United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 05-1251
DANNY LOCKE,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
BRUCE W. CATTELL, WARDEN, NEW HAMPSHIRE STATE PRISON, and
KELLY A. AYOTTE, ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE,
Respondents, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Paul Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lipez, Circuit Judge,
Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Singal,* District Judge.
Christopher M. Johnson for appellant.
Kelly A. Ayotte, Attorney General, with whom N. William
Delker, Senior Assistant Attorney General was on brief for
appellees.
February 9, 2007
*
Of the District of Maine, sitting by designation.
SINGAL, District Judge. Danny Locke (“Locke”) was convicted
in New Hampshire Superior Court of conspiracy to commit robbery,
felony robbery, first degree assault and second degree murder
relating to the robbery and death of Roland Labranche. The
Supreme Court of New Hampshire upheld the convictions. State v.
Locke, 813 A.2d 1182, 1193 (N.H. 2002). Locke now appeals the
district court’s order denying his petition for writ of habeas
corpus. A certificate of appealability was granted solely on the
issue of whether Locke was in custody after he implicated himself
in the robbery. Because the state court decision that Locke was
not in custody at any point during the interview was not an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, we
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
We recount here only the relevant, undisputed facts related
to the interview of Locke.1 A statement of facts relating to the
robbery and murder of Roland Labranche can be found in State v.
Locke, 761 A.2d 376, 377-78 (N.H. 1999).
In the early morning hours of June 29, 1996, Roland
Labranche was robbed and beaten to death on Pierce Island in New
Hampshire. On July 2, 1996, Christopher Rockett (“Rockett”)
admitted his participation in the robbery and murder and
1
For a more detailed account of the interview see State v.
Locke, 813 A.2d 1182, 1186-89 (N.H. 2002).
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implicated Locke. Four police officers, dressed in plain
clothes, drove in two unmarked police cars to Locke’s residence,
in Concord, New Hampshire. After Detective Ronchi and Sergeant
Yeardi knocked on the door, Detective Ronchi identified himself
and told Locke that he was investigating an incident that had
occurred in Portsmouth. Locke agreed to accompany the officers
to the State Police Headquarters (“Headquarters”) after he
dressed.
Locke was transported to the Headquarters in an unmarked
police car, which he entered without assistance. Both at Locke’s
residence and en route to the Headquarters, Locke was told that
he was not in custody and was free to leave. Locke and the
officers arrived at the Headquarters shortly before 10:00 p.m.
Locke exited the car. Upon arrival, Detective Ronchi led Locke
past Rockett, who was standing outside the Headquarters with
another officer, to a third-floor interview room. Again, Locke
was told that he need not stay or speak with the police.
Initially, Locke denied being in Portsmouth on the night of
June 28, 1996. Detective Ronchi responded by informing Locke
that he did not believe Locke’s story and that he was
investigating a homicide. After consenting to a search of his
residence, Locke asked to change his statement. Locke stated
that he and Rockett had gone to Hampton Beach on the night of
June 28, but that Locke had fallen asleep in the back of the car
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on the way home. Locke further stated that when he awoke, a
third person was in the car. When Detective Ronchi asked whether
that person was Matthew Zola, Locke replied that “he [Locke]
didn’t want to be involved in this.” Detective Ronchi responded
by again informing Locke that he could leave and motioning toward
the door, but Locke stayed seated and did not request to leave.
Detective Ronchi reinitiated conversation and informed Locke
that Rockett had admitted being on Pierce Island on the night of
the robbery and murder. Locke again stated that his only memory
of that evening was leaving Hampton and falling asleep in the
car. In addition, Locke requested to speak with Rockett.
Detective Ronchi again stated that he did not believe Locke was
being truthful and told Locke that witnesses on Pierce Island
had seen two persons entering a car identified as the victim’s.
Locke then asked whether he had any rights. The detective stated
that Locke was not under arrest, not in custody and he was free
to leave at any time. Locke did not leave nor did he ask to
leave or be driven home.
Again, Detective Ronchi initiated questioning. During this
line of questioning, Locke admitted to being on Pierce Island on
the night of June 28 and participating in the robbery of Roland
Labranche with Rockett. Locke provided details of the robbery,
stating that he knelt down, held the victim’s head and told the
victim that “it would all be over in a minute.” Locke stated
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that Rockett had knocked the victim to the ground, but that Locke
had become afraid and ran away as Rockett was going through the
victim’s pockets. Locke stated that he had looked back to see
Rockett kicking the victim, and that he soon thereafter returned
to Concord without Rockett.
