United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS August 21, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
_______________________ Clerk
No. 02-21263
_______________________
MARCUS BRIDGER COTTON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
JANIE COCKRELL, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division
Civil Docket H-01-CV-2201
_________________________________________________________________
Before JONES, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:
Marcus Bridger Cotton was convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to death for murdering Assistant District Attorney Gil
Epstein during a robbery in November 1997. After he exhausted
state remedies, Cotton filed a § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in federal district court raising twelve issues. The
district court granted the state’s motion for summary judgment on
all twelve issues. The district court granted summary judgment and
1
denied Cotton’s petition. The district court also refused to grant
a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on any of the issues raised
by Cotton.
Cotton now seeks a COA from this court on four issues:
(1) whether the prosecutor improperly commented on the defendant’s
failure to testify, (2) whether his trial counsel provided
constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to call two
witnesses to testify at trial, (3) whether he was denied due
process by comments made by the trial judge during jury selection
about the history of the Texas capital sentencing scheme, and (4)
whether his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective
assistance by failing to object to the trial judge’s comments
regarding the Texas capital sentencing scheme. We grant a COA on
the first issue but deny the application for COA on the other
issues. With respect to the issue regarding the prosecutor’s
closing argument, however, we affirm the district court’s denial of
habeas relief.
BACKGROUND
At Cotton’s second trial for capital murder, Lawrence
Watson testified that on September 18, 1996, he and Cotton decided
to commit a robbery because they were broke. Sometime later that
day, Cotton and Watson observed Gil Epstein and Sean Caruthers
walking toward their cars in the Houston Jewish Community Center
parking lot and decided to rob them. Watson approached Caruthers,
2
pointed a .38 caliber revolver at him, and demanded money.
Caruthers gave his wallet to Watson and Watson ordered him to
leave. At the same time, Cotton accosted Epstein. Cotton forced
Epstein to the ground with a .380 caliber semi-automatic pistol and
demanded his money. Epstein told Cotton he did not have any money.
Cotton walked Epstein to his car, forced Epstein into the back
seat, and began to search Epstein’s wallet and glove compartment.
Caruthers testified that after being ordered to leave by
Watson, he drove to the front of the community center and went into
the center seeking help. Caruthers came back outside and drove to
the side of the building where he saw Cotton in Epstein’s car.
Watson was on a bicycle outside of Epstein’s car. Caruthers began
to flash the car’s lights and honked the horn in an attempt to
alert the police. Watson testified that when Caruthers created
this disturbance Cotton yelled to Watson to “kill that bitch.”
Watson aimed his gun at Caruthers, but without having fired his
weapon, he heard a gunshot behind him. Watson turned around and
saw Cotton fire his gun while still in Epstein’s car. Several
witnesses testified that Cotton said he decided to kill Epstein
when he found in Epstein’s wallet a badge identifying Epstein as an
assistant district attorney for Fort Bend County, Texas. After
shooting Epstein, Cotton left the car, jumped on his bicycle and
rode toward Caruthers’ car. Caruthers drove into Cotton, knocking
Cotton off his bike. Cotton and Watson then escaped.
3
Cotton was first tried for the murder of Epstein on March
17, 1997. Jury deadlock caused a mistrial. At a second trial in
November 1997, a jury convicted Cotton of capital murder. Cotton
was sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals upheld Cotton’s conviction and sentence. Cotton
v. State, No. 72,964 (Tex. Crim. App. June 30, 1999) (unpublished).
The Supreme Court denied Cotton’s petition for writ of certiorari.
Cotton v. Texas, 530 U.S. 1277 (2000).
Before the Supreme Court’s denial of his petition, Cotton
filed a state application for habeas corpus. The trial judge
entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, which were adopted
by the Court of Criminal Appeals in denying habeas relief. Ex
parte Cotton, No. 49,499-01 (Tex. Crim. App. June 7,
2000)(unpublished). On June 29, 2001, Cotton filed a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court.
DISCUSSION
Cotton’s § 2254 habeas petition is subject to the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). See
Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001). Under AEDPA, Cotton
must obtain a COA before he can appeal the district court’s denial
of habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000); Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000). “[U]ntil a COA has been issued
federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to rule on the merits
4
of appeals from habeas petitioners.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S.
Ct. 1029, 1039 (2003).
