UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-30380
MICHAEL S. CHRICEOL, Reverend,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
MICHAEL PHILLIPS, ETAL,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
March 24, 1999
Before DAVIS, STEWART, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff Michael S. Chriceol (“Chriceol”), Louisiana Prisoner
# 313675, filed a civil rights action, pro se, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging the prison officials at Winn Correctional
Center burdened his right to free exercise of religion by
repeatedly denying him mail from various religious organizations.
Further, Chriceol alleges the prison officials denied him access to
the courts by denying his requests for a withdrawal from his prison
account to pay court costs. Both parties moved for summary
judgment. The United States District Court for the Western
District of Louisiana, adopting the Report and Recommendation of
the Magistrate Judge, entered summary judgment in favor of the
prison officials. Chriceol now appeals.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Chriceol was an inmate at the Winn Correctional Center1
(“WCC”) in Winnfield, Louisiana from August 1, 1994, to November 7,
1997. Chriceol claims he is an ordained minister. As a minister,
he received religious and political material from various religious
leaders, publishers, and organizations relating to his beliefs. In
particular, Chriceol was sent materials from Aryan Nations/Church
of Jesus Christ Christian (“CJCC”).
In August 1996, Chriceol contends WCC hired a new mail room
supervisor who withheld mail sent from the Aryan Nations and CJCC.
From August 1996 to January 1997, the mail room withheld at least
sixteen different items of mail to Chriceol.
The WCC mail room supervisor, Ann Maxey (“Maxey”), withheld
Chriceol's mail under Section 16-1.5 of the Corrections Corporation
of America (“CCA”) Corporate Facility Policy. Section 16-1.5
states, in relevant part: “Books, magazines, newspapers and other
1
The Winn Correctional Center is alleged to be a privately
owned Correctional Facility in the State of Louisiana. The
parties in this matter have not alleged that distinctions between
state and privately owned correctional facilities impact the issues
before the court. We, therefore, do not address the legal
implications of those distinctions on the conditions of
confinement.
2
printed matter may be approved for inmates/residents unless deemed
to constitute an immediate and tangible threat to the security or
order of the facility or to inmate/resident rehabilitation by
meeting one or more of the following criteria....” One of the
criterion is whether “[t]he material advocates racial, religious,
or national hatred in such a way so as to create a serious danger
of violence in the facility.” Section 16-1.5 H.2 (d).
WCC gives notice to an inmate when the delivery of mail
addressed to the inmate is withheld. Furthermore, the inmate is
allowed an opportunity to file a grievance to protest WCC's
decision to withhold the mail. Chriceol appealed WCC's decisions
to withhold mail on each occasion he received a notice. On each
occasion, Chriceol's appeal was denied. Chriceol also made
allegations that individual(s) in the WCC mail room opened his
legal mail.
In January 1997, Chriceol filled out a request to withdraw
money from his prison account to file this action against the WCC
prison officials. Later that month, Chriceol was told that his
withdrawal request had been denied. Chriceol contends he relied on
his parents to pay the necessary filing fees and on February 28,
1997, Chriceol filed this civil rights action, pro se, under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against the officials at WCC.
The complaint alleged that the prison officials: (1) burdened
Chriceol's right to free exercise of religion; (2) violated
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Chriceol's right to free speech; (3) denied Chriceol access to the
courts by denying his requests for withdrawals from his prison
account; (4) unconstitutionally interfered with Chriceol's legal
mail; and (5) retaliated against Chriceol for filing grievances.
The WCC officials filed a motion for summary judgment. The
district court, adopting the Report and Recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge, granted summary judgment in favor of the prison
officials.
II. DISCUSSION
Proceeding on appeal pro se, Chriceol argues the district
court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of the WCC
officials. Chriceol's argument, construed liberally,2 is that the
district court erred in concluding the WCC officials did not
violate (1) his right to freedom of religion or (2) his right to
access to the courts. This court reviews the district court's
grant of summary judgment de novo. See Brewer v. B. Wilkinson, 3
F.3d 816, 819 (5th Cir. 1993). We are not bound by the reasons
articulated by the district court for granting summary judgment and
may affirm the judgment on other grounds. See id. at 820. Summary
judgment is proper only if the record discloses that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
2
We construe liberally the claims of pro se appellants. See
United States v. Gobert, 139 F.3d 436, 437(5th Cir. 1998) (citing
Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993)).
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c).
A. Right to Exercise Religion
Chriceol argues that prison officials at WCC violated his
rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
Specifically, Chriceol contends the WCC mail policy of withholding
mail from organizations such as Aryan Nations and CJCC infringes on
his rights to practice his religion. The prison officials, in
turn, argue Chriceol's withheld mail advocated racial violence and
hatred. Thus, the prison officials contend the mail policy is
legitimately related to ensuring the safety of prisoners and
employees.
This court has been faced with other civil rights claims
relating to infringements on prisoners' rights to free exercise of
religion. See, e.g, Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322 (5th Cir. 1996)
(inclusion of pork in meals not violation of prisoner's right to
practice his religion where prison officials did not know
affiliation with muslim faith); Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22 (5th
Cir. 1995) (prison grooming regulations rationally related to
penological goals and did not violate prisoner's right to exercise
his religion); Matthews v. Morales, 23 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1994)
(statute prohibiting inmate from changing his name had logical
connection to legitimate government interest and did not violate
inmate's right to free exercise of religion). This Court, however,
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has not faced the issue of whether a prison mail policy that
withholds potential violence producing materials violates an
inmate's right to exercise his religion.
