United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 03-1645
ABRAHAM MOSES ASABA,
Petitioner,
v.
JOHN D. ASHCROFT,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER
OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Howard, Circuit Judges.
Allan M. Tow on brief for petitioner.
Barry J. Pettinato, Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, Civil Division, Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Division, and David V. Bernal, Assistant Director,
on brief for respondent.
July 23, 2004
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Abraham Moses Asaba
("Asaba") appeals the Board of Immigration Appeals's ("BIA") April
15, 2003 order denying his motion to reopen and rescind an in
absentia removal order entered by the Immigration Judge on May 21,
1999. We affirm.
I. Background
Asaba is a native and citizen of Uganda who entered the
United States on or about March 27, 1996 as a non-immigrant visitor
authorized to remain in the United States for six months. On June
5, 1997, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS")1
charged Asaba with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1), as a
non-immigrant who had remained in the United States for a time
longer than permitted. On January 28, 1998, Asaba, through his
counsel Michael Ozulumba ("Ozulumba"), admitted the factual
allegations against him and conceded removability. Asaba applied
for adjustment of status on the basis of his marriage to a United
States citizen whose relative visa petition was approved by the
INS. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i). A hearing was eventually set for May
21, 1999 at 2:00 p.m.
Asaba and his wife allegedly arrived at the Immigration
Court in Boston, Massachusetts, at noon on May 21, 1999 to meet
1
In March 2003, the relevant functions of the INS were
transferred into the new Department of Homeland Security and
reorganized into the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
("BICE"). For simplicity, we refer to the agency throughout this
opinion as the INS.
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Ozulumba and prepare for the hearing. They were unable to find
Ozulumba. At 12:30 p.m., they called Ozulumba's office, obtained
his cellular phone number, and called him. Ozulumba allegedly told
Asaba that he was ill and could not come to court. He told Asaba
to go home and that everything would be "okay." Asaba and his wife
then left the Immigration Court. At 2:04 p.m., Ozulumba went to
the clerk's office and filed a motion to continue the 2:00 p.m.
hearing, stating that: (1) Ozulumba had been in court from 9:00
a.m. to 12:00 p.m. and, as a result, was unable to meet Asaba to
prepare for the 2:00 p.m. hearing, and (2) Ozulumba was exhausted
from a severe allergy attack and unable to attend the 2:00 p.m.
hearing.2 At 4:15 p.m., Ozulumba spoke with the Immigration Judge,
restating the reasons for his failure to appear at the 2:00 p.m.
hearing.
The Immigration Judge entered an order of removal in
absentia. On August 30, 1999, Asaba, through Ozulumba, filed a
motion to reopen and for stay of deportation, asking the
Immigration Judge to rescind the order of removal issued in
absentia so that Asaba could apply for asylum and withholding of
removal. The motion stated that Asaba missed the May 21, 1999
hearing because of "extreme circumstances surrounding his [United
States] Citizen wife," and also mentioned that Ozulumba was sick on
2
Ozulumba also used the incorrect alien number on the motion to
continue, and attached a hearing notice with a different name and
alien number than the motion to continue.
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May 21. No affidavits from Asaba or his wife were submitted with
the motion. On September 29, 1999, the Immigration Judge denied
the motion to reopen, finding that Asaba failed to demonstrate any
exceptional circumstances to excuse his failure to appear at the
May 21, 1999 hearing. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i).3
Asaba received a copy of the Immigration Judge's decision
from Ozulumba in October 1999. This copy did not contain a
paragraph in the original decision detailing Ozulumba's meeting
with the Immigration Judge at 4:15 p.m. on May 21, 1999. Asaba
appealed the Immigration Judge's decision to the BIA on October 29,
1999. Asaba argued to the BIA that, on the morning of May 21,
1999, he learned for the first time that his wife had a court date
elsewhere that morning. Asaba's wife refused to disclose any
details about the court date and told him to wait for her at the
Immigration Court. Asaba's wife never appeared at the Immigration
Court and Asaba had no way to contact her. On January 23, 2001,
the BIA affirmed the decision of the Immigration Judge and
dismissed the appeal.
On May 31, 2001, Asaba discharged Ozulumba and retained
new counsel. On June 1, 2001, Asaba filed a grievance against
Ozulumba with the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers ("BBO").
3
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i) states that an order of removal
in absentia may be rescinded "upon a motion to reopen filed within
180 days after the date of the order of removal if the alien
demonstrates that the failure to appear was because of exceptional
circumstances (as defined in subsection (e)(1) of this section)."
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This grievance is still pending before the BBO. On June 4, 2001,
Asaba filed a second motion to reopen before the BIA, arguing that
he failed to attend the May 21, 1999 hearing because of ineffective
assistance of counsel, and that ineffective assistance of counsel
was an "exceptional circumstance" as defined by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(e)(1).4 On April 15, 2003, the BIA denied the motion to
reopen. Asaba appeals the denial of the motion to reopen.5
II. Analysis
We review the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen for
abuse of discretion. See Betouche v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 147, 149-
150 (1st Cir. 2004). "An abuse of discretion will be found where
the BIA misinterprets the law, or acts either arbitrarily or
capriciously." Wang v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 2004).
