F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
AUG 7 2001
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
COALITION FOR SUSTAINABLE
RESOURCES, INC., a Colorado non-
profit corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES FOREST
SERVICE, Department of Agriculture;
ANN M. VENEMAN, Secretary of the
U.S. Department of Agriculture;
UNDERSECRETARY OF No. 99-8060
AGRICULTURE FOR NATURAL
RESOURCES, United States
Department of Agriculture; DALE
BOSWORTH, United States Forest
Service Chief Forester; RICK
CABLES, United States Forest Service
Regional Forester, Rocky Mountain
Region; MARY H. PETERSON,
Supervisor, Medicine Bow National
Forest, United States Forest Service,
all in their official capacities, 1
1
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), new officeholders are substituted as
appellees in this action.
Defendants-Appellees,
BIODIVERSITY ASSOCIATES and
DONALD J. DUERR,
Defendants-Intervenors -
Appellees,
___________________________
NATIONAL WILDLIFE
FEDERATION,
Amicus Curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Wyoming
(D.C. No. 98-CV-174-B)
S. Amanda Koehler (William Perry Pendley, with her on the briefs), of Mountain
States Legal Foundation, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Sylvia F. Liu, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Lois J.
Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, Washington, D.C.; David D. Freudenthal,
United States Attorney, Cheyenne, Wyoming; Carol A. Stakus, Assistant U.S.
Attorney, Cheyenne, Wyoming; Andrew C. Mergen, Edward A. Boling, and Jane
P. Davenport, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Kenneth
Capps, Of Counsel, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Denver, Colorado; and
Kathryn Toffenetti, Of Counsel, Office of General Counsel, U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Washington, D.C., with her on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees. 2
Carolyn L. McIntosh (Michael R. Hope on the brief), of Patton Boggs, LLP,
Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Intervenors-Appellees.
We grant Defendants-Appellees’ motion to substitute counsel Andrew C.
2
Mergen for Sylvia F. Liu.
-2-
James B. Dougherty, Washington, D.C., filed a brief for Amicus Curiae.
Before TACHA, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
The Coalition for Sustainable Resources (“Coalition”) challenges the
United States Forest Service’s failure to implement particular forest-management
practices in the Medicine Bow National Forest in Wyoming, including increased
timber harvesting. The Coalition alleges that these practices would increase the
amount of water in the Platte River in Nebraska and thereby promote the recovery
of several endangered and threatened species utilizing that habitat. The district
court dismissed the case as not yet ripe for review, and also found that the
Coalition had failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the
Endangered Species Act does not require federal agencies to adopt particular
conservation measures.
We hold that this case is not yet ripe, and we therefore lack subject-matter
jurisdiction. Here, the Coalition is challenging the Forest Service’s inaction, but
this inaction is not sufficiently final for review. The Forest Service is currently a
cooperating agency in developing a conservation strategy for the Platte River
species and is also revising its forest plan for the Medicine Bow. Because the
agency has adopted a reasonable timeframe to study this problem, given the
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complexity and urgency of the issues, we conclude that judicial review is not
warranted at this time. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction and VACATE its disposition on the merits.
BACKGROUND
The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544, is a comprehensive
scheme for the protection of listed endangered and threatened species and their
habitat, regulating the activities of both governmental and private entities. The
Act’s ultimate goal is “conservation,” bringing these species to the point where
legal protections are no longer necessary. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(b), 1532(3). The
Department of the Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service and the Department of
Commerce’s National Marine Fisheries Service share primary responsibility for
administration of most parts of the Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15); 50 C.F.R.
§ 17.2(b). At issue in this case, however, is a provision covering all other federal
agencies, including the Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service. These
agencies “shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretar[ies of
the Interior and of Commerce], utilize their authorities in furtherance of the
purposes of [the Endangered Species Act] by carrying out programs for the
conservation of endangered species and threatened species.” 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(a)(1).
