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Berry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.

Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2007-06-27
Citations: 490 F.3d 1211
Copy Citations
38 Citing Cases
Combined Opinion
                                                                     F I L E D
                                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                      Tenth Circuit
                                    PU BL ISH
                                                                     June 27, 2007
                   UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS               Elisabeth A. Shumaker
                                                                      Clerk of Court
                                TENTH CIRCUIT



 B ARBA RA BER RY ,

       Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.                                                    No. 05-1533

 T-M OBILE USA, IN C.,

       Defendant - Appellee.



                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the District of Colorado
                      (D.C. No. 04-cv-1494-LT B-CBS)


Andrew T. Brake of Andrew T. Brake, P.C., Englewood, Colorado, (Lee T. Judd
of A ndrew T. B rake P.C . and Thomas H. Terry of The Law Office of Stephen H .
Sw ift, P.C., Colorado Springs, Colorado, with him on the briefs) for Plaintiff -
Appellant.

David R. Hammond (Sue A. Haskell, with him on the briefs) of Davis Graham &
Stubbs LLP, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant - Appellee.




Before L UC ER O, SE YM OU R and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.


O’BRIEN, Circuit Judge.
      After T-M obile U SA, Inc. (T-M obile) terminated Barbara Berry’s

employment, she filed an action claiming the termination violated the Americans

with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act (sex discrimination), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and the Age Discrimination

in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621. She also alleged breach of implied

contract and promissory estoppel. The district court granted summary judgment

in favor of T-M obile concluding Berry was an “at-will” employee. The court also

determined: (1) Berry was not “disabled” under the ADA because she had not

shown her disability severely impacted a major life activity, and (2) she failed to

establish pretext in relation to her gender and age discrimination claims.

Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM .

                                     Background

      Berry began as an employee with T-M obile’s predecessor, VoiceStream, in

October 2000, working in the Colorado Springs, Colorado, office as a Customer

Care Supervisor for an annual salary of $37,000. She was hired just before her

51st birthday. She received an employee handbook and signed the page which

stated: “I understand that my employment is at will to the fullest extent allowed

by law and is entered into voluntarily and may be terminated by me or the

Company at any time, with or w ithout cause or notice.” (A ppellant’s App. Vol. I

at 201.) In addition, page three of the handbook contained a paragraph which

reiterated her at-will status. It provided in relevant part:

                                           -2-
       Nothing contained in this Agreement shall alter the status of
       Employee’s employment with Employer, which is “at will.”
       Employee acknowledges and understands that Employee’s
       employment is of no specific duration and can be terminated at any
       time by either Employee or Employer with or without cause, for any
       reason or no reason, at any time. Employee acknowledges and agrees
       that any representations to the contrary are unauthorized and void,
       unless contained in a formal written employment contract signed by
       both an Executive Officer of Employer and Employee.

(Id. at 202.)

       On January 30, 2002, Berry accepted a promotion to Customer Care Team

M anager at an annual salary of $42,500 with a possible 10% bonus. 1 As a team

manager, Berry supervised six team coaches. Each team coach led a team of

twelve to fifteen customer care representatives w ho received and handled calls

from customers seeking assistance with their telephone services. Shortly after her

promotion, she received a favorable final performance review for her former

position.

       Later that year, VoiceStream became T-M obile. The new general manager

of the Colorado Springs care center, Kevin Kavanah, assumed his duties in

December 2002. He was charged with evaluating the senior leadership team to

improve the call center’s poor performance. As part of the shift in management,

T-M obile made clear it valued teamwork and expected its team managers to

practice various strategies to promote this overall vision.



       1
       The offer of promotion included a paragraph stating her at-will status
would continue.

                                         -3-
      In 2003, in addition to her salary and bonus, Berry was identified as a “key

employee” and was invited to participate in a T-M obile Cash Incentive Plan. 2 (Id.

at 225.) In September 2003, she received a raise based upon market and job

performance. However, Berry had difficulty with T-M obile’s requirement that

she use the proper coaching methods to improve her teams’ performance. The

endorsed methods included “employing a positive personal style, forming a

detailed plan and strategy for improving the performance of teams and

individuals, establishing timelines, reviewing progress, and [] holding others

accountable for implementing the plan.” (Id. at 132.) According to T-M obile,

Barry did not employ the proper coaching methods, hold her team members

accountable, or interact well with the other managers. A t one point she allegedly

made a “verbal attack” on Stephanie Brickel, the training manager. Kavanah

repeatedly counseled Berry on this aspect of her performance.

