F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
May 31, 2006
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
RICK CAM UGLIA, doing business as
Paisano’s R estaurant,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 05-2128
THE CITY O F ALBU QU ERQUE;
TH E A LB UQ U ER QU E
ENV IRO NM ENTA L HEA LTH
D EPA RTM EN T; G U Y
W ORTHINGTON, in his individual
capacity and as an employee of the
City of Albuquerque,
Defendants - Appellees.
A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR T HE D ISTRICT OF NEW M EXICO
(D .C . N O. C IV -04-48-JB/LFG )
David M . Berlin, Duhigg, Cronin, Spring & Berlin, P.A., and M elissa Stephenson,
New M exico Victim’s Rights Project, Albuquerque, New M exico, for the Plaintiff
- Appellant.
Randy M . Autio, Assistant City Attorney (Peter S. Augh, Assistant City Attorney,
with him on the brief), Albuquerque, New M exico, for the D efendants -
Appellants, The City of Albuquerque and The Albuquerque Environmental H ealth
Department
Patrick D. Allen (April D. W hite, with him on the brief), Yenson, Lynn, Allen &
W osick, P.C., Albuquerque, New M exico, for the Defendant - Appellee, Guy
W orthington
Before L UC ER O, B AL DOC K , and HA RTZ, Circuit Judges.
HA RTZ, Circuit Judge.
Rick Camuglia appeals a summary judgment rejecting his claim that he was
denied substantive and procedural due process when his restaurant was
temporarily shut down for alleged health code violations. W e have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I. B ACKGR OU N D
The evidence before the district court was as follows: On February 19,
2003, Guy W orthington, an employee of the Albuquerque Environmental H ealth
Department (EHD), inspected Paisano’s Restaurant, owned by M r. Camuglia.
M r. W orthington cited the restaurant for several violations, including
cockroaches. M r. Camuglia told M r. W orthington that the insect problem would
be immediately remedied, and invited him to return the next morning to reinspect
the premises.
M r. Camuglia contacted Glen W aters of AACTION Pest Control, who had
applied pesticides regularly at Paisano’s for some time. The following morning
M r. W aters began applying ULD 300, a pesticide that is approved for use in
restaurants but can be hazardous to humans. The “Directions for Use” on the
product label begin: “Do not apply directly to food. Food should be removed or
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covered during treatment. Do not apply while food processing is underway. All
food processing surfaces and equipment should be covered or washed with an
effective cleaning compound followed by a potable water rinse.” Aplt. App. at
58. The directions also state: “Close room or warehouse and shut off all
ventilating systems. . . . Do not remain in treated areas after application, and
leave room closed for at least one hour. Ventilate thoroughly before occupants
are allowed to re-enter.” Id.
M r. W aters testified in his deposition that no ventilating systems were on
and there was nobody in the restaurant when he began applying the ULD 300; that
it was his practice to close all doors in a building before he began spraying; and
that he did not see any exposed food in Paisano’s. He also testified that although
the U LD 300 spray settled on food-preparation areas and tables, Paisano’s
em ployees knew that it w as their responsibility to “wash everything . . . after w e
left. That was a standing rule that we had always talked about, before we ever did
anything in that restaurant. . . . By that time, they pretty much knew what the
deal was. This w asn’t the first time I w as there to do that kind of work.” A plt.
App. at 86. “[A]nybody that I work with there,” he continued, “knew not to be in
there when I was doing this. . . . They knew they couldn’t be in there for at least
an hour. I told them two hours just to be on the safe side.” Id. He added that
while he was spraying he did not see anyone in the restaurant until
M r. W orthington entered.
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M r. W orthington arrived after M r. W aters had begun applying the pesticide.
His account contradicts M r. W aters’s account in several respects. He swore in an
affidavit that
the back door of the facility was w ide open and people w ere freely
entering and exiting the facility without regard for the presence of
chemicals. N o notice w as posted of the on-going fumigation. No
effort had been made to cover food, food preparation areas, tables, or
even the salt and pepper shakers. Out of concern for public safety, I
requested that all employees exit the restaurant and asked to see the
warning label for the pesticide being used.
