United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 04-2020
RUSSELL J. HADFIELD,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
JOSEPH M. PALOMBO; KEVIN DALTON; GEORGE B. MADSEN, JR.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JOSEPH McDONOUGH, in his individual and official capacity
as Sheriff of Plymouth County; MATTHEW HANLEY, in his
individual and official capacity as Special Sheriff
of Plymouth County; CHARLES LINCOLN, in his individual
and official capacities; COLEMAN McDONOUGH, in his individual
and official capacities; JOHN P. REARDON, in his official
capacity as Commissioner of the County of Plymouth;
ROBERT J. STONE, in his official capacity as County Commissioner
of the County of Plymouth; PETER G. ASIAF, JR., in his official
capacity as Commissioner of the County of Plymouth;
JOHN F. McLELLAN, in his official capacity as the Treasurer
of the County of Plymouth,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. George A. O'Toole, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Circuit Judge,
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Howard, Circuit Judge.
Ross D. Ginsberg with whom Richard D. Vetstein and Gilman,
McLaughlin & Hanrahan, LLP were on brief for appellant.
Kevin F. Moloney with whom Roger T Manwaring, Barron &
Stadfeld, P.C., Thomas M. Hoopes and Kelly, Libby & Hoopes, P.C.
were on brief for appellee Joseph F. McDonough.
Kenneth H. Anderson with whom Thomas Drechsler and Finneran,
Byrne & Drechsler, L.L.P. were on brief for appellees Matthew
Hanley, Charles Lincoln and Coleman McDonough.
May 11, 2005
HOWARD, Circuit Judge. In November 2000, Joseph
McDonough defeated incumbent Charles Decas for the office of
Plymouth County Sheriff. Shortly after assuming office, McDonough
fired Russell J. Hadfield from his position as Assistant Deputy
Superintendent in Field Services for Training ("ADS for Training").
Hadfield brought this federal action claiming that the termination
violated his constitutional rights. He alleged that the Sheriff
and three of his associates, Coleman McDonough, Matthew Hanley, and
Charles Lincoln, unlawfully fired him on account of his support for
Decas in the 2000 election. He also alleged that the Sheriff and
the Plymouth County Commissioners illegally denied him a hearing
concerning his termination in violation of his due process rights.
The district court awarded all defendants summary judgment. We
affirm.
I.
We present the facts in the light most favorable to
Hadfield. See O'Neill v. Baker, 210 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 2000).
The Plymouth County Massachusetts Sheriff's Department has three
primary responsibilities. It operates the Plymouth County
Correctional Center, provides support to local police and fire
departments, and oversees the service of civil process and other
legal documents. The Department is headed by a popularly elected
Sheriff and employs over 500 people.
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Hadfield worked for the Department in various capacities
from 1983 until his termination. In May 2000, Hadfield was made
ADS for Training, a position in which he was supervised by the
Department's Director of Training. Among his duties, Hadfield
supervised instructors, developed resources, arranged classes,
researched curricula, and taught various courses.
In the period before the November 2000 election, Hadfield
worked for Decas' reelection. To help in the effort, Hadfield held
Decas signs at various rallies. On November 4, 2000, on his way to
a Decas rally, Hadfield passed a rally at which he noticed many
people holding signs supporting McDonough. Hadfield attended this
rally while holding a Decas sign. At the rally, Hadfield was
approached by two of McDonough's supporters, Charles Lincoln and
Coleman McDonough. After telling Hadfield that he should not be
attending the rally, Coleman McDonough told Hadfield, "Bad move,
Bubba, bad career move." In a similarly threatening vein, Lincoln
told Hadfield, "You weren't even on the list. Now you're at the
top of the list."
After McDonough took office in December 2000, he
initiated a Department reorganization. As part of this process, he
and his staff interviewed senior holdovers from the prior
administration, including the Assistant Deputy Superintendents.
Hadfield's interview took place in February 2001. Soon thereafter,
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Hadfield received a letter from McDonough informing him that he was
immediately discharged from his post as ADS for Training.