      In late October or early November 2003, W illiam Grier w as promoted to




      2
        The Plan itself contained a paragraph entitled Employment at W ill which
provided:

      Nothing in this Plan shall be construed in any way to alter the fact
      that the participant is an employee at will and that either the
      participant or the Company can terminate the employment
      relationship at any time, with or w ithout reason.

(A ppellant’s App. Vol. I at 227.)

                                        -4-
senior manager, supervising the team managers and reporting to Kavanah. 3 After

Grier became senior manager, Berry reported to him. On October 30, 2003, Berry

approached Kavanah to discuss her “not feeling valued as a [team manager]” and

“she fe[lt] any day she may be terminated.” (Id. at 193.) Kavanah, having

become aware of a recent “breakthrough” in Berry’s coaching and reports of her

improvements, assured her things w ere fine and she had nothing to worry about.

(Id. at 150-51.) H e also called her that day to repeat his assurances. He

documented the conversation in a memorandum stating her teamw ork had

obviously improved, she was valued highly, and “she would clearly know if her

job was in jeopardy, and that any leader would know that before the ultimate in

disciplinary action takes place.” (Id. at 193.)

      T-M obile contends that Kavanah’s belief Berry had made a breakthrough

was based on one successful coaching session in late summer 2003.

Unfortunately, his belief was short-lived. Kavanah later sat in on a meeting in

which Berry did not coach well and two weeks later reminded her she needed

improvement. Shortly before being fired, she prepared an unsatisfactory action

plan to address specific needs for her teams and coaches to improve. At the same

time, Grier reported to Kavanah that Berry again was failing to hold her teams

      3
       Prior to Grier’s promotion, Randy Smith had been promoted from team
manager to senior manager. Although Smith had done excellent work as a team
manager, he was not successful in the senior manager position. Eventually Smith
was demoted back to his old position. During the period between Smith’s
demotion and Grier’s promotion, Berry reported directly to Kavanah.

                                         -5-
accountable and refusing to w ork as a team member with her peers.

      In October or November of 2003, Berry spoke with Kavanah about needing

a rest at work due to extreme fatigue caused by multiple sclerosis (M S). Berry

had been diagnosed with M S twelve years earlier and Kavanah was aware she was

receiving treatment for her condition. Her primary treating physician was D r.

Elliott Frohman located in Dallas, Texas, whom she saw annually. Kavanah

responded she would need to apply for leave under the Family M edical Leave Act

(FM LA) in order to take time off. She filed her application, which was granted

the day before T-M obile terminated her employment.

      According to T-M obile, the decision to terminate Berry’s employment had

already been made when she made her request for FM LA leave. Kavanah had

been engaged in discussions with the human resources manager, Cassandra

Shepard, regarding the call center’s poor performance. Some time in November

the discussions culminated in a decision in which Kavanah, after consulting with

Kavanah’s supervisor, Shepard, Shepard’s supervisor and Grier, decided to

terminate the three female team managers Berry, Bannister and Olson, and a team

coach, David M cM illeon.

      T-M obile terminated Berry’s employment on November 25, 2003. The

reason given on her termination form was a reduction in force. However, it is

undisputed that T-M obile was not undergoing a reduction in force at the time and

T-M obile asserts the written justification was a clerical error. As indicated on the

                                         -6-
other employees’ termination papers, these employees, including Berry, were

fired for poor performance. Specifically, Berry was repeatedly counseled

regarding her failure to employ proper coaching methods and her inability to get

along with others. Berry was replaced on an interim basis by Jeff Edmonds, a

younger male, and eventually her position was filled by Karen W illis.