To obtain a COA, Cotton must make “a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)
(2000); Miller-El, 123 S. Ct. at 1039; Slack, 529 U.S. at 483. To
make such a showing, he must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists
could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition
should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further.” Miller-El, 123 S. Ct. at 1039 (quoting Slack, 529 U.S.
at 484).
In Miller-El, the Supreme Court instructed, as it had
previously held in Slack, that we should “limit [our] examination
to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of [the
petitioner’s] claims.” Miller-El, 123 S. Ct. at 1034. The Court
observed that “a COA ruling is not the occasion for a ruling on the
merit of petitioner’s claim . . .” Id. at 1036. Instead, our
determination must be based on “an overview of the claims in the
habeas petition and a general assessment of their merits.” Id. at
1039. “This threshold inquiry does not require full consideration
of the factual or legal bases adduced in support of the claims.”
Id. We do not have jurisdiction to justify our denial of a COA
based on an adjudication of the actual merits of the claims. Id.
Accordingly, we cannot deny an “application for a COA merely
because [we believe] the applicant will not demonstrate an
5
entitlement to relief.” Id. “[A] claim can be debatable even
though every jurist of reason might agree, after the COA has been
granted and the case has received full consideration, that
petitioner will not prevail.” Id.
Even if we grant Cotton’s application for COA, Cotton is
not necessarily entitled to habeas relief. “To prevail on a
petition for writ of habeas corpus, a petitioner must demonstrate
that the state court proceeding ‘resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States.’” Robertson v. Cockrell, 325 F.3d 243, 247-48 (5th
Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000)). A
state court’s decision is "contrary to . . . clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States . . . if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to
that reached by the Court on a question of law or if the state
court decides a case differently than the Court has on a set of
materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 412-13 (2000). A state court’s decision “involves an
unreasonable application of [] clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States . . . if the
state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from
the Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to
the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413.
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In making the “unreasonable application” inquiry, this
court must determine whether the state court’s application of
clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable. Neal
v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 236 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 963 (2003). “We have no authority to grant
habeas corpus relief simply because we conclude, in our independent
judgment, that a state supreme court's application of [federal law]
is erroneous or incorrect." Catalan v. Cockrell, 315 F.3d 491, 493
(5th Cir. 2002)(quoting Neal, 286 F.3d at 236). “The federal
habeas scheme leaves primary responsibility with the state courts
for these judgments, and authorizes federal-court intervention only
when a state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Woodford
v. Visciotti, -- U.S. --, 123 S. Ct. 357, 361 (2002).
Finally, for Cotton to be entitled to habeas relief based
on a constitutional “trial” error, he must demonstrate not only
that the state court’s decision was contrary to or an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law, but also that it
was harmful under the standard set forth in Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U.S. 619 (1993). Robertson v. Cain, 324 F.3d 297, 304 (5th
Cir. 2003). “Under Brecht, a federal court may grant habeas relief
on account of constitutional error only if it determines that the
constitutional error had a ‘substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Id. (quoting Brecht,
507 U.S. at 623 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,
776 (1946)).
7
1. Comment on Cotton’s Failure to Testify
Cotton first seeks a COA with respect to the district
court’s failure to grant habeas relief based on the prosecutor’s
allegedly improperly comment on Cotton’s failure to testify in his
own defense. During the State’s closing argument at the
guilt/innocence phase of trial, the prosecutor stated:
One of the things – you know, they talked about what a
liar [Watson] was and how you can’t believe him and all
that, but you know, he told you some things that really
smack of the truth, and one of the things that is so
indicative of the fact that he told you the truth was
they never shook him about one event, and he makes
admissions about some things, but they never shook him
about one event in this case. They can’t contradict him
about one event in this case. And they’ve got an expert
witness that could tell them if he lied. Marcus Cotton
was with him.
Cotton’s counsel timely objected to this statement as a comment on
Cotton’s failure to testify. The trial court overruled the
objection.
The Fifth Amendment prohibits a prosecutor from
commenting on a defendant’s failure to testify, Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1968), if “the prosecutor’s manifest
intent in making the remark must have been to comment on the
defendant's silence, or the character of the remark must have been
such that the jury would naturally and necessarily construe it as
a comment on the defendant’s silence.” Jackson v. Johnson, 194
F.3d 641, 652 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Grosz, 76
F.3d 1318, 1326 (5th Cir. 1996)). “The prosecutor’s intent is not
8
manifest if there is some other, equally plausible explanation for
the remark.” Grosz, 76 F.3d at 1326. As for whether a jury would
naturally and necessarily construe a remark as a comment on the
defendant’s failure to testify, “the question is not whether the
jury possibly or even probably would view the challenged remark in
this manner, but whether the jury necessarily would have done so.”
Id. (quoting United States v. Collins, 972 F.2d 1385, 1406 (5th
Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Carrodeguas, 747 F.2d 1390,
1395 (11th Cir. 1984)). Additionally, challenged comments are
evaluated in the context of the trial within which they are made.
United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 33 (1988).
As a threshold matter, we grant Cotton a COA on this
issue. Reasonable jurists could debate whether a constitutional
violation occurred due to the prosecutor’s reference to the
defendant as an “expert witness” while arguing that the defense
could not impeach the prosecution’s principal witness.
The district court held that the state courts did not
unreasonably apply clearly established federal law in denying
relief on Cotton’s claim. The district court concluded that the
prosecutor’s statement referred to the inability of the defense
counsel to impeach Watson’s credibility even though Cotton was
available to assist them. The district court found that this
statement was intended to be a “comment on the failure of the
defense, as opposed to the defendant, to counter or explain the
testimony presented or evidence introduced” and as such did not
9
violate the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. Cotton v. Cockrell, Case No. H-01-CV-2201, at 41
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2002) (quoting Montoya v. Collins, 955 F.2d
279, 287 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Becker, 569 F.2d
951, 965 (5th Cir. 1978)).
We need not decide whether the state courts’ conclusion
was or was not in that respect an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law, however,1 because habeas relief is
unwarranted as the error was harmless. The comment Cotton
complains of was “an isolated comment in a sea of evidence”
incriminating him for Epstein’s murder. Montoya, 955 F.2d at 287.
Fellow victim Caruthers and the Jewish Community Center security
guard Carla Chisholm both identified Cotton at trial as Epstein’s
attacker. Caruthers used his car to strike Cotton. When he was
arrested, Cotton bore injuries consistent with such an event.
Additionally, the state introduced testimony that, shortly after
Epstein’s murder, Cotton stated to an acquaintance that he had
“killed a DA.” Watson testified at length about his and Cotton’s
actions throughout the entire course of the robbery and murder.
Finally, before the jury retired to deliberate, the trial court
1
See Barrientes v. Johnson, 221 F.3d 741, 781 (5th Cir. 2000)
(holding that prosecutor’s comments that “He [the defendant] knows.
He knows where the witness is as he sits there right now. He
knows. He knows.” were not improper); Lucas v. Johnson, 132 F.3d
1069, 1079 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that prosecutor's comments that
“Only one person does know [the identity of the handwriting], and
that’s [the defendant] Henry Lee Lucas.” were not improper).
10
instructed the jury that they were not to consider Cotton’s failure
to testify during their deliberations.
Given the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the court’s
cautionary instruction to the jury, we conclude that the
prosecution’s statement had no substantial and injurious effect or
influence in the determination of Cotton’s guilt. See Nethery v.
Collins, 993 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding overwhelming
evidence of guilt and presence of curative instruction rendered
harmless an impermissible comment by prosecutor).
In sum, even if the state courts’ conclusion was an
unreasonable application of law, the constitutional error was
harmless.
2. Ineffective Assistance for Failure to Present Witnesses
Cotton next seeks a COA on his claim that his trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to present at
his second trial the testimony of two men, John Fourmy and Andrew
Mansfield, who testified at the first trial. During Cotton’s first
trial, Fourmy and Mansfield testified that they were in the parking
lot of the Jewish Community Center on the night of Epstein’s murder
and observed men riding bicycles. Both Fourmy and Mansfield
testified that they did not see Cotton in the parking lot that
night. Cotton argues that there was no rational basis for his
trial counsel not to present their testimony, which supports what
11
he alleges would have been his best argument: that he was not at
the scene of the crime when it occurred.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Cotton
must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that he
was actually prejudiced by the deficient performance. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Deficient performance is
determined by examining whether the challenged representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness. Kitchens v.
Johnson, 190 F.3d 698, 701 (5th Cir. 1999). “So long as counsel
made an adequate investigation, any strategic decisions made as a
result of that investigation fall within the wide range of
objectively reasonable professional assistance.” Smith v.
Cockrell, 311 F.3d 661, 668 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). “A conscious and informed decision on
trial tactics and strategy cannot be the basis for constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel unless it is so ill chosen that
it permeates the entire trial with obvious unfairness.” United
States v. Jones, 287 F.3d 325, 331 (5th Cir.) (quoting Garland v.
Maggio, 717 F.2d 199, 206 (5th Cir. 1983)), cert. denied, 123 S.
Ct. 549 (2002).
Even if Cotton establishes that his counsel’s performance
was deficient, he must also establish that “prejudice caused by the
deficiency is such that there is a reasonable probability that the
result of the proceedings would have been different.” Ransom v.
Johnson, 126 F.3d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 1997). Cotton must show that
12
the prejudice rendered the trial “fundamentally unfair or
unreliable.” Id. (quoting Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364
(1993)).
Cotton has failed to make a substantial showing that his
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. While Fourmy and
Mansfield did testify at Cotton’s trial that ended with a hung
jury, counsel was faced with a very different strategic landscape
at Cotton’s second trial. This is because, unlike at the first
trial, Cotton’s accomplice Watson had become available to the state
after a plea bargain. Watson both placed Cotton at the scene of
the crime and described in detail Epstein’s robbery and murder at
Cotton’s hands.
Further, as noted by the district court in its thorough
analysis, Fourmy’s and Mansfield’s testimonies contradicted each
other and the testimony of the other witnesses. Cotton’s trial
counsel stated, in an affidavit, that he observed Fourmy testify
during the first trial and felt that his demeanor was poor. Since
neither Fourmy nor Mansfield witnessed the shooting or the robbery
of either victim, and neither of them saw Epstein in the parking
lot, their testimony that they also did not see Cotton in the
parking lot was of limited value. In addition, neither witness
recalled the date of the murder or the fact that there was a
torrential rainstorm that night, and they could not agree on who
else was with them in their car. Mansfield testified at the first
13
trial as a rebuttal witness for the state, contradicting or casting
doubt on Fourmy’s testimony.
Although Fourmy and Mansfield could have supplied weak
evidence that Cotton was not present at the scene of Epstein’s
murder, the prosecution introduced the testimony of eyewitnesses
Caruthers and Chisholm and accomplice Watson, all of whom
identified Cotton. There was also testimony that Cotton had told
others that he had killed a district attorney. Cotton’s trial
counsel opted to impeach Watson’s credibility rather than try to
establish that Cotton was not at the scene. Calling Fourmy and
Mansfield did not fit into counsel’s strategy. Notably, Cotton’s
counsel defended Cotton in both his first and second trial. He was
uniquely qualified to assess the desirability of having Fourmy and
Mansfield testify at the retrial. Given these circumstances,
reasonable jurists could not debate or find wrong the conclusion
that counsel’s strategic decision is entitled to deference under
Strickland. We deny Cotton’s application for COA on this claim.
3. Trial Court Address to Jury Venire
Finally, Cotton seeks a COA for his claim based on
comments made by the trial judge to the jury venire before voir
dire regarding the history of the Texas death penalty. Cotton
argues that the court’s comments reduced the jury’s sense of
responsibility for imposing the death penalty and thus violated the
Eighth Amendment as construed in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S.
14
320 (1985). Cotton also appears to argue that the comments
violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In his initial address to prospective jurors, the judge
discussed, among other topics, the history of capital punishment in
Texas. He described the development of capital punishment since
the founding of the United States and the effect of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, as
construed by the Supreme Court, on the procedures used in capital
cases in Texas. He explained, among other things, that Texas at
one time provided for capital punishment for several types of
crimes, but now, only defendants convicted of certain categories of
murder are eligible for the death penalty in Texas.
This claim, however construed, is procedurally barred.
Cotton’s counsel failed to object at trial to the comments he now
argues are improper. During the state habeas proceedings, the
court found that the failure to make a contemporaneous objection at
trial resulted in a default of his Due Process claim.
Alternatively, the state court found that the comments were not
improper and even if improper they did not rise to the level of
harmful error.
“[F]ederal courts are precluded from granting habeas
relief where the last state court to consider the claims raised by
the petitioner expressly and unambiguously based its denial of
relief on an independent and adequate state-law procedural ground.”
15
Haley v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 2003). We have
previously recognized that the Texas contemporaneous objection
rule, upon which the state court relied in this case, is an
adequate and independent state ground that procedurally bars
federal habeas review. Id. at 262 n.8. Further, the fact that the
state court alternatively addressed the merits of Cotton’s claim
does not prevent its procedural default determination from being an
independent basis that bars review by the federal courts. Foster
v. Johnson, 293 F.3d 766, 790 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct.
625 (2002); Corwin v. Johnson, 150 F.3d 467, 473 (5th Cir. 1998)
("It is clear in this Circuit that alternative rulings do not
operate to vitiate the validity of a [state] procedural bar that
constitutes the [state court's] primary holding."). Thus, to be
entitled to relief on his Fourteenth Amendment claim, Cotton must
either show cause for the default and resulting prejudice or that
a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result. See Haley, 306
F.3d at 263.
Cotton argues that the failure of his trial counsel to
object to the remarks made by the trial judge constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel that caused the default.
Ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute "cause" for a
procedural default. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).
We do not agree that counsel’s failure to object to the comments
constituted deficient performance under Strickland.
16
The conduct of a judge violates due process “only if the
judge appears to predispose the jury toward a finding of guilt or
to take over the prosecutorial role.” Derden v. McNeel, 978 F.2d
1453, 1459 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc). The judge here outlined the
history of capital punishment in Texas and described the limited
circumstances under which the state can seek the death penalty. He
expressed no opinion on the death penalty either generally or as it
related to Cotton’s crime. Nor did the trial judge encourage the
jury to impose the death penalty in this case or even remotely
suggest they should feel historically obliged to impose a death
sentence should they find Cotton guilty. The comments simply
provided a brief introduction to the Texas capital punishment
scheme before the attorneys began conducting individualized voir
dire examinations. These comments cannot be construed as
predisposing the jury to impose a death sentence and violating
Cotton’s due process right. Reasonable jurists could not debate or
find wrong that counsel did not unreasonably decline to object to
these comments.
In any event, Cotton was not prejudiced by his counsel’s
failure to object. Throughout voir dire and during closing
arguments the court and counsel repeatedly informed the jury that
whether Cotton received a death sentence would be based on the
jury’s answers to the special issues submitted to them at the end
of the punishment phase of the trial. Cotton’s counsel was not
constitutionally ineffective. In the absence of ineffective
17
assistance, Cotton cannot establish cause to excuse the procedural
default of his due process claim.
Reasonable jurists could not debate or find wrong the
district court’s conclusion that Cotton’s claim is procedurally
barred. Therefore, we deny his application for a COA on his Due
Process claim.
Additionally, Cotton is not entitled to a COA on his
Caldwell claim. Cotton did not raise this theory during his state
habeas proceedings. Federal courts cannot grant habeas relief
unless the applicant has presented the claims to the state court
and exhausted the remedies available in state court. 28 U.S.C.
2254(b) (2000); Martinez v. Johnson, 255 F.3d 229, 238 (5th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1163 (2002). Where an applicant has
not presented a legal theory to the state court it is not
exhausted. Finley v. Johnson, 243 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2001).
Reasonable jurists could not debate or find wrong the
conclusion that Cotton cannot return to the Texas courts to present
this claim. Texas’s abuse of writ doctrine prohibits the filing of
a successive petition to raise this claim, absent a showing of
cause, if it could have been raised in his first habeas petition.
Id.; see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 11.071, § 5(a) (stating Texas’s
abuse of writ doctrine). Cotton could have objected when the
allegedly inappropriate comments were made by the judge, and he
certainly could have raised the claim in his first state court
18
petition. Thus, Texas would bar a new petition that presented his
Caldwell claim.
This bar constitutes an adequate and independent state
ground that precludes federal review. Finley, 243 F.3d at 220. “If
a petitioner fails to exhaust state remedies, but the court to
which he would be required to return to meet the exhaustion
requirement would now find the claim procedurally barred, then
there has been a procedural default for purposes of federal habeas
corpus relief.” Id. Since reasonable jurists could not disagree
or find wrong the conclusion that Cotton’s Caldwell claim is
defaulted, we deny his application for a COA on this claim.
CONCLUSION
With respect to Cotton’s claim that the prosecutor
improperly commented on his failure to testify at trial, we grant
his application for COA. We conclude, however, that the district
court did not err in denying habeas relief on this claim because
the prosecutor’s comment did not rise to the level of harmful
error. We affirm the district court’s denial of relief on this
claim. We deny Cotton’s application for COA on his other claims
and as such lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial
of habeas relief on these claims.
AFFIRMED; COA DENIED.
19
Cotton v. Cockrell
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date filed: 2003-08-22
Citations: 343 F.3d 746
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