Aplt. A pp. at 53-54.
M r. W orthington concluded that the ULD 300 was not being applied in
accordance with its warning label. He contacted his supervisor and together they
decided to suspend Paisano’s food-service permit temporarily. See Albuquerque,
N.M ., Code of Ordinances ch. 9, § 9-6-1-13(A) (1988) (hereinafter “Albuquerque
Code”) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to operate a food-service or food
processing establishment within the city who does not possess a valid permit
issued to him by the enforcement authority); id. at § 9-6-1-13(C) (“Permits may
be suspended by the enforcement authority for failure of the holder to comply
with the requirements of [the Code] or of other applicable laws, regulations or
ordinances.”). He then returned to his office and prepared an inspection report
which, in accordance with EHD policy, was faxed to local media outlets. See id.
at § 9-6-1-12(C) (“W henever an inspection of a food-service . . . establishment is
made, the findings shall be recorded on an enforcement authority inspection
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form. . . . The completed inspection report form is a public document that shall
be made available for public disclosure at the enforcement authority’s office to
any person who requests it.”). As a result, members of the media came to
Paisano’s that day and reported on the suspension of Paisano’s permit. The
following day, February 21, 2003, M r. W orthington reinspected Paisano’s and
reactivated its permit after concluding that any food that had been exposed to the
pesticide had been discarded and that the food preparation surfaces had been
cleaned.
Also on February 21, Steve Baca, an inspector for the New M exico
Department of Agriculture, which has oversight responsibility for pesticide
application, conducted an investigation to see whether the ULD 300 had been
properly applied. His report repeats the essential facts set forth above: (1)
M r. W orthington was concerned that the ULD 300 was not being properly
applied; (2) it was Paisano’s standard practice to wash all food preparation
surfaces after application of the pesticide; (3) any uncovered food had already
been thrown out; and (4) during past applications M r. W aters had discussed with
Paisano’s employees that they must remain outside during the application of the
pesticide and clean the premises after application, but this was not discussed
before this application. In addition, M r. Baca took three swab samples from
within the restaurant. He testified in his deposition that pesticide was “detected
on the kitchen electric box and the salad area light fixture, but not on the specials
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board in the dining area.” Aplt. App. at 110. He did not test the areas that he
was told had been cleaned, “like food prep areas, dishes, and any areas close to
the food.” Id. at 109. His inspection report states that he “noted a violation
because the operator should have clearly told M r. W orthington and the restaurant
staff that nobody was allowed into the treated area for one hour.” Aplt. App. at
65. W hen asked at his deposition whether anyone had entered before one hour
had expired, he responded: “That’s what it sounded like. No specific times w ere
given, but it sounded like pesticide application was stopped, [employees] were
showing up right around that time or soon after, that they were told to go in and
clean up, and that was about it pretty much.” Id. at 63. He further testified that
he believed that it was M r. W orthington who had directed the employees to go
into the restaurant to clean, but faulted M r. W aters because “he needed to make it
clear that nobody be in there, . . . .” Id.
M r. Camuglia filed suit in the United States District Court for the District
of New M exico. His Second Amended Complaint for D eprivation of Property
W ithout Due Process alleges three causes of action. The first, which is the only
one at issue on appeal, raises a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the City of
Albuquerque (City), EHD, and M r. W orthington deprived him of due process of
law. It asserts that the application of the pesticide was not improper, and that
M r. W orthington acted “without permitting Plaintiff or its representatives to
contest the alleged violations, something they had a right to do as a matter of
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law.” Aplt. App. at 24. It further asserts that “W orthington’s acts were
intentional, willful and wanton and meant to deprive Plaintiff of property
rights . . . .” Id. at 25. In their motion for summary judgment the defendants
treated this cause of action as alleging deprivations of both procedural and
substantive due process. M r. Camuglia did the same in his response
memorandum, and the district court also addressed both claims. W e will
therefore treat the complaint the same w ay. (The second cause of action makes
the same allegations against the same defendants under the due process clause of
the N ew M exico Constitution; and the third cause of action is a libel claim against
an EHD employee. The district court granted summary judgment on the state
constitutional claim; and the libel claim was dismissed by M r. Camuglia w ith
prejudice.)
