F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JAN 6 1999
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
CRAIG CLYMORE, also known as
James Burchell, also known as Steve
Brown, also known as Kevin Riley,
also known as Wayne Samuel Powell,
also known as Cliff G. Wilson, No. 97-2319
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. No. C.V.-96-763-JC/RLP)
Submitted on the briefs:
Craig Clymore, Plaintiff-Appellant, pro se.
John J. Kelly, United States Attorney, and Stephen R. Kotz, Assistant
U.S. Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before BALDOCK , EBEL , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
EBEL , Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff appellant, Craig Clymore, pled guilty to conspiracy to knowingly
and intentionally possess with intent to distribute more than 100 kilograms of
marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841 (b)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2. Sometime after his incarceration, Clymore, proceeding pro se, filed a motion
for return of property pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) seeking the return of nine
items of property forfeited in various state and federal proceedings. The district
court adopted the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge denying
Clymore’s motion for summary judgment and granting that of the government.
However, contrary to the magistrate judge’s recommendation that only some of
Clymore’s claims be dismissed with prejudice, the district court dismissed all
claims with prejudice. On appeal, Clymore raises various challenges to the
conclusions of the district court. 1 We address those issues in order.
I.
We review the grant or denial of summary judgment
de novo, applying the same legal standard used by the
district court pursuant to Fed. R. C.V. P. 56(c).
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
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on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. When applying this standard, we examine the
factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the
light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment. If there is no genuine issue of material fact in
dispute, then we next determine if the substantive law
was correctly applied by the district court.
Kaul v. Stephan, 83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted).
As did the district court, we separate the nine forfeited items into four
distinct categories. The first category consists of items subject to judicial
forfeiture: a 1990 Honda Accord judicially forfeited in 1991 in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, and two items forfeited
in New Mexico state judicial proceedings -- a Cessna TU 206 aircraft Tail
No. N2691X and a 1988 Ford truck. The district court, citing United States v.
Madden, 95 F.3d 38 (10th Cir. 1996), held that Rule 41(e) could not be used to
contest judicial forfeitures. Clymore argues that, while this may be the case with
regard to federal judicial forfeitures, Rule 41(e) is still available to challenge
state judicial forfeitures. We disagree.
Initially, we note that Rule 41(e) is an equitable remedy, see Floyd v.
United States , 860 F.2d 999, 1003 (10th Cir. 1988), available to Mr. Clymore only
if he can show irreparable harm and an inadequate remedy at law, see id. ; see also
Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. United States (In re 6455 S. Yosemite) , 897 F.2d
-3-
1549, 1556 (10th Cir. 1990) (same with pre-indictment 41(e) motion). Assuming
Mr. Clymore has state avenues of relief open to him, he cannot show
an inadequate remedy at law.
Apart from principles of equity, however, there are some limited
circumstances under which Rule 41(e) can be used as a vehicle to petition for the
return of property seized by state authorities. Those circumstances include actual
federal possession of the property forfeited by the state, constructive federal
possession where the property was considered evidence in the federal prosecution,
or instances where property was seized by state officials acting at the direction of
federal authorities in an agency capacity. See United States v. Solis, 108 F.3d
722, 722-23 (7th Cir. 1997) (denying Rule 41(e) motion where there was no
evidence of federal possession or federal direction of state seizure); see also
United States v. White, 718 F.2d 260, 261 (8th Cir. 1983) (denying Rule 41(e)
motion where United States did not have possession of property); cf. United
States v. Fabela-Garcia, 753 F. Supp. 326, 328 (D. Utah 1989) (finding federal
constructive possession where state had deferred to the United States “in all
aspects of the prosecution”).
In his reply brief, Clymore attaches various documents establishing
the involvement of federal law enforcement officers with his prosecution and
conviction. None of those documents, however, specifically refer to the property
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at issue. Clymore’s assertion that federal authorities controlled the ongoing
investigation and were “involved” in the seizures, without more, is insufficient to
establish the extensive federal possession or control necessary to make Rule 41(e)
the appropriate vehicle by which to recover the state-forfeited property. 2
Because the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over
the state-forfeited Cessna TU 206 aircraft and the 1988 Ford truck, the claims
regarding them should have been dismissed without prejudice. Upon remand,
the district court is directed to amend its order of dismissal to so indicate.
II.