      On January 6, 2004, Berry filed a charge of discrimination claiming she

was fired due to her disability, age and gender. The district court granted

summary judgment in favor of T-M obile. Addressing the A DA claim, the court

found Berry’s M S was an impairment, but she failed to show the M S substantially

affected her major life activities. In the alternative, Berry contended that even if

her major life activities were not severely restricted, T-M obile regarded her

disabled as evidenced by its approval of her FM LA request. The district court

ruled T-M obile’s approval, in itself, was insufficient to establish that her

employer regarded her as disabled. The court concluded Berry failed to establish

she w as disabled under the A D A .

      As to her gender and age discrimination claims, the district court

determined Berry established her prima facie case, but failed to rebut T-M obile’s

proffered non-discriminatory reasons for terminating her employment. Because

Berry did not dispute she had been advised about the stated deficiencies in her

performance and that teamw ork and accountability were priorities for T-M obile,

her proffered evidence of pretext was insufficient to survive summary judgment.

                                          -7-
      Finally, the court rejected Berry’s breach of contract and promissory

estoppel claims, noting Berry’s signed employment agreement specified her at-

will employment status and there was no evidence of mandatory progressive

discipline policies, written or unwritten. Thus, there was no breach of contract

and no reasonable reliance on the impact of unwritten policies contradicting the

written employment agreement. Berry filed a timely appeal challenging each

aspect of the district court’s decision. W e address each in turn.

                                      Discussion

      The purpose of a summary judgment motion is to assess whether a trial is

necessary. White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1995). In other

words, there “must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the

plaintiff.” Panis v. M ission Hills Bank, N.A., 60 F.3d 1486, 1490 (10th Cir.

1995). A court grants summary judgment for the moving party only where there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact in the pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). W hen

applying this standard, a court must view the factual record in the light most

favorable to the non-movant. Applied Genetics Int'l., Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec.,

Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990). “[S]ummary judgment will not lie if

the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

                                           -8-
A.    Whether Berry is “disabled” or “regarded as disabled” under the ADA.

      “To establish a valid claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must first prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that she has a disability. 4 To satisfy the A DA’s

definition of disability, a plaintiff must (1) have a recognized impairment, (2)

identify one or more appropriate major life activities, and (3) show the

impairment substantially limits one or more of those activities.” Holt v. Grand

Lake M ental Health Ctr., Inc., 443 F.3d 762, 765 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations

omitted). “W hether the plaintiff has an impairment within the meaning of the

ADA and whether the conduct affected is a major life activity for purposes of the

ADA are questions of law for the court to decide. Ascertaining whether the

impairment substantially limits the major life activity is a question of fact for the

jury, although a court is not precluded from deciding the issue on a motion for

summary judgment.” Id. at n.1 (citation omitted).

              1.    Substantial Limitation

          The United States Supreme Court defines a “substantial” impairment as

one “that prevents or severely restricts [an] individual from doing activities that

are of central importance to most people’s daily lives” and that is “permanent or

long term.” Toyota M otor Mfg., Ky. Inc. v. William s, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002)



      4
        The ADA defines the term "disability" as: (1) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an
individual; (2) a record of such impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such
an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).

                                         -9-
(citation omitted). W e must strictly interpret the term “substantial” to “create a

demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.” Id. at 197. The ADA regulations

describe “substantially limited” as “[u]nable to perform a major life activity that

the average person in the general population can perform;” or “[s]ignificantly

restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can

perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or

duration under w hich the average person in the general population can perform

that same major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(I)-(ii) (2001). Factors to

be considered are: “[t]he nature and severity of the impairment; [t]he duration or

expected duration of the impairment; and [t]he permanent or long term impact, or

the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment.”

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii). 5 An impairment’s effects are assessed on a

case-by-case basis. Holt, 433 F.3d at 766. On summary judgment, the ultimate

question is whether the evidence presented could allow a jury to conclude the

limitations “amount to such severe restrictions in the activities that are of central

importance to most people’s daily lives that they establish a manual task

disability.” Toyota, 534 at 202.

      Berry contends she is substantially limited in the life activities of caring for

herself, walking and performance of manual tasks. Specifically, Berry alleges she



      5
       To date, the Supreme Court has expressly declined to determine the
amount of deference due these regulations. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 194.

                                         -10-
“has to rest before showering, cannot do household chores that are handled by

others in the family, and essentially has to plan when things can be accomplished.

She also is limited in duration in the amount of time available to her.”

