Butera v. District of Columbia

                  United States Court of Appeals

               FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

        Argued October 12, 2000   Decided January 9, 2001 

                           No. 00-7008

         Terry E. Butera, Individually, and as Personal 
            and Legal Representative of the Estate of 
                 Eric Michael Butera, deceased, 
                             Appellee

                                v.

                  District of Columbia, et al., 
                            Appellants

          Appeal from the United States District Court 
                  for the District of Columbia 
                         (No. 98cv02794)

     Charles F.C. Ruff argued the cause for appellants.  With 
him on the briefs were Kevin C. Newsom, Robert R. Rigsby, 
Corporation Counsel, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corpora-
tion Counsel, and Donna M. Murasky, Assistant Corporation 
Counsel.

     Daniel A. Rezneck, General Counsel, was on the brief for 
amicus curiae District of Columbia Financial Responsibility 
& Management Assistance Authority.

     Paul Mogin argued the cause for appellee.  On the brief 
were Brendan V. Sullivan, Jr., John G. Kester, Peter C. 
Grenier and James M. Ludwig.  J. Alan Galbraith entered 
an appearance.

     Before:  Edwards, Chief Judge, Rogers and Garland, 
Circuit Judges.

     Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

     Rogers, Circuit Judge:  This appeal arises from the tragic 
death of 31-year-old Eric Butera while he served as an 
undercover operative for the Metropolitan Police Department 
of the District of Columbia.  Mr. Butera's mother, Terry 
Butera, sued, on her own behalf and on behalf of her son's 
estate, the District of Columbia and the four police officers 
who engineered the undercover operation, alleging that they 
recklessly failed to provide adequate protection for her son.  
She alleged violations of her son's and her own civil rights 
under 42 U.S.C. s 1983 (1994), negligence under the District 
of Columbia Survival Act, D.C. Code s 12-101 et seq. (1995 
Repl.), and the District of Columbia Wrongful Death Act, 
D.C. Code s 16-2701 et seq. (1997 Repl.), and at common law 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The jury 
returned verdicts against the officers on the constitutional 
claims and against the officers and the District of Columbia 
on the statutory claims, and awarded Terry Butera 
$70,530,000 in compensatory damages and $27,570,000 in pu-
nitive damages.

     On appeal, the District of Columbia and the four officers 
(collectively, "the District of Columbia") contend that the 
district court erred in denying their motion for judgment as a 
matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, or alternatively for a 
new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, or for remittitur.  See 
Butera v. District of Columbia, 83 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 
1999) ("Butera II").  With respect to the civil rights claims, 
the District of Columbia contends that the officers did not 

violate either Eric Butera's or Terry Butera's substantive due 
process rights, because no such rights existed.  Alternatively, 
the District of Columbia contends that the officers are enti-
tled to qualified immunity because, even if Eric and Terry 
Butera could assert substantive due process rights, it was not 
clearly established prior to Eric Butera's death that the 
officers' conduct would violate these rights.  In this regard, 
the appeal presents two questions of first impression in this 
circuit:  (1) whether the District of Columbia can be held 
constitutionally liable for failing to protect an individual who 
is not in custody from harm inflicted by a third party, and (2) 
whether a parent has a constitutionally-protected interest in 
the society and companionship of her adult son.  In addition 
to challenging the civil rights claims, the District of Columbia 
disputes the lawfulness of imposing punitive damages against 
it and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the punitive 
damages awards against the four officers.  Finally, the Dis-
trict of Columbia challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the statutory claims, and the denial of its request to 
substitute an expert witness for a disqualified expert.

     We affirm in part and reverse in part.  On the civil rights 
claims, we hold that the "State endangerment" concept, 
through which Eric Butera might have succeeded in proving a 
constitutional violation, was not clearly established prior to 
his death;  hence, the officers were entitled to qualified immu-
nity.  We also hold that there is no parental due process right 
to the company of an adult child who is independent;  conse-
quently, Terry Butera had no grounds for asserting a consti-
tutional violation.  Therefore, the officers were entitled to 
summary judgment on all claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 
s 1983.  We further hold, consistent with recent precedent in 
this circuit, that the evidence did not amount to the "extraor-
dinary circumstances" necessary to award punitive damages 
against the District of Columbia.  For these reasons, we 
vacate the $70 million compensatory award on the civil rights 
claims and the $27 million punitive damages award against 
the District of Columbia.  In all other respects, we affirm the 
judgment awarding $530,000 in compensatory damages under 

the Survival and Wrongful Death Acts, and a total of $570,000 
in punitive damages against the four officers.

                                I.

     A. Background.  On November 16, 1997, Eric Butera 
telephoned the Metropolitan Police Department of the Dis-
trict of Columbia ("MPD") to provide information about the 
highly publicized triple homicide at the Starbucks coffee shop 
that had occurred July 7, 1997.  He told Detective Anthony 
Patterson, one of the MPD's homicide detectives assigned to 
the Starbucks investigation, that on two separate occasions, 
while he was purchasing or using crack cocaine at a house in 
the Greenleaf Gardens housing complex in Southwest Wash-
ington, D.C., he overheard someone talking about the Star-
bucks murders.  He also said he had seen firearms at the 
house.  Detective Patterson and his partner met with Eric 
Butera that same day.  Both detectives found him to be 
credible and trustworthy.  Eric Butera told Detective Patter-
son that he had come forward with this information because 
"he was no longer taking drugs, he was attempting to get his 
life in order and he wanted to do the right thing."  On 
November 23, 1999, Eric Butera went to the homicide branch 
and identified from mug shots the person whom he had 
overheard talking about the Starbucks murders.

     In addition to Detective Patterson, Lieutenant Brian McAl-
lister and Sergeant Nicholas Breul were assigned to the 
Starbucks investigation.  To advance the investigation, the 
officers decided to stage an undercover drug purchase at the 
house where Eric Butera had overheard the conversation and 
seen the drugs and firearms.  The officers asked Eric Butera 
to assist them by conducting the undercover drug purchase, 
and Eric Butera agreed.  For purposes of the Butera drug 
purchase, Lieutenant McAllister supervised the officers, Ser-
geant Breul was in charge of the operation, and Detective 
Patterson was the lead detective.  They also enlisted the 
participation of Detective Anthony Brigidini, who was familiar 
with the Greenleaf housing complex.

     On December 4, 1997, officers Patterson, Brigidini, and 
Breul met with Eric Butera to plan and execute the drug 
purchase.  The officers planned the operation to resemble as 
closely as possible Eric Butera's previous visits to the Green-
leaf Gardens house.  Eric Butera told them that usually he 
would enter and exit through the back door of the house, and 
that the entire transaction generally took "anywhere from 
one minute to ten minutes, maybe fifteen minutes."  Eric 
Butera and the officers agreed to follow this same pattern, 
with one exception:  Eric Butera would exit through the front 
door and meet the officers at a pre-arranged location.  The 
officers assured Eric Butera that the MPD would "exercise 
proper care to ensure that he would not be harmed," and that 
they would "carefully watch and monitor him throughout the 
process."  They supplied him with $80 in marked twenty 
dollar bills to make the drug purchase.

     After the debriefing, the officers decided that Detective 
Brigidini would drive Eric Butera to the house, and Detective 
Patterson and Sergeant Breul would follow in a separate car 
for surveillance and backup.  Detective Brigidini drove Eric 
Butera to the house around 9:20 p.m., and watched as Eric 
Butera approached the back door.  As Eric Butera knocked 
on the door, Detective Brigidini drove away and parked 
approximately one hundred fifty feet from the house.  Detec-
tive Brigidini testified that he was attempting to mirror the 
practices of those who had driven Eric Butera to the location 
in the past, by circling the area until Eric Butera emerged 
from the house to be picked up.  Detective Brigidini also 
intended to place himself in a position where he could see the 
front of the house (from which he expected Eric Butera to 
emerge) and the rear opening of the walkway behind the 
house;  from his location, however, he was unable to see the 
back of the house.  Meanwhile, Detective Patterson and 
Sergeant Breul parked their car, with their windows down, in 
a location that enabled them to see only part of the back alley 
of the housing complex.1  As a result, none of the officers was 

__________
     1  At that time, Sergeant Breul joked to Detective Patterson 
that they should keep the windows down so they could "hear any 
gunshots or screams."

in a position to see (or otherwise monitor) Eric Butera when 
he attempted to enter the house.

     After approximately fifteen minutes had passed since Eric 
Butera approached the house, Detective Brigidini, who had 
not seen Eric Butera, notified Sergeant Breul and Detective 
Patterson that he was becoming uneasy.  Detective Brigidini 
began driving around the block to look for him, and after 
circling the streets, he returned to his original position.  
Sergeant Breul and Detective Patterson also began to look 
for Eric Butera.  Approximately thirty minutes after Detec-
tive Brigidini dropped off Eric Butera, uniformed police 
officers from the MPD First District who were unrelated to 
the Starbucks investigation appeared at the scene;  they were 
responding to a "911" call by a civilian reporting an uncon-
scious person in the rear walkway of the house where Detec-
tive Brigidini had left Eric Butera.  Detective Brigidini chose 
to remain inside his car when he saw the uniformed officers, 
for fear of compromising the operation.

     Shortly after seeing the uniformed officers, the detectives 
heard an MPD First District radio report of a man down in 
the alley behind the house that Eric Butera attempted to 
enter.  Approximately forty minutes had passed since Detec-
tive Brigidini had last seen Eric Butera.  Because the officers 
had left Eric Butera at the rear of the house, they were 
unaware that he had never gained entry;  rather, Eric Butera 
was accosted by three men, who robbed and stomped him to 
death in the alley behind the house.  Sergeant Breul and 
Detective Patterson drove to the alley and found a uniformed 
First District officer standing with a flashlight over Eric 
Butera, who was bleeding from the back of his head.  An 
ambulance took Eric Butera to George Washington Universi-
ty Hospital, where he was pronounced dead by reason of 
blunt force trauma to the head;  he was 31 years old.