The BIA denied Asaba's motion to reopen because (1) the
motion failed to comply with the procedural requirements set forth
in Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988), and (2)
4
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(1) states that "[t]he term 'exceptional
circumstances' refers to exceptional circumstances (such as serious
illness of the alien or serious illness or death of the spouse,
child, or parent of the alien, but not including less compelling
circumstances) beyond the control of the alien." The BIA has found
that ineffective assistance of counsel may qualify as an
exceptional circumstance. See In re Grijalva-Barrera, 21 I. & N.
Dec. 472, 474 (BIA 1996); Saakian v. INS, 252 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir.
2001).
5
Asaba also filed a motion to reconsider before the BIA on May
13, 2003. On November 19, 2003, the BIA denied the motion to
reconsider. Asaba did not appeal the BIA's denial of the motion to
reconsider.
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the BIA found that the motion was outside the 180-day limit
provided for in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i). We affirm because
the motion to reopen failed to comply with the Lozada requirements
and need not reach the issue of timeliness. See Betouche, 357 F.3d
at 151 (finding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion where
petitioner failed to comply with the Lozada requirements).
"Given the sheer volume of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims asserted by deportable aliens, the BIA has developed
threshold procedural requirements to enable the efficient screening
of frivolous, collusive or dilatory claims." Wang, 367 F.3d at 27;
see Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639. In Lozada, the BIA stated that
a motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel
should be supported by:
(1) an affidavit describing in detail the
agreement between the alien and his counsel
regarding the litigation matters the attorney
was retained to address; (2) evidence that the
alien informed his counsel as to the alien's
ineffective assistance allegations and
afforded counsel an opportunity to respond;
and (3) evidence that the alien had either
filed a complaint with the appropriate
disciplinary authority regarding the
attorney's ethical or legal misfeasance, or a
valid excuse for failing to lodge such a
complaint.
Betouche, 357 F.3d at 147; Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639. The BIA
acts within its discretion in denying motions to reopen that fail
to meet the Lozada requirements as long as it does so in a non-
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arbitrary manner. See Saakian, 252 F.3d at 26; Betouche, 357 F.3d
at 149 n.2.
The BIA emphasized that Asaba failed to submit evidence
that he notified Ozulumba of the allegations of ineffective
assistance and afforded him an opportunity to respond.6 Asaba
filed a complaint against Ozulumba with the BBO on June 1, 2001.
On June 4, 2001, Asaba filed a motion to reopen with the BIA. This
motion did not contain any evidence that Asaba had notified
Ozulumba of the allegations with the BBO. A supplement to the
motion to reopen, filed on August 13, 2002, also failed to provide
any evidence that Asaba had notified Ozulumba of the allegations.
Asaba argues, based entirely on evidence he presented for
the first time in his motion to reconsider, filed on May 13, 2003,
that he provided evidence that he notified Ozulumba of the
allegations. None of this evidence was properly before the BIA
when it denied Asaba's motion to reopen on April 15, 2003. Asaba
has not appealed the BIA's denial of his motion to reconsider.
Because motions to reopen and motions to reconsider are appealed
6
The BIA also found that Asaba failed to submit a separate
affidavit describing in detail Asaba's agreement with Ozulumba
regarding the litigation matters Ozulumba was to address. The BIA
noted, however, that "it could be argued that the respondent
substantially complied with the first Lozada requirement in that
his complaint is very detailed and could be considered an adequate
substitute for a separate affidavit." Because we find that Asaba
failed to comply with the Lozada notification requirement and that
the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to
reopen on that ground, we do not reach the issue of whether Asaba
presented an appropriate affidavit for Lozada purposes.
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separately, see Zhang v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 289, 292 (1st Cir.
2003); see also Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405-406 (1995), the
motion to reconsider is not before us. Therefore, the only
evidence properly before us is the evidence that was in the record
before the BIA when it denied Asaba's motion to reopen. See
Betouche, 357 F.3d at 151 n.6; Fesseha v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 13, 18
(1st Cir. 2003). There is no evidence in the record that Asaba
notified Ozulumba of the ineffective assistance of counsel
allegations.
Even if Asaba had presented evidence that he notified
Ozulumba, he failed to meet Lozada's requirement that counsel be
provided an opportunity to respond before filing the motion to
reopen. See Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639 ("[B]efore allegations
of ineffective assistance of former counsel are presented to the
[BIA], former counsel must be informed of the allegations and
allowed the opportunity to respond.")(emphasis added). Asaba filed
the motion to reopen on June 4, 2001, three days after filing the
grievance with the BBO on June 1, 2001. Even assuming that Asaba
mailed Ozulumba notice of the allegations that same day, on June 1,
2001, three days does not provide Ozulumba an "adequate opportunity
to respond" to the allegations. See Reyes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d
592, 599 (9th Cir. 2004)(affirming the BIA's decision where
petitioner did not prove that he gave former counsel "notice of the
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ineffective assistance allegations or an adequate opportunity to
respond").
Asaba's failure to meet the Lozada notice requirement is
significant. The Lozada notice requirement provides a mechanism by
which the Immigration Judge and the BIA "may more accurately assess
the merits of a petitioner's ineffective assistance claim." Reyes,
358 F.3d at 599. "The potential for abuse is apparent where no
mechanism exists for allowing former counsel, whose integrity or
competence is being impugned, to present his version of events if
he so chooses, thereby discouraging baseless allegations." Lozada,
19 I. & N. Dec. at 639. Asaba inexcusably failed to provide the
BIA with evidence that he met the Lozada notice requirement,
despite having time and opportunity to do so. We therefore find
that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to
reopen.
Affirmed.
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