-4-
The Platte River in Nebraska is home to the whooping crane, least tern,
pallid sturgeon, and piping plover, all species listed as endangered or threatened
under the Endangered Species Act, and part of the river has been designated
“critical habitat” for the whooping crane. The Coalition alleges that more water
(some 238,000 acre-feet per year) is needed in the Platte River to meet target
flows established for the listed species. The Coalition alleges that the Fish and
Wildlife Service has determined that a loss of as little as 0.7 acre-feet of water
per year from the South Platte River drainage in Colorado is likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of these species and adversely modify the designated
critical habitat. 3
The Department of the Interior and the states of Colorado, Nebraska, and
Wyoming have signed a “Cooperative Agreement for Platte River Research and
Other Efforts Relating to Endangered Species Habitats Along the Central Platte
River, Nebraska.” The purpose of this plan is to study the listed species
dependant on the Platte River and implement a recovery plan. Although it is not a
signatory, the Forest Service is participating as a “cooperating agency” in the
development of an Environmental Impact Statement for the Cooperative
3
The Final Biological Opinion referenced by the Coalition’s allegation does
refer to a proposed action that could reduce flow by 0.7 acre-feet annually, but
that Opinion makes it clear that this particular action is only a “very small
proportion of the depletions in the Platte River system” which cumulatively could
have the adverse effects alleged by the Coalition.
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Agreement. The record reflects that a program would be developed by the end of
2000. 4
The Coalition is a non-profit organization devoted to encouraging the
recovery of endangered species “using sound scientific, technological, and legal
means in a manner that avoids unnecessary interference with private property
rights.” Among its members are ranchers, farmers, and other water-users in
Wyoming and Colorado whose water-use practices are subject to restriction to
prevent harm to the Platte River species. A declaration submitted for standing
purposes indicates that the Coalition also has a member who is an amateur
photographer with an aesthetic interest in these species.
Some 300 miles west is the Medicine Bow National Forest in Wyoming,
part of which lies within the Platte River watershed. The Coalition alleges that
implementing certain vegetation and snow management techniques in the
Medicine Bow and other nearby National Forests could supply most or all of the
water needed for the Platte River species to recover. Because denser forests yield
less water, these techniques include increasing timber harvesting and allowing
forest fires and insect outbreaks to proceed without human intervention. The
The district court concluded that the study would be complete by July
4
2000. Intervenor Biodiversity Associates similarly informed us in its brief that
the work “should be finished later this year [2000].” However, the parties have
not given us a status report on those expected timetables.
-6-
1985 forest plan 5 for the Medicine Bow states that the forest could be managed so
as to increase the forest’s yield of water by 41,000-53,500 acre-feet per year; the
Coalition alleges (and the Forest Service concedes) that a substantial portion of
this increase would accrue to the Platte River, although it is not specifically
alleged how much of this increased flow would benefit the listed species, given
the water claims of the other water users in the river. The Coalition alleges,
however, that the Medicine Bow is being managed in a manner that increases
forest density and therefore decreases the quantity of water produced by the
forests. In particular, in recent years the total timber sale volume in the Medicine
Bow has fallen short of the level prescribed in the forest plan. The Forest Service
is currently revising the Medicine Bow forest plan and expects to finish by the
fall of 2002. 6 This revision will look at a broad range of alternatives for
managing the forest, such as “increas[ing] the acreage where natural disturbance
events (fire, insects and disease) are tolerated.”
The Coalition sued Defendants, who are responsible for managing the
Medicine Bow, under the citizen-suit provision of the Endangered Species Act, 16
5
Forest plans guide management strategies in the National Forests. They
are developed with public participation, provide for an appropriate mix of
multiple uses (commercial, recreational, and conservation-oriented), and are
updated at least every fifteen years. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1604.
6
The district court concluded that the Medicine Bow forest plan would be
completed by 2001. Again, the parties have not provided us with a status report
on the expected timetables.
-7-
U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1), which states that “any person may commence a civil suit on
his own behalf . . . to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other
governmental instrumentality or agency . . . , who is alleged to be in violation of
any provision of” the Act. 7 It alleged that Defendants violated their duty under
§ 1536(a)(1) 8 to carry out conservation programs in its management of the
Medicine Bow. In particular, the Coalition alleged that the agency’s inaction – its
failure to implement the water-producing techniques, specifically more aggressive
timber-harvesting practices – violated its conservation duty. The Coalition also
implied that by allowing forest density to increase, the Forest Service was
contributing to the decline of the Platte River species. 9 As less water is produced
by the upstream forests, greater restrictions are imposed on downstream water-
7
The complaint also asserted a violation of the Forest and Rangeland
Renewable Resources Planning Act. The district court dismissed this claim on
the grounds of sovereign immunity, and the Coalition has not appealed that ruling.
8
In relevant part this section provides, “All other federal agencies shall, in
consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, utilize their authorities
in furtherance of the purposes of [the Endangered Species Act] by carrying out
programs for the conservation of endangered species and threatened species
listed” under the Act.