     At trial, the parties presented conflicting evidence concern-
ing (1) the purpose of the undercover operation, (2) the 
manner in which Eric Butera came to participate in the 
undercover drug buy, (3) the degree to which the officers 
made Eric Butera aware of the risks involved, and (4) the 

adequacy of the measures that the officers took to ensure 
Eric Butera's safety.  The District of Columbia made a 
number of admissions, which were read to the jury.  Terry 
Butera presented evidence that the officers gave conflicting 
versions of the purpose of using Eric Butera in this operation:  
While the District of Columbia admitted that the purpose of 
the operation was to obtain a search warrant, the individual 
officers testified that the operation was intended to test Eric 
Butera's reliability as an informant, to learn the name of the 
person whom Eric Butera heard talk about the Starbucks 
murders, and to acquire drugs or information from individuals 
at the house.2  As to the origin of Eric Butera's participation 
in the undercover plan, Terry Butera presented evidence that 
the police officers devised the undercover plan and actively 
solicited Eric Butera, who had ceased being a drug user, for 
this operation.  The District of Columbia presented evidence 
that, from the outset, Eric Butera volunteered to return to 
the Greenleaf Gardens house, which he had visited on numer-
ous occasions (and whose residents he knew) to "get more 
information."

     The evidence was also in conflict regarding the degree to 
which the officers made Eric Butera aware of the dangers 
associated with the undercover operation.  Terry Butera 
presented evidence that the officers did not notify Eric But-
era of a drug bust that had occurred at the house on the 
previous evening (December 3, 1999), of the activities of two 
violent criminal gangs in the area, of the violent crimes that 
were being investigated in the area, or of the risks associated 
with the undercover operation.  The District of Columbia 
responded with evidence that Eric Butera knew the people in 
the area and did not think that the environment was danger-
ous for him.  The District of Columbia admitted, however, 
that Lieutenant McAllister did not fully advise Eric Butera of 
the potential risks of physical harm.

__________
     2  At trial, the District of Columbia admitted that the officers 
could have obtained a search warrant without the aid of Eric 
Butera.

     Finally, Terry Butera introduced evidence disputing the 
adequacy of the measures taken to ensure Eric Butera's 
safety.  Specifically, Terry Butera submitted evidence that 
the officers failed to (1) use surveillance equipment and wires;  
(2) make arrangements for safety and danger signals;  (3) set 
time limits for the operation;  or (4) enlist the assistance of 
the MPD's First District, where the undercover operation 
was to occur, or of specialized MPD narcotics, special investi-
gations, and electronic surveillance units.  Through admis-
sions by the District of Columbia, she presented evidence that 
the officers had planned the undercover operation recklessly 
without conducting a full assessment of the need to use a 
citizen in a controlled drug buy, and that Sergeant Breul had 
admitted to the MPD's Office of Internal Affairs that, in 
carrying out the undercover operation, Eric Butera's safety 
was not the officers' principal concern.  In response, the 
District of Columbia introduced evidence that Eric Butera did 
not want to wear a wire, and that he insisted that he was 
"comfortable with going to the area" because "[e]verybody 
down there knew him."  The District of Columbia admitted, 
however, that other precautions could have been taken to 
ensure Eric Butera's safety.

     B. Procedural History.  Terry Butera, on behalf of her-
self and the estate of Eric Butera, sued the District of 
Columbia, and Lieutenant McAllister, Sergeant Breul, Detec-
tive Patterson, and Detective Brigidini ("the officers"), for 
negligence under the District of Columbia Wrongful Death 
Act and the District of Columbia Survival Act, for violation of 
her son's and her own constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 
s 1983, and at common law for negligence and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. The District of Columbia 
moved for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, 
arguing that the civil rights claims under s 1983 should be 
dismissed as a matter of law because neither Eric Butera nor 
his mother could assert a substantive due process violation 
and, in any event, the officers were entitled to qualified 
immunity.  In addition, the District of Columbia argued that 
punitive damages could not be awarded against the District of 
Columbia as a matter of law, and, alternatively, that even if 
punitive damages were so recoverable, no such award was 

justified by the evidence.3

     The district court denied the motion for summary judg-
ment.  See Butera v. District of Columbia, 83 F. Supp. 2d 15 
(D.D.C. 1999) ("Butera I").  The court concluded that both 
Eric and Terry Butera could assert substantive due process 
claims, based on Eric Butera's right to life and Terry But-
era's right to her son's companionship.  See id. at 19 & n.3.  
The district court also ruled that the allegations in the 
complaint "present[ed] circumstances upon which a jury 
might find the existence of 'extraordinary circumstances' " 
necessary to award punitive damages against the District of 
Columbia.  Id. at 22.

     After trial, the jury returned a verdict against the District 
of Columbia and the four officers on the Survival Act and 
Wrongful Death Act claims (but not on Terry Butera's claim 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress), and against the 
four officers (but not the District of Columbia) under 42 
U.S.C. s 1983, and awarded Terry Butera compensatory and 
punitive damages.4  The District of Columbia moved for 

__________
     3  The District of Columbia and the officers also argued that 
they were entitled to summary judgment because (1) Eric Butera's 
negligence claims were barred by the doctrine of assumption of 
risk;  (2) Terry Butera's intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claim failed as matter of law, and (3) Terry Butera's claims of 
negligent training and supervision by the District were barred 
because she had already sued to hold the District of Columbia 
vicariously liable on a theory of respondeat superior.  Terry Butera 
subsequently abandoned, and the district court dismissed, her 
claims of negligent training and supervision.  See Butera I, 83 
F. Supp. 2d at 18 n.1.

     4  The jury awarded the following damages:
     Compensatory Damages
     Survival Act Claim            $     462,000
     Wrongful Death Act Claim      $       68,000
     Civil Rights Claim of Eric Butera  $36,000,000
     Civil Rights Claim of Terry Butera $34,000,000
     Punitive damages
     Against District of Columbia       $27,000,000
     Against the four Officers
          ($142,500 for each officer)   $     570,000





judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, or for a 
new trial and vacatur or remittitur of the damages awards 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59.  The district court denied the 
motion.  See Butera II, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 27-38.

                               II.

     On appeal, the District of Columbia contends that the 
district court erred in denying it judgment as a matter of law, 
or alternatively a new trial or remittitur, for essentially three 
reasons:  First, the officers are not constitutionally liable to 
Eric or Terry Butera on their s 1983 claims because (A) the 
officers did not have a constitutional duty to protect Eric 
Butera from private violence, (B) Terry Butera had no consti-
tutional interest in the companionship of her adult son, and 
(C) even if such rights existed, the officers were entitled to 
qualified immunity because it was not clearly established 
prior to Eric Butera's death that their conduct would violate 
the Due Process Clause.5  Second, the punitive damages 
awards should be vacated because (A) there is no allegation 
that the officers intended to injure or expose Eric Butera to 
harm by third parties, nor is there evidence that the officers 
acted with evil motive or actual malice, and (B) as a matter of 
District of Columbia law, punitive damages cannot be award-
ed against the District of Columbia;  alternatively, if punitive 
damages against the District of Columbia were permissible, 
there was no evidence of extraordinary circumstances to 
justify such an award.  Third, the damages awards under the 
Survival and Wrongful Death Acts must be set aside because 
(A) Terry Butera failed to establish a national standard of 
care, and (B) the district court's refusal to allow a substitute 
for the District of Columbia's disqualified expert was prejudi-
cial.

__________
     5  Alternatively, the District of Columbia contends that the $36 
and $34 million compensatory awards on the civil rights claims are 
excessive and should be remitted.

     We address in Part II the District of Columbia's challenge 
to the constitutional claims.  In Part III, we address the issue 
of punitive damages.  Finally, in Part IV, we address the 
evidentiary issues regarding the statutory claims.6

     Constitutional Claims.  Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to 
seek money damages from government officials who have 
violated her constitutional rights.  See 42 U.S.C. s 1983.7  
Qualified immunity, on the other hand, generally shields State 

__________
     6  Terry Butera relies on District of Columbia v. Air Florida, 
Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1984), in contending that the 
District of Columbia is barred from raising certain issues on appeal 
because it did not raise exactly the same theories in the district 
court.  By contrast with Air Florida, however, the record estab-
lishes that the District of Columbia, with one exception, is not 
presenting entirely new contentions on appeal.  See Butera II, 83 
F. Supp. 2d at 30-33;  Butera I, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 18-22.  We do 
not reach the exception--the District of Columbia's constitutional 
and evidentiary challenges to the amount of the punitive damages 
award against it--because we vacate this award as a matter of law.  
See infra Part III.B.

     7  Section 1983 provides in relevant part:

     Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
     regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
     District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
     citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
     tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
     immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable 
     to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
     proper proceeding for redress....
     
