United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 03-1084
CECILIO PEÑA-BORRERO; ORLANDO PEÑA-AYALA;
ASTRY PEÑA-AYALA,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
JUAN ESTREMEDA; HECTOR MILLAN SANTIAGO,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Mauricio Hernández-Arroyo for appellants.
Eduardo A. Vera-Ramírez with whom Eileen Landrón Guardiola and
Landrón & Vera, LLP were on brief for appellees.
April 9, 2004
COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge. On November 10, 2000, appellant
Cecilio Peña-Borrero was arrested by officers of the Puerto Rico
Police Department on a valid warrant. He was released the same day
after posting a $300 bond. Nearly six weeks later, on December 21,
he was awakened at his home in the middle of the night and arrested
again; the warrant carried by the officers was facially identical
to the earlier document but was no longer active because of its
prior execution. Despite his protests of a mistake, and his
display of documents showing the earlier arrest and release, the
officers took him into custody and transported him to police
headquarters. He was released later that morning. Appellant
subsequently filed this action, claiming civil rights violations
under federal and Commonwealth law. The district court concluded
that the complaint failed to state a viable claim for relief and
thus granted defendants' motion to dismiss. We now vacate the
dismissal and remand the case for further proceedings.
I. Background
We summarize the facts and allegations set forth in the
complaint. When police officers arrived at appellant's home at
approximately 3:30 a.m. on December 21, 2000, he and his two young
children, Orlando and Astry Peña-Ayala,1 were asleep. Appellant
heard a loud noise in the yard and looked out to see eight to ten
1
Although the children also are plaintiffs-appellants, for
simplicity, we refer only to Peña-Borrero as the appealing party.
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police officers gathered there. Informed that the officers had an
arrest warrant, appellant asked if it involved "the Sabana Grande
or Mayaguez case" and reported that the warrant already had been
executed. Two officers, one of whom was identified as Captain
Santiago, repeated the instruction for appellant to come outside.
As he opened the door to comply,2 officers entered the house,
pushed appellant's arms behind his back, and handcuffed him in
front of the two children. In the course of the arrest, he re-
injured his ribs and back, which previously had been injured in a
car accident.
Once outside, appellant told the officers that he had in the
trunk of his car a copy of the executed arrest warrant and a
receipt for the bond that he had posted to be released on bail.
Officers retrieved his car keys from inside the house, opened the
trunk, and found the copy of the executed warrant. It was
identical to the one possessed by defendants – showing its issuance
in Sabana Grande on October 19 – but bore a stamp showing that it
had been executed on November 10. The bond receipt also was dated
November 10.
Despite the obvious overlap, the officers persisted in taking
appellant to police headquarters. His children were taken away in
another vehicle. Appellant was placed in a cell with three other
2
Appellant stated that he immediately moved to exit the house
because the officers threatened to break down his door and gates
and used foul language.
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individuals. He met with his attorney at about 7 a.m. and was
taken to court at about 9 a.m., "chained together with other
arrestees." After some time, a judge reviewed the court papers,
ordered him released, and apologized for the mistake.
Appellant brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, and
various provisions of Commonwealth law, contending that the
officers,3 inter alia, violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to
due process and his Fourth Amendment right to be free from illegal
searches and seizures by subjecting him to false arrest, false
imprisonment, excessive force and an illegal search of his home.
He further asserted that the officers conspired to deprive him of
these rights. He claimed that the officers acted at least
recklessly by failing to check police records before executing a
two-month-old warrant and by ignoring the documentary evidence
showing that the warrant previously had been executed.
On defendants' motion to dismiss, the district court concluded
that, "[a]t best . . . plaintiff's allegations state negligence
claims, which, though actionable under Puerto Rico law, do not rise
to the level of reckless disregard or callous indifference required
for a constitutional claim." The court thus dismissed the federal
3
The complaint initially was brought against four named
officers and four additional unnamed officers, but appellant
dismissed the claims without prejudice against all but two
defendants: Héctor Millán-Santiago and Juan Estremeda.
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claims explicitly, implicitly dismissing as well the pendent
commonwealth claims.
On appeal, appellant contends that the district court
improperly applied a heightened pleading standard to assess his
claims and erred in finding his allegations inadequate to support
a constitutional violation.4
II. Discussion
We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss, keeping in
mind that a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim
"'only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set
of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.'"
Torres-Viera v. Laboy-Alvarado, 311 F.3d 105, 108 (lst Cir. 2002)
(quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002));
see also Judge v. City of Lowell, 160 F.3d 67, 72 (lst Cir. 1998).