M r. Worthington moved for summary judgment on the § 1983 claims. He
asserted that he was entitled to qualified immunity because there was no
constitutional violation and, in the alternative, no violation of clearly settled law.
The district court agreed on both grounds and granted the motion.
At a later hearing the City orally moved for summary judgment.
M r. Camuglia conceded that “[t]he case law is clear, if the underlying
individual’s out, then the municipality is also out.” A plt. App. at 205. Shortly
thereafter the district court granted summary judgment to the City (apparently
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treating EHD and the City as the same party, a course we also take).
M r. Camuglia appeals only the adverse judgments on the § 1983 claims.
II. D ISC USSIO N
“W e review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard the district court should apply under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).” Hayes v.
M arriott, 70 F.3d 1144, 1146 (10th Cir. 1995). Ordinarily, the district court must
“view the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment” and should grant summary judgment only “when there is no genuine
dispute over a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard applies to
the City’s motion for summary judgment. It is somewhat modified with respect to
M r. W orthington, however, because he has asserted qualified immunity. W e now
turn to the claims against M r. W orthington, first explaining the effect of his
assertion of qualified immunity.
A. Claims Against M r. W orthington
1. Q ualified Immunity
Under the qualified-immunity doctrine, “government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “[T]he affirmative defense of qualified
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immunity . . . protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law.” M edina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1127 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In contrast to a typical motion for summary judgment,
which places the initial burden on the moving party, a motion based on a claim of
qualified immunity imposes that burden on the plaintiff:
W hen a defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff, who must first establish that the defendant
violated a constitutional right. If no constitutional right would have
been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity
for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity. If, on the other
hand, a violation has been shown, the next step in the qualified
immunity sequence is to ask whether the constitutional right was
clearly established. . . . The relevant dispositive inquiry in
determining whether a right is clearly established is w hether it would
be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation.
Cortez v. M cCauley, 438 F.3d 980, 988 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). Thus, we now turn to whether M r. Camuglia has presented
evidence that would establish the violation of a constitutional right. As noted, he
claims violations of both procedural and substantive due process. W e start with
his procedural-due-process claim.
2. Procedural Due Process
M r. Camuglia contended in district court that his procedural-due-process
rights were “violated . . . when [M r. W orthington] closed Paisano’s and notified
the media without providing M r. Camuglia with any level of process.” Aplt. App.
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at 75. The district court disagreed, determining that M r. W orthington’s actions
were in accordance with Albuquerque Code ch. 9, § 9-6-1-13(C), which states:
Notwithstanding the other provisions of §§ 9-6-1-1 et seq., whenever
the enforcement authority finds an imminent health hazard or other
conditions in the operation of a food-service or food processing
establishment which, in his judgment, constitute a substantial hazard
to the public health, he may without any prior warning, notice, or
hearing, issue a written notice to the permit holder or operator citing
such condition, specifying the corrective action to be taken, and
specifying the time period within which action shall be taken; and, if
deemed necessary, such order shall state that the permit is
immediately suspended and all food-service or food processing
operations are to be immediately discontinued. Any person to whom
such an order is issued shall comply immediately therewith. An
opportunity for a hearing will be provided if a w ritten request for a
hearing is filed with the enforcement authority by the permit holder
within five working days. The hearing shall be held within five
working days after the date of the filing of the written request for the
hearing.
(emphasis added). M r. Camuglia conceded to the district court that this ordinance
is constitutional. He argued, however, that M r. W orthington’s actions w ere not in
accordance with the ordinance because there was no “substantial hazard.” The
district court’s order rejected this argument:
Camuglia disputes whether in fact there was a “substantial
hazard” to the public. He does not, however, dispute that
W orthington, “in his judgment,” concluded there was a substantial
hazard and decided suspending Camuglia’s license w as in the interest
of public safety. [The ordinance] authorized W orthington to use his
discretion. A mere misapplication or violation of a city ordinance
does not become a violation of federal due process rights.