Other circuits have considered the extent to which prisons can
withhold materials sent their inmates. The Ninth Circuit has held
that a total ban on literature advocating racial purity “cannot be
constitutionally banned as rationally related to rehabilitation.”
McCabe v. Arave, 827 F.2d 634, 638 (9th Cir. 1987). The McCabe
court, however, did recognize that literature advocating violence
or illegal activity could be banned. See id. See also Murphy v.
Missouri, 814 F.2d 1252, 1256-57 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding a total
ban on Aryan Nation materials too restrictive, but stating a policy
restricting materials that advocate violence or that are racially
inflammatory would be valid); Winburn v. Bologna, 979 F. Supp.
531, 534 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (prison mail policy withholding material
that promotes violence and racial supremacy reasonable and valid);
Thomas v. United States Secretary of Defense, 730 F. Supp. 362 (D.
Kan. 1990) (regulation rejecting mail that communicates information
designed to encourage prisoners to disrupt institution by strikes,
riots, racial or religious hatred does not violate First
Amendment). This Court agrees with the reasoning of the other
Circuits and holds that a prison mail policy restricting access to
potential violence producing materials is valid.
In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987), the
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Supreme Court established the test for evaluating the
constitutionality of regulations that infringe on prisoners' First
Amendment Rights. "[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates'
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests." O'Lone, 482 U.S. at
349. To determine whether a challenged regulation is valid, we are
directed to four factors relevant for determining whether a
challenged regulation is valid: (1) whether the regulation has a
logical connection to the legitimate government interests invoked
to justify it; (2) whether there are alternative means of
exercising the rights that remain open to the inmates; (3) the
impact that accommodation of the asserted constitutional rights
will have on other inmates, guards, and prison resources; and (4)
the presence or absence of ready alternatives that fully
accommodate the prisoner's rights at de minimus cost to valid
penological interests. See O'Lone 482 U.S. at 350-52 (citing
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987)).
Applying the Turner factors, as elaborated in O'Lone, WCC's
policy of withholding mail that advocates racial, religious, or
national hatred that creates a serious danger of violence is valid.
First, there is a logical connection between WCC's policy and the
legitimate government interest to justify it. The purpose of the
rule is to eliminate potential threats to the security or order of
the facility. Clearly, this is a legitimate interest. See, e.g.,
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Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974) ("[C]entral to all
other corrections goals is the institutional consideration of
internal security within the corrections facilities themselves.")
The second factor, alternative means of exercising the right,
also weighs in favor of the prison officials. Chriceol stated in
his affidavit that the material from the Aryan Nations and CJCC
were only a part of the “publications/materials/letters” he
received. Moreover, Chriceol acknowledged in his complaint that he
was in possession of many different religious, political, and
nationalist publications. There is no evidence the prison
officials have withheld other religious material that would
preclude him from exercising his right to free exercise of
religion.
Third, we must consider the impact the accommodation of
Chriceol's asserted rights will have on other inmates, guards, and
prison resources. The prison officials contend the publications,
a majority of which were from white supremacist groups, encouraged
hatred and violence. The magistrate judge found the materials were
“incendiary to the point of being almost certain to cause
interracial violence and nearly all of them openly advocate
violence or other illegal activities.” The prison officials could
legitimately conclude that accommodating Chriceol's requests for
materials that advocate violence and hatred could cause violence.
The third factor weighs in favor of the prison officials.
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Finally, this Court must consider the possibility of
alternatives. “[I]f an inmate claimant can point to an alternative
that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimus cost to
valid penological interests, a court may consider that as evidence
that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship
standard.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 91. Chriceol has not directed this
Court to any alternatives. Further, there are no easy alternatives
to barring potential violence producing materials. For example,
allowing Chriceol to review these materials, in the presence of
security, would cause more than a de minimus cost in terms of the
necessary security measures. The fourth factor also weighs in
favor of the prison officials.
Applying Turner, the WCC mail policy did not violate
Chriceol's rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.
B. Denial of Access to the Courts
Prisoners clearly have a constitutionally protected right of
access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996)
(citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977)). Interference with
a prisoner's right to access to the courts, such as a delay, may
result in a constitutional deprivation. See Jackson v. Procunier,
789 F.2d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Ryland v. Shapiro, 708
F.2d 967, 972 (5th Cir. 1983). Arguably, withholding access to a
prison account to pay for legal fees could, at a minimum, cause a
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delay in access to the courts. Withholding money from a prison
account could also effectively deny access to obtaining an
attorney, filing a complaint, or mailing other legal documentation.
While denial of access to a prison account may give rise to
relief under § 1983, the facts of this case do not exemplify a
constitutional deprivation. In Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-
54 (1996), the Supreme Court held that an inmate alleging denial of
access to the courts must demonstrate an actual injury stemming
from defendants' unconstitutional conduct. See also Ruiz v. United
States, 160 F.3d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 1998) (“without proving an
actual injury, a prisoner cannot prevail on an access-to-the-courts
claim.”). Thus, to secure relief, Chriceol must demonstrate actual
injury.
Chriceol has not demonstrated that withholding access to his
prison account caused actual injury in this case. Furthermore, a
review of the record does not show any evidence of actual injury.
Chriceol's fee was paid and the complaint was successfully filed.
III. CONCLUSION
In sum, we AFFIRM the district court's decision to grant
summary judgment.
AFFIRMED
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Chriceol v. Phillips
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date filed: 1999-03-24
Citations: 169 F.3d 313
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