At oral argument, appellants' counsel acknowledged that the
conspiracy claim was thinly developed, and we agree with the
district court that the allegations in the complaint directed to
conspiracy are wholly conclusory and inadequate, under any pleading
standard, to support relief. No more is necessary on that issue.
The remaining § 1983 claims "need only comply with the liberal
'notice pleading' standards of the Federal Rules." Wilson v. Town
of Mendon, 294 F.3d 1, 10 (lst Cir. 2002) (citing Leatherman v.
4
An additional argument that the court improperly allowed
defendants to file a sur-reply concerning their motions to dismiss
is without merit, and we do not address it.
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Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163, 168 (1993)); see also Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513 ("Rule
8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions,
with limited exceptions.").5 With respect to those claims, we
accept as true all well-pleaded facts and draw all reasonable
inferences in plaintiff's favor.
Following these precepts, we accept as true that appellant was
abruptly awakened in the middle of the night, forcefully arrested,
and incarcerated for some six hours, despite unequivocal
documentary evidence that the warrant justifying his arrest had
been rendered invalid by prior execution. Moreover, officers had
failed to check with the precinct in which the warrant originated
to verify that it remained active.6
Based on these facts, we understand appellant to allege
violations of the Fourth Amendment, applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, stemming from both the fact of
5
The parties argue at some length about whether a heightened
pleading standard, as discussed in Judge, governs this case.
Putting aside the conspiracy claim, the heightened review discussed
in Judge would be inapplicable here because the claims do not
require proof of wrongful motive. See Judge, 160 F.3d at 74
(quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597-98 (1998)).
6
Appellant did not specifically allege in his complaint that
police department procedures required defendants to check internal
records before making an arrest under a months-old warrant, but he
made that assertion in his opposition to defendants' motions to
dismiss and the district court presumed the obligation existed. In
their brief on appeal and at oral argument, defendants accepted the
district court's summary of the facts and assumed the existence of
such a requirement.
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his arrest and its forceful nature. See Albright v. Oliver, 510
U.S. 266, 274 (1994) (plurality opinion) ("deprivations of liberty
that go hand in hand with criminal prosecutions" are properly
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 395 (1989) (Fourth Amendment provides the guide for analyzing
claims that law enforcement officers used excessive force in the
course of an arrest or other seizure).
We begin our analysis with the claim of excessive force, which
is argued by appellant in highly abbreviated, conclusory form. His
complaint alleges that officers threatened to break down the door
and gates to gain entry to his home, used foul language, and
pushed both of [his] arms up behind his back up to almost
his neck, whereby plaintiff told them that they were
hurting him. Plaintiff was injured while being
handcuffed in front of his two children . . . .
Plaintiff reinjured his ribs near his chest which had
been fractured due to a prior car accident in 1997 and
his back was also injured where he has three (3)
herniated discs.
In essence, appellant asserts a constitutional violation based on
harsh language and handcuffing that was accomplished by pushing his
arms behind his back, causing injury exacerbated by prior non-
obvious injuries. Making only cursory reference to this claim in
his brief, he suggests that, since no force was necessary to
effectuate his arrest, any force was therefore unreasonable and
excessive. In our view, however, the allegations demonstrate no
more than the "degree of physical coercion," Graham, 490 U.S. at
396, typically attendant to an arrest. Given the unknown
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circumstances facing the officers as they entered appellant's home,
see id. ("a particular use of force must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with
the 20/20 vision of hindsight"), appellant's allegations of
forceful handcuffing are insufficient to state a constitutional
claim of excessive force. See id. ("'Not every push or shove, even
if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's
chambers,' Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d [1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)],
violates the Fourth Amendment."); cf. Alexis v. McDonald's
Restaurants of Mass., 67 F.3d 341, 352-53 (lst Cir. 1995) (finding
actionable excessive force claim where officers "suddenly and
violently grabbed and pulled" plaintiff from a restaurant booth and
across the table; handcuffed her hands tightly behind her back;
dragged her from the booth, bruising her legs; hoisted her by her
elbows and carried her to the police car, and then pushed her in).7
7
Although the complaint also refers to an illegal search,
neither the allegations contained therein nor the argument on
appeal are sufficiently developed to require our consideration.
-8-
The remaining claim, however, is not so easily dismissed.8
The Fourth Amendment guarantees individuals "the right 'to be
secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures'
of the person." Graham, 490 U.S. at 394. Despite facially
authentic documentary evidence that the warrant was no longer
effective, and with knowledge that they had failed to follow
precautionary procedures to assure its vitality, the officers
persisted with appellant's arrest and detention. If any doubts
remained after appellant displayed the stamped warrant, a quick
phone call to the precinct presumably would have resolved them.
While the officers arguably were simply negligent in failing to
check on the warrant before they acted on it, following through on
the arrest and detention once confronted with appellant's documents
reflected a much more deliberate disregard for whether the warrant
remained valid. We thus conclude that the complaint's allegations
would support a jury conclusion that defendants acted unreasonably
in arresting appellant and taking him into custody. See Graham,
490 U.S. at 397 ("[T]he reasonableness inquiry [in the Fourth
8
Appellant's complaint suggests that he is asserting
independent claims for "false arrest" and "false imprisonment." In
this context, we view the former as a subset of the latter and
believe it most appropriate to view the allegations as stating a
single claim for violation of appellant's Fourth Amendment right to
be free from an unreasonable seizure. Cf. Camilo-Robles v. Hoyos,
151 F.3d 1, 6 (lst Cir. 1998) ("The right to be free from
unreasonable seizure (and, by extension, unjustified arrest and
detention) is clearly established in the jurisprudence of the
Fourteenth Amendment (through which the Fourth Amendment constrains
state action).").
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Amendment context] . . . is an objective one: the question is
whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light
of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to
their underlying intent or motivation.").
The documentary evidence that appellant presented to the
officers distinguishes this case from the mistaken identity setting
of Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979), cited by the district
court. In Baker, the Supreme Court found no constitutional claim
was stated where the plaintiff was arrested on a valid warrant that
was issued in his name but intended for his brother. In the course
of its decision, the Court observed that "a sheriff executing an
arrest warrant is [not] required by the Constitution to investigate
independently every claim of innocence, whether the claim is based
on mistaken identity or a defense such as lack of requisite
intent." Id. at 145-46. In this case, however, appellant's claim
of improper arrest arguably required no independent investigation;
he did not simply assert a mistake, but also provided
substantiation.
Our decision in Torres Ramirez v. Bermudez Garcia, 898 F.2d
224, 227 (lst Cir. 1990), also supports appellant's right to pursue
his claim. In that case, the plaintiff similarly was arrested and
transported to court despite his protests that the underlying
matter had been resolved and the arrest warrant vacated. We
concluded that the general marshal of the court that issued the
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warrant could be found liable under § 1983 for recklessly
recirculating an old warrant without first checking the court's
records, which included a notation that the warrant had been
vacated. See id. at 227.9 In this case, where the officers had at
hand proof that the warrant was deficient, the decision to proceed
with appellant's arrest and incarceration appears even more
reckless than the general marshal's conduct in Torres Ramirez, and
more clearly unreasonable.
Defendants make two other attempts to dispose of the
complaint. First, they contend that the allegations fail to
attribute specific acts to either defendant. Reading the complaint
in the light most favorable to appellant, however, we have no
difficulty concluding that the Fourth Amendment claim remains
viable against Millán. He is identified as the supervisor of the
group of officers at the scene; as such, he presumably had the
authority to call off the arrest – or check with the issuing
precinct – when presented with the evidence casting doubt on the
warrant's continuing validity. We also conclude that it is
premature to dismiss the claim against defendant Estremeda.
Although he is mentioned by name only once – appellant allegedly
9
We note that neither the Supreme Court in Baker nor our
panel in Torres Ramirez analyzed the plaintiffs' cases under the
Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" standard and instead viewed the
plaintiffs' claims as alleging violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection against deprivations of liberty without due
process of law. See Baker, 443 U.S. at 142; Torres Ramirez, 898
F.2d at 226.
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saw Estremeda "abruptly wake up his sleeping children" – at this
stage of the case, appellant's allegation that "codefendants found
the court papers but ignored them completely" is properly
attributable to each of the officers on the scene. See Judge, 160
F.3d at 76 n.13 ("[G]eneral allegations of omissions by all of the
officer defendants as a group gave the defendants 'fair notice' .
. . of at least the general nature of [the plaintiff's] claims
against them.") (citation omitted).
The defendants' second point of attack is via the doctrine of
qualified immunity. "An officer is entitled to qualified immunity
when his conduct is objectively reasonable based on the information
available at the time and in light of clearly established law."
Torres Ramirez, 898 F.2d at 228; see also Kelley v. LaForce, 288
F.3d 1, 6-7 (lst Cir. 2002). We think it apparent that defendants
may not use this defense to extinguish appellant's case. Taken in
the light most favorable to appellant, the allegations show that
defendants pursued appellant's arrest and incarceration in the face
of unambiguous evidence that their warrant was unenforceable. In
our view, such a seizure could be objectively unreasonable and a
violation of appellant's clearly established Fourth Amendment
rights. If a jury so finds, defendants would not be protected by
qualified immunity, and dismissal on that basis is therefore
unavailable.
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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is vacated and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
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