9
The Coalition did not allege that Defendants’ inaction was an agency
“action . . . likely to jeopardize the continued existence” of the Platte River
species or adversely modify their habitat in violation of § 1536(a)(2). We
therefore have no occasion to consider whether an agency’s inaction can
constitute an “action” for these purposes under § 1536(a)(2).
-8-
users such as the Coalition’s members. The complaint sought declaratory and
injunctive relief.
The Forest Service moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the
Coalition lacked standing and failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. Biodiversity Associates, an environmental group, and Donald J. Duerr,
one of its members, intervened as defendants and moved to dismiss the complaint
for lack of ripeness. The district court found that the Coalition had standing, at
least for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, but that the claims were not ripe and
the Endangered Species Act does not require federal agencies to undertake
particular conservation measures. Coalition for Sustainable Resources v. United
States Forest Serv., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (D. Wyo. 1999). The Coalition now
appeals.
DISCUSSION
To fall within our subject-matter jurisdiction, a case must raise issues that
are ripe for review. Park Lake Res. v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 197 F.3d
448, 450 (10th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff bears the burden of providing evidence
to establish that the issues are ripe. Id. Where, as here, a party has attacked the
factual basis for subject-matter jurisdiction, we do not presume the truthfulness of
the complaint’s factual allegations; rather, we may consider evidence not
-9-
contained in the pleadings. Pringle v. United States, 208 F.3d 1220, 1222 (10th
Cir. 2000) (per curiam). We may not do so, however, if resolution of the
jurisdictional question is intertwined with the merits of the case: If “resolution of
the jurisdictional question requires resolution of an aspect of the substantive
claim,” id. at 1223, reference to evidence outside of the pleadings converts the
motion to one under Rule 56. We review the district court’s dismissal on ripeness
grounds de novo and its findings of jurisdictional fact for clear error. Holt v.
United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 1995); accord Cedars-Sinai Med.
Ctr. v. Watkins, 11 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[I]n the context of a
ripeness determination, the district court’s factual findings on jurisdictional issues
must be accepted unless clearly erroneous.” (quotation marks and brackets
omitted)). Judicial review of agency action through the citizen-suit provision is
governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See, e.g., Biodiversity
Legal Found. v. Babbitt, 146 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 1998); Newton County
Wildlife Ass’n v. Rogers, 141 F.3d 803, 807-08 (8th Cir. 1998); Cabinet
Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
The basic rationale of the ripeness requirement is “to prevent the courts,
through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in
abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the
agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been
- 10 -
formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.”
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967), overruled on other
grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977). Application of the
ripeness doctrine, however, “remains a confused mix of principle and pragmatic
judgment reflecting its mixture of article III case and controversy requirements
with prudential restraints on the exercise of jurisdiction.” Sierra Club v. Yeutter,
911 F.2d 1405, 1410 (10th Cir. 1990). 10 Cases that challenge an agency’s failure
to act, such as this one, are particularly difficult to analyze. Id.
To determine whether a case is ripe, we examine both “the fitness of the
issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration.” Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149.
In making this determination, we look to four factors: (1) whether the
issues in the case are purely legal; (2) whether the agency action
involved is “final agency action” within the meaning of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704; (3) whether the action
has or will have a direct and immediate impact upon the plaintiff and
(4) whether the resolution of the issues will promote effective
enforcement and administration by the agency.
10
The Coalition does not appear to argue that the citizen-suit provision of
the Endangered Species Act abrogates the prudential (non-constitutional)
component of the ripeness inquiry. Cf. Roe v. Odgen, 253 F.3d 1225, 1231 (10th
Cir. 2001) (noting that ripeness has constitutional and prudential components).
The citizen-suit provision abrogates the prudential component of the standing
inquiry by allowing suits by “any person.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164
(1997) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)). There is no comparable language
authorizing a suit at “any time,” for example. We therefore examine both
constitutional and prudential limits to ripeness in this case.
- 11 -
HRI, Inc. v. EPA, 198 F.3d 1224, 1235-36 (10th Cir. 2000). 11 None of these
factors weigh strongly in favor of our exercising jurisdiction over the case at this
point. To the contrary, the challenged agency “action” – the Forest Service’s
inaction – is not yet “final.” In addition, not all the issues are purely legal, the
immediate impact from the Forest Service’s inaction is at best uncertain, and
resolution of the merits at this time might impede rather than promote efficient
administration of the Endangered Species Act.
