IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-1886
Filed April 24, 2024
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JUSTICE LEE HILL,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Michael Motto, Judge.
A defendant challenges his convictions for animal abuse after pleading
guilty. APPEAL DISMISSED.
Audra F. Saunders, West Des Moines, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.
Justice Lee Hill pled guilty to two counts of animal abuse causing serious
injury or death. The district court accepted his plea and dismissed the remaining
counts. Hill appeals.
Hill contends that good cause exists for him to appeal because the statutory
restrictions placed on appeals are unconstitutional. He then challenges the factual
basis for the guilty plea and the court’s finding of good cause to extend the
speedy-trial deadline. Because we lack jurisdiction to hear this case, we must
dismiss.
In 2019, the Iowa legislature amended the Iowa Code to limit a defendant’s
ability to appeal as a matter of right. See 2019 Iowa Acts ch. 140, § 28 (codified
at Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2019) (eliminating the ability to appeal as a matter
of right following a guilty plea unless the defendant pled guilty to a class “A” felony
or established good cause to appeal)). Hill argues this amendment violates his
rights to due process and equal protection and the separation-of-powers doctrine
under the Constitutions of the State of Iowa and the United States. But the Iowa
Supreme Court has already addressed such challenges and determined the
amendment is constitutional. See State v. Tucker, 959 N.W.2d 140, 146
(Iowa 2021) (concluding section 814.6 does not violate due-process or
equal-protection rights); see also State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 104
(Iowa 2021) (finding the provisions “do not violate the separation-of-powers
doctrine” and similarly are “within the legislative department’s prerogative and not
in derogation of the judicial power” (quoting Tucker, 959 N.W.2d at 152–53)). “We
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are not at liberty to overturn” Iowa Supreme Court precedent. See Johnson v.
State, No. 15-1461, 2016 WL 3281044, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 15, 2016).
Good cause “means a ‘legally sufficient reason.’” Treptow, 960 N.W.2d
at 109 (citation omitted). “What constitutes a legally sufficient reason is context
specific.” Id. “[A] legally sufficient reason is a reason that would allow a court to
provide some relief.” Id. Here, Hill contends that his guilty plea is not supported
by a factual basis. When Hill pled guilty, he waived his right to file a motion in
arrest of judgment and he never filed such motion. As Hill never filed a motion in
arrest of judgment attacking the factual basis of his plea, we cannot provide relief.1
See id. Accordingly, there is no legally sufficient reason to permit Hill’s appeal,
and Hill has failed to establish good cause to appeal. See id.
Finally, his argument that the court should not have extended the
speedy-trial deadline is similarly waived for lack of good cause because we cannot
provide relief. See id. (noting “good cause” means a “legally sufficient reason”
which means “a reason that would allow a court to provide some relief”); State v.
Goddard, No. 18-0513, 2019 WL 476508, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2019)
(finding pleading guilty waives a speedy-trial challenge on appeal); State v. Hanes,
1 The requirement to file a motion in arrest of judgment is waived when the
defendant is not adequately informed of the consequences of failing to file such
motion. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d at 109. As Hill was adequately informed of the
consequences of filing a motion in arrest of judgment in paragraph ten of his guilty
plea, this exception does not apply here.
Previously, a defendant could avoid the requirement to file a motion in arrest
of judgment when the failure to do so was the result of ineffective assistance of
counsel. However, Iowa Code section 814.7 (2023) prevents us from considering
ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal. As our supreme court has held
section 814.7 does not violate the constitution as Hill suggests, the ineffective-
assistance exception to the motion-in-arrest-of-judgment requirement “no longer
provides an avenue for relief on direct appeal.” Id.
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981 N.W.2d 454, 461 (Iowa 2022) (“A guilty plea waives all defenses and
challenges not intrinsic to the voluntariness of the plea” (quoting Tucker, 959
N.W.2d at 146)).
In an attempt to save his appeal, Hill asks us to grant discretionary review
instead of hearing this case as an appeal as a matter of right. The only ground for
discretionary review Hill cites is Iowa Code section 814.6(2)(e), which permits us
to grant discretionary review when the appeal raises “a question of law important
to the judiciary and the profession.” In its brief, the State responds that granting
review of unpreserved claims under this section would “contravene the clear intent”
of the 2019 legislative amendments, which require a timely motion in arrest of
judgment before discretionary review is granted. See Iowa Code § 814.6(2)(f).
We therefore exercise our discretion to deny the application for discretionary
review. See, e.g., State v. Walker, No. 23-0021, 2023 WL 7391802, at *2 (Iowa
Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2023); State v. Richardson, No. 22-2041, 2023 WL 7391802,
at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2023).
Because no good cause exists to hear Hill’s appeal and we decline to grant
discretionary review, we lack jurisdiction and must dismiss.
APPEAL DISMISSED.