The detective again informed Locke that he did not believe
his story and that Rockett had provided a different version of
the events. Detective Ronchi then arranged a meeting between the
petitioner and Rockett. Rockett entered the interview room where
Locke, Detective Ronchi and Sergeant Yeardi were present and told
Locke: “Danny, go ahead and tell them. They know everything.
They knew everything before they got here.” Locke responded by
stating: “We had an agreement never to talk to anybody about
this.” Detective Ronchi then ended the meeting and removed
Rockett from the interview room.
After the initial encounter with Rockett, Locke stood and
walked into the hallway. Sergeant Yeardi “ran into” Locke in the
hallway and had a brief discussion with Locke, during which he
stated that someone would be with Locke in a few minutes.
Sergeant Yeardi neither blocked Locke’s path nor told him to go
back into the interview room.
Next, Detective Ronchi returned to the interview room and
again stated that he did not believe Locke was telling the whole
truth. Locke continued to maintain that his only involvement was
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in holding the victim’s head and telling him it would all be over
soon.
Detective Ronchi then initiated a second meeting between
Locke and Rockett. Rockett was brought into the interview room
by the police. Although no police officers were present in the
interview room, the police monitored the conversation through an
adjacent observation room and could observe both Locke and
Rockett. During this meeting, Locke was visibly upset. After
twenty minutes, the police ended the second meeting and Rockett
was escorted out of the interview room.
After this second meeting with Rockett, Detective Ronchi
asked Locke to accompany him into another interview room, and
stated that Locke did not have to go with him. Locke agreed to
accompany the detective into the second interview room. During
this meeting, Locke admitted to participating in both the robbery
and the murder. He stated: “Chris and I both were kicking the
man, and that I knelt down and put my hand over the man’s mouth
to prevent him from screaming.” After this statement, the
petitioner indicated that he did not want to talk anymore and the
interview was concluded. Locke was then arrested. At no point
prior to either admission was Locke advised of his Miranda
rights.
On February 14, 2001, a jury found Locke guilty of
conspiracy to commit robbery, felony robbery, first degree
assault and second degree murder. Locke’s statements implicating
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himself in the robbery and murder were admitted at trial. The
New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the convictions. Locke, 813
A.2d at 1193. In affirming that Locke was not in custody at any
point during the interview, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
stated: “The defendant was clearly not in custody at the
beginning of his questioning. . . . Nor was the defendant in
custody at any time during the course of the interview.” Id. at
1188-89. The New Hampshire Supreme Court emphasized that Locke
repeatedly was told that he was not in custody and that he was
free to leave. Id. at 1189.
On April 29, 2004, Locke filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in federal court. The district court entered its judgment
against Locke on January 14, 2005 and this timely appeal
followed. A certificate of appealability was granted solely on
the issue of whether Locke was in custody after he implicated
himself in the robbery.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the federal district court’s denial of Locke’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus de novo. Johnson v. Norton,
249 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that review of a federal
district court’s legal determinations is de novo). Our review,
however, like that of the district court, is ultimately governed
by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006).
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Under AEDPA, an application for writ of habeas corpus by a
person in state custody that was adjudicated on the merits will
not be granted unless the decision of the state court “resulted
in a decision that . . . involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States.”2 Id. § 2254(d)(1). Clearly
established federal law means “the holdings, as opposed to the
dicta, of [the Supreme Court’s] decisions as of the time of the
relevant state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 412 (2000).
In his petition, Locke asserts that the state court decision
was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal
law. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application” of
federal law when “the state court identifies the correct
governing legal principle from [Supreme Court] decisions but
unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the
prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. It is not sufficient for the
federal court to determine that the state court judgment was
incorrect or erroneous; rather, the application of the law must
be objectively unreasonable. See id. at 411; accord Castillo v.
Matesanz, 348 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2003).
2
Although there are additional grounds for relief under AEDPA,
Locke does not assert that the state court decision was “an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence”
nor does he argue that the decision was “contrary to . . . clearly
established Federal law.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
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Furthermore, in determining whether a state court decision
is an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal
law, the specificity of the legal rule must be considered.
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004). As the Supreme
Court indicated in Yarborough, where the legal test is specific,
the range of reasonable judgments is narrow. Id. Where,
however, the legal test is general, there is a broader range of
reasonable judgments. Id. “Applying a general standard to a
specific case can demand a substantial element of judgment. . . .