(A ppellant’s Br. at 21.) She maintains the district court erred in considering only

whether the impairment “severely” restricted Berry from performing the affected

major life activities. Berry contends the district court failed to consider “[t]he

duration or expected duration of the impairment; and [t]he permanent or long term

impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the

impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)-(iii). W hile Berry correctly cites the

federal regulation, we need not parse the relevant considerations here. Under any

of them, Berry is not currently disabled.

      The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Berry, reveals at the

time of her discharge, Berry suffered from extreme fatigue which would cause

cognitive difficulties, temporary postponement of activities and, on occasion,

result in a fall. However, the medical records submitted by her physician

demonstrate her activities were not substantially limited and many of her

symptoms could be addressed through medication. W hen Berry first began

treatment with Dr. Frohman she would see him every six months, but eventually

her appointments were extended to annual visits. In M ay 2002, Dr. Frohman

proscribed Provigil for Berry’s fatigue, an ongoing problem w hich was

exacerbated by changes in her w ork schedule. During the same visit, Dr.

                                            -11-
Frohman reported Barry was “doing remarkably well” in her daily activities.

(Appellant’s App. Vol. I at 125.) She was advised, however, to use a straight

cane later in the day to prevent “fatigue induced falling.” (Id.) In D r. Frohman’s

2003 report, he stated Berry had not fallen within the last six months and had

benefitted from the Provigil, but still experienced cognitive dysfunction such as

short-term memory problems when fatigued. Overall, the doctor reported her

daily living activities remain unchanged. Dr. Frohman’s 2004 report states Berry

received “excellent benefit” from her medication regarding fatigue. (Id. at 128.)

Her condition apparently remained stable in 2005, when the doctor noted she was

doing “remarkably well with . . . no evidence of significant change in her daily

activities.” (Id. at 136.) Indeed, Berry admitted her fatigue level depended on

whether she was taking her medication. If she takes the proscribed Provigil, she

“has a greater ability to do everything.” (Id. at 84.) Even in the event the

medication did not provide complete relief, her strategy for dealing with her

fatigue was to postpone her chores or allow her husband and daughter to complete

them.

        Compare these facts to those in our recent case, Holt v. Grand Lake M ental

Health Center, Inc., 443 F.3d 762 (10th Cir. 2006). There, the plaintiff had

cerebral palsy. In determining whether she had a substantial disability, we

observed:

        W hile Holt needs help when chopping, cutting, and slicing food, the

                                         -12-
      evidence is insufficient to allow a factfinder to conclude she is
      severely restricted in her ability to cook. It is undisputed that Holt
      occasionally must ask others for assistance when buttoning her
      clothing; Holt has introduced no evidence, however, that would
      permit a factfinder to conclude she is severely restricted in dressing
      herself.

      ...

      Holt also claims the limitations caused by her cerebral palsy
      substantially impair her ability to perform the major life activity of
      caring for herself. Caring for one's self encompasses normal
      activities of daily living; including feeding oneself, driving,
      grooming, and cleaning home. As discussed above, the relevant
      evidence shows Holt has difficulty with, or is prevented from
      performing, a limited number of manual tasks. It also indicates Holt
      sometimes has difficulty chew ing and swallow ing her food. These
      specific limitations, however, do not permit a rational factfinder to
      conclude Holt is prevented from caring for herself or is severely
      restricted in her ability to care for herself.

Holt, 443 F.3d at 767 (internal citation and quotation omitted). 6 Unlike Holt,

Berry does not dispute she can perform all daily life activities given sufficient

rest, walk with the aid of a cane, can treat her symptoms with medication, and her

cognitive difficulty does not prevent her from learning and working. The district



      6
          See also Croy v. Cobe Labs., Inc., 345 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 2003):

      In support of her claim that her multiple sclerosis limited her major
      life functions, Appellant argues that she was frequently forced to
      take unscheduled leave, was frequently unable to lift heavy objects,
      could not bear “sustained exertion,” and could not care for her
      children, complete household chores, or cook for her family.
      Appellant alleges that when she is suffering fatigue all of her life’s
      activities are halted.
      ....
      [W ]e agree with the district court that Appellant has not shown the
      substantial impairment of a life activity.