McDonough did not provide Hadfield with notice or a
hearing before taking this action. After receiving the termination
letter, Hadfield sent a written hearing request to the Plymouth
County Board of Commissioners, which serves as the county personnel
board. The Commissioners denied Hadfield's request. Hadfield did
not appeal this decision to the Massachusetts state courts.
Instead, in April 2001, Hadfield filed this 42 U.S.C. §
1983 action claiming political discrimination in violation of the
First Amendment and the denial of procedural due process in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. After a period for
discovery, all defendants moved for summary judgment.
The discrimination defendants argued that Hadfield
occupied a position for which political affiliation was a
requirement and that he therefore was not entitled to bring a claim
of unlawful political discrimination. See, e.g., Galloza v. Foy,
389 F.3d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 2004) (stating that the First Amendment
protection against politically motivated discharges does not extend
to positions for which political affiliation is an appropriate
requirement). The due process defendants argued that Hadfield was
not entitled to a hearing because he did not have a property
interest in continued employment under Massachusetts law, and that,
even if he did have a right to hearing, his due process claim is
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barred by the so-called Parratt-Hudson doctrine. See Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984)
(stating that a federal procedural due process claim may not be
based on the random and unauthorized conduct of government
officials so long as the state has provided an adequate
postdeprivation remedy).
In a brief order, the district court awarded summary
judgment for all defendants. The court agreed with the
discrimination defendants that political loyalty was a legitimate
job requirement for the position of ADS for Training. As to the
procedural due process claim, the court concluded that, even if
Hadfield was entitled to a hearing, his federal rights were not
violated because any deprivation of process to which Hadfield was
entitled resulted from random and unauthorized conduct and the
state provided adequate postdeprivation remedies. This appeal
followed.
II.
A. Standard of Review
We review the entry of summary judgment de novo, viewing
the record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing
summary judgment. See Padilla-García v. Guillermo Rodriguez, 212
F.3d 69, 73 (1st Cir. 2000). We do not credit "conclusory
allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation" in
this analysis. Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896
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F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990). Summary judgment is proper only if the
record, read favorably to the non-moving party, reflects no genuine
issues of material fact and the undisputed facts indicate that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c).
B. Political Discrimination
We begin by considering whether the discrimination
defendants met their summary judgment burden of demonstrating that
the ADS for Training was a position for which political affiliation
was an appropriate basis for dismissal.1 As mentioned above, we
perform this analysis by drawing all reasonable inferences in favor
of Hadfield. But the question of whether a position is subject to
political discharge is a legal question for the court, even if it
presents a close call. See Flynn v. City of Boston, 140 F.3d 42,
44 (1st Cir. 1998); McGurrin Ehrhard v. Connolly, 867 F.2d 92, 93
(1st Cir. 1989).
The First Amendment right to association includes a
qualified right to be free from discharge from public employment
merely because of political affiliation. See Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. 347, 359-60 (1976). But the right does not extend to all
public employees. See id. at 360. In Elrod, the Court recognized
that the wholesale protection of public employees could undermine
1
The defendants denied that, in fact, they dismissed Hadfield
because of his political views but assumed that this is a
trialworthy issue for purposes of their summary judgment argument.
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representative government by forcing those who win elective office
to employ individuals who disagree with the prevailing candidate's
(and presumably the electorate's) goals. See id. at 367; Flynn,
140 F.3d at 46. To permit the prevailing candidate sufficient
leeway to enact his or her programs, individuals in policymaking
and confidential positions were held to be excluded from the
prohibition against politically motivated discharges. See Elrod,
427 U.S. at 367 & 375.
Four years later, in Branti v. Finkle, 445 U.S. 507, 518
(1980), the Court reaffirmed the constitutional protection against
patronage dismissals but expanded upon the
"policymaker/confidential employee" test. The Court instructed
that a public employee is not protected from a politically
motivated discharge if "the hiring authority can demonstrate that
party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective
performance of the public office involved." Id.
After Branti, this court and others have engaged in the
process of developing a somewhat evolving standard for identifying
those positions that fit within the exception articulated by the
Supreme Court. See Flynn, 140 F.3d at 45 (describing the
"porridge" of general statements and tests that have been applied
in the wake of Branti). We have tended to ask (1) if the position
deals with issues over which there can be partisan differences and
(2) if the specific responsibilities of the position resemble those
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of a policymaker or other officeholder whose functions are such
that party affiliation is an appropriate criterion for holding the
post. See Galloza, 389 F.3d at 29. We have recognized, however,
that deciding whether a position is protected from political
discharge is not "a matter of inserting variables into a known
equation." Id. Rather, it requires a court to look closely at the
position to identify its inherent duties and then to make a
judgment about whether the position is one for which political
affiliation is an appropriate requirement. See Duriex-Gauthier v.
Lopez-Nieves, 274 F.3d 4, 10-11 (1st Cir. 2001).
With that said, our cases do yield some general
principles which help demarcate the line between protected and non-
protected positions. In Flynn, we surveyed our precedents to
conclude that "the cases have regularly upheld against First
Amendment challenge the dismissal on political grounds of mid- or
upper-level officials or employees who are significantly connected
to policymaking." 140 F.3d at 45. We explained that an employee
is not immune from termination merely because the employee "stands
apart from partisan politics," is not the ultimate decisionmaker in
the agency, or is guided in some responsibilities by technical or
professional standards. Id. at 46. "It is enough that the
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official [is] involved [in policy], if only as an adviser,
implementer or spokesperson." Id.2
Application of our cases convinces us that political
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the position of ADS
for Training. The Sheriff is involved in several areas which can
be affected by partisan divisions. The Sheriff runs a prison and
therefore must make numerous politically-influenced decisions about
prison operations and the treatment of inmates -- some or many of
which decisions could be the subject of partisan political
contention. These decisions are embodied in Department policies
and directives which are put into effect by Department employees
working directly within the prison. These employees, in turn,
learn about the new policies and directives primarily through
training. The Sheriff's efforts to implement his agenda could
therefore be frustrated by a training program which does not
accurately reflect his views.
The ADS for the Training is a high-ranking employee in
this politically important branch of the Department. According to
2
These principles have led to rulings dismissing political
discharge cases when brought by mid- to upper-level employees
including a regional director of an administrative agency, the
municipal secretary in a mayor's office, an officer in charge of
human resources, a director of public relations, a superintendent
of public works, and a director of a city's office of federal
programs. See Flynn, 140 F.3d at 45. They have also yielded
rulings permitting claims to proceed by lower-level employees
including a cleaning supervisor and a career administrative aide.
See id.
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the formal job description,3 the ADS for Training supervises and
directs the training program for Department personnel; develops
instructor resources; arranges for classes and seminars; researches
curricula, methods, policies, and procedures pertinent to training;
develops and administers evaluative testing; instructs certain
training courses; coordinates use of department training resources;
assures that instructors meet training certification requirements;
and develops the training schedule based on the availability of
personnel.
In our view, this job description demonstrates that the
ADS for Training is an "adviser, implementer, [and] spokesperson"
concerning Department policy. Flynn, 140 F.3d at 46. The
position's duties include researching methods, policies and
procedures related to training and developing instructor resources.
These duties illustrate that the ADS for Training works
independently to revise and improve the training program. Indeed,
Hadfield acknowledged that he advised the Director of Training (to
whom he reported) concerning proposed changes in training
operations. There is no dispute then that the ADS for Training
advises on training policy.
3
We have observed that the job description is the best, and
sometimes dispositive, source for identifying the functions of the
position. See Duriex-Gauthier, 274 F.3d at 8; Roldan-Plumey v.
Cerezo-Suarez, 115 F.3d 58, 64-65 (1st Cir. 1997).
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The ADS for Training is also a policy implementer.
