F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
SEP 8 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
FRIENDS OF MAROLT PARK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION; RODNEY E.
No. 02-1480
SLATER, in his official capacity as
Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Transportation,
Defendants-Appellees.
--------------------------
STATE OF COLORADO,
Amicus Curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 99-B-978)
Lori Potter, Kaplan, Kirsch & Rockwell, LLP, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-
Appellant.
Ellen J. Durkee, Appellate Section, Environment & Natural Resources Division,
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Thomas L. Sansonetti, Assistant
Attorney General, Washington, D.C., David Ortez, Assistant Chief Counsel, U.S.
Department of Transportation, San Francisco, California, with her on the brief),
for Defendants-Appellees.
Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Alan J. Gilbert, Solicitor General, Harry S.
Morrow, First Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, filed an amicus
curiae brief for the State of Colorado.
Before MURPHY, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
O’BRIEN, Circuit Judge.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this case, plaintiff-appellant, Friends of Marolt Park, raises challenges
under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f
and § 4(f) of the Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 303(c), to a Record of Decision
(“ROD”) issued by defendant-appellee, the United States Department of
Transportation. The ROD authorized two alternative construction plans for a
transit improvement project near Aspen, Colorado. Under one plan, the “phased
approach,” highway improvements will be constructed with two additional lanes
dedicated to buses. The bus lanes will be removed at a later date if funding
becomes available for the construction of a light rail transit system. Under the
second plan, the “non-phased approach,” the highway improvements and the light
rail system will be built at the same time without construction of the bus lanes.
Neither of these plans can go forward without further action by local voters.
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Friends of Marolt Park (“FMP”) argues that the Department of
Transportation (“USDOT” or “the Agency”) violated § 4(f) by approving the
phased approach because immediate construction of the light rail system will have
less environmental impact on the Marolt-Thomas Open Space, a publicly owned
park. FMP also argues that the requirements of NEPA have not been met because
the alternatives authorized by the Record of Decision altered the outcome
projected by the Final Environmental Impact Statement without allowing the
public an opportunity to comment. The district court denied FMP’s requests for
relief. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because we conclude that
the § 4(f) issue is not ripe for decision, we remand to the district court with
instructions to vacate the relevant portion of its judgment. We affirm the district
court’s judgment regarding the NEPA claim.
II. BACKGROUND
State Highway 82 is a two lane highway that serves as the primary means of
access to the town of Aspen, Colorado and the ski resorts in the area. Local
debate over expanding or improving the highway has continued without resolution
since the 1960s. The road is frequently congested and has a high accident rate in
comparison with other state roadways. In 1995, the USDOT circulated to the
public a draft Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) for what it refers to as the
“Entrance to Aspen” project. That initial draft EIS identified the various public
parks which might be affected by the project, including the Marolt-Thomas Open
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Space Park (“Marolt Park” or “the Park”). Marolt Park is a 74-acre, publicly-
owned parcel on the western edge of the town of Aspen. The Park serves a
variety of recreational interests for local residents including biking, cross-country
skiing, and hang gliding. In addition, the Park contains a number of historic
buildings. FMP is a nonprofit organization dedicated to the protection and
stewardship of the area.
State Highway 82 borders Marolt Park on the north for more than half a
mile. One of the central features of the planned modifications to Highway 82 is a
realignment of the roadway in order to eliminate an accident-prone section of “S”
curves. This realignment requires an easement across land that is currently part
of the Park. All of the project alternatives, with the exception of a “no-action”
alternative, involve taking some amount of land from Marolt Park.
After the draft EIS was circulated, the Agency issued a supplemental draft
EIS, which identified a preferred alternative called the “phased modified direct”
alternative. Under this plan, the construction would be completed in two phases.
First, four vehicle lanes would be built; these would consist of two lanes of
general traffic and two dedicated bus lanes. Later, a light rail track would be
installed. This alternative was rejected in the final EIS:
The phased approach to light rail evaluated in the [draft supplemental
EIS] is eliminated from further consideration because of a lack of
support from the community and the Aspen City Council. The
phased approach adds costs and unnecessary disruption to the Section
4(f) resources when compared with the non-phased approach.
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The non-phased approach referred to above called for the immediate construction
of the light rail system without ever building the bus lanes. The non-phased
approach was selected as the preferred alternative in the final EIS.
During the period of public comment on the final EIS, the City of Aspen,
Pitkin County, and Snowmass Village jointly passed and submitted as a comment
a resolution asking the USDOT to approve the phased approach as a fall-back to
the non-phased approach. The elected officials representing the towns and county
recognized the non-phased approach as preferable, but expressed their concern
that voter approval for a light rail financing plan might not materialize. Although
they committed to placing the appropriate ballot questions before the electorate,
the local governments sought environmental clearance from the Agency to
implement the phased approach “in the event that the Preferred Alternative is
determined to be impossible to implement.”
In August of 1998, the USDOT issued the Record of Decision. The ROD
approves the construction of a two-lane highway with a “[light rail transit] system
that, if local support and/or funding are not available, will be developed initially
as exclusive bus lanes.” The USDOT interprets this decision as approving both
the phased and non-phased approaches. Both the phased and non-phased plans,
however, require further action by the local electorate. The phased option
requires approval by Aspen voters of a right-of-way transfer through Marolt Park
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for four lanes instead of two. The non-phased option requires voter approval to
fund construction of the light rail. 1
FMP brought suit in district court seeking a declaratory judgment that the
Agency had violated § 4(f) and NEPA, a remand to the USDOT to resolve the
alleged violations, and an injunction preventing any construction during the
period of the remand. After concluding that NEPA and § 4(f) had not been
violated, the district court denied the request for relief.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Ripeness
Before we reach the merits of appellant’s claims we must examine whether
the issues raised in this case are ripe for review. Ash Creek Mining Co. v. Lujan,
934 F.2d 240, 243 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that “before a court may review an
agency decision, it must evaluate” whether the claim is ripe). While we recognize
1
FMP asserts there is no record support for the Agency’s contention that
funding is unavailable for the non-phased approach. While FMP is correct that
the final EIS indicated funding was available, the record clearly indicates a vote
must take place. The Agency’s statements concerning funding in the final EIS
relied upon a resolution stating that local officials supported the non-phased
option. The draft supplemental EIS made clear, however, that voter approval of a
local bond was required before the light rail could be constructed. Moreover, the
final EIS, despite its statements to the contrary, recognizes that local cooperation
is still required. Finally, contrary to FMP’s assertion, the joint resolution clearly
stating that any funding plan would require approval by the local electorate was
submitted during the comment period to final EIS and is part of the record. As
noted below, FMP acknowledges that the construction of the project, whether
phased or non-phased, is not imminent.
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that the parties have conceded our jurisdiction in this case, this court is compelled
to assure itself that it has subject matter jurisdiction. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998). “As a jurisdictional prerequisite,
ripeness may be examined by this court sua sponte.” Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,
Denver, Colo., 119 F.3d 1437, 1444 (10th Cir. 1997).
This court determines whether an agency decision is ripe for judicial review
by “examining the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship
caused to the parties if review is withheld.” Park Lake Res. Ltd. Liab. Co. v.
United States Dep’t of Agric., 197 F.3d 448, 450 (10th Cir. 1999). 2 Ordinarily,
whether the issues are fit for review depends on whether the plaintiffs challenge a
final agency action. Id. Even where an agency action is considered final,
however, a claim may not be ripe if there is no direct, immediate effect on
plaintiffs. See Toilet Goods Ass’n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 164-65 (1967).
1. Section 4(f) Claim
2
We have set forth a variety of factors that may be helpful in analyzing
whether an issue is ripe. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. United States Dep’t of Energy,
287 F.3d 1256, 1262-63 & n.3 (10th Cir. 2002) (applying a three factor test and
noting the previous use of an equivalent four factor test). As we did in Park Lake
Resources Limited Liability Co. v. United States Department of Agriculture, we
utilize the two considerations articulated in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 136 (1967), fitness of the issues for decision and the hardship to the parties
caused by delay, because these factors are sufficient to guide our decision. See
197 F.3d 448, 450 (10th Cir. 1999).
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FMP’s § 4(f) claim rests on the assertion that the approval of the phased
approach will cause the construction of a highway design which does not
minimize harm to Marolt Park as required by the Transportation Act. Both the
USDOT and FMP, however, acknowledge that before the project can go forward
further action by local voters is required. The ROD indicates that before the
phased project can be built, Aspen voters must approve a right-of-way transfer for
the construction of two highway lanes, two bus lanes, and the light rail.
Likewise, the non-phased project cannot go forward without voter approval of a
funding plan for the light rail. Thus, any impact on FMP from the USDOT’s
decision “rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or
indeed may not occur at all.” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998)
(quotations omitted).
With such vital contingencies remaining to be resolved, FMP’s § 4(f) claim
is not ripe for adjudication. Any conflict between FMP’s goals and the ROD is
purely hypothetical at this point. The voters may approve the funding scheme
needed for the light rail, in which case the non-phased option, preferred by FMP,
would be implemented. Indeed, local elected officials have indicated their
support for the non-phased option and their intent to seek approval from the
voters for that project. Likewise, the voters may not pass either of the measures
required for the projects. No project could then be pursued without revision and
potential further Agency involvement. The measure of remaining uncertainty
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about the future of the project is reflected in FMP’s briefing. FMP flatly states
“[c]onstruction of Highway 82 through Marolt Park is not imminent or even
foreseeable.” Deciding the merits of the issues raised by FMP in this context
would run counter to one of the central purposes of the ripeness doctrine as
articulated by the Supreme Court: “to protect [] agencies from judicial
interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects
felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.” Ohio Forestry Ass’n Inc. v.
Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998) (quotation omitted). There is nothing
concrete about a highway that may never be built.
The lack of significant hardship to FMP resulting from a delay in review
also convinces us that this issue is not ripe for decision. We acknowledge, of
course, that delaying review raises costs for the parties and inconveniences those
involved, but courts have not “considered this kind of litigation cost saving
sufficient by itself to justify review in a case that would otherwise be unripe.” Id.
at 735. Nothing would prevent FMP from attacking the Agency’s § 4(f) decision
once the voters have acted and no further obstacles to construction remain. Our
conclusion that the issue is not ripe “reflects a judgment that the disadvantages of
a premature review that may prove too abstract or unnecessary ordinarily
outweigh the additional costs of–even repetitive–postimplementation litigation.”
Id. Given FMP’s ability to address the § 4(f) issue if and when construction is
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certain and the significant contingencies upon which the construction depends, we
conclude that FMP’s claim under § 4(f) is not ripe.
2. NEPA Claim
FMP also alleges the USDOT violated the procedural requirements of
NEPA because the public was denied the opportunity to comment on the Agency’s
decision to approve the phased approach. As the Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he
person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests
can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability
and immediacy.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
Unlike a claim concerning a substantive violation, such as FMP’s allegation that
the Agency failed to minimize the harm resulting from the project as required by
§ 4(f) of the Transportation Act, a claim that an agency violated NEPA’s
procedural requirements becomes ripe when the alleged procedural violation
occurs, assuming the plaintiff has standing to bring the claim. Sierra Club v.
United States Dep’t. of Energy, 287 F.3d 1256, 1263-64 (10th Cir. 2002).
Standing requires an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged action
and is likely to be redressed by judicial intervention. Id. at 1264-65. To show an
injury-in-fact from a failure to follow NEPA’s procedural requirements, FMP
must show (1) the Agency created an increased risk of actual, threatened, or
imminent environmental harm and (2) the increased risk of environmental harm
injures FMP’s interests. Id. at 1265. In this context, FMP need not show that the
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USDOT’s decision “will surely harm the environment” or that the project will go
forward because of the Agency’s decision. Id.
There is sufficient information in the record to establish that the USDOT’s
approval is a necessary step in the construction of the “Entrance to Aspen”
project. Likewise, FMP has shown sufficient facts to support its allegation that
the approval of the phased project means an increased risk of harm to Marolt
Park. FMP has also shown that its members make use of the Park for recreational
purposes. Thus, FMP has alleged sufficient facts to establish an injury-in-fact for
purposes of standing. Id. at 1265. Moreover, this injury is fairly traceable to the
alleged procedural violation because FMP alleges that the USDOT should have
issued a supplemental final EIS before approving the phased project. Finally, the
injury is redressable by judicial intervention. A court order requiring a
supplemental impact statement would allow the USDOT to further consider
FMP’s arguments against approval of the phased alternative. Accordingly, we
conclude that FMP’s NEPA claim is ripe and proceed to consider the merits of
that claim.
B. The NEPA Claim
We review de novo the district court’s decision regarding the alleged
NEPA violation. Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1114 (10th Cir. 2002).
FMP argues the final EIS is inadequate to explain the Agency’s rationale
for approving the phased alternative because it explicitly states that the phased
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alternative had been eliminated from consideration. FMP also argues the Agency
is required to issue a supplemental EIS considering the impact of its decision to
approve the phased option.
1. The Adequacy of the Final EIS
In reviewing the adequacy of an EIS, we examine whether the EIS’s “form,
content and preparation foster both informed decision-making and informed
public participation.” Colo. Envtl. Coalition v. Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162, 1172
(10th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted).
