Legal Research AI

Acevedo-Feliciano v. Ruiz-Hernandez

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Date filed: 2006-05-11
Citations: 447 F.3d 115
Copy Citations
12 Citing Cases
Combined Opinion
          United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 04-1154

               ENRIQUE ACEVEDO-FELICIANO, ET AL.,

                     Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                               v.

                MIGUEL A. RUIZ-HERNÁNDEZ, ET AL.,

                     Defendants, Appellees.




          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

       [Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]


                             Before

                      Boudin, Chief Judge,
                Selya and Lynch, Circuit Judges.


     Claudio Aliff Ortiz, with whom Pablo Landrau Pirazzi and
Aldarondo & López Bras were on brief, for appellants.
     Jorge Martínez-Luciano, with whom Gina Ismalia Gutiérrez-
Galang, Law Offices Pedro Ortiz Alvarez, Alfredo Acevedo-Cruz,
and Civil Rights Legal Task Force were on brief, for appellees.



                          May 11, 2006
            LYNCH, Circuit Judge.           Plaintiffs and appellants are

twenty-two   former     temporary   employees       of    the    Municipality      of

Aguada, Puerto Rico.      Each held a contract stating that the term of

employment was effective through June 30, 2001, but also stating

that the employment was "by way" of a particular financial grant (a

"Law 52" grant, explained further below) that the Municipality had

received from the Commonwealth.             Funding under that grant was

exhausted on December 31, 2000, and the Municipality, under a new

Mayor, terminated plaintiffs' contracts one month later on the

basis of lack of Law 52 funding.

            Plaintiffs sued the Municipality and individual municipal

officers (in their official and personal capacities) under 28

U.S.C. § 1983 on two federal claims and related state claims.                    They

alleged    that   the   termination    of    their       contracts      before    the

expiration dates, without a pretermination hearing, violated their

procedural due process rights under the U. S. Constitution.                      They

also alleged that their contracts were terminated because they

belonged to a different political party, the New Progressive Party

(NPP), than the newly elected Popular Democratic Party (PDP) mayor

of   the   Municipality     in   violation     of    the        First   Amendment.

Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, back pay,

front pay, economic and punitive damages, pre- and post-judgment

interest, and other relief.




                                      -2-
          At trial on June 16, 2003, after the close of plaintiffs'

evidence, the district court granted judgment under Rule 50, Fed.

R. Civ. P., for defendants on the procedural due process claim.

The court held that the plaintiffs had no property interest in

further employment inasmuch as the program in which they were

employed depended upon receipt of the Law 52 funding from the

Commonwealth which had expired on December 31, 2000.       The jury

considered the First Amendment claim and returned a verdict for

defendants.

          On appeal, the plaintiffs challenge both the Rule 50

procedural due process ruling and the denial of a motion for

mistrial based on a nearly three-month delay in the middle of the

trial proceedings.   They do not challenge the jury verdict.   As to

the denial of the motion for mistrial, we find no abuse of

discretion and affirm.    As to the procedural due process claim,

however, we vacate and remand for further consideration.

                                I.

          The Commonwealth established the Law 52 program more than

twenty-five years ago.   Under the program, see P.R. Laws Ann. tit.

29, § 711c, Puerto Rico "subsidize[s] locally managed programs to

ameliorate unemployment." Gomez v. Rivera Rodriguez, 344 F.3d 103,

107 (1st Cir. 2003).     Municipalities do not have an automatic

entitlement to Law 52 grants: a municipality must submit a proposal

describing how it will use the money; such proposals must be


                                -3-
approved by the Commonwealth's Department of Labor and Human

Resources (DLHR).     Id.    Once a grant is approved, the Commonwealth

and the municipality sign a contract specifying how much money the

municipality will receive, over what term, and how many jobs it

will   subsidize.      The    various     Law    52   contracts     between    the

Municipality of Aguada and the DLHR contained standard clauses

stating that the Municipality "commit[ted] itself to create" the

number of jobs specified, and that "[u]nder no circumstances will

it be construed that people hired [by virtue of the Law 52

contract] are or act as employees of the [DLHR]."