The second category of property identified by the magistrate judge is
approximately $2,000 in United States currency. Because Clymore acknowledges
that this property was judicially seized by the state of New Mexico, his claim for
return of the property pursuant to Rule 41(e) fails for the reasons discussed
above. This claim, too, should have been dismissed without prejudice.
2
Clymore cites United States v. Deninno, 103 F.3d 82 (10th Cir. 1996), to
support his argument that Rule 41(e) can apply to state judicial forfeitures. While
the Deninno defendant’s Rule 41(e) motion sought the return of property seized
both administratively by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and
judicially by the state of Oklahoma, the Deninno opinion focuses exclusively on
state and federal administrative forfeiture. See id. at 82 (“Although we find the
record insufficient to hold the administrative forfeitures procedurally valid, we
dismiss Mr. Deninno’s Rule 41(e) motion because it failed to offer any legal basis
for the return of the forfeited property.”) (emphasis added). We refuse to read
Deninno to suggest that Rule 41(e) can be used to challenge state judicial
forfeitures.
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III.
The third category of property consisted of a second Cessna TU 206 aircraft
Tail No. N7352G, $4,510 in United States currency, approximately three million
pesos in Mexican currency, and an ICOM portable transceiver with battery pack.
These items were the subject of federal administrative forfeiture. The district
court found, and the government conceded, that Clymore had not received
constitutionally adequate notice regarding the forfeiture of these items. The issue
on appeal is what a district court should do under these circumstances when the
statute of limitations prevents commencement of a judicial forfeiture.
Mr. Clymore essentially argues that a forfeiture without adequate notice is
void and that, because the statute of limitations has run against the government,
his property or its value should be returned to him. 3 The district court examined
the merits of the forfeitures and found that, because Mr. Clymore could not
prevail on the merits, his claims must fail. We reverse.
3
The forfeiture procedures relating to the customs laws apply to forfeitures
occasioned by violation of the drug laws. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(d). 19 U.S.C.
§ 1621, the limitations provision for the customs laws, provides:
No suit or action to recover . . . any pecuniary penalty or forfeiture of
property accruing under the customs laws shall be instituted unless
such suit or action is commenced within five years after the time
when the alleged offense was discovered.
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In United States v. Rodgers, 108 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1997), this court
found that notice was constitutionally ineffective where the DEA failed to mail
seizure notices to the defendant at a residence known to the agency. See id.
at 1251. The court ordered that the forfeitures be vacated, thus treating the
defective forfeiture as void. See id. at 1255; see also Aero-Medical, Inc. v.
United States, 23 F.3d 328, 331 (10th Cir. 1994) (vacating administrative
forfeiture where notice was inadequate); Armendariz-Mata v. United States Dep’t
of Justice, 82 F.3d 679, 683 (5th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Volanty,
79 F.3d 86, 88 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that “[w]hen an administrative forfeiture is
void for lack of notice, a district court must set aside the forfeiture Declaration
and order DEA either to return [the] property or commence judicial forfeiture in
the district court” (quotation omitted)); United States v. 2751 Peyton Woods
Trail, 66 F.3d 1164, 1166-67 (11th Cir. 1995) (dismissing government’s forfeiture
complaint where petitioner received neither notice nor a hearing before the
issuance of warrants seizing real property); United States v. Giraldo, 45 F.3d 509,
512 (1st Cir. 1995) (“If the notice turns out to have been inadequate, the
forfeiture is void.”). Thus, applying Rodgers, the forfeitures here must be
vacated.
In an effort to avoid this result, the government cites United States v.
Deninno, 103 F.3d 82 (10th Cir. 1996). In that case, the defendant’s Rule 41(e)
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motion asserted that, although he had been served in jail with notice of the
forfeiture of his property, he was deprived of writing materials and postage with
which to object to the proceedings. Defendant’s uncontested allegation thus
established that he had not received constitutionally adequate notice.
Instead of vacating the offending forfeiture and remanding the case, the
panel proceeded to address the merits of the defendant’s motion. After examining
the record, the panel concluded that dismissal was warranted because the
defendant had failed to “offer any plausible legal theories upon which to
challenge the forfeitures.” Id. at 85. The court noted that the defendant had been
convicted of various drug offenses and that “[a]ll of the property at issue in [the]
case was seized from a hotel where Mr. Deninno was carrying out these crimes,”
id. at 86, thus making the property forfeitable under both state and federal
statutes. Because the defendant could “offer [no] reason why the property
at issue [was] not subject to forfeiture,” id., he could not show that he was
prejudiced by the defective notice. The court reasoned that “[u]psetting the
forfeitures because of the alleged procedural faults, when Mr. Deninno appears to
have no basis for the return of the property once the faults are remedied in new
proceedings, would serve no purpose other than to waste limited judicial
resources.” Id. at 86.