1. The Issues Are Not Purely Legal
Some aspects of this case involve pure questions of law. For example, the
parties dispute whether 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) imposes any substantive
requirements on a federal agency, or whether the agency instead maintains
unfettered discretion to decide how to fulfill its conservation duty. If we were to
rule that the Forest Service has unfettered discretion, the Coalition’s case would
likely fail on purely legal grounds. If we were to rule that § 1536(a)(1) imposes
substantive requirements, however, we would then have to determine if increased
11
In Roe v. Ogden, we articulated a slightly different test for ripeness: “(1)
whether delayed review would cause hardship to the plaintiffs; (2) whether
judicial intervention would inappropriately interfere with further administrative
action; and (3) whether the courts would benefit from further factual development
of the issues presented.” 253 F.3d at 1231. Notwithstanding the difference in
articulation, the Roe standard essentially includes all the same considerations that
appear in the HRI test.
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timber harvesting in the Medicine Bow will promote conservation of the Platte
River species. Will water produced 300 miles upstream reach the Platte River
species and habitat, or will it be diverted by downstream users? Will the water be
of an appropriate quality for these species? Will it accrue during the needed
seasons? Will the proposed management techniques have collateral effects that
must be considered, such as on other endangered species? It is evident that this
case may raise numerous questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact.
“Where disputed facts exist and the issue is not purely legal, greater caution is
required prior to concluding that an issue is ripe for review.” Yeutter, 911 F.2d at
1417; cf. id. at 1418 (cautioning against “piecemeal review” when a case has
some purely legal issues and some factual questions).
2. The Agency Action Is Not Final Within the Meaning of the APA
“Administrative finality is interpreted pragmatically.” Yeutter, 911 F.2d at
1417. Keeping this admonition in mind, we find that in the absence of a definite
statutory deadline for action, agency inaction can become “final” for these
purposes in three situations. First, the agency might affirmatively reject a
proposed course of action. See, e.g., NRDC v. Adm’r, EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 983
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (opinion of Wald, C.J.) (stating that if an agency “explicitly
determines after review” not to change a rule, “that decision would, in most
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situations, . . . be final”), vacated by voluntary dismissal, 921 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir.
1991); cf. id. at 989 (opinion of Edwards, J.) (stating that inaction is final when
the agency has completed a rulemaking and there is “some clear indication that
the disputed issue was considered during the rulemaking procedure”). Second,
the agency might unreasonably delay in responding to the proposal. See, e.g.,
Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 793-94 (D.C. Cir. 1987); cf. Forest
Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178, 1190 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that under the
Endangered Species Act, “if an agency has no concrete deadline establishing a
date by which it must act, and instead is governed only by general timing
provisions . . . a court must compel only action that is delayed unreasonably.”);
NRDC, 902 F.2d at 983-84 (opinion of Wald, C.J.) (stating that circumstantial
“contextual or historical evidence,” such as silence throughout an entire
rulemaking cycle, may indicate that an agency is “hiding a final decision not to
[act] behind its silence”). Third, the agency might delay responding to the
proposal beyond the time in which action could be effective. See, e.g., Thomas,
828 F.2d at 793 (“[A]gency inaction may represent effectively final agency action
that the agency has not frankly acknowledged: when administrative inaction has
precisely the same impact on the rights of the parties as denial of relief, an agency
cannot preclude judicial review by casting its decision in the form of inaction
rather than in the form of an order denying relief.”). See generally Daniel P.
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Selmi, Jurisdiction To Review Agency Inaction Under Federal Environmental
Law, 72 Ind. L.J. 65, 90-102 (1996) (describing five judicial tests for determining
whether agency inaction is final); Peter H.A. Lehner, Note, Judicial Review of
Administrative Inaction, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 627, 652-55 (1983) (stating that
inaction is final when the agency either refuses to take particular requested
actions or fails to act entirely before a deadline).
This case presents none of the above situations. First, the Forest Service
has not yet rejected the possibility of implementing Coalition’s proposed
management techniques. To the contrary, the district court found that the Forest
Service is actively considering this course of action both in its revisions to the
Medicine Bow forest plan and through its participation in the Cooperative
Agreement. While the agency may not seek to evade judicial review by constantly
beginning new rule-making cycles, cf. Legalization Assistance Project v. INS,
976 F.2d 1198, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 1992) (“If we allow the possibility that an
agency may promulgate additional regulations in the future to dictate our
decisions on ripeness, then an administrative agency’s regulations could forever
escape judicial review. The doctrine of ripeness is not intended to promote an
absurd result.”), vacated, 510 U.S. 1007 (1993); Ohio Envtl. Council v. United
States Dist. Court, 565 F.2d 393, 398 (6th Cir. 1977) (“If a plan became
unenforceable every time . . . a revision became a possibility, the entire
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enforcement procedure of the Clean Air Act would be crippled.”), we are satisfied
that is not occurring here.
