In Re: Sealed Case

                  United States Court of Appeals

               FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

       Argued January 22, 2001     Decided April 24, 2001 

                           No. 00-3057

                       In re:  Sealed Case

          Appeal from the United States District Court 
                  for the District of Columbia 
                        (No. 99cr00196-01)

     Gregory L. Poe, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued 
the cause for appellant.  With him on the briefs was A.J. 
Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

     Marc O. Litt, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for 
appellee.  With him on the brief were Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. 
Attorney, John R. Fisher, Roy W. McLeese, III, and Mary T. 
O'Connor, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

     Before:  Williams, Ginsburg and Sentelle, Circuit Judges.

     Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Williams.

     Williams, Circuit Judge:  Appellant pleaded guilty to one 
count of unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of 18 
U.S.C. s 922(g)(1) and one count of unlawful possession of 

cocaine in violation of 33 D.C. Code s 33-541.  The presen-
tence investigation report found that appellant had threat-
ened to shoot someone with the firearm, a separate felony 
that under s 2K2.1(b)(5) of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines calls for a 4-level enhancement of the sentence for 
gun possession.  Appellant objected, and the district court 
took evidence, including some hearsay testimony.  On finding 
by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant had indeed 
made such a threat, the district court applied the enhance-
ment and sentenced appellant accordingly.

     Appellant challenges the court's reliance on the hearsay.  
He also objects to the use of the preponderance standard, 
contending that the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), requires the 
government to prove the gun threat beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  (He makes no claim of entitlement to jury trial on the 
gun threat.)  Neither of appellant's claims prevails.  We 
address the Apprendi theory first.

                              * * *

     Apprendi had pleaded guilty to a gun possession charge 
carrying a sentence of 5-to-10 years.  At sentencing, the trial 
court found by a preponderance that he had committed the 
crime with a racially biased purpose, a finding that under 
New Jersey law allowed a 10-to-20 year sentence for the 
underlying crime.  The court imposed a 12-year sentence.  
In vacating the sentence, the Supreme Court held that any 
fact (other than a prior conviction) "that increases the penalty 
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must 
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt."  Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63 (emphasis added).

     In the present case, appellant's sentence, with the enhance-
ment, was 48 months, far less than the 10-year statutory 
maximum for the gun possession charge.  18 U.S.C. 
s 924(a)(2).  Thus appellant can win on his Apprendi claim 
only if Apprendi also applies to a Guidelines enhancement 
that results in a sentence within the statutory range.  Be-
cause appellant failed to raise this issue at sentencing, we 

review for plain error, United States v. Foster, 988 F.2d 206, 
209 (D.C. Cir. 1993);  in fact there is no error at all.

     Clearly Apprendi does not articulate a rule that takes the 
step proposed by appellant.  In addition, the Apprendi Court 
specifically distinguished, and found permissible, the practice 
of authorizing "judges to exercise discretion--taking into 
consideration various factors relating both to offense and 
offender--in imposing a judgment within the range pre-
scribed by statute."  120 S. Ct. at 2358 (citing Williams v. 
New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949)).  See also id. at 2366 n.21 
(stating that the Court took no position on the effect of the 
decision on the Guidelines, but quoting the observation in 
Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 515 (1998), that 
"petitioners' statutory and constitutional claims would make a 
difference if it were possible to argue, say, that the sentences 
imposed exceeded the maximum that the statutes permit.").  
The opinion stressed that the Court had "often noted" that 
judges had exercised this discretion "within statutory limits."  
Id. at 2358.  In fact, the Court recently approved enhance-
ments based on acquitted conduct when supported by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  See United States v. Watts, 
519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997).  Given this traditional latitude, and 
the Apprendi Court's explicit endorsement of the tradition, it 
is hard to see how the Court could have intended to mandate 
the heightened standard for application of the Guidelines' 
enhancement instructions when the resulting sentence re-
mains within the statutory maximum.  Reading the Apprendi 
rule to avoid such a result is consistent with the Court's 
statement that the case addressed a "narrow issue."  Appren-
di, 120 S. Ct. at 2354.

     Appellant seeks support in the fact that the Court has 
granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded ("GVR'd") a Guide-
lines case for further consideration in light of Apprendi.  See 
Clinton v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 296 (2000), remanding 
United States v. Reliford, 210 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 2000).  At 
best a GVR order could add little to appellant's case.  While 
it may indicate "a reasonable probability that the decision 
below rests upon a premise that the lower court would reject 
if given the opportunity for further consideration," Lawrence 

v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 167 (1996), it does "not amount to a 
final determination on the merits," Henry v. City of Rock 
Hill, 376 U.S. 776, 777 (1964).  But appellant's attempted 
inference is even weaker here.  The GVR'd case involved not 
only Guidelines enhancements but also the application of a 
statutory progression of minimum and maximum sentences 
under 21 U.S.C. s 841 (providing for increasing penalties for 
different quantities and types of drugs).  Facts that trigger 
the higher statutory maxima provided in s 841 are clearly 
subject to Apprendi, as we found in United States v. Fields, 
242 F.3d 393 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  The Solicitor General sup-
ported a grant of certiorari in Clinton only for the statutory 
penalty issues, but the Court issued the GVR order without 
making the distinction.  App. Br. at 22-23.  As weak as 
inferences from a GVR may be, an inference from the Court's 
failure to sever some issues from the remand is feebler yet.  
We give it no weight.

     The Apprendi dissenters, to be sure, attacked the line 
drawn by the majority as "meaningless formalism," 120 S. Ct. 
at 2388-90, and appellant argues in essence that their reading 
reveals that the logic of Apprendi will ultimately compel the 
Court to apply the case to Guidelines enhancements.  App. 
Br. at 21-22.  The Apprendi dissent suggested that the 
majority's stated rule would allow a legislature to set astro-
nomic statutory ceilings for crimes, and then direct the courts 
to make adjustments in accordance with facts determined 
solely by the judge.  120 S. Ct. at 2389.  But the majority 
responded that "structural democratic constraints exist to 
discourage legislatures from enacting penal statutes that 
expose every defendant ... to a maximum sentence exceed-
ing that which is, in the legislature's judgment, generally 
proportional to the crime."  Id. at 2363 n.16.  It is clearly not 
for us to disregard a conceptual line that the Court majority 
has not only stated but also stoutly defended against a 
dissenting challenge.

     We therefore join all of our sister circuits that have ad-
dressed the issue in declining to extend Apprendi beyond its 
stated coverage.  See United States v. Caba, 241 F.3d 98, 101 
(1st Cir. 2001);  United States v. Garcia, 240 F.3d 180, 184 (2d 

Cir. 2001);  United States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858, 862-63 
(3d Cir. 2000);  United States v. Kinter, 235 F.3d 192, 198-201 
(4th Cir. 2000);  United States v. Keith, 230 F.3d 784, 786-87 
(5th Cir. 2000);  United States v. Munoz, 233 F.3d 410, 413-14 
(6th Cir. 2000);  Hernandez v. United States, 226 F.3d 839, 
841 (7th Cir. 2000);  United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 
F.3d 926, 933-34 (8th Cir. 2000);  United States v. 
Hernandez-Guardado, 228 F.3d 1017, 1027 (9th Cir. 2000);  
United States v. Heckard, 238 F.3d 1222, 1235-36 (10th Cir. 
2001);  United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825, 829 (11th Cir. 
2000).

                              * * *

     The Sentencing Guidelines provide that a sentencing judge 
may use relevant information to resolve a dispute over a 
factor without regard to admissibility at trial, "provided that 
the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support 
its probable accuracy."  U.S.S.G. s 6A1.3 (2000).  The evi-
dence supporting the finding of a gun threat was clearly 
hearsay that would not have been admissible at trial.  Officer 
Spalding of the Metropolitan Police Department gave testi-
mony that included reports of statements made to him by the 
complainant and a friend of hers, and (double hearsay) state-
ments made by the complainant to another police officer 
(Sergeant White) and relayed to Spalding.  Appellant asserts 
that the crediting of hearsay testimony delivered by Officer 
Spalding violates both s 6A1.3 and appellant's due process 
rights under United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 
(1972), which holds that a sentence founded on "misinforma-
tion of constitutional magnitude" may not be sustained.  We 
have recently held that use of hearsay at sentencing does not 
per se violate a defendant's rights.  See United States v. 
Drew, 200 F.3d 871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  As we cannot 
imagine how hearsay with "sufficient indicia of reliability to 
support its probable accuracy" could violate Tucker's due 
process standard, our analyses of the due process and Guide-
lines arguments merge for the purposes of this appeal.

     Appellant argues that we should review the reliability 
determination de novo.  In support he cites Ornelas v. United 

States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996), prescribing such review for 
district court findings of reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause, and the plurality opinion in Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 
116, 136 (1999), requiring de novo review to resolve whether 
hearsay received in a criminal trial had the "particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness" that are required under the 
Confrontation Clause for hearsay not meeting any recognized 
exception, see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).  The 
government argues for an abuse of discretion standard, on 
the ground that the issue is basically an evidentiary ruling in 
a phase of the proceeding where the judge exercises broad 
discretion.  We need not decide this dispute, because even 
under de novo review we find that the hearsay testimony has 
sufficient indicia of reliability.

     Spalding testified that he responded to a radio run for a 
man with a gun at an apartment in Southeast Washington.  
Spalding went to the apartment and found appellant and his 
sister.  Appellant "appeared distraught."  Spalding asked if 
"there was a weapon in this apartment that needs to be 
removed," and appellant directed him to the back bedroom 
where another officer, White, found a 12-gauge shotgun.  See 
Transcript of Sentencing, May 9, 2000 ("Tr.") at 14-16.  After 
the gun was secured, Spalding interviewed those present in 
the apartment while White interviewed people on the street, 
including the complainant.  See id. at 16-17.  Spalding con-
ducted follow-up interviews with the complainant and, at her 
suggestion, a friend of hers who was also present during the 
incident but who was not interviewed at the time.  See id. at 
20.  The friend's story was consistent with the complainant's 
in all relevant respects.  At the sentencing hearing Spalding 
offered the statements made to him and to White.

     It appears agreed that appellant was acquainted with the 
complainant and that she took offense when he made a lewd 
comment about her from the apartment window as she passed 
by on the street.  It is further agreed that appellant went 
down to the front of the building to intercept her, and an 
argument ensued.  Here the agreement ends.  According to 
the complainant's version as reported by Spalding, she made 
some (possibly threatening) reference to her boyfriend, and 

appellant responded that "he would take care of her, or he 
would take care of them."  Id. at 18.  Appellant retreated 
into the building, while complainant remained at the locked 
front door to the building.  See id.  Appellant then returned 
carrying something in his right hand.  See id.  When com-
plainant recognized the item as a gun, she began to flee but 
then changed her mind.  See id. at 19.  As she returned 
toward the building, her friend stepped between her and the 
door.  See id. at 19-20.  Appellant reportedly told complain-
ant's friend "to move out of the way, because he did not want 
to shoot her."  Id. at 20, 21-22.  Complainant understood 
herself to be the intended target.  See id. at 20.

     To establish reliability the government notes that complain-
ant presented her version of the facts on the night of the 
incident, maintained it consistently in more than one later 
interview, and testified to it before the grand jury under oath.  
(The grand jury testimony was not admitted into evidence but 
government counsel proffered that she had read it and that it 
was consistent with the accounts by Spalding except as to the 
exact words of the appellant's threat.  Gov't Br. at 20-21 
n.15.)  See United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 910, 914-15 
(1st Cir. 1993) (crediting hearsay declarant who had previous-
ly presented story under oath and therefore subjected to 
perjury);  United States v. Corvin, 998 F.2d 1377, 1386 (7th 
Cir. 1993) (crediting hearsay based in part on fact that 
declarant gave statement to police at the scene "without 
opportunity for reflection" and maintained a consistent ver-
sion).