                                        -13-
court did not err in considering her family’s assistance w ith the household chores,

as that is part of daily living in most families. Berry’s condition has not

significantly degenerated over the last several years, and according to her

physician, she has stabilized. Thus, while Berry may have to make some

adjustments in her daily routine, the district court did not err in finding Berry was

not “disabled” as a matter of law . 7

             2.     Regarded As Disabled

             In the alternative, Berry asserts the district court erred in concluding

there was no issue of fact as to whether T-M obile considered her disabled. Berry

contends T-M obile’s grant of her FM LA leave request is sufficient to raise a

question of fact. W e disagree.

      Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations presents three

different ways in which an individual may satisfy the meaning of “regarded as

having a disability”: (1) the individual may have an impairment that is not

substantially limiting but is perceived by the defendant as constituting a

substantially limiting impairment; (2) the individual may have an impairment that

is substantially limiting only because of the attitudes of others toward the

impairment; or (3) the individual may have no impairment at all but is regarded

by the defendant as having a substantially limiting impairment. 29 C.F.R.

      7
        See Heisler v. M etropolitan Council, 339 F.3d 622, 628 (8th Cir. 2003)
(“[B]ald assertions that one is limited in a major life activity are insufficient to
withstand summary judgment.”).

                                         -14-
§ 1630.2(l). In addition, a claimant may be deemed to have a “record” of

disability either by having a history of substantial limitation of a major life

activity or by having been misclassified as having such an impairment. 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(k).

      Because T-M obile knew Berry had M S and knew of her fatigue and

resulting cognitive challenges, Berry argues Kavanah’s suggestion she apply for

FM LA leave and the approval of her application is evidence that T-M obile

considered her disabled. Although we have found no precedent directly on point

in this Circuit or others, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that T-

M obile’s approval of Berry’s FM LA request does not establish a question of fact. 8



      8
         An unpublished Tenth Circuit district court case has clearly rejected a
contention that recommending FM LA leave establishes an A DA “regarded as”
claim. M cKinzie v. Sprint/United M gmt Co., No. 03-2348-GTV, 2004 W L 263444
*7 (D. Kan. Nov. 16, 2004) (supervisor’s “awareness of Plaintiff’s panic disorder
and his belief that she should apply for FM LA leave does not establish a
‘regarded as’ claim under the ADA”) (citing Bost v. Headco Indus., Inc., No.
02-2182-GTV, 2003 W L 21939020, at *5 (D . Kan. Aug. 4, 2003); Ruggles v.
Keebler Co., 224 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1302 (D. Kan. 2002) (citation omitted)
(determining that an employer’s recommendation to apply for disability insurance
did not support the plaintiff’s “regarded as” claim because “disability is a term of
art under the ADA”); Gazaway v. M akita U.S.A., Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1288
(D . Kan. 1998) (holding the fact that the employer encouraged an employee to
seek counseling established only that the employer was sympathetic to the
employee’s experience, not that the employer regarded the employee as disabled);
Ellis v. M ohenis Servs., Inc., No. 96-6307, 1998 W L 564478, at *5 (E.D. Penn.
Aug. 24, 1998) (“[w]hether the defendants believed the plaintiff was eligible for
FM LA leave, or believed the taking of such leave was proper under the
circumstances, does not demonstrate that they regarded him as disabled” because
“an employee who has a ‘serious health condition’ for purposes of the FM LA is
not necessarily ‘disabled’ under the ADA.”).

                                          -15-
An employer’s knowledge of an impairment alone is insufficient to establish the

employer regarded the employee as disabled. Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d

1248, 1256 (10th Cir. 2001).

      W e have often stated “[d]isability is a term of art under the ADA.” Doyal

v. Okla. Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 495 (10th Cir. 2000); Poindexter v. Atchison,

Topeka & Santa Fe Rwy Co., 168 F.3d 1228, 1230 (10th Cir. 1999). In contrast,

the leave provisions of the FM LA are wholly distinct from the statutory definition

of “disability” and an employer’s reasonable accommodation obligations covered

under the ADA. 9 As courts have recognized in various contexts, “there may be

some parallels between the ADA and FM LA, but applicable regulations explicitly

state that ADA's ‘disability’ and the FM LA’s ‘serious health condition’ are

different concepts, and must be analyzed separately.” Hurlbert v. St. M ary’s

Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Stekloff v.