FMP claims that the final EIS issued by the Agency is inadequate because it
does not explain why the Agency ultimately chose to approve both the phased and
non-phased options. Doing so, FMP asserts, deprived the public of the
opportunity to comment on the proposal before the final decision was made. The
public, however, had a full and fair opportunity to comment on the phased
approach when that approach was considered in the draft supplemental EIS. The
final EIS makes clear that the public did submit extensive comments. As has
often been noted, NEPA does not guarantee a particular result. Stryker’s Bay
Neighborhood Council, Inc., v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1987). Thus, the
Agency was not required to select the preferred option indicated in the final EIS,
and it did not cut off the public’s right to comment by approving an option
previously rejected.
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Nonetheless, FMP is correct that NEPA requires the Agency to articulate “a
rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Baltimore Gas
& Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 105 (1983). In this
case, it is the ROD which provides that rational connection. The ROD states that
the phased option will be implemented if local support or financing for the non-
phased option is lacking. Thus, it is clear that the USDOT approved the phased
option because of concerns raised by local officials about the availability of
funding and support for the non-phased option. That reason provides a rational
explanation for the Agency’s decision to approve the phased option. While the
final EIS itself does not contain that rationale, we cannot conclude that it is
therefore inadequate. Forcing the Agency to continually re-draft the final EIS
simply to duplicate an explanation that is provided in the ROD “would render
agency decision-making intractable, always awaiting updated information . . . .”
Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989). The final EIS
explains the alternatives studied by the USDOT and addresses the environmental
impacts of the project at length. Because the ROD supplies a rational connection
between the facts and the Agency’s decision and because the various
environmental impact statements drafted by the Agency, including the final EIS,
indicate that the Agency took the required “hard look” at the environmental
impact of its decision, we conclude that the final EIS is adequate.
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2. Supplemental EIS
An agency is required to prepare a supplemental environmental impact
statement “if there are significant new circumstances or information relevant to
environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts.” Colo.
Envtl. Coalition, 185 F.3d at 1177 (quotation omitted). A supplement is only
required “if the new information is sufficient to show [the proposed action] will
affect the quality of the human environment in a significant manner or to a
significant extent not already considered.” Marsh, 490 U.S. at 374 (quotation
omitted). This court reviews the Agency’s decision regarding the need for a
supplemental EIS under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Colo. Envtl.
Coalition, 185 F.3d at 1178. 3
3
In Colorado Environmental Coalition v. Dombeck the United States Forest
Service was confronted with additional information concerning potential
environmental impacts of its decision. 185 F.3d 1162, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999). We
noted that in those circumstances an agency must provide an explanation as to
why the new information did not require further environmental analysis. Id. at
1177-78. In this case, the information which affected the USDOT decision does
not concern potential environmental impacts at all. Rather, the joint resolution
simply raises concerns about local funding and support for the non-phased project
design. It would make little sense to require an explanation of why the non-
environmental information received by the Agency did not require a new
environmental analysis. Thus, the Agency is not required to explain its decision
to forego a supplemental EIS in response to the joint resolution, but instead
should explain how the information altered its decision and why that alteration
does not require a supplemental EIS. As explained above, we find that the
information provided by the Agency in this case is sufficient.
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FMP argues that the joint resolution submitted by the local governments
and the Agency’s decision to select a previously rejected alternative necessarily
constitute a “substantial change[] in the proposed action that [is] relevant to
environmental concerns.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(i). Even assuming the
implementation of the phased project will have a significant environmental
impact, the failure to issue a supplemental EIS is not arbitrary or capricious
because the relevant environmental impacts have already been considered. As
stated in the ROD, the two options approved by the Agency had been fully
examined in the supplemental draft EIS and the final EIS. The draft supplemental
EIS considered the phased option in detail because at that stage the phased option
was the preferred option. The Agency has determined a supplemental EIS is not
required where the ROD selects an option not identified as the preferred option in
the final EIS, as long as the selected option was fully evaluated. 23 C.F.R. §§
771.130(a)(1),(b)(2); See Marsh, 490 U.S. at 374 (noting that a supplemental EIS
is only required where the impacts of new decision have not already been
considered). Given that the environmental impacts of the phased option have
already been fully considered, we conclude that the Agency’s failure to issue a
supplemental EIS in this case was not arbitrary or capricious.
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IV. Conclusion
For reasons stated above, we remand to the district court with instructions
to vacate that portion of its judgment pertaining to the § 4(f) claim, and affirm
the district court’s order regarding the NEPA claim.
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