     Appellant tries to turn the complainant's self-consistency 
around, saying that she had an "obvious incentive to hold 
fast" once she had told her story.  See App. Br. at 25.  
Perhaps so, but self-consistency, in accounts given virtually in 
the heat of the event and later with a clear exposure to 
perjury, must still count as a plus.  Appellant further argues 
that complainant's self-corroboration is insufficient because 
her grand jury testimony differed from the earlier interviews.  
But all we know is that there was a minor difference in her 
report of the wording of the threat.  This alone is not enough 
to undermine credibility.  Finally, appellant notes that com-

plainant failed in the first instance to reveal a past sexual 
relationship between them that might have created bias.  But 
the testimony of co-conspirators and informers is often credit-
ed if other indicia of reliability are present, despite the fact 
that they may be perceived as interested parties.  See United 
States v. Golden, 17 F.3d 735, 736 (5th Cir. 1994) ("This court 
has previously concluded that information provided by an 
'interested adverse witness' was sufficiently reliable.");  Unit-
ed States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 403 (8th Cir. 1992) ("[A] co-
conspirator's prior inconsistent statement, brought out during 
his testimony at the sentencing hearing, was sufficiently 
reliable, when considered along with the other corroborating 
circumstances present.") (citing United States v. Sciarrino, 
884 F.2d 95, 97 (3rd Cir. 1989)).

     The government points to other indicia of reliability besides 
self-consistency.  First, appellant's own sister, testifying on 
his behalf, gave testimony consistent with the complainant's 
account at least up to the point of appellant's retreat into the 
building.  She also acknowledged, on listening to a tape of a 
911 call placed from the apartment, that appellant can be 
heard screaming, "[W]here is the gun?", that he was "pretty 
angry at this point," and that another woman at the scene 
was repeatedly yelling at appellant "to get into the house."  
Tr. at 75-78.  That appellant was actively in search of the 
gun during the confrontation supports the likelihood of his 
using it to make a threat, and the would-be pacifier's shouts 
suggest that she at least saw a risk of violence.  Finally, the 
account of complainant's friend matched hers in all serious 
respects.  Although there is no non-hearsay witness precisely 
confirming the threat, appellant has not pointed us to any 
case that would demand it.  And it would make little sense 
for this court to make such a demand, especially in the 
context of judicial sentencing, as then the hearsay would be 
largely unnecessary to the court's finding.

     Appellant takes several shots at the corroborating data, but 
most of his critiques show no more than that each item taken 
alone falls short of independently establishing the threats.  
Beyond that, he observes that the district court gave no 
weight to the claim by another sister of appellant, who was 

not present during the incident, that complainant had been 
drinking and smoking marijuana laced with PCP earlier in 
the day.  See id. at 53-54.  But the district court noted the 
testimony, expressed grave doubt as to its credibility, and 
said that even if true it was of little relevance, as there was no 
doubt of her ability to identify appellant correctly.  See id. at 
95-96.

     Appellant also argues that the district court erred in dis-
crediting the sister who was present.  The court observed 
that it "was perfectly clear that her desire to protect her 
brother outweighed her desire, if any, to tell the truth."  Id. 
at 95.  The decision to disbelieve this direct witness, though 
affecting the court's ultimate assessment of the hearsay, was 
a garden-variety credibility issue that we could reverse only 
for clear error.  We find none.  The sister's testimony was 
jumbled and inconsistent and included retractions.  Further, 
Spalding testified that neither sister had been forthcoming on 
the night of the incident and that both seemed committed to 
consulting with each other before talking with the police.  We 
therefore find that the hearsay has substantial indicia of 
reliability and that appellant has failed to undermine our 
confidence in this assessment.

     Finally, appellant claims for the first time on appeal that 
s 6A1.3(b) of the Guidelines and Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1) 
(which s 6A1.3(b) makes applicable to resolution of disputed 
sentencing factors) required specific written findings relating 
to the reliability and credibility of the hearsay declarants.  
But we have long and consistently held that one who fails to 
object to the absence of Rule 32(c)(1) findings waives his right 
to challenge an enhancement on these grounds and that we 
will uphold an enhancement supported by the record.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Sobin, 56 F.3d 1423, 1428 (D.C. Cir. 
1995).  In any event, because here we have reviewed the 
issue de novo, any error would appear harmless.

     The judgment of conviction and sentence are

                                                              Affirmed.