The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in
reaching outcomes in case by case determinations.” Id.
Therefore, where the legal rule is general and review of the
state court decision is under the deferential standard of §
2254(d)(1), state courts have substantial leeway in reaching a
reasonable decision. See id. at 665.
III. THE CUSTODY DETERMINATION
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court first recognized
that warnings alerting a person as to his constitutional rights
must be given prior to custodial interrogations. 384 U.S. 436,
458 (1966). A person must therefore be “in custody” before
Miranda warnings are due. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 102
(1995). The Court in Miranda noted that the term “custodial
interrogation” signified “questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
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way.” 384 U.S. at 444. In Thompson v. Keohane, the Supreme
Court explained the process courts must use to make the custody
determination:
Two discrete inquiries are essential to the [“in
custody”] determination: first, what were the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and
second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable
person have felt he or she was not at liberty to
terminate the interrogation and leave. Once the scene
is set and the players’ lines and actions are
reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test
to resolve “the ultimate inquiry”: “[was] there a
‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of
the degree associated with a formal arrest.”
516 U.S. at 112 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121,
1125 (1983) (per curiam)). The subjective views of the
interrogating officers or the person being interviewed have no
bearing on this inquiry. Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 663.
Turning to the present case, we must determine whether the
state court determination that Locke was not in custody was an
unreasonable application of this clearly established federal test
for custody determination. In Yarborough, the Supreme Court
indicated that the custody determination is a general test, where
substantial judgment is demanded in applying the law to the facts
of a given case. Id. at 665. State courts, therefore, are
provided with ample leeway in reaching a reasonable decision.
See id.
Locke concedes that he was not in custody at the beginning
of the interview. This is supported by the fact that Locke
agreed to accompany the plain clothed officers to the
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Headquarters and was told numerous times that he did not have to
speak with them. The central inquiry, then, is whether Locke was
in custody after admitting his participation in the robbery.
In this close case, certain facts weigh in favor of finding
that Locke was in custody during the latter portion of his
interview at the Headquarters. Locke repeatedly was confronted
with his co-defendant’s statements implicating him in the robbery
and murder, and he twice met with Rockett face-to-face while the
police monitored the conversation. See, e.g., Tankleff v.
Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 244 (2nd Cir. 1998) (finding a suspect
“certainly” in custody after the police confronted the suspect
with a statement by the victim implicating him in the crime).
But cf. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495-96 (1977) (holding
that a police officer’s false statement regarding incriminating
fingerprints at the scene of the crime did not transform the
interview into a custodial interrogation). Similarly, Detective
Ronchi continually stated that he did not believe Locke was
telling the truth. See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318,
324-25 (1994) (finding that an officer’s suspicions conveyed to a
suspect may bear upon the custody determination). But see
Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664 (considering the police officer’s
appeal to defendant’s interest in telling the truth when
evaluating factors that weighed against a finding that defendant
was in custody). In addition, by the time Locke made the
admission to participating in the robbery, it was late at night
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in a building generally closed to the public at that time of day.
See United States v. Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d 6, 13-14 (1st Cir.
2003) (stating that the early morning hour tended toward a
finding of custody). In the end, the interview lasted for more
than three hours. See Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 665 (contrasting
the thirty minute non-custodial interview in Oregon v. Mathiason,
429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977), with the two hour interview of
Alvarado, which pointed towards a custodial interrogation). But
see United States v. Pagan-Santini, 451 F.3d 258, 263 (1st Cir.
2006) (finding defendant not in custody where the interview
lasted nine hours and defendant rejected breaks or a deferral of
questioning to a second day). Finally, when Locke “ran into”
Sergeant Yeardi in the hallway outside the interview room, he was
told that someone would be with him in a few minutes.
Ultimately, Locke asserts that his admission that he was
involved in the robbery necessarily transformed the interview
into a custodial interrogation. Indeed, several state courts
have found custodial interrogations following an admission. See,
e.g., Jackson v. State, 528 S.E.2d 232, 235 (Ga. 2000) (“A
reasonable person in [defendant’s] position, having just
confessed to involvement in a crime in the presence of law
enforcement officers would, from that time forward, perceive
himself to be in custody . . . .”); Commonwealth v. Smith, 686
N.E.2d 983, 987 (Mass. 1997) (“[A]fter the defendant told the
police that he was there to confess to the murder of his girl
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friend, given the information the police already had received
about the murder, we conclude that if he had wanted to leave at
that point, he would not have been free to do so.”); People v.
Ripic, 587 N.Y.S.2d 776, 782 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (“[I]t is
utter sophistry to suggest that a person in defendant’s position,
having made such an incriminating statement to police officers
concerning the very homicide they were investigating, would feel
that she was not under arrest and was free to leave.”).
Nonetheless, no Supreme Court case supports Locke’s contention
that admission to a crime transforms an interview by the police
into a custodial interrogation. Therefore, there is no clearly
established federal law on which to base a finding of
unreasonableness. See, e.g., Carey v. Musladin, 127 S.Ct. 649,
654 (2006) (“Given the lack of holdings from [the Supreme Court]
regarding the potentially prejudicial effect of spectators’
courtroom conduct of the kind involved here, it cannot be said
that the state court ‘unreasonably applied clearly established
Federal law.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1))); Stansbury, 511
U.S. at 325 (“Even a clear statement from an officer that the
person under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in itself,
dispositive of the custody issue, for some suspects are free to
come and go until the police decide to make an arrest.”).
Because Yarborough was decided after the New Hampshire
Supreme Court decision, Locke, 813 A.2d at 1182, it is not
clearly established federal law for purposes of our review. See
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Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Nonetheless, the facts of Yarborough
are instructive. In Yarborough, during an interview with a Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s detective, the defendant, Michael
Alvarado, initially denied any involvement in a carjacking and
murder. 541 U.S. at 656. Unpersuaded by the denial, the
detective encouraged Alvarado to tell the truth. Id. at 656-57.
Alvarado first admitted his participation in the carjacking but
denied any knowledge of a gun or the murder. Id. at 657. After
the detective again appealed to Alvarado’s sense of honesty and
the need to bring the victim’s killer to justice, Alvarado
confessed to knowing that the other carjacker had a gun and to
helping hide the gun after the shooting. Id. at 657-58. The
Supreme Court upheld the state court’s determination that
Alvarado was not in custody. Id. at 665.
In the absence of clearly established federal law on this
issue, we cannot say that the state court was unreasonable in its
decision that Locke was not in custody. Weighing against the
already outlined factors suggesting a custodial interrogation are
facts tending to show that the tenor of the interview did not
change after the initial admission and that a reasonable person
in Locke’s position would continue to believe that he was free to
terminate the interview and leave. Most significantly, Locke was
told at least five times that he did not have to speak with the
police and that he was free to leave. See United States v.
Muegge, 225 F.3d 1267, 1271 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding a non-
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custodial interview primarily because the suspect was told
directly that he was free to leave); United States v. Lanni, 951
F.2d 440, 442-43 (1st Cir. 1991) (indicating that statements by
questioning officers that defendant was free to leave tend
against a finding of custody). Although after the initial
admission, Locke was not again explicitly told he was free to
leave, he was not prohibited from leaving or terminating the
interview. Further, when prior to the initial admission, Locke
twice expressed hesitation in speaking with the police, he was
told that he was free to terminate the interview and leave.
When Locke ran into Sergeant Yeardi in the hallway outside
the interview room, his path was not blocked nor was he told to
return to the interview room. See Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d at 14
(indicating that the lack of restraint on defendant’s movement
favored a finding that defendant was not in custody); United
States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1349, 1350-51 (8th Cir. 1990)
(providing that a suspect’s unrestrained freedom of movement
“would tend to mitigate the existence of custody at the time of
questioning”). Further, Locke elected to accompany an officer
into a second interview room after being given the choice. See
id.
If this case were before us on de novo review, we might well
reach a different result. We believe it likely that a reasonable
person would not have felt that he was at liberty to terminate
the interrogation and leave after confessing to a violent crime
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and learning that a co-defendant has implicated him.
Reluctantly, however, we conclude that such a holding by the
state court is not an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law. Thus, we are constrained by the
deferential standard of review to affirm the state court’s
determination that Locke was not in custody. “Under § 2254(d)’s
‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may not
issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its
independent judgment that the state-court applied [the law]
incorrectly.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002)
(per curiam). In the absence of any case from the Supreme Court
supporting Locke’s contention that confession to a serious crime
transforms an interview by the police into a custodial
interrogation, we cannot say that the state court’s determination
was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal
law. See, e.g., Carey v. Musladin, 127 S.Ct. 649, 654 (2006).
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the decision of the district court is
affirmed.
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