-8-
Deninno is distinguishable from this case. As the magistrate judge
acknowledged, there was no statute of limitations problem apparent in Deninno. 4
The panel, therefore, had the option of either remanding the case to the district
court where a judicial forfeiture could be commenced, or examining the merits
of the forfeiture based on the record on appeal. Efficiency dictated the latter
approach, and the government’s failure to provide adequate notice was essentially
viewed as harmless error. 5
4
Indeed, documents from the Deninno case extant in this court’s files reveal
that Mr. Deninno was arrested in February 1992. The decision in Deninno was
issued in 1996, well within the five-year limitations period. Unless the alleged
offense was discovered well before Mr. Deninno’s arrest, an unlikely scenario,
there should have been ample time for the government to recommence a new
forfeiture action.
5
Any broader reading of Deninno to the effect that constitutionally defective
notice of a forfeiture merely renders the subsequent forfeiture voidable rather
than void would be contrary to our holding in Aero-Medical, Inc. v. United States,
23 F.3d 328, 331 (10th Cir. 1994). Becau
se
Aero-
Medic
al is
the
earlie
r
opinio
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“const
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circui
(continued...)
-9-
5
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t
prece
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constr
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subse
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panels
absent
en
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recon
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or a
supers
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ry
decisi
on by
the
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.[Thu
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No such approach is possible in this case. The forfeiture of which
5
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ct, a
panel
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Hayne
s v.
Willia
ms,
88
F.3d
898,
900
n.4
(10th
Cir.
1996)
(citati
ons
omitte
d).
-11-
Clymore complains is void and must be vacated. See Rodgers, 108 F.3d at 1255;
Aero-Medical, 23 F.3d at 331. Because the statute of limitations has expired,
any finding that constitutional error occurred in the notice procedure would not be
harmless as to Clymore, thus making the Deninno approach unworkable.
The magistrate judge cited both Rodgers and Deninno, but noted, as
mentioned above, that no statute of limitations issue had been raised in either
case. Relying on Boero v. DEA, 111 F.3d 301 (2d Cir. 1997), and United States
v. Marolf, 973 F. Supp. 1139 (C.D. Cal. 1997), cases which explicitly address the
limitations issue, the district court determined that there was sufficient
information in the record to reject Clymore’s claim on the merits. We disagree
with this approach.
In Boero, 111 F.3d 301, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to
distribution of cocaine and conspiracy to commit kidnaping. Currency seized at
the time of his arrest was eventually administratively forfeited by the DEA. The
DEA conceded that the defendant had never received proper notice of the
forfeiture, but the district court held that the defendant’s remedy was via
administrative claims procedures. See id. at 303-04. The Second Circuit
reversed the latter determination, holding that
[t]he court’s findings concerning the impropriety of the forfeiture
gave the court power to correct the deficiency. The court, however,
did not correct the deficiency, and instead allowed Boero to pursue
an administrative remedy, over five years from the date of the initial
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seizure, as if an improper forfeiture had never occurred. . . .
Consignment of Boero to his administrative remedy is contrary
to this Circuit’s civil forfeiture law.
Id. at 305 (citation omitted). As a broad proposition, the court stated that “when
the government is responsible for a known claimant’s inability to present a claim,
through the government’s disregard of its statutory obligation to give notice
(or otherwise), a hearing on the merits is available in the district court.” Id.
at 306. Because the court found that the DEA was responsible for the failure of
notice, the court vacated the judgment “to the extent that the DEA was directed to
commence administrative forfeiture proceedings, and direct[ed] the district court
to consider Boero’s claim on the merits.” Id. at 307. Following Boero, the court
in Marolf, 973 F. Supp. 1139, proceeded to examine the merits of a challenge to
a forfeiture where the limitations period had run against recommencement of any
further forfeiture action.
We respectfully disagree with the Second Circuit’s decision in Boero
insofar as the hearing ordered there examined the merits of the challenged
forfeiture when the original notice was constitutionally deficient and the statute
of limitations had already run. This result is required by our circuit precedent
which holds that a forfeiture accomplished without adequate notice is void and
must be vacated. See Rodgers, 108 F.3d at 1255; Aero-Medical, 23 F.3d at 331.