Subject to only "general supervision," the ADS for Training
"supervises and directs the training program" for his or her
assigned program areas within the Department. Open-ended
responsibilities are a telltale sign that the position includes a
policy implementing function. See Galloza, 389 F.3d at 32; Duriex-
Gauthier, 274 F.3d at 10.
Finally, the ADS for Training acts as an internal
spokesperson for the Sheriff. The officeholder is responsible for
instructing certain courses and supervising the instructors. In
these roles, the ADS for Training acts as the Sheriff's
spokesperson by representing the Sheriff's views to the rank and
file and to his subordinate instructors. See Vazquez Rios v.
Hernandez Colon, 819 F.2d 319, 328 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating that a
job requiring an officeholder to act as spokesperson for political
official could not be done effectively except by one who shared the
[official's] political beliefs). Hadfield acknowledges that he
represented the views of the Sheriff as part of his duties.
The duties of the ADS for Training resemble other mid- to
upper-level positions for which we have held political affiliation
is an appropriate requirement. See supra n.2. For example, we
held that the head of the Personnel and General Services Office in
the Puerto Rico Office of the Ombudsman was a policymaking
position. See Duriex-Gauthier, 274 F.3d at 10. We relied on the
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position's open-ended responsibilities for "planning and
supervision of personnel activities" and the fact that the
officeholder reported to those in the upper echelons of the agency.
Id. Similarly, in Flynn, we held that the associate director for
field operations of the Boston Community Centers was not protected
from a political discharge. 140 F.3d at 45. The duties of that
position included overseeing several programs, acting as a liason
to other agencies, and maintaining agency compliance with legal
duties. See id.
Despite the policymaking or implementing duties inherent
in the ADS for Training position, Hadfield contends that, in fact,
he served in a primarily administrative role, and that the policy
aspects of the training program were handled by the Director of
Training. But the fact that Hadfield may not have been involved in
such activities in the prior administration is of little
significance. His job description could be read to encompass
participation in policymaking and political affairs, and the
Sheriff, in forming his new administration, could be frustrated by
an ADS for Training whose view varied from the Sheriff's. A new
administration should not be overly hamstrung in filling key
positions with loyal employees simply because of the way the prior
administration operated. See Galloza, 389 F.3d at 31 (stating that
"the goal of the [Branti] analysis is not to shackle a new
administration"). This is why the Branti analysis eschews reliance
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on "what functions a particular occupant of the position may in
fact carry out from time to time" in favor of focusing on "the
essential attributes of the position." Id. at 30.
Moreover, as we have already stated, an employee is not
protected merely because he is a "subordinate within [his] own
office[]." Flynn, 140 F.3d at 45 & 46. It is sufficient that an
officeholder is responsible for implementing policies that derive
from partisan decisions made by others.4 Id. at 46. "These major
responsibilities mean[] that political disagreements [between the
ADS for Training] and his politically appointed [superiors] could
lead to less effective implementation of political goals."5 Id. at
4
Of course an employee who merely implements policy is not
thereby converted into one for whom political affiliation is a
reasonable requirement.
5
Hadfield also argues that summary judgment should have been
denied because a Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision
holds that the position of classification and treatment director
within the Plymouth County Sheriff's Department was not a
policymaking position because the position retained civil service
protection under Massachusetts law. See Sheriff of Plymouth County
v. Plymouth County Personnel Bd., 802 N.E.2d 71, 76 (Mass. 2004).
Hadfield contends that because the "director" classification is
higher than his "assistant deputy sheriff" classification, his
position also cannot be deemed as policymaking. There are two
flaws in this argument. Neither the SJC decision nor Hadfield has
provided information concerning the duties which the classification
and treatment director performs. Without a description of the
position's duties, we cannot discern whether it involves the kind
of functions which we have concluded qualifies Hadfield's position
as one for which political affiliation is an appropriate
requirement. See Flynn, 140 F.3d at 44 (explaining that in the
Branti analysis "duties prevail over titles"). Moreover, the SJC's
analysis equated the definition of policymaking with the position's
civil service status under Massachusetts law. But the state law
classification of a position is not determinative in the Branti
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45.
In sum, the evidence demonstrates that the ADS for
Training is at or near the top of the Department's training
program. The officeholder has broad power to advise policymakers,
to implement policy, and to act as a spokesperson for the Sheriff
to rank and file personnel. Because the training program is
critical to the Sheriff's ability to implement his agenda, it is
reasonable for the Sheriff to fill this position with an individual
whom he believes is committed to his program. We therefore
conclude that political affiliation is an appropriate requirement
for the ADS for Training and that the district court correctly
granted the discrimination defendants summary judgment on
Hadfield's First Amendment claim.
C. Procedural Due Process
Hadfield alleges that the due process defendants violated
his right to procedural due process by denying him a hearing
concerning his termination. The due process defendants contend
that Hadfield was not entitled to a hearing because he did not have
a property interest in continued employment. They also argue that,
even if they were wrong in this respect, the Parratt-Hudson
doctrine bars Hadfield's claim.
Hadfield's claim depends on him having a property right
in continued employment. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
analysis. See, e.g., Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 246.
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576-78 (1972). If he did, he could not be discharged without due
process which, in the employment context, includes the right to a
predeprivation hearing. See Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532, 538-42 (1985). Whether Hadfield possessed a property
interest in his employment is a matter of Massachusetts law.
See id. at 538
The due process defendants argue that Hadfield did not
have a property interest in continued employment (and thus was not
entitled to a hearing) because his employment was governed by Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 126, § 8A. This statute provides that any deputy
superintendent appointed by the Sheriff for employment in the house
of corrections serves at the pleasure of the Sheriff and is exempt
from civil service protection. Hadfield counters that his
employment was governed by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 35, § 51 which
provides covered employees with civil service protection. Under
this statute, covered employees may not be terminated without
receiving notice and a hearing from the appointing authority. In
addition, they may appeal the appointing authority's decision to
the county personnel board and, if still dissatisfied, to the state
courts. As part of the appeal, an aggrieved employee may claim
that he was denied the requisite process, including the complete
denial of a hearing. See Puorro v. Commonwealth, 794 N.E.2d 624,
628 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (holding that deputy sheriff, who was
terminated without a hearing, could, as part of an appeal under
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Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 35, § 51, claim that he was denied a hearing
because he was misclassified as a non-covered employee). A
prevailing employee may obtain reinstatement and recover backpay.
Because we conclude that Hadfield's claim is barred by
the Parratt-Hudson doctrine, we do not decide Hadfield's proper
employment classification under Massachusetts law. We assume
arguendo that Hadfield possessed a property interest in continued
employment and the concomitant right to a hearing concerning his
termination.
We have summarized the Parratt-Hudson doctrine as
follows:
When a deprivation of a property
interest is occasioned by random and
unauthorized conduct by state
officials, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly emphasized that the due
process inquiry is limited to the
issue of the adequacy of the
postdeprivation remedies provided by
the state.
O'Neill v. Baker, 210 F.3d 41, 40 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Lowe v.
Scott, 959 F.2d 323, 340 (1st Cir. 1992) (alterations in O'Neill
omitted). Parratt-Hudson shields a public entity from a federal
due process claim where the denial of process was caused by the
random and unauthorized conduct of government officials and where
the state has provided adequate postdeprivation remedies to
correct the officials' random and unauthorized acts. See Mard v.
Town of Amherst, 350 F.3d 184, 193 (1st Cir. 2003); Brown v. Hot,
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Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 536-37 (1st Cir. 1995).
The doctrine thus permits "procedural claims to be resolved in
state forums where states . . . provide adequate remedies."
O'Neill, 210 F.3d at 50.
Our cases establish that a government official has
committed a random and unauthorized act when he or she misapplies
state law to deny an individual the process due under a correct
application of state law. See O'Neill, 210 F.3d at 50; Herwins v.
