Carter v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 11, 2007 Decided October 5, 2007

No. 06-7174

MARISSA L. CARTER,
APPELLANT

v.

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY,
APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 05cv01970)

Ronald Dixon argued the cause for appellant. With him on
the brief was Kenneth D. Bynum.

Gerard J. Stief argued the cause for appellee. With him on
the brief was Mark F. Sullivan.

Before: HENDERSON, RANDOLPH and BROWN, Circuit
Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.

BROWN, Circuit Judge: Marissa Carter appeals the district
court’s dismissal of her complaint, alleging unlawful discrimina-
 2

tion by her employer, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority. Carter contends her completed, but inaccurate,
EEOC questionnaire constituted a timely filed charge of
discrimination. We conclude Carter’s charge was timely.
Therefore, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of her
complaint.

I

On July 6, 2004, Marissa Carter was allegedly sexually
assaulted by a co-worker while working as a subway station
manager for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Author-
ity (WMATA). Carter immediately reported the incident to her
supervisor. WMATA’s Office of Civil Rights conducted an
internal investigation and found insufficient evidence of sexual
harassment. An October 4, 2004 letter from WMATA to Carter
reported the results of the investigation and noted Carter’s right
to file a discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

On October 25, 2004, Carter went to the EEOC and asked
to file a charge of discrimination against WMATA. The EEOC
gave Carter a “Charge Questionnaire,” which she completed that
same day. The questionnaire states that “[w]hen this form
constitutes the only timely written statement of allegations of
employment discrimination, the Commission will . . . consider
it to be a sufficient charge of discrimination under the relevant
statute(s).” The questionnaire included Carter’s name and
contact information, identified WMATA as Carter’s employer,
contained Carter’s handwritten description of the alleged
incident, and noted that WMATA had conducted an investiga-
tion. On the questionnaire, Carter handwrote “4-6-04” and
“4-04” as the dates on which she sought and obtained
WMATA’s assistance in dealing with the assault. She also
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handwrote “4-6-04” as the date on which the alleged incident
occurred.

During her October 25, 2004 visit, the EEOC told Carter to
return for a follow-up meeting on the next available date, which
was January 20, 2005. Carter claims she had no control over the
date of her follow-up meeting. She returned to the EEOC one
day early and filed a “Charge of Discrimination” on January 19,
2005. In contrast to the October questionnaire, the January 19,
2005 document correctly listed July 6, 2004 as the date of
alleged discrimination.

After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, Carter
filed a complaint against WMATA in federal district court on
October 5, 2005. Her complaint contained a Title VII claim
alleging gender-based discrimination. On January 9, 2006,
WMATA moved to dismiss, arguing Carter had not filed a
charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of July
6, 2004, as required by Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(e)(1).1 In response, Carter contended her October 25,
2004 questionnaire should constitute a timely charge of discrim-
ination. The district court granted WMATA’s motion to dismiss
Carter’s complaint with prejudice. The district court reasoned
that Carter’s responses to the October 25, 2004 questionnaire
rendered the questionnaire untimely because she handwrote
April 6, 2004 as the date of the alleged discrimination, and April
6 falls more than 180 days prior to October 25. In addition, the
district court noted Carter’s January 19, 2005 charge fell more
than 180 days after the alleged discrimination. After the district
court dismissed the complaint, Carter filed a motion for recon-
sideration, which—for the first time—asserted that the equitable

1
Aside from the argument that Carter’s charge was untimely,
WMATA does not attack the sufficiency of the October 25, 2004
questionnaire.
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tolling doctrine should excuse her potential untimeliness. The
district court denied Carter’s motion for reconsideration.

II

We review the district court’s order granting the motion to
dismiss de novo. King v. Jackson, 487 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir.
2007).

Title VII prohibits a variety of employment practices,
including gender-based discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a). The statute’s enforcement scheme required Carter to file
a charge of discrimination with the EEOC “within one hundred
and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (emphasis added). See
generally Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S.
____, 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2170-71 (2007) (explaining that Congress
established this deadline to “encourage the prompt processing”
of charges and protect employers from having to defend stale
claims). This requirement essentially functions as a statute of
limitations for Title VII actions. See Zipes v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (“[A] timely charge of
discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite
to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of
limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable toll-
ing.”). Most importantly for the purposes of this appeal, the
180-day filing period begins on the date “the alleged unlawful
practice occurred”—not the date listed in the charge itself. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).

Both parties agree the alleged incident occurred on July 6,
2004. In fact, WMATA acknowledges Carter simply made a
 5

mistake when she wrote “4-6-04” and “4-04” on the EEOC
questionnaire.2

Since the parties agree July 6, 2004 is the date “the alleged
unlawful practice occurred,” Title VII required Carter to file a
charge within 180 days of July 6, 2004. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(e)(1). This is, in fact, exactly what she did. Her completion
of an EEOC questionnaire on October 25, 2004 fell well within
the 180-day filing period that commenced on July 6, 2004.
Accordingly, the district court should not have granted
WMATA’s motion to dismiss.

We reach our holding by applying the plain language of
Title VII to the undisputed facts of this case, but our holding is
consistent with the statute’s spirit as well. WMATA had notice
of Carter’s allegation from the outset. A significant purpose of
Title VII’s charge requirement is to notify the employer of the
nature of the allegation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (estab-
lishing the 180-day filing period for charges and requiring that

2
Because the district court held Carter’s questionnaire was
untimely, Carter argued—as an apparent afterthought—that the
equitable tolling doctrine should excuse any untimeliness. We
conclude this argument was improperly raised because Carter first
raised it in her motion for reconsideration, despite the fact that
reconsideration is only appropriate when “the moving party shows
new facts or clear errors of law which compel the court to change its
prior position.” Nat’l Ctr. for Mfg. Sci. v. Dep’t of Def., 199 F.3d 507,
511 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v.
CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996)
(“Reconsideration is not an appropriate forum for rehashing
previously rejected arguments or arguing matters that could have been
heard during the pendency of the previous motion.”). Carter’s
equitable tolling argument demonstrated neither “new facts” nor “clear
errors of law.” Accordingly, she did not properly raise—and we do
not reach the merits of—this argument.
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“notice of the charge . . . be served upon the person against
whom such charge is made”); EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S.
54, 75 (1984) (explaining that providing an employer notice of
a charge “seems to have been designed to ensure that the
employer was given some idea of the nature of the charge”).
Carter immediately reported the incident to her supervisor;
WMATA began its investigation the same day and had com-
pleted its review by the time Carter filed her October 25, 2004
questionnaire. WMATA had immediate and adequate notice.

As the Supreme Court recently emphasized in Ledbetter,
Title VII’s procedural framework—including the 180-day
charging period—must be respected. 127 S. Ct. at 2170-72.
Indeed, “strict adherence to the procedural requirements
specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded
administration of the law.” Id. at 2171 (internal quotation marks
omitted). In this context, we note our decision does nothing to
undermine Congress’s careful calibration of Title VII’s proce-
dures.3 Carter’s October 25, 2004 questionnaire—along with the
undisputed fact that the alleged discrimination occurred on July
6, 2004—fulfills the requirement of a filing within 180 days of
the alleged discrimination. Accordingly, we reverse the district
court’s dismissal of Carter’s complaint.

III

We reverse the district court’s order granting WMATA’s
motion to dismiss and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

3
Our holding does not rest on the relation-back doctrine
delineated in 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12, which applies in relatively narrow
circumstances.
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So ordered.