St. John’s Mercy Health Sys., 218 F.3d 858, 861 (8th Cir. 2000); see also Hoge v.

Honda of Am. M fg., Inc., 384 F.3d 238, 249 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Unlike the FM LA ,

the finding of a disability is the key ‘that unlocks the storehouse of statutory

protections’ under the A D A .”). Given the very different focus of the two

statutory protections, Kavanah’s suggestion to apply for FM LA leave and T-

      9
        The FM LA grants an eligible employee the right to take up to twelve
workweeks of unpaid leave annually for any one or more of several reasons,
including “[b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable
to perform the functions of the position of such employee.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 2612(a)(1)(D).

                                         -16-
M obile’s approval of Berry’s application does not demonstrate an issue of fact as

to whether Berry was considered disabled under the ADA. Consequently, Berry

failed to present a case of discrimination under the ADA.

B.    Pretext

      Berry claims T-M obile unlawfully discriminated against her based on her

gender and age. Because she presented circumstantial evidence to support her

claims, we apply the framew ork set forth in M cDonnell Douglas Corporation v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Plotke v. White, 405 F.3d 1092, 1099 (10th Cir.

2005). “The employee must first establish a prima facie case of a prohibited

employment action and if she does, the burden shifts to the employer to state a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment action. If the

employer meets this burden, then summary judgment is warranted unless the

employee can show there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the

proffered reasons are pretextual.” Id. A pretext argument requires the court to

“examine the facts as they appear to the person making the decision,” to

determine whether the employer “honestly believed those reasons and acted in

good faith upon those beliefs.” Rivera v. City & County of Denver, 365 F.3d

912, 924-25 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). Our inquiry does not

review the wisdom or fairness of the employer’s proffered reasons. Id. “[A]t

issue is whether the evidence of Plaintiff’s misconduct presented to [the

decisionmakers] was so weak that a rational factfinder could infer that [the]

                                        -17-
expressed reason for terminating Plaintiff must have been pretextual.” Id. at 925.

      The district court determined Berry presented a prima facie case of

discrimination on both her claims but failed to demonstrate T-M obile’s proffered

non-discriminatory basis for its decision, her performance, was pretextual. Berry

contends the district court erroneously resolved issues of fact in reaching its

conclusion.

      Berry claims pretext is shown by a series of events in context. First, she

points to evidence of her satisfactory performance, her raise in September 2003

and Kavanah’s October 30th oral assurances and memo approving her

performance, and insists any earlier performance difficulties were rendered “non-

issues” by her improvement. She then points to the timing; Kavanah’s approval

was given only three weeks before her termination, which itself occurred just

days after she requested accommodation for her fatigue. In addition, she finds it

suspicious that Kavanah’s original assessment was based on his own observation

and that of others, yet his alleged turnaround was based solely on Grier’s

comm ents. Consequently, she concludes the district court made a factual

determination in favor of T-M obile w hen it discounted this evidence solely

because there was no evidence rebutting Kavanah’s testimony as to his motivation

in terminating her employment.

      Berry’s rendition of the record, however, is incomplete. She fails to

mention T-M obile presented uncontested evidence that her raise in 2003 was an

                                         -18-
across-the-board payment adjustment made at all call centers and therefore is not

evidence of Kavanah’s assessment of her performance. Further, Berry does not

deny she was repeatedly counseled regarding her failure to improve her

interactions. Nor does she deny Grier’s criticism of her performance to Kavanah

after October 30. She does not argue the action plan she submitted for her teams

and coaches was adequate. M ost importantly, Berry misapprehends the tenor of

Kavanah’s October 30 memo. It does not exonerate all past performance issues.

Rather, it affirms her improvement with cautionary advice. Two weeks prior to

October 30, Kavanah recorded the substance of another meeting he had with

Berry and one of her team coaches. The team coach was called to K avanah’s

office, with Berry present, to discuss coaching effectiveness. Kavanah noted that

during the meeting “[Berry] did not offer any response, but rather sat silently . . .