City of Revere, 163 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1998); Cronin v. Town of
Amesbury, 81 F.3d 257, 260 (1st Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Brown, 68
F.3d at 536-37; Lowe, 959 F.2d at 344. In other words, conduct is
"random and unauthorized" within the meaning of Parratt-Hudson
when the challenged state action is a flaw in the official's
conduct rather than a flaw in the state law itself.6 See Herwins,
168 F.3d at 19 (stating that, but for Parratt-Hudson, "federal
suits might be brought for countless local mistakes by officials
in administering the endless array of state laws and local
ordinances").
We have applied this doctrine in the public employment
context. In Cronin, we rejected an employee's procedural due
process claim because the claim was not directed at the
6
Hadfield cites to cases from other courts which have taken
a narrower view of "random and unauthorized conduct," see, e.g.,
Honey v. Distelrath, 195 F.3d 531, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1999), but
acknowledges that we have adopted a broader view described above.
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sufficiency of the statutorily provided pretermination procedures,
but rather at the conduct of the government officials charged with
implementing the procedures. 81 F.3d at 260 & n.2. Similarly, in
O'Neill, we rejected an employee's procedural due process claim
based on the failure of a state actor to provide an employee with
the statutorily required pretermination notice. 210 F.3d at 50.
We explained that "state law clearly provid[ed] for adequate
notice and there [was] no suggestion that either by formal or
informal means the state ha[d] authorized the giving of inadequate
notice to persons who may be terminated, or that this was any form
of regular practice." Id.; see also Learnard v. Inhabitants of
Town of Van Buren, 182 F. Supp. 2d 115, 1124-25 (D. Me. 2002)
(applying Paratt-Hudson and First Circuit precedent to reject an
employee's procedural due process claim based on the denial of a
hearing because state law provided that the employee had a
property interest in continued employment).
Here, Hadfield was denied a hearing because the due
process defendants erred (if they erred at all) by misapplying
Massachusetts civil service law. This determination was not
discretionary or governed by a formal or informal policy.7 Cf.
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 136-138 (1990) (holding that the
7
Whether an employee is entitled to a hearing under
Massachusetts law is a matter of statutory construction, not
administrative discretion. See Hogarth v. Sheriff of Suffolk
County, 564 N.E.2d 397, 398-99 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990).
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Parratt-Hudson doctrine does not apply where the denial of
predeprivation process resulted from the state-sanctioned
discretion of the official to decide what process is necessary);
O'Neill, 210 F.3d at 50 (stating that the doctrine may not apply
when unlawful conduct is in accord with informal policy). Rather,
if error, it was simply a missaprehension of state law. This is
the sort of random and unauthorized conduct to which Parratt-
Hudson applies. See Herwins, 163 F.3d at 19.
Having concluded that any deprivation of process was
caused by random and unauthorized conduct by the due process
defendants, we turn to whether Massachusetts law provided Hadfield
with an adequate postdeprivation remedy. We have previously
considered this issue under an almost identical Massachusetts
statute. See Cronin, 81 F.3d at 260. In Cronin, we found that a
Massachusetts civil service statute, which allowed a terminated
employee to appeal the termination decision to the civil service
commission and the state superior court (and, if successful, to
obtain reinstatement and backpay) provided a sufficient
postdeprivation remedy. See id. (discussing Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
31, § 44); see also Herwins, 163 F.3d at 19-20 (stating that
administrative and judicial review is the "conventional regime"
for remedying erroneous decisions by state officials and thus
constitutes adequate postdeprivation process).
The statute at issue in this case is materially
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indistinguishable, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 35, § 51, and therefore
provided Hadfield with an adequate postdeprivation remedy for
purposes of Parratt-Hudson. Hadfield chose not to pursue his
postdeprivation remedy in state court, but there is no dispute
that it was available to him. See Herwins, 163 F.3d at 19
(stating that it "makes no sense" to permit a plaintiff to pursue
a federal due process claim after ignoring the "state provided
procedural remedy"). Accordingly, the district court correctly
awarded the due process defendants summary judgment.
III.
For the reasons stated, the district court's judgment is
affirmed.
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Hadfield v. McDonough
Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Date filed: 2005-05-11
Citations: 407 F.3d 11
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