Camuglia v. City of Albuquerque, 375 F.Supp.2d 1299, 1309 (D.N.M . 2005). The
district court therefore held that M r. Camuglia was not deprived of procedural due
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process. Although our analysis is somewhat different, we agree with the district
court’s conclusion.
“W e engage in a two-step inquiry [in determining whether an individual’s
procedural-due-process rights were violated]: (1) Did the individual possess a
protected property interest to which due process protection was applicable? (2)
W as the individual afforded an appropriate level of process?” Clark v. City of
Draper, 168 F.3d 1185, 1189 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
On this appeal we are not concerned with the first step because M r. W orthington
concedes that M r. Camuglia had a protected property interest.
As for the second step, ordinarily one who has a protected property interest
is entitled to some sort of hearing before the government acts to impair that
interest, although the hearing need not necessarily provide all, or even most, of
the protections afforded by a trial. See M athews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976) (the type of hearing required depends on (1) the nature of the private
interest at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation given the procedures
already guaranteed, and whether additional procedural safeguards would prove
valuable; and (3) the government’s interest, and the burdens that additional
procedures might impose). But “due process is flexible and calls [only] for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Id. at 334 (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted). For example, “[w ]here . . . the state must
act quickly, a meaningful postdeprivation hearing is adequate.” Clark, 168 F.3d
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at 1189; see also Spielman v. Hildebrand, 873 F.2d 1377, 1385 (10th Cir. 1988)
(removal of child from parents’ custody requires predeprivation hearing “except
for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake
that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
In matters of public health and safety, the Supreme Court has long
recognized that the government must act quickly. Quick action may turn out to be
wrongful action, but due process requires only a postdeprivation opportunity to
establish the error. In North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211
U.S. 306, 315 (1908), the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the city was
required to have a hearing before seizing putrid poultry:
The general power of the state to legislate upon the subject embraced
in the above ordinance of the city of Chicago, counsel does not deny.
Nor does he deny the right to seize and destroy unwholesome or
putrid food, provided that notice and opportunity to be heard be
given the owner or custodian of the property before it is destroyed.
W e are of opinion, however, that provision for a hearing before
seizure and condemnation and destruction of food which is
unwholesome and unfit for use is not necessary. The right to so seize
is based upon the right and duty of the state to protect and guard, as
far as possible, the lives and health of its inhabitants, and that it is
proper to provide that food which is unfit for human consumption
should be summarily seized and destroyed to prevent the danger
which would arise from eating it. The right to so seize and destroy
is, of course, based upon the fact that the food is not fit to be eaten.
Food that is in such a condition, if kept for sale or in danger of being
sold, is in itself a nuisance, and a nuisance of the most dangerous
kind, involving, as it does, the health, if not the lives, of persons who
may eat it.
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(internal citation omitted). This holding has been repeatedly reaffirmed. See,
e.g., M ackey v. M ontrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979) (“W e have traditionally accorded
the states great leeway in adopting summary procedures to protect public health
and safety. States surely have at least as much interest in removing drunken
drivers from their highways as in summarily seizing mislabeled drugs or
destroying spoiled foodstuffs.”); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
416 U.S. 663, 679 (1974) (“[D]ue process is not denied when postponement of
notice and hearing is necessary to protect the public from contaminated
food . . . .”); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91-92 (1972) (“[T]he Court has
allowed summary seizure of property . . . to protect the public from . . .
contaminated food.”).
W e have followed these precedents in this circuit. In Clark a child was
scratched by two blue foxes w hile on a school field trip to a petting zoo. His
mother took him to the emergency room, and a local animal control officer was
contacted. The officer learned that the foxes w ere considered “wild” under state
law for purposes of rabies control, and are required to be tested whenever they
bite or scratch a person. A city judge issued an order of impoundment without
notice to the zoo owner. The foxes w ere impounded until a hearing could be held
the next morning. After the hearing, the animals were killed. The zoo owner
filed suit alleging a due-process violation. After a detailed discussion of the zoo
owner’s property interest in the foxes, which “was subject to the city’s police
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power,” we concluded that the postdeprivation hearing was adequate,
“particularly in light of the government’s strong interest in public health and in
the speedy resolution of rabies tests on the foxes.” Clark, 168 F.3d at 1189-90.