42 U.S.C. s 1983.  Claims of substantive due process violations by 
State officials are generally analyzed under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "[n]o State shall 
... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law."  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, s 1.  While the District 
of Columbia is not a state, it is subject to the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment, which also states that "[n]o person shall be 
... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law."  U.S. Const. amend. V.  See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 
499 (1954).

officials from liability for their discretionary functions "inso-
far as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable per-
son would have known."  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
818 (1982).  To evaluate a substantive due process claim in 
which State officials have raised the defense of qualified 
immunity, and particularly where defendants can be spared 
the burdens of long trials and where the court can provide 
clarity in standards for official conduct, the Supreme Court 
has instructed that courts ordinarily follow a two-prong analy-
sis.  See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999);  County 
of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998);  Har-
bury v. Deutch, No. 99-5307, 2000 WL 1769100, at *5-6 (D.C. 
Cir. Dec. 12, 2000);  Kalka v. Hawk, 215 F.3d 90, 95-98 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000).  First, courts must address the threshold issue in 
any action brought under s 1983:  "whether the plaintiff has 
alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all."  
Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609 (quoting Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 
286, 290 (1999));  see also Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 841 n.5;  
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146-47 (1979).  In this 
stage, courts must not define the relevant constitutional right 
in overly general terms, lest they strip the qualified immunity 
defense of all meaning:

     For example, the right to due process of law is quite 
     clearly established by the Due Process Clause, and thus 
     there is a sense in which any action that violates that 
     Clause (no matter how unclear it may be that the partic-
     ular action is a violation) violates a clearly established 
     right.  Much the same could be said of any other consti-
     tutional or statutory violation.  But if the test of "clearly 
     established law" were to be applied at this level of 
     generality, it would bear no relationship to the "objective 
     legal reasonableness" that is the touchstone of Harlow.  
     Plaintiffs would be able to convert the rule of qualified 
     immunity that our cases plainly establish into a rule of 
     virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation 
     of extremely abstract rights.
     
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).  Conse-
quently, the court must define the right to a degree that 
would allow officials "reasonably [to] anticipate when their 
conduct may give rise to liability for damages," thus preserv-
ing "the balance that [Supreme Court] cases strike between 
the interests in vindication of citizens' constitutional rights 
and in public officials' effective performance of their duties."  
Id. (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984)).

     Put otherwise, the constitutional right must be identified 
"at the appropriate level of specificity" for a court to deter-
mine the second prong of the inquiry:  whether the right was 
"clearly established."  Wilson, 526 U.S. at 615.  A constitu-
tional right was "clearly established" at the time of the events 
in question only if "[t]he contours of the right [were] suffi-
ciently clear that a reasonable officer would understand that 
what he [was] doing violate[d] that right."  Anderson, 483 
U.S. at 640;  see also Harris v. District of Columbia, 932 F.2d 
10, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1991);  Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 253 
(D.C. Cir. 1987).  As the Court stated in Anderson, "[t]his is 
not to say that an official action is protected by qualified 
immunity unless the very action in question has previously 
been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-
existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent."  483 U.S. at 
640 (citation omitted).

     The district court ruled in denying summary judgment to 
the District of Columbia that Eric Butera had a constitutional 
right to "life," and that Terry Butera had a "constitutionally-
protected liberty interest" in the companionship of her son.  
Butera I, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 19 & n.3.  At trial, the district 
court instructed the jury that Eric Butera's right to "life," 
"personal security," "bodily integrity," and "personal priva-
cy," and Terry Butera's right to her son's companionship, 
were "clearly-established constitutional rights as of the date 
of the incident, December 4, 1997."8  On appeal, the court 

__________
     8  Having declared that the constitutional rights were clearly 
established, the district court allowed the jury to determine wheth-
er a reasonable police officer could have believed that his conduct 
did not violate the clearly-established constitutional rights and 

reviews de novo the district court's legal conclusion that the 
constitutional rights allegedly violated existed and that they 
were clearly established as a matter of law in December 1997.  
See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 n.9 (1985);  United 
States v. Popa, 187 F.3d 672, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

     Under the first stage of the Wilson inquiry--whether the 
plaintiff has asserted the relevant constitutional rights at the 
appropriate level of specificity--we conclude, consistent with 
the Supreme Court's instructions in Anderson and Wilson, 
that the district court erred by defining the constitutional 
rights as Eric Butera's right to life, bodily integrity, personal 
security, and personal privacy, and as Terry Butera's "liberty 
interest" in the companionship of her son.  Although courts 
have acknowledged the existence of these general rights in 
certain circumstances, see, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 
651, 674-75 (1977);  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 
(1972);  Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1201 (3d Cir. 1996);  
Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 589 (9th Cir. 1989), they are 
overly broad where a qualified immunity defense is asserted.  
Applying the standards of Wilson and Anderson, we conclude 
that the relevant inquiries are (1) whether Eric Butera has a 
constitutional right to protection by the District of Columbia 
from danger that it created or enhanced that resulted in harm 
by third parties, and (2) whether Terry Butera has a liberty 
interest in the society and companionship of her independent 
adult child.  This narrower definition of the rights allows a 
reasonable police officer to anticipate whether his actions 
amount to a constitutional violation.

     A. State Endangerment.  As a general matter, a State's 
failure to protect an individual from private violence, even in 
the face of a known danger, "does not constitute a violation of 
the Due Process Clause."  DeShaney v. Winnebago County 
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989);  see also Harris, 
932 F.2d at 13.  The Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court 
has emphasized, is "phrased as a limitation on the State's 

__________
whether, for purposes of qualified immunity, the officers' conduct 
was sufficiently egregious to constitute a due process violation.  See 
Butera I, 83 F. Supp. 2d. at 19.

power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of 
safety and security."  DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.  Thus, the 
Due Process Clause "generally confer[s] no affirmative right 
to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary 
to secure life, liberty, or protect property interests of which 
the government itself may not deprive the individual."  Id. at 
196.  It followed in DeShaney that the State was not constitu-
tionally liable for the permanent brain damage to a child who 
was beaten severely by his father, notwithstanding evidence 
that the State was aware of the child's physical abuse yet 
failed to remove the child from his father's custody.  See id. 
at 202.

     Despite this general rule, the DeShaney Court acknowl-
edged that, in "certain limited circumstances[,] the Constitu-
tion imposes upon the State affirmative duties of care and 
protection with respect to particular individuals."  Id. at 198.  
One such circumstance, the Court stated, arises when the 
State "takes a person into its custody and holds him there 
against his will," hence depriving him of liberty.  Id. at 199-
200;  see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982);  
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976);  LaShawn v. 
Kelly, 990 F.2d. 1319, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1993).  In this circuit, 
the custody exception is narrowly construed:  Mere police 
interaction with or assistance to an individual, for example, 
does not necessarily amount to custody.  See Harris, 932 
F.2d at 14-15.  Thus, in Harris, the court held that police 
officers did not have a constitutional obligation to provide 
medical care to a victim of a drug overdose whom they 
encountered on the street and placed in restraints for his own 
safety.  See id. at 13-15.  In so holding, the court noted that 
the Due Process Clause is "phrased in the negative--'[n]o 
State shall deprive any person'--and does not easily admit of 
a construction imposing on government officials the duty 
affirmatively to do anything."  Id. at 13.  Unlike cases in 
which the Supreme Court declared the State's "affirmative 
duty to protect" individuals in custody, see, e.g., Revere v. 
Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983);  Young-

berg, 457 U.S. at 315-16;  Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104,9 the court 
stated, "Harris had not been formally committed, either by 
conviction, involuntary commitment, or arrest, to the charge 
of the District";  hence, "the government had not entered into 
a special relationship with Harris."  Harris, 932 F.2d at 14.  
Consequently,

     any affirmative constitutional duty on the District offi-
     cials to look after [Harris'] medical needs would ... have 
     to arise not ... 'from the limitation which [they] ... 
     imposed on [Harris'] freedom to act on his own behalf,' 
     but from the limitation which they imposed (by locking 
     him in the police van) on the possibility of others learning 
     of Harris' condition and coming to his aid.
     
Id. at 14 (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200).  The court 
continued, "it is no longer the 'deprivation of liberty' which 
causes the injury, as was deemed crucial in DeShaney to 
trigger due process protections, so much as the 'deprivation 
of visibility' or the appearance of helplessness."  Id. at 15.  
Moreover, the court observed, "we are not at all confident 
that it will be subsequently determined by the Supreme 
Court (or other federal courts) that the Youngberg line [i.e., 
the custody definition,] will be extended to this kind of 
situation."  Id.

     In addition to custody, the DeShaney Court left open the 
possibility that, under a second set of circumstances, the 
State could be liable for harm inflicted to an individual by 
third parties.  In explaining the absence of constitutional 
liability for the child's physical abuse by his father, the Court 
stated:

__________
     9  In Estelle, the Supreme Court held that the cruel and unusual 
punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment obliges the State to 
provide medical care to prisoners.  See 429 U.S. at 103-04.  Young-
berg extended this obligation as a matter of substantive due process 
to mental patients who were involuntarily committed.  See 457 U.S. 
at 315-16.  In Revere, the Supreme Court held that the Due 
Process Clause also requires the State to provide medical care to 
persons who were injured while being apprehended by the police.  
See 463 U.S. at 244.

     While the State may have been aware of the dangers that 
     Joshua faced in the free world, it played no part in their 
     creation, nor did it do anything to render him more 
     vulnerable to them.
     
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.  All circuit courts of appeals, 
except this circuit, have by now relied on this passage in 
DeShaney to acknowledge that there may be possible consti-
tutional liability under s 1983 "where the state creates a 
dangerous situation or renders citizens more vulnerable to 
danger."10  Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 947 (1993).11  In Reed, police 
officers arrested a presumably sober driver and left behind 
an obviously intoxicated passenger, who subsequently drove 
the car and was involved in a collision with the victims.  The 
Seventh Circuit held that the victims of the collision stated a 
substantive due process claim because "[p]olice officers who 
remove sober drivers and leave behind drunk passengers with 

__________
     10  See, e.g., Frances-Colon v. Ramirez, 107 F.3d 62, 64 (1st Cir. 
1997);  Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1993);  
Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1201 (3d Cir. 1996);  Pinder v. 
Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175-77 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 994 (1995);  Johnson v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Distr., 
38 F.3d 198, 200-01 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1017 
(1995);  Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1066-67 (6th 
Cir. 1998);  Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1993), 
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 947 (1993);  Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 
F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 913 
(1993);  Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 589-90 (9th Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990);  Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 
572 & n.7 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1118 (1996);  Wyke 
v. Polk County Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 567 (11th Cir. 1997).

     11  Even before DeShaney, several courts of appeals had recog-
nized a State's constitutional duty to protect an individual whom the 
State placed in a situation of heightened danger.  See, e.g., Wells v. 
Walker, 852 F.2d 368, 370-71 (8th Cir. 1988);  Escamilla v. City of 
Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1986);  Estate of Gilmore v. 
Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 722 (1st Cir. 1986);  Jones v. Phyfer, 761 
F.2d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1985);  Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 
(7th Cir. 1982).

keys may be said to create a danger."12  Id. at 1125.  Similar-
ly, in Wood, a police officer arrested a drunk driver at 2:30 
a.m. and impounded his vehicle, leaving the driver's female 
passenger by the side of the road in a high-crime area.  The 
passenger, who was five miles from her home, accepted a ride 
from a stranger, who raped her.  See 879 F.2d at 586.  The 
Ninth Circuit held that the passenger had "raised a triable 
issue of fact as to whether [the police officer] affirmatively 
placed [her] in a position of danger."  Id. at 589-90 (citation 
omitted).  Additionally, in Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 
F.3d 1055 (6th Cir. 1998), city officials released personal 
information from the files of undercover police officers (in-
cluding names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the 
officers and their families) to defense counsel for the alleged 
drug conspirators whom the officers had investigated.  The 
Sixth Circuit held that "the City's actions placed the officers 
and their family members in 'special danger' by substantially 
increasing the likelihood that a private actor would deprive 
them of their liberty interest in personal security."  Id. at 
1067.

     The circuit courts have adopted the State endangerment 
concept in a range of fact patterns concerning alleged miscon-

__________
     12  Like this court in Harris, which refused to adopt an expand-
ed definition of "custody," the Seventh Circuit in Reed was reluctant 
to "expand any existing duties for police officers," 986 F.2d at 1127.  
Nonetheless, the court imposed a duty where officers "knowingly 
and affirmatively create a dangerous situation for the public and fail 
to take reasonable preventative steps to diffuse that danger."  Id.  
In Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1992) (en 
banc), the Eighth Circuit reached a different conclusion on a 
somewhat similar fact pattern.  In Gregory, a police officer de-
tained the designated driver of a drinking group and allowed him to 
follow the officer to the police station.  The driver entered the 
police station, leaving the keys inside the car;  one of the intoxicated 
passengers drove away and had an accident.  See id. at 1007-08.  
The court concluded that the police officer had not taken the 
requisite affirmative actions to trigger liability under the State 
endangerment concept, because it was the designated driver (and 
not the police officer) who placed the passengers in danger by 
leaving the keys in the car.  See id. at 1012.

duct by State officials.13  Regardless of the conduct at issue, 
however, the circuits have held that a key requirement for 
constitutional liability is affirmative conduct by the State to 
increase or create the danger that results in harm to the 
individual.  No constitutional liability exists where the State 
actors "had no hand in creating a danger but [simply] 'stood 
by and did nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a 
more active role for them.' "  Reed, 986 F.2d at 1125 (quoting 
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203);  see also Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 
1066;  Armijo v. Wagon Mound Pub. Schs., 159 F.3d 1253, 
1262-63 (10th Cir. 1998);  Frances-Colon v. Ramirez, 107 
F.3d 62, 64 (1st Cir. 1997);  Estate of Stevens v. City of Green 
Bay, 105 F.3d 1169, 1176-77 (7th Cir. 1997);  Johnson v. 
Dallas Indep. Sch. Distr., 38 F.3d 198, 201 (5th Cir. 1994);  
Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1993);  
Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(en banc);  L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 121 (9th Cir. 1992).  
Absent such affirmative conduct by the State to endanger an 
individual, courts have rejected liability under a State endan-
germent concept.  See, e.g., S.S. v. McMullen, 225 F.3d 960, 
962 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc);  Stevens v. Umsted, 131 F.3d 
697, 705 (7th Cir. 1997).

     Unlike other circuit courts of appeals, this court has never 
been presented with a State endangerment claim;  rather, it 
has only addressed the first DeShaney exception-custody.  In 
Harris, for example, the court was confronted with a claim 
that officers had a constitutional obligation to provide medical 
care to a drug overdose victim whom they had restrained in a 
police wagon for his own safety.  In this context, the court 
addressed the contention that the officers entered into a 
"special relationship" with the victim because they placed him 

__________
     13  Plaintiffs have brought s 1983 suits under the State endan-
germent theory for the actions of various types of State actors, 
including police officers, see, e.g., Reed, 986 F.2d at 1123;  supervi-
sors of State custodial institutions, see, e.g., L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 
F.2d 119, 120 (9th Cir. 1992);  city officials, see, e.g., Kallstrom, 136 
F.3d at 1059;  and public school officials, see, e.g., Armijo v. Wagon 
Mound Pub. Schs., 159 F.3d 1253, 1256 (10th Cir. 1998);  Stevens v. 
Umsted, 131 F.3d 697, 699 (7th Cir. 1997).

in police custody.  See Harris, 932 F.2d at 14.14  Similarly, in 
LaShawn, the court was confronted with a claim of constitu-
tional liability based on DeShaney's custody exception.  In 
LaShawn, class action plaintiffs brought constitutional and 
statutory claims against the District of Columbia, alleging 
abuses in the District of Columbia's child welfare and foster 
care system.  See 990 F.2d at 1320-21.  The district court 
ruled that the plaintiffs had stated a due process claim based 
on DeShaney's concept of custody, because "the rights of 
children in foster care [were] analogous to the rights of the 
involuntarily committed."  LaShawn v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 
959, 992 (D.D.C. 1991).  On appeal, the court avoided reach-
ing the constitutional and federal statutory issues, choosing 
instead to address the claims presented under District of 
Columbia statutes and regulations.  See LaShawn, 990 F.2d 
at 1324.15  Only now is the court directly confronted with a 
plaintiff's express s 1983 claim of State endangerment.

     The development of the State endangerment concept by the 
circuit court of appeals is consistent with the notion, implied 
in DeShaney, that something less than physical custody may 
suffice to present a substantive due process claim.  We join 

__________
     14  The concurrence in Harris alludes to the State endanger-
ment exception, see 932 F.2d at 17, but does not directly address it.

     15  The court concluded in LaShawn that the District of Colum-
bia statutes created a private right of action both for children who 
were in its foster care and for children who were abused or 
neglected but not yet in its custody.  See 990 F.2d at 1325.  Citing 
District of Columbia precedent that "conclusively" showed this to be 
the case for the latter category of plaintiffs under the District of 
Columbia Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act, id. (citation 
omitted), the court reasoned that, in view of the Act's application to 
children who were not yet in custody, it "seem[ed] self-evident that 
th[e] Act ... also creates privately enforceable rights for those 
children actually in the District [of Columbia]'s custody."  Id.  In 
dictum, the court interpreted DeShaney to hold that "the state has 
a constitutional duty to assume responsibility for the safety and 
well-being of a person only when the state takes that person into its 
custody."  Id. (emphasis added).

the other circuits in holding that, under the State endanger-
ment concept, an individual can assert a substantive due 
process right to protection by the District of Columbia from 
third-party violence when District of Columbia officials affir-
matively act to increase or create the danger that ultimately 
results in the individual's harm.16  In so doing, we are "mind-
ful of the caution we must exercise in expanding the liberty 
interests protected by substantive due process," Harbury, 
2000 WL 1769100, at *9 (citing and quoting Collins v. Harker 
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)), but conclude that the 
circuits' exposition of the concept has mitigated some of the 
general concerns about the lack of guideposts;  to that extent, 
the court is hardly "break[ing] new ground in this field."  
Collins, 503 U.S. at 125.

     To assert a substantive due process violation, however, the 
plaintiff must also show that the District of Columbia's con-
duct was "so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be 
said to shock the contemporary conscience."  Sacramento, 
523 U.S. at 847 n.8.  This stringent requirement exists to 
differentiate substantive due process, which is intended only 
to protect against arbitrary government action, from local 
tort law.  See id. at 845-46, 848-49;  Daniels v. Williams, 474 
U.S. 327, 331 (1986);  Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 
(1974);  see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).  
Hence, while it may be possible under District of Columbia 
tort law for a plaintiff to obtain a remedy by proving mere 
negligence or failure to exercise due care, this "lowest com-
mon denominator of customary tort liability" is "categorically 
beneath the threshold of constitutional due process."  Sacra-
mento, 523 U.S. at 848-49.

     It is, on the contrary, behavior at the other end of the 
     culpability spectrum that would most probably support a 
     
__________
     16  Because we hold that the right arising from State endanger-
ment was not clearly established in this circuit at the time of Eric 
Butera's death, we do not address whether the possibly voluntary 
nature of his conduct would relieve or mitigate the District of 
Columbia of constitutional liability.  See Summar v. Bennett, 157 
F.3d 1054, 1060 n.2 (6th Cir. 1998).

     substantive due process claim;  conduct intended to in-
     jure in some way unjustifiable by any government inter-
     est is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the 
     conscience-shocking level.
     
Id. at 849.  Hence, in Sacramento, in the context of a high-
speed chase by police officers that accidentally killed a fleeing 
motorcyclist, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff must 
satisfy the higher "intent to harm" standard to prove that the 
officers' behavior was conscience-shocking.  See id. at 854.

     The Supreme Court in Sacramento acknowledged, howev-
er, that in some circumstances the "point of the conscience-
shocking" can be reached by proving "something more than 
negligence but 'less than intentional conduct, such as reck-
lessness or gross negligence.' "  Id. at 849 (citation omitted).  
While such proof "is a matter for closer calls," id., this lower 
threshold, the Supreme Court has instructed, is appropriate 
in circumstances where the State has a heightened obligation 
toward the individual.  For example, where the State has 
taken a person into custody, it "so restrains [his] liberty that 
it renders him unable to care for himself";  therefore, the 
"Constitution imposes upon [the State] a corresponding duty 
to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-
being."  Id. at 851 (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200).  
Further, where an individual is in State custody, prison 
officials have "the luxury ... of ... time to make unhurried 
judgments, upon the chance for repeated reflection, largely 
uncomplicated by the pulls of competing obligations."  Id. at 
853.  Because of these special circumstances, a State official's 
deliberate indifference in the context of state custody can be 
"truly shocking."  Id.

     As in the context of State custody, the State also owes a 
duty of protection when its agents create or increase the 
danger to an individual.  Like prison officials who are 
charged with overseeing an inmate's welfare, State officials 
who create or enhance danger to citizens may also be in a 
position where "actual deliberation is practical."  Id. at 851.  
In the instant case, the officers had the opportunity to plan 
the undercover operation with care.  In view of the officers' 

duty to protect Eric Butera, he may prove that the officers' 
treatment of him in connection with the attempted undercov-
er drug buy "shocked the conscience" by meeting the lower 
threshold of "deliberate indifference."  See Radecki v. Barela, 
146 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 1998);  L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 
894, 896 (9th Cir. 1996).

     The remaining question, under the second prong of the 
Wilson test, is whether, in December 1997, the law surround-
ing the violation of Eric Butera's asserted due process right 
to be protected from third-party violence in the context of 
State endangerment was "sufficiently clear that a reasonable 
officer would understand that what he [was] doing violate[d] 
that right."  Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640;  see also Wilson, 526 
U.S. at 615.  Qualified immunity is intended to "provide 
government officials with the ability 'reasonably to anticipate 
when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages,' " 
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646 (citation omitted).  In light of this 
purpose, an official "[cannot] reasonably be expected to antici-
pate subsequent legal developments, nor ... fairly be said to 
'know' that the law forb[ids] conduct not previously identified 
as unlawful."  Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.  Consequently, the 
court must determine whether the Supreme Court, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, and, to the extent that there is a 
consensus, other circuits have spoken clearly on the lawful-
ness of the conduct at issue.17  See Clanton v. Cooper, 129 
F.3d 1147, 1156-57 (10th Cir. 1997);  Gan v. City of New 
York, 996 F.2d 522, 532 (2d Cir. 1993).

     Upon examining relevant case law on the "State endanger-
ment" exception to DeShaney, we conclude that, in December 
1997, Eric Butera's constitutional right to protection by the 
District of Columbia from third-party violence was not clearly 

__________
     17  In Anderson, the Supreme Court made clear that, in evaluat-
ing whether the right at issue was clearly established, a court need 
not have found the very action in question unlawful in the past.  See 
id. at 640.  Rather, a court must consider whether "in the light of 
pre-existing law the unlawfulness [was] apparent."  Id.  To make 
this determination, however, the parties have pointed us to no 

established within the meaning of Anderson.  First, as dis-
cussed, this circuit has never recognized constitutional liabili-
ty in the context of a State endangerment claim, and the 
court in Harris intimated that it would construe narrowly the 
express custody exception set forth in DeShaney.18  See 932 
F.2d at 13.  Furthermore, LaShawn, albeit in dictum, did not 
indicate any circumstance other than custody that would give 
rise to District of Columbia liability.  See 990 F.2d at 1325.  
Moreover, the only Supreme Court authority to support a 
State endangerment concept consisted of the often-quoted 
dictum in DeShaney, which simply "leaves the door open for 
liability" in this context.  Reed, 986 F.2d at 1125.

     Second, as of 1997, the "contours" of the rights created by 
the State endangerment concept were not settled among the 
circuits.  See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640.  While courts of 
appeals had adopted the State endangerment concept without 
prompting Supreme Court review,19 there was little consisten-
cy in courts' explanations of the types of actions that would 
amount to constitutional liability.  The Eighth Circuit, for 
__________
source other than case law from the Supreme Court and the 
circuits.

     18  This court and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
have acknowledged that, in regard to liability for negligence, if a 
"special relationship" exists between an individual and the police, 
the latter has a "duty to protect."  Malhoyt, 830 F.2d at 259 
(citation omitted);  see also Butera II, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 31.  To 
determine whether a "special relationship" exists, the District of 
Columbia courts ask whether the police "have beg[un] to act in 
behalf of a particular citizen in such a way as to raise significantly 
the quotient of risk over and above the risks assumed by every 
other member of the community."  Malhoyt, 830 F.2d at 259 
(quoting Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306, 1312 (D.C. 
1983)).  The issue of constitutional liability, however, involves con-
siderations not pertinent to the negligence inquiry.  See, e.g., Sacra-
mento, 523 U.S. at 848-49.

     19  See, e.g., Uhlrig, 64 F.3d 567, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1118 
(1996);  Pinder, 54 F.3d 1169, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 994 (1995);  
Johnson, 38 F.3d 198, cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1017 (1995);  Reed, 986 
F.2d 1122, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 947 (1993);  City of Rogers, 974 
F.2d 1006, cert. denied, 507 U.S. 913 (1993);  Wood, 879 F.2d 583, 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990).

example, first acknowledged that "[i]t is not clear, under 
DeShaney, how large a role the state must play in the 
creation of danger and in the creation of vulnerability before 
it assumes a corresponding constitutional duty to protect."  
Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990).  The 
court later stated that, to establish constitutional liability, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that he "would not have been in 
harm's way but for the government's affirmative actions."  
Carlton v. Cleburne County, 93 F.3d 505, 508 (8th Cir. 1996).  
The Seventh Circuit, in turn, provided a slightly different 
standard, finding State endangerment where the State "great-
ly increased the danger to [the plaintiff] while constricting 
access to self-help."  Estate of Stevens v. City of Green Bay, 
105 F.3d 1169, 1177 (7th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).  Other 
circuits, however, adopted more elaborate tests to determine 
whether the actions of State officials amounted to State 
endangerment and therefore triggered constitutional liabili-
ty.20

__________
     20  For example, while stating in 1995 that it had "yet to decide 
definitively whether the State endangerment theory is a viable 
mechanism for finding a constitutional injury," the Third Circuit 
identified four elements that State endangerment cases from other 
circuits had "in common":

     (1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly 
     direct;  (2) the state actor acted in willful disregard for the 
     safety of the plaintiff;  (3) there existed some relationship 
     between the state and the plaintiff;  [and] (4) the state actors 
     used their authority to create an opportunity that otherwise 
     would not have existed for the third party's crime to occur.
     
Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1152 (3d Cir. 1995).  In 
1996, the Third Circuit applied the four elements outlined in Mark 
to hold that an individual could assert a constitutional claim based 
on the State endangerment theory.  See Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1208-
11.  The Fifth Circuit, in turn, stated the following common ele-
ments, while also acknowledging in 1994 that it had never predicat-
ed relief based on a State endangerment claim:

 

     [T]he environment created by the state actors must be danger-
     ous;  they must know it is dangerous;  and ... they must have 
     
     While all of these tests share the key element of State 
endangerment, namely, affirmative conduct by State actors, 
see, e.g., Reed, 986 F.2d at 1126, they are inconsistent in their 
elaborations of the concept.  For example, the circuits have 
adopted different nexus requirements, compare Mark v. Bor-
ough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1152 (3d Cir. 1995), and 
Carlton, 93 F.3d at 508, with Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 
574 (10th Cir. 1995), and employed differing degrees of 
specificity in defining actionable conduct, compare Estate of 
Stevens, 105 F.3d at 1177, and Carlton, 93 F.3d at 508, with 
Johnson, 38 F.3d at 201, Mark, 51 F.3d at 1152, and Uhlrig, 
64 F.3d at 574.  Moreover, although we do not suggest that 
State liability would necessarily be eliminated or mitigated, to 
date no circuit has applied the State endangerment concept 
where an arguably voluntary informant, much less a police 
operative like Eric Butera, was involved.  See supra note 16.  
This lack of clarity in the law of the circuits leads us to 
conclude that no reasonable police officer would have known 
that his or her actions were subject to a State endangerment 
limitation.  See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640.  Harris' silence, 
and LaShawn's restrictive dictum, as to the second DeShaney 

__________
     used their authority to create an opportunity that would not 
     otherwise have existed for the third party's crime to occur.
     
Johnson, 38 F.3d at 201.  Finally, the Tenth Circuit expounded a 
multi-part test to determine whether the defendant created a 
"special danger" sufficient to trigger the State's constitutional liabil-
ity:
     Plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) [plaintiff] was a member of
     a limited and specifically definable group; (2) Defendants'
     conduct put [the plaintiff] . . . at substantial risk of serious,
     immediate and proximate harm; (3) the risk was obvious or
     known; (4) Defendants acted recklessly in concious disregard
     of that risk; and (5) such conduct, when viewed in total, is
     conscience shocking.
Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 574.  In 1998, the Tenth Circuit added another
criterion to theUhlrig test: Plaintiff must show 34that the charged
state entity and the charged individual defendant actors created the
danger or increased the plaintiff's vulnerability to the danger in
some way.34  Armijo, 159 F.3d at 1263.

 

exception gave no such warning in this circuit.  See La-
Shawn, 990 F.2d at 1325;  Harris, 932 F.2d at 13.