. and this concerned me about her interaction and coaching . . . .” (A ppellant’s

App. Vol. I at 195) The memo continues:

        After [team coach] left the office . . . . I asked [Berry] why she did
        not know about [his] shortcomings in advance of this meeting. She
        stated she had not looked in the blue books (this is my concern of her
        other coaches too) . . . I directed [Berry] to ensure all her team
        members’ blue books are reviewed by October 28th, and that
        effective Success Plans are documented by each coach showing the
        steps that will be taken to help ensure the . . . success and the time
        frames to achieve such activities.

(Id.)

        Berry accurately states the O ctober 30 memo records K avanah telling Berry

she was “highly valued” but it also included:

                                          -19-
      Follow-up with Barb related to her not feeling valued as a TM . . . .
      She indicated that she feels that Sue N ichols and Cassandra Shepard
      are “spies” and looking for questionable behavior of hers.

      Barb became teary-eyed as she spoke of this.

      I let her know that Cassandra and Sue are clearly not spies, but rather
      enablers for us to have a strong leadership team, and their role is to
      observe and give feedback on the + and — of those behaviors. I
      cited several instances in which Barb’s behaviors w ere conflicting to
      our direction, and that she was given very valuable, actionable
      feedback to help her become more effective. I cited several
      situations w here she took that feedback and indeed acted upon it.
      ...

      I let Barb know that her continued area of improvement is inspecting
      the coaching ability of her coaches and the documentation in coaches
      (sic) blue books. . . . She agreed and committed to this.

      Discussed her high focus on caring for the individual and continually
      seeing the “bright side” of things in people — almost to a fault. Her
      trust in her coach’s [sic] words is causing serious lapses in their
      performance due to lack of followup on Barb’s part.

      She indicated she had a “come to Jesus” meeting with her team and
      told them they were no longer going to be able to skate by, and not
      do what was directed by her (finally, a right step by Barb).
      Discussed ensuring she follows up on deadlines given, and force the
      accuracy of reports they generate for her. She is giving direction
      little follow-up. Is this a respect issue? Do her coaches feel she will
      not follow-up or follow through with them? This stems back to the
      “holding people accountable” tag she has earned in the site.

      Barb and I agreed she would give direction to her coaches with a
      time frame, and follow-up on that date to see if they have delivered
      on the expectation.

(Id. at 193-94.) These two memos together demonstrate the “issues” prior to

October 30, in this instance holding the employees she supervised accountable,

providing diligent follow up, and interaction with her peers, remained an area of



                                        -20-
concern. Berry does not argue these issues were not discussed on October 30 nor

does she contest that, after the memos, Grier informed Kavanah that Berry was

“telling you what you want to hear but she’s not improving.” (Id. at 189).

      Berry also claims the error on her termination papers marking a reduction

in force as the reason for her termination indicates pretext. Because poor job

performance was also an option in the list of reasons provided on the form, she

concludes the paperw ork is evidence T-M obile’s “clerical error” excuse is a sham.

Berry offers no support for this theory. Nothing in the record suggests a

reduction in force occurred at T-M obile. The paperwork for every other manager

fired at the same time as Berry marked performance as the reason for termination.

Berry fails to show any benefit to T-M obile from its mistake. W e agree with the

district court that this discrepancy does not constitute an inconsistency sufficient

to show pretext.

      Finally, Berry claims the termination violated T-M obile’s policies and

procedures. Berry presents no written policy, but contends T-M obile had an

unwritten progressive disciplinary policy. She relies on Shepard’s testimony

regarding T-M obile’s approach to discipline. 10 W hile Shepard testified there were

general progressive disciplinary strategies used depending on the employee and



      10
        Berry also attempts to rely on her own experience as a manager, claiming
she was trained she could recommend an employee’s termination only after
progressive discipline. However, as has occurred throughout Berry’s brief, the
record cite does not support her assertion.