Second, the Forest Service has not unreasonably delayed a decision on
whether to implement the proposed management techniques. It is sensible for the
Forest Service to consider the issue in tandem with the Cooperative Agreement
parties and as a part of its new forest plan. The Coalition asserts that we should
not consider the Cooperative Agreement since the Forest Service is not a
signatory. As noted above, however, the Forest Service is participating in that
process as a “cooperating agency.” This is particularly appropriate given that
§ 1536(a)(1), the provision at issue in the lawsuit, requires federal agencies to
carry out conservation programs in consultation with the Department of the
Interior, which is a signatory to the Cooperative Agreement. Both the
Cooperative Agreement and the forest-plan revisions anticipate final action within
a reasonable period of time given the enormous complexity of the issues involved
and the obvious benefits of a coordinated approach.
Third, the district court found that the Platte River species are not facing
immediate jeopardy. This finding is not clearly erroneous. 12 Although the
12
As noted above, the district court properly considered evidence outside of
the pleadings on this motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Pringle, 208 F.3d at 1222. We therefore review the district court’s factual
findings deferentially, Holt, 45 F.3d at 1003, and in view of the full record, not
(continued...)
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Coalition alleges that a loss of as little as ninety-eight gallons of water from
Medicine Bow would contribute incrementally to the species’ loss of water, this is
insufficient to allege immediate jeopardy to species three hundred miles away.
The record reflects that the Forest Service, through consultations with the Fish
and Wildlife Service, has sought to offset small water depletions (less than
twenty-five acre-feet annually) by contributing $95,000 toward the development
of Platte River Basin recovery efforts. We acknowledge that some of the
Coalition’s allegations about the plight of the Platte River species are disturbing.
There is no doubt the species face a dire situation; their very presence on the lists
of endangered and threatened species means that they are in danger of extinction
in a significant portion of their range or are likely to face such a danger in the
foreseeable future. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6), (20). Nonetheless, we cannot say
that the district court committed clear error in finding a lack of immediate
jeopardy. On this record, the Coalition has not established that the Forest
Service’s inaction “has precisely the same impact on the rights of the parties as
denial of relief,” Thomas, 828 F.2d at 793, by placing the Platte River species in
jeopardy of imminent extinction. Even while the Forest Service considers its
options, the species retain strong protection against agency actions that are likely
12
(...continued)
just the complaint.
- 17 -
to jeopardize their continued existence or adversely modify their critical habitat.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
3. There Is Little Immediate Impact from the Forest Service’s Inaction
As noted above, the district court found that the listed species do not face
immediate harm from the Forest Service’s inaction. On the record before us, we
cannot say that this amounts to clear error. The Coalition also seems to assert
that some of its members will be subjected to further restrictions on their water
use while the Forest Service studies the issue. This does not tip the balance in
favor of finding ripeness. At best the immediate impact is uncertain. Given the
lack of finality and the factual issues implicated, the possibility of short-term
water-use restrictions is not enough to make this case fit for immediate judicial
resolution.
4. Resolution of These Issues Will Not Promote Effective Administration
Finally, we conclude that addressing the merits of this case at the present
time would not promote efficiency. To the contrary, the district court found that
judicial involvement at this stage might impede the efforts of the Cooperative
Agreement. The Department of the Interior and the Forest Service, with their
specialized expertise, should be allowed a first chance to balance the competing
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interests at stake and choose a course of action. That decision, once it is final,
can be reviewed by the courts more effectively and efficiently.
5. Conclusion
The Forest Service’s alleged inaction has not yet ripened into final agency
action. In addition, this lawsuit raises factual questions and resolution at this
time would likely impede rather than promote an effective conservation program
for the Platte River species. Because we perceive little hardship in withholding
judicial consideration at present, we hold that the case is not ripe for review.
CONCLUSION
The Coalition’s challenge to the Forest Service’s conservation program is
not ripe for review under the Endangered Species Act, and we lack subject-matter
jurisdiction over this case. Without jurisdiction, we may not comment on the
merits; to the extent the district court ruled on the substance of § 1536(a)(1), we
must vacate that decision. We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal for lack of
ripeness and VACATE its dismissal on the merits.
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Coalition for Sustainable Resources, Inc. v. United States Forest Service
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2001-08-07
Citations: 259 F.3d 1244
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion