LABRADOR v. POE

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

this Court in those circumstances could clear the
certworthiness bar, meaning that we may still have to
consider likelihood of success when deciding it.
In short, a rule limiting the scope of district court
injunctions may be correct as a matter of law, even apart
from its effects on this Court’s emergency docket. And the
result of a rule against nationwide or statewide injunctions
may be to somewhat reduce the number of emergency
applications involving new laws where this Court must
assess likelihood of success on the merits. But that rule
would not eliminate the need for this Court to sometimes
decide important emergency applications involving new
laws by assessing likelihood of success on the merits.4
II
As the discussion so far has sought to illustrate, this
Court cannot avoid evaluation of the merits in at least some
emergency applications involving consequential new laws.
If I am correct about that basic reality, another important
question concerns this Court’s processes. What process
should this Court employ for assessing likelihood of success
on the merits with respect to an emergency application,
particularly in cases involving important new federal or
state laws? Given the extraordinary significance of the
question whether a consequential new law can be enforced
during the several years while merits litigation is ongoing,
the Court should use as many tools as feasible and
appropriate to make the most informed and best decision.
Sometimes that might mean taking more time (if available),
ordering supplemental briefing, or inviting amicus briefs.
In certain circumstances, moreover, the Court might
benefit from oral argument or may even grant certiorari
before judgment.
——————
4 Here, the State’s application seeks a stay primarily because of the

scope of the injunction. That issue is itself certworthy, and I believe that
the State has a likelihood of success on that issue.
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 11

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

Especially in recent years, the Court has employed many
of those tools to help the Court better decide important
emergency applications. See, e.g., Biden v. Nebraska, 600
U. S. 477 (2023) (Court granted certiorari before judgment
and expedited oral argument after receiving emergency
application involving federal student loan forgiveness
program); National Federation of Independent Business v.
OSHA, 595 U. S. 109 (2022) (per curiam) (Court granted
expedited oral argument after receiving emergency
application involving OSHA vaccine mandate); Biden v.
Missouri, 595 U. S. 87 (2022) (per curiam) (same, for
emergency application involving CMS vaccine mandate).
And I believe that the Court should continue to be flexible
in employing appropriate procedures so as to best decide
important emergency applications.
A related question is whether the Court should issue
opinions—that is, opinions for the Court as distinct from
separate concurring or dissenting opinions—to publicly
explain our grounds for granting or denying an emergency
application involving an important new law. Opinions for
the Court can sometimes be appropriate in order to explain
our reasoning, as in the vaccine mandate cases, for
example. See ibid.5 That said, an opinion for the Court
addressing likelihood of success on the merits for an
emergency application can sometimes come at a cost. A
written opinion by this Court assessing likelihood of success
on the merits at a preliminary stage can create a lock-in
effect because of the opinion’s potential vertical

——————
5 During the COVID–19 pandemic, the Court sometimes found it

important to issue opinions on COVID–19-related legal questions, in part
because of the widespread assumption that the pandemic would largely
be over before any final ruling on the merits in the court system.
Therefore, the emergency docket during the COVID–19 pandemic in
essence was the merits docket as to certain COVID–19-related issues.
Not surprisingly, this Court’s emergency docket, while still robust, has
shrunk in the years since COVID–19.
12 LABRADOR v. POE

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

precedential effect (de jure or de facto), which can thereby
predetermine the case’s outcome in the proceedings in the
lower courts and hamper percolation across other lower
courts on the underlying merits question. (Of course, that
can happen to a lesser degree even when the Court simply
issues a bare-bones order granting or denying relief.) So in
my view, issuing opinions for the Court with respect to
emergency applications may sometimes be appropriate, but
we should exercise appropriate caution before doing so.
* * *
Although the volume of cases challenging new laws and
coming to this Court on the emergency docket is a relatively
recent development, this Court’s emergency docket—and
the difficulties associated with it—are not new. The
emergency docket has always existed, and both the Court
and even individual Justices acting in chambers have made
a plethora of important decisions for the Nation in an
emergency posture. See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 577
U. S. 1126 (2016) (temporarily enjoining Clean Power
Plan); Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1 (2006) (per curiam)
(vacating injunction pending appeal regarding state voter
ID law); Rubin v. United States, 524 U. S. 1301 (1998)
(Rehnquist, C. J., in chambers) (denying stay pending
certiorari of order enforcing subpoenas to Secret Service
agents regarding observations of the President);
Schlesinger v. Holtzman, 414 U. S. 1321 (1973) (Marshall,
J., in chambers) (staying District Court’s injunction that
ordered a halt to bombing in Cambodia); Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 584, 589 (1952) (after
expedited oral argument, affirming District Court’s
preliminary injunction that proscribed seizure of steel mills
by government); cf. Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U. S.
273, 283–285 (1953) (vacating stay of execution of the
Rosenbergs).
In my view, the Court can potentially reduce the number
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 13

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

of emergency applications involving new laws where the
Court has to assess likelihood of success on the merits. But
this Court is responsible for resolving questions of national
importance, even when they arise on the emergency docket.
Fulfilling that responsibility will sometimes require us to
assess likelihood of success on the merits in emergency
cases involving new laws, as the Court has in the past.
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 1

JACKSON, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 23A763
_________________

RAUL LABRADOR, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF IDAHO
v. PAM POE, BY AND THROUGH HER PARENTS AND NEXT
FRIENDS, PENNY AND PETER POE, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
[April 15, 2024]

JUSTICE JACKSON, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR joins,
dissenting from grant of stay.
When a party asks this Court to “sideste[p] the ordinary
judicial process” and intervene at an atypical juncture, our
default should be “restraint.” Barr v. East Bay Sanctuary
Covenant, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dis-
senting from grant of stay) (slip op., at 5). We do not have
to address every high-profile case percolating in lower
courts, and there are usually many good reasons not to do
so. Few applicants can meet our threshold requirement of
“an exceptional need for immediate relief,” by showing that
they will suffer not just substantial harm but an “irreversi-
ble injury . . . occurring during the appeals process that can-
not be later redressed.” Louisiana v. American Rivers, 596
U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (KAGAN, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 2).
Even when an applicant establishes that highly unusual
line-jumping justification, we still must weigh the serious
dangers of making consequential decisions “on a short fuse
without benefit of full briefing and oral argument.” Does 1–
3 v. Mills, 595 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (BARRETT, J., concurring
in denial of application for injunctive relief ) (slip op., at 1).
Without adequate caution, our decisions risk being not only
“unreasoned,” but unreasonable. Whole Woman’s Health v.
Jackson, 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (KAGAN, J., dissenting
from denial of application for injunctive relief ) (slip op., at
2 LABRADOR v. POE

JACKSON, J., dissenting

1–2).
This case presents numerous reasons for exercising re-
straint. As explained in Part I below, the State of Idaho’s
emergency application asks us to override the decisions of
two lower courts based on an issue not clearly implicated
and under circumstances where the State does not contest
that its law should remain enjoined as likely unconstitu-
tional, at least as applied to the plaintiffs. As described in
Part II, even if today’s application actually involved a “uni-
versal injunction,” the emergency docket would not be the
place to address the open and challenging questions that
that issue raises. I respectfully dissent.
I
Three interdependent reasons counsel against our inter-
vention. First of all, the applicant seeks displacement of
the decisions of both “the District Court and . . . a unani-
mous panel of the Court of Appeals.” Beame v. Friends of
the Earth, 434 U. S. 1310, 1312 (1977) (Marshall, J., in
chambers). A Federal District Court determined that a
never-before-in-effect Idaho law is likely unconstitutional,
and that court issued a preliminary injunction that tempo-
rarily blocks the law’s enforcement while it considers the
merits of the challengers’ legal claims. Wishing to enforce
the challenged law during the course of the litigation, the
State asked for a stay pending appeal. But both the District
Court and the Ninth Circuit denied that request. Our re-
spect for lower court judges—no less committed to fulfilling
their constitutional duties than we are and much more fa-
miliar with the particulars of the case—normally requires
an applicant seeking an emergency stay from this Court af-
ter two prior denials to carry “an especially heavy burden.”
See Edwards v. Hope Medical Group for Women, 512 U. S.
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 3

JACKSON, J., dissenting

1301, 1302 (1994) (Scalia, J., in chambers) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).1
Second, the State has not come close to carrying its heavy
burden in this case. No party disputes that, assuming all
of the other stay factors were met, Idaho needs to show “a
reasonable probability that this Court will grant certiorari”
in order to obtain an emergency stay. Maryland v. King,
567 U. S. 1301, 1302 (2012) (ROBERTS, C. J., in chambers)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Emergency Ap-
plication for Stay 29–32; Response in Opposition 19–24; Re-
ply Brief 14–15.2 Idaho maintains that this case is certwor-
thy because it raises the question of whether a district court
can issue an injunction that grants relief directed to all po-
tentially impacted nonparties—a so-called “universal in-
junction.” The only problem: That’s not what the District
Court did here. Far from attempting to grant relief to par-
ties not before it, the District Court expressly stated that,
——————
1 The concurrence seems perplexed by the idea that lower court deci-

sions about interim relief deserve our respect. See ante, at 6–7 (opinion
of GORSUCH, J.) (hereinafter concurrence). In its telling, that “upside-
down” suggestion leaves this Court either powerless to correct mistakes
or hopelessly inconsistent when we do. Ante, at 6. But to say that a party
bears an especially heavy burden is not to say that burden can never be
carried. See Little v. Reclaim Idaho, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (ROBERTS,
C. J., joined by, inter alios, GORSUCH, J., concurring in grant of stay) (slip
op., at 5) (“No one has overlooked that the State bears an ‘especially
heavy burden’ in justifying a stay pending its appeal to the Ninth Cir-
cuit[,] . . . [b]ut in my view that burden has been met”). Even when two
lower courts deny relief, an applicant can still prevail in this Court under
our traditional emergency stay factors. The heavier burden, though, has
long served as a sobering reminder that, after two prior levels of review,
interim relief has consistently been deemed unwarranted.
2 While the concurrence appears to attribute the certworthiness con-

sideration to this dissent, see ante, at 7–8, it is standard practice for this
Court to assess certworthiness when evaluating an emergency applica-
tion. See, e.g., Does 1–3 v. Mills, 595 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (BARRETT, J.,
concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief ) (slip op., at 1);
Little, 591 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U. S.
183, 190 (2010) (per curiam).
4 LABRADOR v. POE

JACKSON, J., dissenting

“[i]n the absence of class certification, injunctive relief gen-
erally should be limited to the named plaintiffs.” ___
F. Supp. 3d ___, ___ (Idaho 2023), App. A to Application for
Stay 52. Then, ultimately, the District Court settled on is-
suing a statewide preliminary injunction for a party-cen-
tered, fact-specific reason: because it found that doing so
was necessary to protect the particular plaintiffs before the
court, including two minors proceeding under pseudonyms,
against action by the State it deemed likely unconstitu-
tional. Id., at 53. Any error by the District Court as to the
necessity of the preliminary relief it has chosen raises, at
best, a factbound question, not a certworthy issue.3
Third, and finally, Idaho seeks emergency relief without
contesting that its law should be preliminarily enjoined as
likely unconstitutional, at least as applied to the plaintiffs
before the District Court. See ante, at 2–3 (opinion of
GORSUCH, J.). The State takes this litigating position while
defending a statute that regulates access to gender-affirm-
ing medical care for transgender children. That is a serious
and consequential matter, which, indeed, raises the profile
of this case and the stakes of our intervention, for the law
at issue here will have a significant practical impact on eve-
ryone it affects. The constitutional questions around this
law are significant as well because statutes like this one
raise new and complex issues. Unlike in myriad other
emergency cases, however, the State is not seeking interim
——————
3 The concurrence all but ignores this key aspect of the District Court’s

decision. See ante, at 1–3. But even the most ardent critics of “universal
injunctions” acknowledge that, in providing relief to the parties before a
court, an injunction may incidentally benefit nonparties. See, e.g.,
United States v. Texas, 599 U. S. 670, 693 (2023) (GORSUCH, J., concur-
ring in judgment); Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. 667, 717 (2018) (THOMAS,
J., concurring). We might ultimately disagree in this case about whether
the District Court’s determination about the necessary scope of relief to
protect the plaintiffs qualifies as an abuse of discretion. See ante, at 8,
n. 2. But any such debate would not transform the State’s case-specific,
fact-intensive request for error correction into a certworthy issue.
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 5

JACKSON, J., dissenting

relief based on any errors by the lower courts with respect
to consequential merits questions. Contra, ante, at 8–9.
Instead, in a troubling bid for this Court’s early interven-
tion, the State asks us to wade into the middle of ongoing
lower court proceedings to weigh in on a single query con-
cerning only one aspect of a preliminary determination by
the District Court: whether the temporary relief that the
District Court has afforded pending its review of the merits
sweeps too broadly. In my view, we should resist being con-
scripted into service when our involvement amounts to mi-
cromanaging the lower courts’ exercise of their discretion-
ary authority in the midst of active litigation. This Court is
not compelled to rise and respond every time an applicant
rushes to us with an alleged emergency, and it is especially
important for us to refrain from doing so in novel, highly
charged, and unsettled circumstances. Here, where the
State does not even seek relief from the District Court’s de-
termination that the law is likely unconstitutional as to at
least some of the individuals it will impact, caution is espe-
cially warranted.
II
JUSTICE GORSUCH’s concurrence demonstrates the perils
of treating this application any other way. Conspicuously
minimized in that opinion is the word that appears, bolded
and capitalized, on the cover of the State’s application:
“EMERGENCY.” The concurrence proceeds, instead, to
treat the State’s application as a run-of-the-mill motion for
interim relief, just as any court might dispose of such a mo-
tion on its regular docket. See ante, at 3. From the stand-
point of an interest in taming our emergency docket, that is
folly.4

——————
4 This is not to say that the traditional stay factors do not matter, or

that this Court can only entertain an application that is labeled as an
“emergency.” See ante, at 9–10, n. 3. Rather, my point is that not every
6 LABRADOR v. POE

JACKSON, J., dissenting

What is more, in resolving this particular application, the
concurrence reaches out to address an unsettled remedial
issue that, by the concurrence’s own assessment, is of pro-
found significance for the functioning of our government.
See ante, at 11. It appears, then, that if the concurrence is
right that “universal injunctions . . . ‘tend to force judges
into making rushed, high-stakes, low-information deci-
sions,’ ” the majority has taken the bait. Ante, at 12.
To be clear, though, the Court has not decided the propri-
ety of “universal injunctions.” Whether federal courts have
the power to issue “universal injunctions” is “an important
question that could warrant our review in the future,” not
a foregone conclusion dictated by our precedent. Griffin v.
HM Florida-ORL, LLC, 601 U. S. ___, ___ (2023)
(KAVANAUGH, J., statement respecting denial of application
for stay) (slip op., at 3); see also, e.g., Department of Home-
land Security v. New York, 589 U. S. ___, ___ (2020)
(GORSUCH, J., concurring in grant of stay) (slip op., at 5)
(framing “underlying equitable and constitutional ques-
tions raised by . . . nationwide injunctions” as ones “we
might at an appropriate juncture take up”). After today,
that question remains.
Nor does history offer an easily discernible answer. As
one leading scholar candidly admits, “traditional equity
lacked the sharply defined rule” that the concurrence would
claim the Court adopted today. S. Bray, Multiple Chancel-
lors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 Harv. L. Rev.
417, 421 (2017). And other leading scholars are actively de-
bating what lessons can be gleaned from the historical rec-
ord. See A. Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93
N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1065, 1080–1090 (2018) (offering an ac-
count of “universal injunctions” consistent with Article III

——————
alleged error made by a lower court judge warrants this Court’s immedi-
ate intervention and correction in real time, while the lower court’s pro-
ceedings are pending.
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 7

JACKSON, J., dissenting

and American courts’ traditional equitable powers); see also
M. Sohoni, The Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction,
133 Harv. L. Rev. 920, 1008 (2020) (expressing concern
that, in debate over the limits of federal courts’ equitable
powers, “we risk allowing selectively crafted conceptions of
historical tradition to run away with us”).
Simply put, the questions raised by “universal injunc-
tions” are contested and difficult. I would not attempt to
take them on in this emergency posture, even in a case that
actually raised the issue. We do not have full adversarial
briefing, the benefits of oral argument, or even a final opin-
ion from the Court of Appeals. To the extent we can draw
any lesson from the lower courts at this point, it is that,
“when faced with laws very much like Idaho’s,” determining
the appropriate bounds of equitable relief and the propriety
of “universal injunctions” is not straightforward. Ante, at 7
(citing Brandt v. Rutledge, 47 F. 4th 661, 672 (CA8 2022);
L. W. v. Skrmetti, 83 F. 4th 460, 489–490 (CA6 2023)).
* * *
All that said, I see some common ground. I agree that our
emergency docket seems to have become increasingly un-
workable. See ante, at 10. I share the concern that courts
heed the limits of their power. See ante, at 12. And surely
all could benefit from “more carefully reasoned judicial de-
cisions attuned to the facts, parties, and claims at hand,”
not to mention “a more . . . deliberative judicial process.”
Ante, at 12–13. With respect, though, I worry that we may
be too eager to find fault in everyone but ourselves.
This Court will almost certainly have a chance to consider
the entirety of this case soon, whoever prevails below. In
the meantime, it is far better for all concerned to let the
lower courts proceed unfettered by our intervention. We
can, and usually should, wait to provide our assessment in
the ordinary course—when it is our turn to do so. Put dif-
ferently, whenever this Court must determine whether to
8 LABRADOR v. POE

JACKSON, J., dissenting

exercise its discretionary power to intervene in pending
cases on an emergency basis, I firmly believe we must pro-
ceed with both reason and restraint. Because the majority
demonstrates neither today, I respectfully dissent.