                                         -21-
the situation, she did not testify T-M obile had an unwritten specific approach

requiring progressive discipline. Indeed, T-M obile presented substantial evidence

that many of its employees had been fired without warning or prior disciplinary

measures. Between 2002 and 2004, T-M obile fired twenty-six team managers,

team coaches and senior managers. Of those, twenty-one received no previous

discipline. 11 M oreover, even if T-M obile fell short of Berry’s expectation of

progressive discipline, this fact adds little to the pretext analysis. “The mere fact

that an employer failed to follow its own internal procedures does not necessarily

suggest that . . . the substantive reasons given by the employer for its employment

decision were pretextual.” Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 454 (10th

Cir.1995) (emphasis omitted). Because it is uncontroverted that T-M obile

decisionmakers did not believe a rigid policy existed, “even if the failure to

[follow procedure] was a mistake, it was not pretextual.” Id. at 455.

      Given these facts, Berry failed to show “weaknesses, implausibilities,

inconsistencies, incoherencies or contradictions in [T-M obile’s] proffered

legitimate reasons for its action such that a reasonable factfinder could rationally

find them unw orthy of credence.” M organ v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323

(10th Cir. 1997).

C.    Implied Contract/Promissory Estoppel



      11
        Eighteen were male, seventeen were younger than Berry and twelve were
under the age of forty.

                                         -22-
      Berry was hired as an “at-will” employee as stated in both her letters of

employment in 2000 and 2002. T-M obile’s employee handbook contains a

conspicuous disclaimer and does not have a provision for progressive discipline.

Nonetheless, Berry claims there was an “unwritten policy” that immediate

dismissal would only be “for cause” which provides the basis for her breach of

implied contract and promissory estoppel claims. Berry also claims she relied on

Kavanah’s explicit promises he would tell her if her employment was in jeopardy.

Berry again relies on Shepard’s testimony regarding different levels of corrective

action, her testimony that only certain acts, such as violence, would lead to direct

dismissal if the dismissal were based on that act alone, and her confirmation

Berry did not engage in any activity that would support a direct dismissal and had

not received a written or verbal warning or been suspended.

      Citing Evenson v. Colorado Farm Bureau M utual Insurance Com pany, 879

P.2d 402 (Colo. App. 1993), Berry claims she had an employment contract despite

the disclaimers in her letter of employment. In Evenson, the Colorado Court of

Appeals recognized "an employee hired for an unspecified period of time is

presumed to be an 'at-will employee' whose employment may be terminated

without cause or notice and such termination does not give rise to a cause of

action.” Id. at 408. This general rule does not apply, however, if the employer

has limited its right to terminate employees. Id. at 408-09. The Evenson court

noted that, even if there is a conspicuous disclaimer, the manual may create an

                                         -23-
implied contract if it contains mandatory termination procedures or requires “just

cause” for termination. Id. at 409. Finally, the Evenson court held that even if

the manual contains a disclaimer and includes language that makes use of the

disciplinary procedures discretionary, the contract issue should be submitted to

the jury if there is evidence that the employer's supervisors treat the disciplinary

procedures as mandatory. Id. A mandatory policy is demonstrated by evidence

that “the procedures were used in each instance of termination generally” and “the

procedures were always used with reference to employees in plaintiff's

department or at her level of management in the company.” M ariani v. Rocky

M ountain Hosp. & M ed. Serv., 902 P.2d 429, 435 (Colo. App. 1994).

      Unlike Evenson, the evidence offered by Berry is insufficient to warrant

submission of the issue to a jury. The employee handbook does not contain any

reference to a policy of progressive discipline. As noted above, Shepard’s

statements do not establish an unwritten policy mandating progressive discipline

prior to terminating employment. Further, the evidence demonstrates many

employees were fired without progressive discipline, including employees at

Berry’s level of management in the company. Kavanah’s assurances to Berry do

not change this conclusion. The “promises” he made on October 30 did not alter

Berry’s at-will status or promise progressive discipline. Thus, Berry could not

reasonably rely on his words to restrict T-M obile’s right to terminate her

employment with or without cause. As a result, the district court properly

                                         -24-
awarded summary judgment to T-M obile on this claim.

                                   Conclusion

      Berry failed to demonstrate she was “disabled” under the ADA . Her claims

of gender and age discrimination collapse in the face of T-M obile’s evidence that

Kavanah terminated her employment because he genuinely believed her

performance had not improved despite the repeated efforts of several T-M obile

managers. Finally, Berry presented no evidence T-M obile or its managers

followed an unwritten progressive discipline policy or considered it a mandatory

process preceding termination of employment.

A FFIRME D.




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