In light of this precedent it cannot be denied that the City, acting through
its inspectors, may close a restaurant to protect the health of patrons and workers
without first providing a hearing to the restaurant owner. Indeed, M r. Camuglia
acknowledges the constitutionality of the ordinance under which M r. W orthington
acted, even though it provides for a hearing only after suspension of the permit.
See Albuquerque Code ch. 9, § 9-6-1-13(C). W hat M r. Camuglia complains about
is that, in his view, M r. W orthington had no basis for suspending the
permit— M r. W orthington was wrong about the health danger, perhaps even
intentionally and maliciously wrong. As stated by his counsel at oral argument
before the district court: “W e’re not challenging the constitutionality of the
ordinance itself. W e’re contesting or challenging the manner in which it was
applied in this particular instance, because there’s no substantial hazard.” A plt.
App. at 157; see also id. at 152 (“So under these circumstances he was denied due
process procedurally, because without an imminent danger, he was entitled to a
hearing.” (emphasis added)). At one point in the hearing, counsel for
M r. Camuglia stated: “They can close [the restaurant] if there’s an imminent
danger, but if there’s not an imminent danger, then [the Ordinance] provides
differently.” Id. at 154.
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This argument misses the point. It concedes that limiting the owner to a
postdeprivation hearing comports with due process when the government has
acted properly, but contends that a predeprivation hearing is required when the
government has erred. In other words, the government can delay the hearing until
after the deprivation only when the deprivation was in fact lawful. W e might ask
why even a postdeprivation hearing is required in that circumstance, when one is
conceding that the government did nothing wrong. The purpose of a hearing,
after all, is to determine whether government conduct has been (or would be)
unlawful. W hen the Supreme Court states that granting just a postdeprivation
hearing is constitutionally adequate, it is saying that determining the propriety of
government action can wait. As the Court wrote in North American Cold Storage
Co., 211 U.S. at 316:
The ex parte finding of the health officers as to the fact [that food is
contaminated] is not in any way binding upon those who own or
claim the right to sell the food. If a party cannot get his hearing in
advance of the seizure and destruction he has the right to have it
afterward, which right may be claimed upon the trial in an action
brought for the destruction of his property, and in that action those
who destroyed it can only successfully defend if the jury shall find
the fact of unwholesomeness, as claimed by them.
This is why the disputed facts here are irrelevant to the procedural-due-
process claim. They relate only to whether M r. W orthington was correct in his
judgment that the U LD 300 was being improperly used and that the restaurant’s
permit should be temporarily suspended as a result. But they are irrelevant to
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whether M r. Camuglia was entitled to a hearing before suspension of his permit.
The process one is due is not dependent on whether the government was right or
wrong in the particular case but on whether, in general, constitutional norms
require particular procedures to balance private and public interests. Postponing
the hearing may, as M r. Camuglia contends happened here, cause harm. The
Supreme Court, however, has recognized that possibility and ruled that the public
interest in prompt action permits that action to precede a hearing in public-health
matters. M r. Camuglia may have a remedy for a governmental error, but he
cannot claim that he has been deprived of procedural due process.
3. Substantive D ue Process
Nor can M r. Camuglia prevail on a claim of a substantive-due-process
violation. In his response to M r. W orthington’s m otion for summary judgment,
M r. Camuglia contended below that M r. W orthington’s actions were “arbitrary,
capricious and without a rational basis,” because “there were no grounds upon
which Defendants should have issued a citation and then notify the media that
Paisano’s had somehow become an unhealthy facility in which to eat.” A plt.
App. at 77. The district court disagreed:
Although Camuglia argues that W orthington was not using sound
discretion, “the D ue Process Clause ‘is not a guarantee against
incorrect or ill-advised [government] decisions.’” Uhlrig v. Harder,
64 F.3d [567,] 573 [(10th Cir. 1995)] (citing Collins v. City of
Harker Heights Tex., 503 U.S. [115,] 129 [1992]). Even if
W orthington made a poor decision, Camuglia presents no evidence
that W orthington’s actions w ere arbitrary, capricious, or w ithout a
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rational basis. . . . Thus, Camuglia’s allegations do not meet the high
standard that the Supreme Court set for substantive due process
claims in County of Sacramento v. Lewis[, 523 U.S. 833 (1998)].
Camuglia, 375 F.Supp.2d at 1309-1310. In our view , the district court had it
right.
“An arbitrary deprivation of an individual’s property right can violate the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause.” Clark, 168 F.3d at 1190. But
the arbitrariness must be extreme.
The ultimate standard for determining whether there has been a
substantive due process violation is whether the challenged
government action shocks the conscience of federal judges. It is w ell
settled that negligence is not sufficient to shock the conscience. In
addition, a plaintiff must do more than show that the government
actor intentionally or recklessly caused injury to the plaintiff by
abusing or misusing government power.
M oore v. Guthrie, 438 F.3d 1036, 1040 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). “[T]he plaintiff must demonstrate a degree of
outrageousness and a magnitude of potential or actual harm that is truly
conscience shocking.” Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 574 (10th Cir. 1995). This
is a “high level of outrageousness.” Id. Establishing these limits advances
“three basic principles highlighted by the Supreme Court in evaluating
substantive due process claims: (1) the need for restraint in defining their scope;
(2) the concern that § 1983 not replace state tort law; and (3) the need for
deference to local policymaking bodies in making decisions impacting upon
public safety.” Id. at 573 (internal citations omitted).
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Even view ing the evidence in the light most favorable to M r. Camuglia, w e
can say with confidence that he has not demonstrated a substantive-due-process
violation. He does not contend that M r. W orthington acted unreasonably when he
first came to Paisano’s and noted certain violations. M r. Camuglia assured
M r. W orthington that they would be taken care of and invited him to return the
next day. He did so, and became concerned about the application of the ULD
300. He spoke w ith his supervisor and they agreed to suspend the restaurant’s
permit temporarily. The restaurant was shut down for only one day, and the
permit was immediately restored once contaminated food had been disposed of
and food-preparation surfaces had been cleaned. As for notification to the media,
the ordinance requires that the inspection report “be made available for public
disclosure . . . to any person who requests it.” Albuquerque Code ch. 9,
§ 9-6-1-12(C), and, after repeated requests by media outlets for the reports, the
City had adopted a policy of automatically faxing them to the media. Thus,
sending the report to the media was a routine part of M r. W orthington’s job. The
conduct of M r. W orthington does not shock the conscience.
B. Claims Against the City
Only individuals, not municipalities, are protected by qualified immunity.
The City may be liable even if M r. W orthington is not:
W hile it would be improper to allow a suit to proceed against the city
if it was determined that the officers’ action did not amount to a
constitutional violation, there is nothing anomalous about allowing
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such a suit to proceed when immunity shields the individual
defendants. The availability of qualified immunity does not depend
on whether a constitutional violation has occurred. W hile a
government official who violates the constitution will be protected if
his or her actions were reasonable in light of clearly established law
and the information the official possessed when he or she acted,
municipalities enjoy no such shield.
Watson v. City of Kansas City, Kan., 857 F.2d 690, 697 (10th Cir. 1988) (internal
citation omitted). Here, however, we have determined that there was no
constitutional violation. “A municipality may not be held liable where there was
no underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers.” Hinton v. City of
Elwood, Kan., 997 F.2d 774, 782 (10th Cir. 1993). The City was therefore also
entitled to summary judgment.
III. C ON CLU SIO N
W e AFFIRM the summary judgment granted by the district court.
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Camuglia v. City of Albuquerque
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2006-05-31
Citations: 448 F.3d 1214
Copy Citations