           On July 1, 2000, a new Law 52 agreement ("the Law 52

contract") between the Municipality and the DLHR took effect.

Under the contract's provisions, the DLHR awarded the Municipality

$295,908   to   pay   the    salaries    and    benefits   of    the    forty-five

employees through December 31, 2000.            The Law 52 contract required

the Municipality to keep the Law 52 funds separate from other

municipal funds.

           The plaintiffs are among the forty-five workers hired by

the Municipality in connection with this Law 52 grant.                    Between

June 20 and September 1, 2000, each of the plaintiffs received

letters ("the hiring letters") signed by then-Mayor Julio César

Román,   appointing    them    to   various      municipal      jobs,   including

carpentry and labor positions. The stated starting dates for these




                                        -4-
jobs       ranged   from    July   1   to   September   6,   2000.   The   stated

termination date for each job was the same: June 30, 2001.

               Mayor Román was a member of the NPP, as is each of the

plaintiffs.         It is noteworthy that the Mayor's letter used an

employment date for the plaintiffs through June 2001, despite the

fact the Law 52 funding lasted only through December 2000, and that

he did so in the face of an upcoming municipal election in which

control of the municipal government might switch to the opposing

political party.           Defendants rely on this to argue that the Mayor

acted ultra vires in using a termination date of June 30.

               The hiring letters signed by Mayor Román varied only

slightly in their terms.           A typical letter, such as the one sent to

plaintiff José Méndez Valle, stated:

               Allow me by these means [to] appoint you to
               hold the post of Laborer by way of the Labor
               Department   Proposal1 for   this  Municipal
               Administration.

               The same shall be effective September 6, 2000
               until June 30, 2001. You shall earn a monthly
               salary of $837.00.

               As of the autumn of 2000, then, the twenty-two plaintiffs

were all employed by the Municipality and receiving salaries paid

out of Law 52 funds.          On November 7, 2000, elections were held in

Aguada, and a new mayor, defendant Miguel Ruiz-Hernández of the



       1
       It is clear that "the Labor Department Proposal" is a
reference to the Municipality's request for Law 52 funding from the
DLHR.

                                            -5-
PDP, was elected.   The twenty-two plaintiffs had supported the new

Mayor's opponent in the mayoral race.2

           Mayor Ruiz-Hernández was sworn into office on January 9,

2001.    By this time, the funding provided by the Law 52 contract

had expired.    The Municipality nonetheless continued plaintiffs'

employment through the month of January, paying their salaries out

of municipal funds.   On January 31, however, Mayor Ruiz-Hernández

sent letters to the plaintiffs ("the firing letters") informing

them that the Law 52 funds had expired a month earlier and that

their jobs were therefore being terminated.      A typical firing

letter, this one addressed to plaintiff Edwin Acevedo Acevedo, read

as follows:

           I hereby inform you that your work contract
           through the Proposal of the Department of
           Labor and Human Resources (Law 52) expired on
           December    31,   2000.       The    previous
           administration failed in not informing you
           that your contract expired and that your
           functions ceased on the aforementioned date.

           We do not have the funds that the Department
           of Labor and Human Resources provided for
           these contracts.    That is why we have to
           dispense with your services.   We regret the
           inconveniences this may cause you.

All of the plaintiffs' jobs were terminated on January 31; none of

the plaintiffs were granted a pre-termination hearing, although




     2
       The opponent was not Mayor Román; he had not run for
reelection.

                                -6-
each had notice (via the firing letters) that the stated reason for

termination was the expiration of Law 52 funding.

            On February 12, 2001, less than two weeks later, the

Municipality and the DLHR entered into a new Law 52 contract, which

provided funding for forty positions from February 16 through June

30, 2001.      None of the plaintiffs were offered any of the jobs

created by these funds, despite the fact that defendant Glenda

Peña-Muñoz, the new municipal human resources director appointed by

Mayor Ruiz-Hernández, had promised them they would be recalled when

new Law 52 funds were procured.

            The plaintiffs filed suit on April 12, 2001, against the

Municipality, Mayor Ruiz-Hernández, and Human Resources Director

Peña-Muñoz.3    In response to plaintiffs' political discrimination

claim, defendants countered that the terminations had nothing to do

with political animus, but were instead inevitable and proper given

the cessation of Law 52 funding.         And as to the procedural due

process claim, defendants argued that Mayor Román had had no

authority to offer the plaintiffs contracts that outlasted the Law

52   funding;   thus   the   contracts   were   void   as   to   a   June   30




      3
       Plaintiffs also sued municipal Director of Public Works
Aníbal Mendoza, but the district court dismissed Mendoza from the
case prior to the verdict, and plaintiffs do not appeal as to him.
The defendants filed a third-party complaint against former Mayor
Román; this complaint likewise was dismissed by the district court,
and Mayor Román is not a party on appeal.

                                   -7-
termination date, and no pre-termination hearing was required under

the Due Process Clause.4

           Jury    trial       began    on    March   19,   2003.      On   April   4,

plaintiffs rested.           Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of

law   pursuant    to    Fed.    R.     Civ.   P.   50(a)    as   to   the   political

discrimination and procedural due process claims.                       On June 16,

2003, during an extended hiatus in the trial (discussed further

below), the district court entered judgment for the defendants on

the   procedural       due    process    claim     but     allowed    the   political

discrimination claim to proceed.                Trial resumed on July 1 on the

plaintiffs' remaining claims and the jury rejected the political

discrimination claim on July 18.5


      4
      Defendants also argued, in the district court and on appeal,
that some of the Municipality's Law 52 employees had not just a
hiring letter in their personnel files, but also a second letter
from Mayor Román, identical to the first except for the fact that
it stated a term of employment through December 31, 2000.
Defendants imply that Mayor Román knew he had to shorten
plaintiffs' terms of employment, that he took steps to do so, but
that he reversed course after his party lost the election, either
by removing the second letter from the plaintiffs' files or by
inserting a third letter with identical terms to the first.
Defendants point to a smattering of evidence in the record that
lends support to this idea. The district court did not mention
this evidence in granting judgment on the due process claims.
      5
       As to the negligence issue, the jury found for the
plaintiffs only against the Municipality itself, not defendants
Mayor Ruiz-Hernández and Peña-Muñoz.     On August 12, 2003, the
Municipality moved for post-trial judgment as a matter of law
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). It argued that since plaintiffs
had centered their negligence claim on the actions of Mayor Ruiz-
Hernández and Peña-Muñoz, and since the jury had found both not
liable, the Municipality itself could not be liable either. In a
December 19, 2003 order, the district court agreed and entered

                                          -8-
                                 II.

A.        Denial of Mistrial Based on The Trial Delay

          Plaintiffs argue the district court erred in not granting

their motion for mistrial.

          On April 4, 2003, the day the plaintiffs rested, the

district court authorized the jury forewoman to take a previously

scheduled vacation from April 11 through April 27 and halted the

trial pending her return.      None of the parties objected to this

continuance, despite having had the chance to do so both on April

4 and at sidebar on April 2.

          On April 24, the district court announced a date for

resumption of the trial, noting that it had two additional trials

scheduled for May and that another juror had told the court he

would be away from May 30 to June 22.    The district court decided

that the trial would not reconvene until June 23.      Again, there

were no objections.

          On June 17, after the trial had already been on hold for

two-and-a-half months and only a week before it was to resume,

plaintiffs raised their first objection to the delay, moving for a




judgment for the Municipality.     The plaintiffs have not appealed
from this ruling.

                                 -9-
mistrial.6     The district court rejected the motion three days

later.     In a June 26 explanatory order, the court stated that

             calendar exigencies and the unopposed absence
             of two jurors in this case were the only
             reasons for the interruption . . . .       The
             adjournment    was   compelled    under    the
             circumstances since the Court could neither
             vacate the trial settings in the other cases
             nor did the plaintiffs in this case oppose the
             absence of the two jurors who took annual
             leave.

             Review of denial of a motion for mistrial is for abuse of

discretion.     Rodriguez-Torres v. Caribbean Forms Mfr., Inc., 399

F.3d 52, 62 (1st Cir. 2005).          We will not reverse if there is no

showing of prejudice.        See, e.g., Ferrara & DiMercurio v. St. Paul

Mercury Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2001); Clemente v.

Carnicon-P.R. Mgmt. Assocs., 52 F.3d 383, 388 (1st Cir. 1995)

(finding no abuse of discretion in part because appellant did not

"demonstrate[] actual prejudice"). Plaintiffs argue that prejudice

may   be   presumed   from    a   protracted   delay   after   the   close   of

plaintiffs' evidence. They cite supporting case law to this effect

from other courts.     See Young & Simon, Inc. v. Merritt Sav. & Loan,

Inc., 672 F.2d 401 (4th Cir. 1982); Citron v. Aro Corp., 377 F.2d

750 (3d Cir. 1967).     But whether prejudice may be presumed or not

is not the point.




      6
       The belated objection came a day after the district court
granted judgment in favor of the defendants as to the due process
claims.

                                      -10-
              More important here is that plaintiffs did not offer any

objection when consulted about the time off requested by the two

jurors.   As the district court pointed out in denying the mistrial

request, plaintiffs had multiple opportunities to object to the

initial three-week hiatus, and they did not do so.                     To the

contrary, they explicitly told the district court they had no

objection.      Plaintiffs argue that their lack of objection "may"

have stemmed from their concern "that the vacationing juror . . .

could have become indisposed with plaintiffs for ruining her

leisure time."       If that were so, then plaintiffs made a tactical

choice with which they must live.            It may not be so: the record

makes clear that the district court offered plaintiffs the chance

to   object    at   sidebar,   out   of   the   jury's   presence,   and   they

declined.      This was still a tactical choice.           As to the second

portion of the continuance, the plaintiffs did not object until

June 17, one week before trial was scheduled to resume.

              Plaintiffs did too little, too late.          See Clemente, 52

F.3d at 388 (refusing to find an abuse of discretion in the

district court's denial of a mistrial where appellant had not

"preserved her rights"); id. at 388 n.5 (noting that "the time to

complain . . . is at the outset" and that "plaintiff did not make

a peep" when the district court took the action which plaintiff

later said warranted a mistrial).          The cases plaintiffs rely on do

not help them in the face of their failure to object.            See Young &


                                      -11-
Simon, 672 F.2d at 402 n.2 (ordering a new trial and repeatedly

emphasizing that "counsel timely and persistently objected to the

[delay] when it was proposed, when it occurred, and after the trial

ended"); Citron, 377 F.2d at 753 (ordering a new trial despite a

lack of objection to the delay, but emphasizing that the trial

judge had told counsel that he was not going to cancel a planned

trip "for this case or any other case," thus making clear in

advance that objection would be futile).     The district court did

not abuse its discretion.

B.          Rule 50 Motion Re: Procedural Due Process

            The district court's grant of defendants' Rule 50(a)

motion as to the procedural due process claim is subject to de novo

review.    Burton v. Town of Littleton, 426 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir.

2005).    "We review the evidence, taking all inferences in favor of

[plaintiffs], and ask whether a reasonable jury could have found

defendants liable based on the evidence presented."     Id.

            In a due process claim stemming from the termination of

employment, "a public employee must first demonstrate that he has

a reasonable expectation, arising out of a statute, policy, rule,

or contract, that he will continue to be employed."        Wojcik v.

Mass. State Lottery Comm'n, 300 F.3d 92, 101 (1st Cir. 2002).     We

determine whether such a property interest exists "by reference to

state law."    Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976).




                                -12-
          While state law may create property interests, it is a

separate question of federal law whether those interests rise to

the level of a legitimate claim of entitlement sufficient to

trigger procedural due process protections. See Memphis Light, Gas

& Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) ("Although the

underlying substantive interest is created by 'an independent

source such as state law,' federal constitutional law determines

whether an interest rises to the level of a 'legitimate claim of

entitlement' protected by the Due Process Clause." (quoting Bd. of

Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972))).

          If the employee has such a state property interest, and

that property interest rises to the level of a "legitimate claim of

entitlement," id., then the employer cannot dismiss the employee

without affording him due process of law.     See, e.g., Gomez v.

Rivera Rodriguez, 344 F.3d 103, 111 (1st Cir. 2003).   In the public

employment context, the required process typically includes "some

kind of hearing" and "some pretermination opportunity to respond."

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985).

          Under our case law a one-year contract of employment with

a Puerto Rico government body usually suffices to show a property

interest sufficient under Commonwealth law.    See, e.g., Caro v.

Aponte-Roque, 878 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1989). Plaintiffs here argue

that they had approximately one-year contracts of employment, that




                               -13-
those contracts had not yet expired, and therefore that defendants

were required to give them pre-termination hearings.

          The district court disagreed, finding that plaintiffs had

no property interest in their employment past December 31, 2000,

the day Law 52 funding expired.        As we understand the ruling, the

district court determined that either the Law 52 contract or

municipal law required that each plaintiff's hiring contract be

read to include the implicit condition that the term of employment

was conditioned on the Municipality's receipt of Law 52 funding.

          The district court's stated reasoning was as follows.

The former mayor, it held, "lacked authority under the Law 52

contract then in effect" between the Municipality and the DLHR to

extend the appointments beyond the term of funding specifically set

forth in the award under Law 52.        In response to the plaintiffs'

argument that the former mayor could have "extended" plaintiffs'

appointments and paid them using municipal funds, the district

court stated that it "need not delve into that possibility" because

"in making the appointments the former Mayor made sole and express

reference to the Law 52 'proposal' as the mechanism which made them

possible."    The court relied on the hiring letters and their

references   to   appointments   "by    way   of"   the   Law   52   funding

agreement.   The court concluded:

          [T]he former Mayor clearly acted ultra vires
          in making appointments to Law 52 posts for
          terms that exceeded the duration of the Law 52
          grant, and in so doing failed to extend

                                 -14-
                plaintiffs' property interest in continued
                employment in their positions beyond the term
                established in the Law 52 contract.

The court correctly referred to precedent to the effect that (1)

illegally obtained public employment confers no property interest

on the employee, see Rosario-Torres v. Hernandez-Colon, 889 F.2d

314, 319-20 (1st Cir. 1989) (en banc), and (2) written assurances

in    a    letter   of     engagement      are    insufficient    to   contravene      a

"comprehensive           network    of   statutory    and   regulatory      directives

governing the terms of . . . employment," Correa-Martinez v.

Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 54-55 (1st Cir. 1990), overruled

on    other     grounds     by     Educadores     Puertorriqueños      en   Accion    v.

Hernández, 367 F.3d 61, 64 (1st Cir. 2004).

                On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the due process interest

was       created   by    the    hiring    letters,    which    themselves     do    not

explicitly limit the terms of the appointments to the limits on Law

52 funding.         They say the Mayor had authority to enter into a

contract of a term of one year legally, without limits under Law

52, by providing additional funding from the municipal budget.

                We understand the district court to have ruled as a

matter of law that Law 52, by its terms, prohibits the extension of

Law 52-funded jobs using municipal funds.                       But the law itself

contains no such prohibition.                    Indeed, the law speaks only in

general terms: it states that funds disbursed thereunder shall be

used       to   promote,        inter    alia,    "employment    opportunities        in


                                           -15-
occupations with future possibilities," "jobs that are in demand in

the   present    market,"       and   "the    creation   of   high    productivity

employment opportunities."            P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 711c(b).        It

further states that "[s]aid moneys may also be used to maintain

existing jobs, extend their duration, modify compensation as [a]

transitory remedial measure in situations that may involve possible

job   loss,    when   it   is    deemed      justifiable   in   the   Secretary's

judgment."      Id. § 711c(c).           The statute does not support the

district court's conclusion.7

              Nothing in the terms of the Law 52 contract between the

Commonwealth and the Municipality adds such a prohibition.                  It is

true that the Law 52 contract was effective only "until December

31, 2000," that it listed the "number of months" per worker as six,

and that it required that the Law 52 funds be held in a separate

account and that no expenditures be made from that account beyond

the sum in the grant.             But none of these provisions forbids,

expressly or impliedly, the use of other funds to fill out a

contract as to which Law 52 funds had been exhausted.                  Indeed, the

seventh paragraph of Agreement provides:

              The incentive approved shall be applied to the
              salary and fringe benefit costs of the


      7
       Defendants cite Gomez v. Rivera Rodriguez, 344 F.3d 103, 107
(1st Cir. 2003), for the proposition that "Law 52 employment is
contingent upon Law 52 funding." Whether or not this is true, it
is not the question here. The question is whether a job that began
as Law 52 employment may be continued, using municipal funds, after
the Law 52 funding expires.