As noted above, we are not alone in this view. See Armendariz-Mata, 82 F.3d at
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683; Volanty, 79 F.3d at 88; 2751 Peyton Woods Trail, 66 F.3d at 1166-67;
Giraldo, 45 F.3d at 512.
Where obvious statute of limitations problems exist, we think the offending
forfeiture should be vacated and the statute of limitations allowed to operate,
subject, of course, to any available government arguments against it. As we noted
in Aero-Medical, “[d]ue process protections ought to be diligently enforced, and
by no means relaxed, where a party seeks the traditionally disfavored remedy of
forfeiture.” 23 F.3d at 331 (quotation omitted). We thus reverse the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to the government as to the property
administratively forfeited by the DEA.
IV.
The last item of property at issue is a 1982 Toyota truck seized in a federal
administrative forfeiture in Texas. The district court declined to exercise
ancillary jurisdiction over property seized in another district. We affirm.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) states, in pertinent part:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure or by the
deprivation of property may move the district court for the district
in which the property was seized for the return of the property on
the ground that such person is entitled to lawful possession of the
property.
There is a split in the circuits regarding whether Rule 41(e) motions must
be brought in the district in which the property was seized or in the district in
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which the criminal proceedings occurred. The Second Circuit in United States v.
Giovanelli, 998 F.2d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 1993), has held that the district court
which had presided over the underlying criminal proceeding had jurisdiction over
a Rule 41(e) motion brought after the conclusion of the criminal matter even
though the property had been seized in a different district. The Eighth Circuit
has carried this reasoning a step further and held that the district court which
had presided over the criminal matter was the only proper district to entertain
a Rule 41(e) motion, implying that the district in which the property had been
seized would not have jurisdiction. See Thompson v. Covington, 47 F.3d 974,
975 (8th Cir. 1995). 6
In contrast to these cases, the Fourth Circuit has held that, after the
conclusion of the criminal proceeding, jurisdiction is proper only in the district
in which the property was seized. See United States v. Garcia, 65 F.3d 17, 20
6
This seems to contradict the first sentence of Rule 41(e) which provides
that:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure or by
the deprivation of property may move the district court for the
district in which the property was seized for the return of the
property . . . .
See also United States v. Garcia, 65 F.3d 17, 20 (4th Cir. 1995) (rejecting
Thompson and characterizing this holding as a “flourish” contrary to the Rule).
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(4th Cir. 1995) (Murhaghan, C.J., dissenting and arguing that jurisdiction would
be proper in either venue). 7
We agree with the Fourth Circuit and hold that, at least in cases where the
underlying criminal proceedings have concluded and the trial court no longer
exercises any control over the subject property, the proper venue for a Rule 41(e)
motion is the district in which the property was seized. We see this interpretation
as conforming more closely to the language of the rule and to the practicalities of
judicial administration. We therefore affirm the district court’s refusal to
exercise ancillary jurisdiction over the Toyota truck. As with the other items
discussed above over which the court had no jurisdiction, this claim should have
been dismissed without prejudice to refile in the district of seizure.
In summary, we AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment to the
government with respect to all items EXCEPT the items discussed in Section III
herein, to wit, the Cessna TU 206 aircraft Tail No. N7352G, $4,510 in United
States currency, approximately three million pesos in Mexican currency, and the
7
Mr. Clymore cites the Tenth Circuit case of United States v. Wingfield,
822 F.2d 1466 (10th Cir. 1987), to urge that the district court should have
exercised ancillary jurisdiction over the Texas truck. Wingfield, however, did not
involve property seized in a jurisdiction different from the one which had
presided over the criminal proceeding. The issue was not whether some other
federal district court would have had jurisdiction over the res, but whether the
trial court continued to have jurisdiction over a subsequent dispute between a
local county agency and the Internal Revenue Service as to rights in the seized
property.
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ICOM portable transceiver with battery pack. We REVERSE the judgment of the
district court as to those items and REMAND for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. We further REMAND with instructions that the claims for the
return of the 1990 Honda EX-Accord, the Cessna TU aircraft Tail #N2691X, the
1988 Ford Truck, the approximately $2,000 in United States currency, and the
1982 Toyota truck be dismissed without prejudice.
This matter was initially treated in the district court as a motion under
28 U.S.C. § 2255. If this error has not already been corrected, the clerk for the
district court for the district of New Mexico is directed to revise its docket to
reflect that this case is brought pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e).
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Clymore v. United States
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 1999-01-06
Citations: 164 F.3d 569
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion