[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
March 31, 2004
No. 03-10486
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 01-00199-CV-FTM-29-DNF
DENNIS EDIC, as parent and next friend
of Dylan Edic, minor son,
MELISSA EDIC, as parent and next friend
of Dylan Edic, minor son,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
CENTURY PRODUCTS COMPANY, a foreign
corporation and a division of Graco
Children's Products, Inc., a foreign
corporation, both subsidiaries of
Newell-Rubbermaid, a foreign corporation,
NEWELL-RUBBERMAID, a foreign corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(March 31, 2004)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, BIRCH and FARRIS *, Circuit Judges.
BIRCH, Circuit Judge:
This case arises out of an automobile collision during which eighteen-month-
old Dylan Edic was ejected from his child restraint system (CRS). Dylan’s parents,
Dennis and Melissa Edic, filed a product liability suit, under Florida law, against
the manufacturers of the CRS claiming that Dylan’s ejectment was due to a defect
in the CRS. They asserted that this defect had caused secondary injuries to Dylan
beyond that which he would have endured from the primary collision alone. At the
end of trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law to defendants,
Century Products Company and Newell Rubbermaid Corporation (collectively,
Century),1 for two reasons. First, the district court found that the Edics had not
provided sufficient evidence that the ejectment enhanced Dylan’s injuries. Second,
the district court held that the Edics had not provided sufficient evidence to permit
Florida’s Cassisi inference of a manufacturing defect. Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396
So.2d 1140, 1148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
The Edics appeal the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law as
well as two of the district court’s evidentiary rulings. We find no error in the
*
Honorable Jerome Farris, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by
designation.
1
Century Products Company is a division of Graco Children’s Products, Inc., and both
are subsidiaries of Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. All three entities are named defendants in this suit.
2
district court’s evidentiary rulings. However, we do find that the Edics provided
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to infer that the CRS was defective and for
a reasonable jury to conclude that these defects enhanced Dylan’s injuries.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Because this case reviews a grant of judgment as a matter of law for Century,
we look at all the facts in the light most favorable to the Edics.
Dylan’s father, Dennis Edic, was driving his Volvo station wagon when a
Pontiac driven by a non-party, Palma Trotta, collided into the right side of the
Volvo at 40 miles per hour. The impact of the collision crushed in the passenger
side of the Volvo more than two feet and caused it to spin clockwise approximately
270° before coming to a stop. Dennis testified that, before he began driving on the
day of the collision, he had placed Dylan into a child restraint system (“CRS”)
manufactured by Century Products Company. After the collision, Dylan was no
longer in the CRS, but lying in the back of the car with a number of injuries,
including a head wound.
From these facts, the Edics deduced that Dylan somehow had been ejected
from the CRS and concluded that the cause of the ejection was a manufacturing
defect in the CRS. The Edics then filed this action in Florida state court asserting
3
that Century should be held strictly liable for the alleged manufacturing defect in
the CRS.2 The Edics filed suit both: (1) individually, seeking damages for their loss
2
We understand Edics’ brief to argue the following theories of defective design of the
CRS: (1) it was designed with a three-point harness system rather than a five-point harness
system; (2) the manufacturer failed to place a clear indication of the date of manufacture on the
CRS packaging; and (3) the manufacturer failed to warn consumers that the CRS was not
subjected to side-impact crash testing. To the extent that the Edics have appealed these claims,
we hold that judgment as a matter of law was properly awarded to Century for the reasons
discussed as follows.
With regard to the Edics’ claim that the CRS was defectively designed with a three-point
harness system, the Edics have failed to put forth any evidence that this design was defective. A
product is defective in design, under Florida law, “when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by
the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reaonable alternative design
and its omission renders the product not reasonably safe.” Scheman-Gonzalez v. Saber Mfg.
Co., 816 So. 2d 1133, 1139 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs have failed,
however, to point to any evidence that the three-point harness design is “not reasonably safe,”
nor have we been able to find such evidence in our search of the record. Plaintiffs’ failure to
offer any evidence showing that this design feature constitutes a defect is fatal to their claim
regardless of whether the claim is based on negligence or strict liability.
The Edics’ claim that the CRS was defective because there was no clear indication of the
date of manufacture must also fail. There is no evidence that the age of the CRS caused, or was
related to, Dylan’s ejectment. All that the Edics proffered was Dennis’s testimony that he would
not have used the CRS if he had known it was over six years old because he once read in a
manual that one should not use a CRS that is over six years old. This evidence does not indicate
in any way that Dylan’s injuries were related to the age of the CRS. Accordingly, the failure to
warn that the CRS was over six years old cannot be the basis for imposing liability on Century
for Dylan’s injuries.
Finally, the Edics argue that the CRS was defectively designed because Century did not
warn consumers that the CRS was not subjected to side-impact collision tests. This claim also
fails because the Edics did not provide any evidence to show how such a warning could have
avoided or ameliorated Dylan’s injuries. American Motors Corp. v. Ellis, 403 So.2d 459 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that there was no failure to warn where there was no evidence
adduced at trial “to show how any warning from [the defendant] . . . could have prevented or
ameliorated the injuries” suffered by plaintiff). Dennis did not testify as to how such a warning
would have affected his decisions regarding the use of this CRS. Moreover, because Century’s
undisputed evidence showed that no CRS manufacturers were conducting such tests on child
seats, we cannot infer that such a warning would have altered the Edics’ decision to use this
particular CRS. R21 at 160-61.
4
of filial consortium; and (2) as next friends for their son, seeking damages for
Dylan’s head injuries.3
A. Plaintiffs’ Evidence at Trial
At trial, the Edics relied on the Cassisi inference to prove a defect in the CRS.
Under Florida law, the Cassisi inference allows a jury to infer that a product is
defective when it (a) malfunctions (b) during normal use. Cassisi, 396 So.2d at
1148. On appeal, the Edics argue that they proved the malfunction requirement of
Cassisi by showing that a CRS is intended to restrain children during collisions and
that this CRS failed to restrain Dylan in this collision. With regard to the normal
use requirement, the Edics argue that it was foreseeable to Century that the CRS
would be involved in a side-impact automobile collision at 40 miles per hour and
that case law supports the idea that “normal use” includes use that is reasonably
foreseeable.
To prove a malfunction, the Edics proffered the discovery deposition of
David Galambos, the corporate representative of defendant Graco. In his
deposition, Galambos conceded that the CRS is intended to provide restraint to a
child: “[I]t’s very much like seat belts. It’s a device used for children that help[s]
reduce injuries in a case of an accident.” R19 at 132. Moreover, Century’s experts
3
The Edics do not argue that any other injuries Dylan suffered were the result of his
ejection from the CRS.
5
in biomechanics and accident reconstruction indicated that the CRS was not
functioning as it should have during this collision. Specifically, both experts
testified that this type of CRS, if the straps were properly adjusted, should have
restrained a child of Dylan’s size in this type of collision. R21 at 77, 183. The
Edics also provided the testimony of several eyewitnesses to the collision
supporting the Edics’ contention that the “CRS” had not restrained Dylan during the
collision. Sheila Cora, Donald Morrison, and Leslie McAlpine all testified that they
saw Dylan in the back of the car rather than in the CRS immediately after the
collision.4
The Edics also put forth evidence tending to show that Dylan’s head injury
(the only injury for which they seek damages) could have been caused by his
ejection from the CRS. Most significantly, Patricia M erritt, another eyewitness to
the collision, testified that she had an unobstructed view of the inside of the Volvo
from her minivan, which was approximately two car lengths behind the Edics’
Volvo. From this vantage point, she saw “a child fly up into the air” at the moment
of impact and “hit its head into the top of the ceiling of the car.” R20 at 236.
4
Century called one eyewitness, Gilbert Dillen, who testified that he found Dylan in the
CRS after the collision and moved him to the back seat. However, on cross examination, when
asked to look at photos of the Volvo taken an hour after the collision, Dillen admitted that he
could not see how it was physically possible for him to have moved Dylan as he had claimed.
6
Merritt also testified that she saw the child land on the “back portion seat of the
car.” Id.
The Edics also presented the videotaped deposition of Dr. Gerald Tuite, the
neurosurgeon who treated Dylan’s injuries, whose testimony lent some support to
their argument that the ejection caused a secondary head injury. Tuite testified that
his examination revealed “an open depressed skull fracture in the right parietal
area.” R12, Ex. 1 at 11. Although Dr. Tuite could not determine the exact source
of Dylan’s injury, he did state that the cause was “some sort of blow” to the right
side of Dylan’s head, which was consistent with Merritt’s testimony that Dylan hit
the right side of his head against the ceiling of the Volvo after being ejected. Id. at
57.
In addition, the Edics presented blood evidence indicating that Dylan’s head
injury did not occur while he was in the car seat. Specifically, witness testimony
established that Dylan’s injury was of a type prone to profuse bleeding and that
Dylan was, in fact, profusely bleeding, yet no traces of blood were found on the
CRS. R17 at 10, 27, 48, 61. In contrast, Dennis’s mother, Belinda Edic, who
inspected the Volvo a few weeks after the collision testified that she saw a stain in
the back of the car, not on the CRS, which, in her opinion, looked like a blood stain.
Id. at 65-66.
7
The Edics also rebutted Century’s allegations that Dennis had misused the
CRS with testimony including that of (1) a Florida Highway Patrol trooper who had
investigated the accident scene and who testified that the CRS was properly placed
and mounted in the rear seat; (2) Rich Holsinger, who had given the Edics the CRS
for Dylan’s first birthday and who testified that the CRS was “brand-new in a
sealed box from the store,” R19 at 68; (3) Dennis’s testimony that the CRS had
never been damaged or modified during the time that the Edics had owned it and
that he had been taught, as part of a Lamaze class, how to place a child in a CRS to
ensure that the harness straps fit tightly.
B. Defendants Evidence at Trial
After the Edics rested their case, Century called two expert witnesses. The
first witness, Kevin Breen, was an accident reconstructionist who cast some doubt
on Merritt’s ability to see what happened during the collision. He offered his expert
opinion that “[l]ess than a tenth of a second” would have transpired “from the time
the Pontiac first [struck] the Volvo until the point of maximum crush.” R21 at 57.
Similarly, Century’s expert in biomechanics, Dr. James H. McElhaney, testified that
car crashes happen too quickly for witnesses to be able to see what is happening to
the occupants. McElhaney also testified that, in his opinion, Dylan’s injuries were
caused at the moment the Pontiac collided into the Volvo––while Dylan was still in
8
the CRS––because the impact on the Volvo’s passenger side would have driven the
passenger door into Dylan’s space.
However, during cross examination, both Breen and McElhaney also
conceded that they would have expected Dylan to remain in the CRS, if it were
properly positioned, in a collision of this severity. In fact, McElhaney, specifically
opined that the CRS “would have restrained Dylan in this collision if the shoulder
straps [were] properly adjusted.” Id. at 183.
C. District Court’s Judgment as a Matter of Law
Following the presentation of the Edics’ case in chief, Century moved for
judgment as a matter of law. The district court reserved its ruling on this motion
until after Century presented its case. When Century renewed the motion at the
close of all the proof, the district court granted it on two grounds.
First, the district court found that the Edics had produced no evidence that
Dylan’s head injury was attributable to the CRS’s performance, rather than to the
primary collision. Specifically, the district court found that there was no evidence
of the order in which the damages occurred, leaving the jury to speculate that all
injuries came after ejection and none came before. The district judge did not
consider Merritt’s testimony as proof of the order of events. The district court
opined that the physical events of the accident happened too quickly for Merritt to
9
have seen Dylan fly out of the car seat and come to rest on the back seat before the
car began to spin.
Second, the district court found that the Edics had not offered sufficient
evidence to warrant the Cassisi inference of a product defect. Specifically, the
district judge stated that normal use of a car seat did not include a collision of this
severity, where one car slammed into the other without even applying the brakes.
The Edics filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59. The district court denied the Edics’ motion, and they timely
appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
The Edics contend that the district court erred in granting judgment as a
matter of law because: (1) the district court improperly weighed conflicting
evidence and improperly made credibility determinations to reach the conclusion
that there was no evidence of enhanced injuries and no evidence that the ejection
from the CRS caused Dylan’s injuries; and (2) the district court erred in ruling as a
matter of law that the Cassisi inference of product defect did not apply in this case.
The Edics also raise two evidentiary issues in passing: (1) whether the district
court erred when it denied their motions in limine to exclude Century’s expert
witnesses Breen and McElhaney, or when the district court overruled the Edics’
10
objections to portions of the expert testimony; and (2) whether the district court
erred when it found that Florida Statute § 316.613(3), which provides that the
failure to use a child passenger restraint shall not be admissible as evidence in any
negligence action, did not prohibit Century from arguing that the Edics’ misuse of
the CRS was the cause of Dylan’s injuries. Fla. Stat. Ann. §316.613(3) (2001). We
discuss each of these arguments in turn, accepting the first two and rejecting the last
two.
A. Judgment as a Matter of Law
1. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s decision to enter a judgment as a
matter of law de novo. . . . [I]f there is substantial evidence opposed to
the motion[], that is, evidence of such quality and weight that
reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment
might reach different conclusions, the motions should be denied, and
the case submitted to the jury . . . . [I]t is the function of the jury as the
traditional finder of facts, and not the Court, to weigh conflicting
evidence and inferences, and determine the credibility of witnesses.
Lipphardt v. Durango Steakhouse of Brandon, Inc., 267 F.3d 1183, 1186 (11th Cir.
2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
2. Evidence of Enhanced Injuries Caused by CRS Malfunction
11
The Edics first assert that the district court improperly weighed evidence and
made credibility judgements in order to grant judgment as a matter of law to
Century.
The district court’s stated reason for granting Century’s motion for judgment
as a matter of law was that the Edics failed to prove enhanced injuries to Dylan
caused by a CRS malfunction. The Edics argue that the district court, in reaching
this conclusion, failed to look at several pieces of evidence in the light most
favorable to them, including: (1) the testimony of Merritt that she saw Dylan hit the
right side of his head on the roof of the car after being ejected from the car seat, (2)
Dr. Truite’s testimony that Dylan suffered a blow to the same area of his head that
Merritt saw hit the car roof, and (3) the eyewitness testimony that Dylan was found
outside the CRS immediately after the collision, and (4) the testimony that there
was no blood found on the CRS even though Dylan’s injury was of a type prone to
profuse bleeding. We agree.
The transcript of the ruling on the motion for judgment as a matter of law
indicates that the district court was weighing the evidence and making credibility
judgments. Although the district judge stated that she did not need to “get into
[Merritt’s] credibililty,” the greater part of her discussion did precisely that. R24 at
4, 5. Specifically, the district judge noted that Merritt’s recollection of the events
12
“seem[ed im]possible ” because “the physical forces at work would not allow either
car to remain motionless for a period of time for a person to be ejected up and then
back down and straddle the seat before turning.” R24 at 3-4. Moreover, throughout
the proceedings on the motion, the district judge weighed Merritt’s recollection of
events against the experts’ testimony regarding the timing of events and concluded
that Merritt could not possibly have made the observations she made because “the
physical events [do] not allow for the increments of the damage that would occur to
the child.” R24 at 3.
Although we agree that the district court improperly weighed the evidence in
reaching its decision, our analysis does not end there. Before we hold that
judgment as a matter of law was improper, we must determine whether there was, in
fact, sufficient evidence of enhanced injury and causation for these issues to go to
the jury. We hold that there was. A reasonable jury after hearing (1) Merritt’s
testimony; (2) Dr. Truite’s testimony; (3) the testimony regarding the location
Dylan’s body after the collision; and (4) the evidence that no blood was found on
the CRS, could conclude that Dylan was ejected from the CRS and that this
ejectment, not the primary collision, caused Dylan’s head injury.
Century argues that this evidence of enhanced injury and causation was
insufficient because the Edics did not have expert testimony proving enhanced
13
injuries from a CRS defect. “No testimony of an expert [is] needed when the jury,
in its ordinary experience, [can] draw its own conclusion from the facts .” Adamo
v. Manatee Condo., Inc., 548 So.2d 287, 289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per
curiam). Given the four pieces of evidence described in the preceeding paragraph,
the jury did not need an expert to make the causal connection between Dylan’s
ejectment and his head injury. See, e.g., Curtis v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d
808, 813 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (holding that expert testimony to establish
enhanced injuries was necessary to avoid jury speculation because there was no
other testimony to establish a causal connection to the injury).5
3. Cassisi Inference
5
Century also argues that, because Florida law places the burden on the plaintiff to prove
the extent of the enhanced injuries attributable to the alleged defect, D’Amario v. Ford Motor
Co., 806 So.2d 424 (Fla. 2001) (per curiam), Florida law also requires expert testimony to prove
enhanced injuries. Century bases this conclusion on their reading of cases from other
jurisdictions that place the same burden on the plaintiff. Century argues that these other
jurisdictions also require expert testimony to prove enhanced injuries. This argument fails for
two reasons:
First, in D’Amario, the Florida Supreme Court was only addressing the issue of whether
comparative fault principles generally apply in crashworthiness and enhanced injury cases.
Nowhere in the opinion does the court discuss whether enhanced injuries must be proven
through expert testimony. The issues are completely unrelated, therefore, even if other
jurisdictions that apportion the burden of proof in the same way as the Florida courts also choose
to require expert testiomony, it is nothing more than a coincidence. Placing the burden of
proving enhanced injuries on the plaintiff does not logically require the conclusion that the
plaintiffs must make their proof through expert testimony.
Second, a review of the cases Century cites for the proposition that expert testimony is
required in other jurisdictions indicates that the Century is misreading these cases. For example,
Century cites Mazda Motor Corp. v. Lindahl, 706 A.2d 526 (Del. 1998), which does not state
that expert testimony is required. Instead, the Delaware Supreme Court states that expert
testimony might be necessary in enhanced injury cases when the question of proximate cause
“require[s] understanding and analysis of issues beyond the ken of the typical jury.” Id. at 533.
14
The district court’s second reason for granting judgment as a matter of law to
Century was that the Edics’ evidence was insufficient to create a Cassisi inference
of a manufacturing defect in the CRS. Without this inference, the Edics could not
prove a manufacturing defect and thus, the district court concluded, judgment as a
matter of law was proper. The Edics contend that the district court erred in ruling
that the Cassisi inference did not apply as a matter of law.
Florida’s Cassisi inference provides that “when a product malfunctions
during normal operation, a legal inference . . . of product defectiveness[] arises, and
the injured plaintiff thereby establishes a prima facie case for jury consideration.”
Cassisi, 396 So.2d at 1148. The district court determined that the Cassisi inference
was not available because the normal use requirment was not met. Specifically, the
district judge stated that “[o]ne would not say that it was normal use of a car seat to
be subjected to this kind of accident when the car that hit the Volvo car . . . did not
apply the brakes and just slammed right into it.” R23 at 12. For two reasons, we
agree with the Edics that it was error for the district court to determine that this
collision was not normal use as a matter of law.
First, we conclude that the question of normal use, in the context of this
collision, was a question of fact for the jury and, as such, the district court erred
when it took this issue away from the jury. As Century’s corporate representative
15
conceded, the normal use and purpose of a CRS is to restrain a child during an
automobile collision; therefore, at least some collisions must consitute normal use
for the CRS.6 Moreover, the Florida Supreme Court has noted that automobiles are
frequently involved in collisions and has held that the probability of these collisions
“must be taken into account by designers and manufacturers.” Ford Motor Co. v.
Evancho, 327 So.2d 201, 203 (Fla. 1976). Although that case involved the
manufacturer of a car rather than a CRS, the same principle holds true for the
manufacturers of a CRS because they also know that their product will be involved
in mishaps––in fact, their product serves no purpose (other than to prevent the child
from moving about) until it is involved in a collision. Conversely, some collisions
will be so horrific and unpredictable that no reasonable person would expect the
CRS to function properly.
A side-impact collision at 40 miles per hour is somewhere in between: it is
more serious than the simulated frontal collision safety tests at 30 miles per hour,
but not necessarily serious enough to be unforeseeable to the defendant
manufacturers of the CRS. R21 at 160. For this reason, this collision falls within a
6
Century argues that Humphreys v. General Motors Corp., 839 F. Supp. 822, 829 (N.D.
Fla. 1993), aff’d 47 F.3d 430 (11th Cir. 1995), precludes us from permitting the Cassisi
inference in this case because, in that case, the Florida trial court held that the collision involved
was not normal use. The Humphreys opinion, however, is not binding authority and our order
affirming Humphreys did not discuss whether automobile collisions are normal use.
16
range where a reasonable jury could find that it is normal use. As such, we
determine that the question of normal use is a question of fact for the jury.
In support of this conclusion, we note that the normal use requirement from
Cassisi is based on the consumer expectations test from the Restatement of Torts
(Second), which asks whether “the ordinary consumer’s expectations [are]
frustrated by the product’s failure to perform under the circumstances in which is
failed.” 396 So.2d at 1144-45. This, in turn, is generally a question of fact for the
jury.7 See, e.g., Zabner v. Howard Johnson’s, Inc., 201 So.2d 824, 828 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1967); Lewis Bass, Prods. Liability: Design and Manufacturing Defects §
4.12 (2d ed. 2003).
Second, we note that there is ample evidence that Dylan was somehow
ejected from the CRS, and that both defense experts testified that the CRS should
have restrained Dylan in this collision. We conclude that the evidence that this
CRS should have restrained Dylan but failed to do so is sufficient to permit the
Cassisi inference of defect because it implies that the CRS malfunctioned during a
collision that was within the range of its normal use.
7
We also note, however, that some cases will involve products and situations where the
normal use question can be determined as a matter of law. See e.g., Cassisi, 396 So.2d at 1142-
43 (the product was a clothes dryer and plaintiffs were using it to dry clothes).
17
In fact, the evidence just described is substantially similar to that in another
case where the Florida District Court of Appeals held that the evidence was
sufficient to permit a Cassisi inference of defect. In Jones v. Heil Co., 566 So.2d
565 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990), the plaintiff sued for damages from injuries he
sustained when a refuse collection unit expelled some boards, one of which struck
the plaintiff in the face. The Florida District Court of Appeals held that there was
enough evidence to permit the Cassisi inference of defect because there was (1)
expert testimony that, based on the design of the unit, it should not have expelled
the boards and (2) plaintiffs’ testimony that the boards and other objects had been
ejected from the truck. Id. at 567. Similarly, here we have (1) Breen and
McElhaney’s testimony that the CRS should have restrained Dylan during this
particular collision 8 and (2) evidence that Dylan was, in fact, not restrained.9 The
evidence here, as in Jones, “supports a reasonable inference that the [product]
malfunctioned during normal, expected operation.” Id. Because the evidence
8
The fact that Breen and McElhaney testified that they believed owner misuse, not a
defect, caused Dylan to be ejected does not change our analysis. In Jones, like here, the expert
witness was a defense witness who did not believe a defect caused the injury at issue. It is
sufficient that the experts here testified that the product, manufactured and used properly, should
not have ejected Dylan.
9
Merritt’s account of seeing Dylan fly out of the car seat in addition to the fact that
Dylan’s body was found out of the car seat immediately after the collision show that he was
ejected at some point.
18
available in this case is similar to that in Jones,10 where the Cassisi inference was
permitted, we conclude it is appropriate to permit the inference here as well.
B. Evidentiary Issues
1. Expert Testimony
The Edics make two arguments regarding the admissibility of testimony from
Century’s experts Breen and McElhaney. First, the Edics argue that the district
court erred by failing to outline its entire Daubert analysis in its order denying their
motion in limine to exclude the testimony of those expert witnesses. See Daubert v.
Merrill Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). The Edics cite no
authority, however, for their argument that the district court must give a
comprehensive review of its Daubert analysis in ruling on a motion in limine.
Moreover, in denying the Edics’ motion, the district court expressly adopted the
reasoning of the Century’s response, which did in fact contain a comprehensive
Daubert analysis.
10
Moreover, we have also addressed this issue in an unpublished opinion involving a
collision during which another car safety device, a side airbag, failed to deploy. Kaplan v.
Daimlerchrysler, No. 02-13223 (11th Cir. Aug. 1, 2003). In that case, we permitted a Cassisi
inference of defect because the plaintiffs offered expert testimony from an accident
reconstructionist who concluded that, although the collision in that case was more severe than
the crashes the type of car involved was subjected to during safety tests, the airbag should have
deployed. Here, as in Kaplan, we have expert testimony that the CRS should have functioned
during the collsion that occurred even though it was more severe than those involved in the CRS
safety tests.
19
Second, the Edics argue that the district court improperly permitted defense
experts to alter the findings submitted in their Rule 26 Discovery Reports in order
to take account of information that was not available to them at the time they wrote
their reports. We review “[t]he district court’s decision overruling defense
counsel’s objection to the admission of testimony . . . for an abuse of discretion
resulting in substantial prejudice to the defendant’s rights.” United States v.
Howard, 953 F.2d 610, 612 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). For two reasons, we
conclude that there was no such abuse of discretion. First, the Edics fail to specify
which statements they find objectionable, making it impossible for us to determine
whether there actually were contradictions. Second, the Edics fail to explain how
these rulings prejudiced them.11
2. Evidence of Misuse
The Edics assert that the district court erred by finding that Florida Statute
§ 316.613(3) did not bar Century from asserting that the Edics’ misuse of the CRS,
and not a CRS defect, was the cause of Dylan’s injuries. We review “de novo a
11
In fact, we find it unlikely that these rulings would have prejudiced the Edics’ case
considering that the Edics had ample opportunity to bring any contradictions to the jury’s
attention through cross-examination.
20
district’s determination of state law.” Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S.
225, 231, 111 S. Ct. 1217, 1221 (1991).
Florida law provides that “[t]he failure to provide and use a child passenger
restraint shall not be considered comparative negligence, nor shall such failure be
admissible as evidence in the trial of any civil action with regard to negligence.”
Fla. Stat. Ann. §316.613. Because the evidence of Dennis’s misuse is not being
offered to prove his negligence––the situation to which § 316.613 expressly
applies––but to disprove a manufacturing defect, the district court did not err in
ruling that the statute did not bar this evidence.12
Moreover, refusing to admit evidence of misuse for the purpose of disproving
a defect would lead to an illogical and unintended result. It would permit a parent
who obviously misused a product to hold a manufacturer liable because the
manufacturer could not use the evidence of misuse to disprove a product defect.
This, in turn, would contravene Florida’s public policy of ensuring that “no
12
The Edics argue, however, that the Florida courts should interpret the phrase “failure to
provide” to include misuse as well. The only support they have for this proposition is non-
binding authority from the Kansas Supreme Court. Watkins v. Hartsock, 783 P.2d 1293, 1299
(Kan. 1989). Not only is Watkins non-binding, but in Watkins, the evidence of non-use was
being offered to show comparative negligence and to mitigate damages, not to disprove a
product defect. In fact, the Tenth Circuit, applying Kansas tort law after Watkins, made this
same distinction and held that the statute would not bar evidence of misuse offered in a products
liability case to defend allegations of a defect. Gardner v. Chrysler Corp., 89 F.3d 729, 736
(10th Cir. 1996).
21
defendant will be held responsible for damages it did not cause.” D’Amario v. Ford
Motor Co., 806 So.2d 424, 440 (Fla. 2002).
III. CONCLUSION
In sum, we hold that the district court properly denied the Edic’s motion to
exclude Century’s expert witnesses and properly ruled that Fla. Stat. § 316.613 did
not bar Century from introducing evidence of Dennis’s misuse of the CRS.
However, we also hold that the district court erred when it found that the Edics had
failed to introduce sufficient evidence of enhanced injuries and defect and, as a
result, erred when it granted judgment as a matter of law to Century. Accordingly,
we AFFIRM the district court’s evidentiary rulings, but REVERSE the district
court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law, and REMAND this case to the district
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
22
EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, dissenting in part:
I would affirm the judgment of the district court. I do not understand
“normal use” to be a jury issue under Florida law.
23
Edic Ex Rel. Edic v. Century Products Co.
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date filed: 2004-03-31
Citations: 364 F.3d 1276
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