                                  -16-
          employments agreed upon in this contract. If
          the Municipality offers to the employees other
          benefits which are not part of this agreement,
          the   Municipality   assumes    responsibility
          therefore and pays them with its funds.

          Of considerable significance is that the Municipality

did, in fact, provide non-Law 52 money from municipal coffers to

fund the plaintiffs' contracts for one month, January 2001.      The

defendants explain this on the ground that they continued to pay

the plaintiffs only while they investigated whether the Law 52

funding had in fact been exhausted.      Perhaps a jury could so

conclude, but because municipal funds were used, it is difficult to

conclude as a matter of law that there was a prohibition on the use

of municipal funds to fund plaintiffs' employment through June 30.

The same is true for the rationale, used by the district court,

that the contract mentioned only Law 52 funding.           Given the

glancing nature of the reference in the hiring letters to Law 52

funding, that rationale is not dispositive.

          The district court's opinion also appears to say that

under municipal law, the Mayor was forbidden from creating jobs (or

extending the duration of jobs) unless he had secured, in advance,

all of the necessary funds.    It may be that under Puerto Rican

municipal law the Mayor was acting ultra vires, as the district

court found.   But at this stage we cannot resolve the question.

The district court did not explain why the Mayor's actions should

be deemed ultra vires.   While the Mayor could not expend more Law


                               -17-
52 monies than he had available, there is no explanation so far as

to why the Municipality was precluded from using other sources of

funds to meet the commitment to the plaintiffs.             The plaintiffs'

brief on appeal argues, in contrast, that the former mayor was

fully    empowered   to   use   municipal   funds   (even   those   not   yet

allocated) to extend the duration of jobs created by other means.

But it, too, has cited to no law that supports its conclusion.8

            Absent clarity on these issues of Puerto Rico municipal

law, the best course is to vacate the judgment and remand to the

district court.      Since a new trial on the procedural due process

issue may not be necessary -- for example, the legal questions may

be susceptible to resolution, in whole or in part, via summary

judgment -- we leave it to the district court to determine the




     8
        Plaintiffs argue that the mayor unquestionably had such
authority because under "basic principles of budgeting," he could
have taken note of the fact that the Municipality had received Law
52 grants for many years in a row and anticipated that the
Municipality would receive another such grant in 2001.       We are
unconvinced.    Defendants, for their part, argue that "[i]n the
absence of funds earmarked for the salaries of improperly appointed
Law 52 employees, the Municipality cannot pay for such expenses
unless it makes a readjustment based on a budgetary surplus." But
the law defendants cite for this proposition, P.R. Laws Ann. tit.
21, § 4309, does not support it. The provision merely states when
and under what circumstances a legislature may adjust a municipal
budget; it contains no other express limitations or proscriptions.
See id.

                                    -18-
nature of the proceedings to follow.9    See Rivera Alicea v. United

States, 404 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2005).

          We add a few points.    What we have been discussing is

whether Puerto Rican law supplies any sort of property interest

once the Law 52 funding ceased.

          That still leaves the question, assuming plaintiffs have

some property interest under Commonwealth law, of whether such

state property interests are among those which give rise to a

"legitimate claim to entitlement protected by the federal due

process clause" and whether existing state remedies are adequate.

See Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189, 195-96

(2001).

                               III.

          We affirm the denial of the mistrial motion.    We vacate

the judgment of the district court for defendants with respect to

the procedural due process claim and remand the case for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.    No costs are awarded.




     9
       We also note an admission in plaintiffs' brief: "Plaintiffs
submit . . . that, although clearly related, plaintiffs' employment
contracts' effectiveness was not contingent on the availability of
Law 52 funds. This is not to say that termination of those funds
would not have given rise to good cause to terminate the relevant
employment contracts."

                               -19-