     Given the criteria imposed by the qualified immunity de-
fense, as well as the absence of Supreme Court and District 
of Columbia Circuit precedent, we hold that the law in this 
circuit was insufficiently clear in December 1997 to alert the 
District of Columbia and its police officers to possible consti-
tutional liability (as distinct from tort liability) for their 
conduct in using Eric Butera as a police operative in an 
undercover operation.  While the law was evolving in the 
circuits to cover situations where either (1) there was State 
control or custody, or (2) the State knowingly created or 
increased the risk that an individual would be exposed to 
danger, we do not know whether, had a State endangerment 
concept been recognized in this circuit in 1997, Eric Butera's 
claim would have survived.  In any event, the officers were 
entitled to qualified immunity.

     B. Right to the Companionship of an Adult Child.  Terry 
Butera's claim of a constitutional right to the companionship 
of her 31-year-old son has a more difficult hurdle to over-
come:  It fails the first prong of the Wilson test.  The 
Supreme Court has not spoken to the precise issue, and the 
precedent in this and nearly all of the other circuits suggests 
that no such right exits.

     Terry Butera testified that her son was an adult, living on 
his own, and that he was not providing her with any financial 
assistance at the time of his death.  The evidence further 
showed that Eric Butera had moved out of his mother's house 
when he was eighteen years old, married, moved to Pennsyl-
vania, and had a child.  In allowing Terry Butera to claim a 
due process interest in the society and companionship of her 
adult son, the district court relied solely on our opinion in 
Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  See 
Butera II, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 31;  Butera I, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 
19 n.3.  In Franz, federal officials relocated and changed the 
identities of a divorced mother and her minor children pursu-

ant to the Federal Witness Protection Program, with "the 
effect of severing the ongoing relationship between the chil`

     dren and their natural father."  707 F.2d at 585.  The chil-
dren's father sued the United States on statutory and consti-
tutional grounds, alleging a violation of his constitutionally-
protected right to his children's companionship.  In holding 
that such a right existed, the Franz court acknowledged "the 
profound importance of the bond between a parent and a 
child to the emotional life of both."  Id. at 599.  The court 
expressed "skepticism" at governmental interference with a 
parent's right to "shape the development" of his children and 
to be intimately involved in the "rearing of his offspring."  Id. 
at 597-99.

     On appeal, Terry Butera relies on Franz, as well on cases 
from other circuits that recognize parents' constitutionally-
protected liberty interest in the companionship and custody of 
their children and in the "maintenance and integrity of the 
family."  Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 
509 n.7 (3d Cir. 1985), overruled in part by DeShaney, 489 
U.S. at 202;  see also Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 
651, 653-54 (9th Cir. 1985);  Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 
F.2d 1205, 1243-44 (7th Cir. 1984).  In Bell, the Seventh 
Circuit recognized this constitutional interest in the context of 
a plaintiff's twenty-three-year-old son.21  See 746 F.2d at 
1242-45.

     The general statements in Franz, as well as in the Supreme 
Court cases on which Franz relies, focus on securing the 
rights of parents to have custody of and to raise their minor 
children in a manner that develops "parental and filial bonds 
free from government interference."  Franz, 707 F.2d at 595.  
This emphasis is clear in cases such as Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), where, in the context of the 
___________
     21   In recognizing a constitutional right for Bell's father (the
plaintiff), the Seventh Circuit noted that the decedent was single, 
had no children, and had not become a part of another family unit
other than his father's, although the two lived apart.  See Bell, 746
F.2d at 1245.  The court concluded that the victim's age and
separate residence were relevant only to the amount of damages to
be awarded to the father for the loss of the son's society and
companionship.  See id.
prosecution of a child's guardian for furnishing her with 
religious literature to sell on the public streets in violation of 
child labor laws, the Court stated that "the custody, care, and 
nurture of the child reside first in the parents," id. at 166, and 
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, (1968), where the Court 
recognized parents' right "to direct the rearing of their 
children [as] basic in the structure of our society."  Id. at 639.  
Moreover, while the Court in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 
(1972), recognized a parent's constitutional interest in the 
"companionship" of his children, it did so in the context of a 
parent's right to the custody and care of a minor child.  See 
id. at 651.  We find nothing in Supreme Court case law to 
indicate an intention to extend these concerns in support of a 
constitutional liberty interest in a parent's relationship with 
her adult son.  Indeed, two of the three cases on which Terry 
Butera relies were also decided in the context of minor (not 
adult) children.  See Kelson, 767 F.2d at 652-54;  Estate of 
Bailey, 768 F.2d at 505, 509 n.7.  In the third case, see Bell, 
746 F.2d at 1245, the Seventh Circuit relied largely on the 
same Supreme Court cases that this court cited in Franz, as 
well as on others that focus on parents' relationships with 
their minor children, to reject the notion that "a constitutional 
line based solely on the age of the child should be drawn."  
Id.22

     This circuit has indicated that it is not prepared to adopt 
the interpretation that the Seventh Circuit espoused in Bell. 
In an addendum to Franz, the court acknowledged different 
constitutional treatment when the parent-child relationship 
involves two adults:

     When children grow up, their dependence on their par-
     ents for guidance, socialization, and support gradually 
     diminishes.  At the same time, the strength and impor-
     tance of the emotional bonds between them and their 
     parents usually decrease.  Concededly, the bond between 
_____________
     22        In addition to Stanley and Prince, the Bell court cites Caban
v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) and Quilloin v. Walcott, 434
U.S. 246, 255 (1978).  Both cases deal with parental interests in
minor children in the context of adoption.
     a parent and child when the child is an adult usually 
     bears some resemblance to the same bond when the child 
     was a minor.  But, as a long line of Supreme Court cases 
     attests, the differences between the two stages of the 
     relationship are sufficiently marked to warrant sharply 
     different constitutional treatment.
     
Franz v. United States, 712 F.2d 1428, 1432 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(citation omitted).  While the court acknowledges the impor-
tance of the parent-child relationship regardless of the child's 
age, and the court does not minimize the devastating loss that 
a parent can experience from the death of an adult child, this 
consideration, in view of circuit precedent, is insufficient to 
establish a constitutional liberty interest under s 1983.  We 
do not think Franz can be read as broadly as the district 
court and Terry Butera suggest.  Neither do we think the 
Supreme Court cases and other authorities on which Bell 
relied can be read to support Terry Butera's constitutional 
claim.  Therefore, we hold that a parent does not have a 
constitutionally-protected liberty interest in the companion-
ship of a child who is past minority and independent.  Conse-
quently, the district court erred in denying summary judg-
ment on Terry Butera's due process claim.23

     For these reasons, we hold that the District of Columbia 
and the four officers were entitled to summary judgment on 
both Eric and Terry's Butera's s 1983 claims.  The officers 
were entitled to qualified immunity regarding Eric Butera's 
constitutional claim;  further, Terry Butera did not have a 
constitutional right to the companionship of her adult son.  
Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order denying 
judgment as a matter of law and vacate the compensatory 
__________
     .23  Because we hold that a parent-child relationship between two
indepedent adults does not invoke constituitonal 34companionship34
interests, we do not reach the District of Columbia's contention that
Terry Butera's claim fails because the District of Columbia's actions
were not intentionally directed or aimed at her relationship with her 
son.  See generally Harbury, 2000 WL 1769100,  at *9.
damages award on the s 1983 claims.24

                               III.

     Punitive Damages.  The District of Columbia contends 
that the evidence presented by Terry Butera does not meet 
the stringent evidentiary standard under District of Columbia 
law for awarding punitive damages against the individual 
officers.  It further contends that, as a matter of District of 
Columbia law, punitive damages may not be awarded against 
the District in this case.  We conclude that the District's 
evidentiary challenge is wanting, see Barbour v. Merrill, 48 
F.3d 1270, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1995), and that the district court 
erred in declining to vacate the punitive damages award 
against the District.25

     A. The Individual Officers.  "In the District of Columbia, 
with rare exceptions, punitive damages [against individuals] 
are available only for intentional torts."  Jemison v. National 
Baptist Convention, U.S.A., Inc., 720 A.2d 275, 285 n.9 (D.C. 
1998);  see also Bernstein v. Fernandez, 649 A.2d 1064, 1073 
(D.C. 1991);  Washington Med. Ctr. v. Holle, 573 A.2d 1269, 
1284 (D.C. 1990).  "Punitive damages are warranted only 
when the defendant commits a tortious act accompanied with 
fraud, ill will, recklessness, wantonness, oppressiveness, wilful 

__________
     24  Because summary judgment was warranted on Eric and 
Terry Butera's civil rights claims, we do not address the contentions 
of the District of Columbia that the s 1983 compensatory damages 
award was excessive and that the verdict awarded "double recov-
ery" to Eric Butera's estate.

     25  The jury did not allocate its punitive damages award among 
the constitutional and statutory claims brought by Terry Butera.  
On appeal, the District of Columbia has not contended that, if the 
court vacates the $70 million compensatory award under s 1983, it 
is entitled either to remittitur of the punitive damages awards or to 
a new trial on damages.  Absent such a contention, and because 
"[a]n award of punitive damages cannot stand alone, unaccompanied 
by compensatory damages," Bernstein v. Fernandez, 649 A.2d 1064, 
1073 (D.C. 1991), we attribute the punitive damages award to Terry 
Butera's Survival Act and Wrongful Death Act claims.

disregard of the plaintiff's right, or other circumstances tend-
ing to aggravate the injury."  Jonathan Woodner Co. v. 
Breeden, 665 A.2d 929, 938 (D.C. 1995) (quoting Washington 
Med. Ctr., 573 A.2d at 1284).  Thus, to obtain punitive 
damages under District of Columbia law, Terry Butera must 
"prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the [officers] 
committed a tortious act, and by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the act was accompanied by conduct and a state of 
mind evincing malice or its equivalent."  Jonathan Woodner 
Co., 665 A.2d at 938.  A jury may "infer the requisite state of 
mind from the surrounding circumstances."  Jemison, 720 
A.2d at 285-86.  Consistent with this standard, the district 
court instructed the jury that it could award punitive dam-
ages

     only if the plaintiff has proved with clear and convincing 
     evidence:  One, that the defendant[s] acted with evil 
     motive, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression, 
     or with intent to injure, or willful disregard for the rights 
     of Eric Butera;  and Two, that the defendants' [sic] 
     conduct itself was outrageous, grossly fraudulent or reck-
     less toward the safety of Eric Butera.
     
The district court further instructed the jury that it could 
"conclude that the [officers] acted with a state of mind 
justifying punitive damages based on direct evidence or based 
on circumstantial evidence."

     In light of the evidence presented by Terry Butera, as well 
as the District of Columbia's admissions at trial, a reasonable 
jury could conclude that the officers were reckless toward 
Eric Butera's safety.  The officers sent Eric Butera, un-
watched and unmonitored, into a housing complex that they 
should have realized was a source of criminal narcotics sales 
and violence;  in so doing, they never made the requisite 
threshold evaluation of the need to use a citizen as a police 
operative and thereby expose him to potential danger.  Not 
only did the officers fail to take obvious precautionary steps, 
such as consulting with the MPD narcotics and special inves-
tigations units, they failed to consult with the MPD First 
District to determine whether there were ongoing or recent 

operations in the area of the Greenleaf Gardens housing 
complex that might interfere with or increase the danger 
involved in the planned undercover operation.  The evidence 
before the jury revealed that the officers did not notify Eric 
Butera of possible police activity or police concerns in the 
area, including a drug-related arrest that had occurred at the 
same location on the previous night. Furthermore, while 
executing the operation, the officers did not arrange for 
monitoring or signaling devices, much less visual, auditory, or 
electronic surveillance from a rooftop, window, or other loca-
tion.  Because of carelessness with respect to Eric Butera's 
safety, the officers were not in a position to come to his aid 
when he was brutally attacked.  Not until forty minutes after 
Eric Butera headed toward the house, when, as a result of the 
arrival of police officers unrelated to the undercover opera-
tion, were the officers in a position to know what had hap-
pened to him;  by that time, it was too late to save Eric 
Butera's life.

     From the entirety of the evidence, the jury could reason-
ably have inferred that the officers' actions were impelled by 
ambition for professional advancement, heedless of Eric But-
era's safety.  See Jemison, 720 A.2d at 285-86.  There was 
testimony about the detectives getting credit for solving the 
high-profile Starbucks murders from which such an inference 
could reasonably be drawn.  That the jury did not return a 
verdict in favor of Terry Butera's claim for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress does not lessen the force of the 
evidence regarding the officers' conduct toward Eric Butera.  
Thus, because no contention is made of error in the jury 
instructions or of excessiveness of the punitive damages 
awards against the officers, the court has no basis to conclude 
that the district court erred in declining to vacate the punitive 
damages awards against the officers.26

__________
     26  Although the District of Columbia asserted in moving for 
judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50, or for a new trial and 
vacatur or remittitur of the damages awards under Rule 59, that 
the punitive damages awards against the officers were grossly 
excessive, no such contention is made on appeal.

     B. The District of Columbia.  In City of Newport v. Fact 
Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981), the Supreme Court stated 
that "a municipality is immune from punitive damages" under 
s 1983.  Id. at 271.  The District of Columbia is a municipal 
corporation.  See D.C. Code s 1-102 (1999 Repl.).  In addi-
tion, this court and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
have held that, absent "extraordinary circumstances," puni-
tive damages are unavailable against the District of Columbia 
under District of Columbia law.  Atchinson v. District of 
Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1996);  see also Finkel-
stein v. District of Columbia, 593 A.2d 591, 599 (D.C. 1991) 
(en banc).  The term "extraordinary circumstances" is a term 
of art in this context.  In Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 
227 F.3d 433 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the court, following Fact 
Concerts, clarified the meaning of "extraordinary circum-
stances" to refer to circumstances such as "where a jurisdic-
tion's taxpayers are directly responsible for perpetrating the 
policies that caused the plaintiff's injuries" or "where a mu-
nicipality or its policymakers have intentionally adopted the 
unconstitutional policy that caused the damages in question."  
Id. at 447.  Terry Butera has made no such showing here.

     Contrary to Terry Butera's contention that there was am-
ple evidence of an "officially sanctioned cover-up" of the 
officers' wrongdoing and of "condonation" by the officers' 
superiors, she has made no showing that the District of 
Columbia policymakers intentionally adopted an unconstitu-
tional policy.  That none of the officers was disciplined in 
connection with the undercover operation does not show that 
the District of Columbia condoned their conduct or attempted 
to deny that the officers were at fault;  the District of 
Columbia's admissions to the jury are to the contrary.  Still, 
the jury found that the evidence was insufficient to hold the 
District of Columbia liable for violation of Eric and Terry 
Butera's claimed civil rights under s 1983.  In addition, 
Terry Butera's contention that the jury's finding that the 
officers engaged in willful misconduct translates into a finding 
of willful misconduct by the District of Columbia is unavail-
ing.  All of the District of Columbia's actions and policies are 

performed through agents.  If these agents' actions were 
always attributable to the District of Columbia, the holdings 
in Fact Concerts and Daskalea, emphasizing the very limited 
circumstances in which a court will award punitive damages 
against the District of Columbia, would be undermined.27

                               IV.

     Claims under Survival Act and Wrongful Death Act.  Re-
garding the verdicts under the Survival and Wrongful Death 
Acts, the District of Columbia contends that the district court 
erred first, in ruling that Terry Butera's expert witness 
established a national standard of care, see Butera II, 83 F. 
Supp. 2d at 28-29, and second, in denying the District of 
Columbia's pretrial request for a substitute expert on police 
practices.28

     A. National Standard of Care.  Under District of Colum-
bia law, "[t]he plaintiff in a negligence action bears the 
burden of proof on three issues:  'the applicable standard of 
care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a 
causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiff's 
injury.' "  Toy v. District of Columbia, 549 A.2d 1, 6 (D.C. 
1988) (quoting Meek v. Shepard, 484 A.2d 579, 581 (D.C. 
1984));  see also Messina v. District of Columbia, 663 A.2d 
535, 537-38 (D.C. 1995).  To prove that a defendant deviated 
from the standard of care, a plaintiff need not rely on expert 
testimony "where the alleged negligent act is 'within the 

__________
     27  Because Daskalea, 227 F.3d at 447, bars the award of 
punitive damages against the District of Columbia, we do not reach 
the District of Columbia's contention that the award was unconstitu-
tionally excessive under BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 
U.S. 559 (1996), and "infected" by the admission of prejudicial 
evidence (Exhibit 214) concerning the finances of the District of 
Columbia.

     28  The District of Columbia does not contend that it is entitled 
to reversal of the judgments on the statutory claims because those 
judgments were premised solely on the validity of the s 1983 claims 
against the officers.  See District of Columbia v. Evans, 644 A.2d 
1008 (D.C. 1994).

realm of common knowledge and everyday experience.' "  
Toy, 549 A.2d at 6 (quoting District of Columbia v. White, 442 
A.2d 159, 164 (D.C. 1982));  see also Daskalea, 227 F.3d at 
445.  A plaintiff must, however, "put on expert testimony to 
establish what that standard of care is if the subject in 
question is so distinctly related to some science, profession, or 
occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average layperson."  
Messina, 663 A.2d at 538 (quoting District of Columbia v. 
Peters, 527 A.2d 1269, 1273 (D.C. 1987)).  The district court 
ruled that expert testimony concerning proper police proce-
dures for the undercover operation was warranted in the 
instant case.  See Butera II, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 29 n.2.

     To establish a national standard of care, an expert must do 
more than rely on his own experience or "simply ... declare 
that the District violated the national standard of care."29  
Clark v. District of Columbia, 708 A.2d 632, 635 (D.C. 1997);  
see also Toy, 549 A.2d at 7-8.  The expert must refer to 
commonly used police procedures, identifying specific stan-
dards by which the jury could measure the defendant's 

__________
     29  We do not reach the district court's suggestion that a nation-
al standard of care might not have been necessary in this case.  See 
Butera II, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 29.  While Clark v. District of 
Columbia, 708 A.2d 632, 635 (D.C. 1997), states that, "[i]n the 
context of actions against the District by persons in its custodial 
care, [the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has] been demand-
ing in requiring proof of a national standard of care," id. at 635, the 
cases on which Clark relies do not appear to impose such a 
requirement.  See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Moreno, 647 A.2d 
396, 399-400 (D.C. 1994);  District of Columbia v. Carmichael, 577 
A.2d 312, 315 (D.C. 1990);  Toy, 549 A.2d at 6-9. In these cases, 
plaintiffs simply presented experts who purported to establish a 
national standard of care;  the court did not expressly hold that a 
national standard was a necessary part of the plaintiff's burden of 
establishing the "applicable standard of care."  Toy, 549 A.2d at 6.  
As in Moreno, Carmichael, and Toy, Terry Butera offered Mr. 
Bradley "as an expert in the national standard of care in police 
procedures," Butera II, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 30, and that is how the 
case was tried.  Hence, we examine whether her expert witness 
established a national standard of care, without suggesting that 
Terry Butera was acting pursuant to a court-imposed requirement.

actions.  See Scott v. District of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 758 
(D.C. Cir. 1996);  Doe v. Dominion Bank of Washington, 963 
F.2d 1552, 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1992);  Phillips v. District of 
Columbia, 714 A.2d 768, 775 (D.C. 1998);  District of Colum-
bia v. Bethel, 567 A.2d 1331, 1333 (D.C. 1990);  Toy, 549 A.2d 
at 7-8;  Peters, 527 A.2d at 1273.  In so doing, however, the 
expert need not "enumerate the facilities across the country 
at which that standard is in effect."  District of Columbia v. 
Wilson, 721 A.2d 591, 599 (D.C. 1998);  see also Dominion 
Bank of Washington, 963 F.2d at 1563.

     In light of these requirements, the district court could 
properly find that Terry Butera's expert witness, Mr. James 
Bradley, presented sufficient evidence to establish a national 
standard of care.  Terry Butera presented Mr. Bradley as an 
expert based on his twenty-five years' experience at the 
MPD, which included experience as a control officer for 
undercover drug purchases and participation with federal 
agencies in undercover operations.  Rather than relying on 
this experience in the abstract to proffer a national standard 
of care, Mr. Bradley set forth concrete bases for his expert 
testimony:  his consultation with police officers in Prince 
George's County, his review of the MPD's General Orders, 
and his examination of the U.S. Department of Justice Drug 
Enforcement Administration Handbook and Manual, and the 
Narcotics Investigators' Manual of the Institute of Police 
Technology and Management, University of North Florida, 
which provides training for police officers.  See Butera II, 83 
F. Supp. 2d at 28-29.  This is a far cry from the expert 
witnesses at issue in the cases that the District of Columbia 
cites.  In Toy, 549 A.2d at 8, for example, the expert did not 
rely on any written product when presenting his expert 
opinion.  Similarly, in District of Columbia v. Carmichael, 
577 A.2d 312 (D.C. 1990), the expert did not "identify any 
concrete standard upon which a finding of negligence could be 
based."  Id. at 315.  In contrast, Mr. Bradley's testimony was 
much more than a simple assertion of "what he ... would do 
under similar circumstances."  Messina, 663 A.2d at 538 
(quoting Toy, 549 A.2d at 7).  Hence, the District of Colum-
bia's sufficiency challenge fails.

     B. Substitute Expert Witness.  The district court granted 
Terry Butera's motion to strike as a witness Detective John-
ny St. Valentine Brown, the expert whose testimony the 
District of Columbia and the officers planned to present, for 
two reasons.  First, there was evidence indicating that the 
attorney for the District of Columbia, rather than Detective 
Brown, wrote his expert witness report, in possible violation 
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).30  Second, Detective Brown had 
falsified his educational credentials during his deposition.  
Although the June 4, 1999 deadline for designating new 
experts had passed, the District of Columbia moved orally 
during a July 7, 1999 pretrial conference, and then in writing 
on July 28, 1999, for leave to replace the stricken expert 
witness.  Noting "surprise[ ]" that Detective Brown "may 
have misrepresented his credentials," the District of Colum-
bia argued that it would be "incurably prejudiced if [it] were 
denied the opportunity to present expert testimony regarding 
the applicable standards of care."  Moreover, the District of 
Columbia argued that Terry Butera would not be prejudiced 
if the court allowed a substitute expert, because the district 
court had continued the trial date from July 26 to October 5 
in response to Terry Butera's July 20, 1998 motion for a 

__________
     30  Rule 26(a)(2)(B) provides in relevant part:

     Except as otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, [the 
     disclosure of expert testimony] shall, with respect to a witness 
     who is retained or specially employed to provide expert testi-
     mony in the case ..., be accompanied by a written report 
     prepared and signed by the witness.  The report shall contain 
     a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the 
     basis and reasons therefor;  the data or other information 
     considered by the witness in forming the opinions;  any exhibits 
     to be used as a summary of or support for the opinions;  the 
     qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications 
     authored by the witness within the preceding ten years;  the 
     compensation to be paid for the study and testimony;  and a 
     listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as 
     an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four 
     years.
     
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).

default judgment or continuance as a result of an allegedly 
"crucial" document that was not turned over during discov-
ery.

     The district court denied the District of Columbia's motion. 
It concluded that first, the named expert had misrepresented 
his qualifications;  second, the "District of Columbia probably 
should have been aware of its own employee's educational 
background;"  and third, while under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) an 
attorney may "assist" in the preparation of an expert's report, 
the actual preparation of the report goes "beyond mere 
assistance."  We review the district court's preclusion of 
expert testimony for abuse of discretion.  See United States 
v. Hall, 969 F.2d 1102, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1992).  "Even if we 
find error, we will not reverse an otherwise valid judgment 
unless [the District of Columbia] demonstrates that such 
error affected [its] 'substantial rights.' "  Whitbeck v. Vital 
Signs, Inc., 159 F.3d 1369, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citation 
omitted).

     In evaluating the district court's preclusion of expert testi-
mony for the District of Columbia, our decisions addressing 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 are instructive.31  The court has noted that 
"[a] district court may order sanctions, including a default 
judgment, for misconduct either pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) ... 
or pursuant to the court's inherent power to 'protect [its] 
integrity and prevent abuses of the judicial process.' "  Webb 
v. District of Columbia, 146 F.3d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(quoting Shepherd v. American Broad. Cos., 62 F.3d 1469, 
1474 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).  These preclusionary orders ensure 
that a party will not be able to profit from its own failure to 
comply with the rules set forth by the court.  See, e.g., 

__________
     31  Rule 37 provides in relevant part:

     (b)(2) Sanctions by Court in Which Action is Pending.
     
     If a party ... fails to obey an order to provide or permit 
     discovery ... or if a party fails to obey an order entered under 
     Rule 26(f), the court in which the action is pending may make 
     such orders in regard to the failure as are just....
     
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).

Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 231, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1977).  Where 
the failure to comply is not due to willful bad faith or fault of 
the disobedient party, however, the harshest sanction of 
dismissal of the action, or preclusion of evidence, which is 
tantamount to dismissal, is inappropriate.  See Societe Inter-
nationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales 
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958);  Bonds v. District of 
Columbia, 93 F.3d 801, 808-10 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

     The court has identified three justifications for the imposi-
tion of defaults or dismissals as sanctions for misconduct:  (1) 
prejudice to the other party, (2) prejudice to the judicial 
system requiring the district court "to modify its own docket 
and operations to accommodate the delay," and (3) the need 
"to sanction conduct that is disrespectful to the court and to 
deter similar conduct in the future."  Webb, 146 F.3d at 971 
(quoting Shea v. Donohoe Constr. Co., 795 F.2d 1071, 1074-77 
(D.C. Cir. 1986));  see also Bonds, 93 F.3d at 808;  Weiner v. 
Kneller, 557 A.2d 1306, 1311-12 (D.C. 1989).  Because Terry 
Butera does not identify how she would have been prejudiced 
by a substitute expert witness, and the district court had 
already continued the trial date for three months, we focus on 
the third justification.

     Regarding the need for a sanction, the district court faced 
competing considerations.  On one hand, the district court 
was confronted with perjury by the District of Columbia's 
named expert, a perceived violation of Rule 26 by the District 
of Columbia's attorney, and an untimely motion by the Dis-
trict of Columbia.  The district court was clearly troubled by 
the misconduct of the attorney in writing the entirety of 
Detective Brown's report, which the court considered a viola-
tion of Rule 26, and which the District of Columbia does not 
contest on appeal.  In addition, the District of Columbia's 
motion, which did not identify the substitute witness or set 
forth in detail the nature of his testimony, was untimely.  
Under these circumstances, the district court would have 
broad discretion to exclude the substituted testimony.  See 
Pride v. Bic Corporation, 218 F.3d 566, 578-79 (6th Cir. 
2000).  The district court could understandably have been 
reluctant to reward the District of Columbia for Detective 

Brown's perjury.  On the other hand, the District of Colum-
bia was apparently caught unaware, particularly as Detective 
Brown had been an expert witness for the United States in 
criminal prosecutions for many years.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Toms, 136 F.3d 176, 184 (D.C. Cir 1998);  Hall, 969 
F.2d at 1109.  Expert testimony was important in this case, 
see Toy, 549 A.2d at 8, and the absence of an expert witness 
for the District of Columbia could have rendered the trial 
imbalanced.

     In some cases, the preclusion of expert testimony would be 
tantamount to a default judgment, and thus constitute an 
abuse of discretion.  See Bonds, 93 F.3d at 808-09.  But this 
is not such a case.  In assessing the prejudice to the District 
of Columbia as a result of the preclusion of expert testimony 
on police practices, the court is confronted with the District of 
Columbia's trial admissions, which are devastating.  The Dis-
trict of Columbia admitted to the jury that it failed (1) to take 
all possible precautions to ensure Eric Butera's safety;  (2) to 
equip Eric Butera with surveillance or signaling devices;  (3) 
to seek the assistance of other MPD units or special divisions 
in conducting the undercover operation;  and (4) to inform 
Eric Butera of the potential risk of harm.  It further admit-
ted that the MPD assured Eric Butera that if he agreed to 
assist the MPD by playing an undercover role, the MPD 
would protect him from harm, would carefully watch and 
monitor him throughout the process, and would be standing 
closely by with sufficient resources to ensure his safety.  In 
addition, there was abundant testimony indicating that the 
undercover operation was seriously flawed, starting with the 
admitted failure of the officers to conduct a comprehensive 
evaluation of the need to involve a citizen in an undercover 
operation, as required by MPD policy.  Moreover, MPD 
General Orders and policies outlining the use of informants 
were in evidence.  Consequently, it seems extremely doubtful 
that an expert for the District of Columbia on police practices 
would have mitigated the prejudice arising from the incrimi-
nating evidence that was before the jury.  Nothing that the 
District of Columbia contends on appeal suggests to the 
contrary.

     Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of judg-
ment as a matter of law on Terry Butera's statutory claims 
and on the punitive damages awards against the individual 
officers.  We reverse the denial of summary judgment on 
Eric and Terry Butera's constitutional tort claims, and on the 
punitive damages award against the District of Columbia.